The Fight Against Revisionism Amsterdam 1904
The Amsterdam Congress of 1904 marks the zenith of the development of the Second International. A decision had to be taken about the first great impe-rialist war to shake the capitalist world, the Russo-Japanese War which flared up in 1904, and about the great differences of principle with the revisionists which had reached a very intense pitch, not only because of the Millerand affair in France, but also because of the struggle in Germany concerning the evalua-tion of the great election victory of 1903. Towards both these questions the Congress adopted an unambiguous, proletarian, revolutionary attitude.
The German Party, the leading party in the Second International, which, as we have seen, by no means always stood on the left wing, appeared at the Amsterdam Congress as the guardian of the Marxist line in opposition to revi-sionism. The years 1903 and 1904, in fact, marked the highest point in the de-velopment of German Social Democracy and in the political life of August Bebel.
The Dresden German Party Congress of 1903 was profoundly influenced by the passionate and inflexible struggle which Bebel was conducting against revisionism. Never had Bebel expressed more clearly the revolutionary will of the class conscious worker, never had he been regarded with greater confi-dence by the German and international proletariat.
In 1903 the German Social Democratic Party entered the elections with a platform of struggle against protective tariffs, against militarism and against the personal regime of Wilhelm II. Compared with 1898 its votes had increased from 2.1 million to 3 million, its percentage of the total poll from 18.4 to 24 and the number of its seats from 32 to 55.
Friend and foe raised the question of what the result of this tremendous election victory would be. If the German Social Democrats held fast to the line of revolutionary class struggle, their growing power was bound to lead to a great intensification of class contradictions, to a great accentuation of the class struggle. That was the perspective envisaged by Bebel and by Kautsky, who was at that time still in the left wing.
Wholly different conclusions were drawn by the reformist adherents of democratic illusions.
They expected “development into socialism” to proceed at a much more rapid rate, they hoped that the “gradual acquisition of governmental power” would soon begin in Germany, as it had in France with the promotion of Mil-lerand into the cabinet. Bernstein, the enfant terrible of reformism, put the question in practical form. A vice president’s post in the Reichstag had to be filled, and a Social Democrat was entitled to that position, in accordance with the strength of that party. But parliamentary custom made it obligatory on the holder of that post to “go to court,” and to present himself most obediently to “His Majesty” Wilhelm II. Bernstein stated that this was an unimportant for-mality, but Bebel was voicing the opinion of the masses of the party member-ship when he declared that they would he bitterly opposed to a Social Democ-rat’s paying homage to the “representative of the ruling power” who, whenever occasion offered, indulged in wild attacks on the “enemy at home.”
Bernstein‘s attack, which was supported by Vollmar and a large section of the Reichstag fraction, as well as the dispute which had arisen in the bour-geois press concerning the question of co-operation with socialists, impelled Bebel to settle accounts with the revisionists.
The resolution moved, which contained a condemnation of Bernstein‘s proposal in the matter of the vice president and of revisionist aspirations in general, rejected the tactics of reconciliation with bourgeois society and re-peated in sharper form the resolution moved by Kautsky in 1900 against par-ticipation in the government; it was adopted by the overwhelming majority of 288 against 11, each delegate who voted giving his name. The ayes included such prominent leaders of revisionism as Auer, Heine, Kolb, Peus and Süde-kum. They explained this manoeuvre by saying that they knew nothing of “re-visionism” and consequently could not share in its aspirations, and that in any case they had no intention whatever of giving up those well-tried and trium-phant tactics based on the class struggle which were recognised in the resolu-tion.
This was of course a deliberate manoeuvre intended to facilitate the in-conspicuous and assiduous undermining of the principles of the party, by the method of paying formal allegiance to those principles. This lack of principle, or rather this denial of principle, is in general characteristic of opportunism. Op-portunism can only develop and gain influence in a proletarian party if it dis-guises its true nature. The German revisionists mastered this art of masquer-ade and secret undermining to a nicety. At this Congress Bebel spared neither words nor threats. He insisted that the party must determine the tactics of the Reichstag fraction and added, with direct reference to Wolfgang Heine:
“Who-ever does not obey, clears out!” At this Congress, at the height of his powers, he had no desire to conceal antagonisms or to endure patiently the popular tactics of unity at any price which was subsequently to lead the party into a morass.
‘‘Without unity in principles and convictions, without unity in objective, there can be no unity and no enthusiasm in the fight.”
Thus spoke Bebel at that time. But the tactics adopted by the revision-ists, of the formal maintenance of discipline, of obedience, of retreat, meant that the left wing, which was never so strong as at that Congress, where it was carried along by the consciousness of strength among the workers who had been heartened by the election victory, saw no opportunity of taking organisational measures against reformism. When the revisionists spread the rumour that there was a desire to draft the resolution in such a fashion that it would be unacceptable to representatives of the right wing, in order that they might be thrust out of the party, the author of the resolution denied the rumour as a malicious slander. In fact Rosa Luxemburg‘s suggestion, made after Bernstein‘s first appearance, to exclude from the party those who supported his stand-point, was not repeated by any one at the congress. The representatives of bourgeois ideas remained within the party, obtained most influential positions (so much so that Bebel complained that Vorwärts, under the management of Kurt Eisner, had not published his statements against the revisionists), and gradually gained control of the party machinery, particularly of the trade un-ions.
In the same year the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was held in London. Here, too, the fundamental struggle between the revolutionary wing under Lenin‘s leadership, and the supporters of com-promise under the leadership of Martov, flared up hotly.
The question discussed at this Congress was the attitude towards the liberals, from the standpoint, not of tactics during parliamentary elections, but of preparation for the approaching revolution against tsarism. The Congress accepted a party programme drawn up by Lenin and Plekhanov which, as against the Erfurt programme, recognised the dictatorship of the proletariat as an indispensable factor in the social revolution.
The problem was not whether socialists should write for bourgeois news-papers, but whether socialists who did not carry out their duty in the illegal or-ganisations in a regular and disciplined fashion should be considered members of the party. That was the famous question dealt with in section one of the statutes of organisation. Lenin explained his irreconcilability on this point on the ground that he saw in this clause the only guarantee of keeping the party clear of petty bourgeois elements, of making it possible to build a party which should be capable of fulfilling the grave tasks of organising the revolution. This Congress marked the formal organisational break between the majority under Lenin’s leadership — called Bolsheviks because they were in the majority — and the opportunist minority — Mensheviks — under Martov‘s leadership.
The consequences of the fight against reformism, the independent organ-isational constitution of the revolutionary wing of the party, which were not drawn in the German Party until 1914, occurred within the Russian Party in 1903, and that was the principal reason why, when the Revolution of 1905 came, the proletariat was able to take the leadership of the mass movement; in 1914, it maintained without vacillation the line of proletarian internationalism, and in 1917, it was able in the course of a few months to change the bourgeois democratic revolution into the victorious proletarian socialist revolution.
In 1904, at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Social Democrats were unanimously against the war. At the opening of the Congress Plekhanov, as leader of the Russian Party, and Sen Katayama, as leader of the Japanese Party, rose from their seats among the presidium and shook hands; it was a solemn vow of international proletarian solidarity which filled the socialist workers of all countries with pride and joy. The Congress broke into stormy applause, which lasted for many minutes. Ten years later Plekhanov had forgotten that solemn vow; in company with the Mensheviks he had fallen to the position of patriotic enthusiasm for the tsarist “fatherland.” while Sen Katayama kept the promise he had made to the international working class in 1904. The chief question at the Amsterdam Congress, however, was not inter-national policy, but the item on the agenda which read: “International Rules of Socialist Tactics.” By 27 votes against with 10 abstentions (!) the commission had adopted a motion drawn up by the Guesdists which contained the essen-tial part of the resolution of the Dresden Party Congress. This resolution ran:
“This Congress decisively condemns the revisionist efforts which would change the tactics employed up to the present, tactics crowned with success and based upon the class struggle, in such a way that the winning of political power by defeating our enemies is replaced by a policy of rapprochement with the existing order of things
“The result of such revisionist tactics would be that a party which is working towards the quickest possible transformation of existing bourgeois society into socialist society, that is, a party which is revolutionary in the best sense of the word, would become a party that is satisfied with reforming bourgeois society.
“Consequently this Congress, in opposition to these revision-ist tendencies, and convinced that class contradictions are not weakening but are continuously growing more acute, declares:
“That the Party rejects all responsibility for the political and economic conditions resulting from the capitalist system of produc-tion and that consequently it refuses to approve of any methods which are calculated to maintain the ruling class in government;
“That the Social Democracy, in accordance with Kautsky‘s resolution at the International Socialist Congress held at Paris in 1900, cannot strive to take part in governmental power within bourgeois society.
‘This Congress further condemns any effort to hide existing class contradictions designed to facilitate support of the bourgeois parties
“The Congress expects the Social Democratic fractions to utilise in the future as in the past the greater power which they have won by the increase in their numbers and by the tremendous growth in the support they have found among the working class electorate, in order to explain the object of Social Democracy and, in accordance with the principles of our programme, to protect the interests of the working class, to exert all their strength to extend and to ensure political liberty and equal rights, to carry on, with greater energy than was possible in the past, the fight against mili-tarism and colonial and imperialist policy, against injustice, oppression and exploitation in every form, and to work for social leg-islation and for the fulfilment of the political and cultural tasks of the working class.”
It will be seen that in spite of the reference to Kautsky‘s 1900 resolution, the question of participation in bourgeois governments is here formulated much more sharply and clearly. The fruits of ministerialism in France had made the left wing (Bebel, Plekhanov, Kautsky) favourable to such a sharper formulation. In a series of articles in the Neue Zeit, Kautsky himself had at-tacked Millerandism much more vigorously and thoroughly than he had done at the Paris Congress. In 1901 he wrote that Millerand‘s activity in the ministry had not only disorganised, but corrupted the party. At the Dresden Party Con-gress Kautsky declared that at Paris, in order to promote unity within the French Party, he had tried to find a formula which, while it was directed against Millerand in principle, characterised his attitude as a mistake rather than a crime. But his resolution was hostile to the revisionist conception that “political power could be won bit by bit without revolution.”1
1 Kautsky betrayed his uncertainty on this question by again speaking in the com-mission about an “emergency situation” in which a socialist might enter a bourgeois gov-ernment; as an example he gave the case of a socialist entering a government m order to organise national defence (!). Jaurès ridiculed this statement by asking whether ministeri-alism became a part of orthodox theory once it was amalgamated with nationalism; he had to admit that he was unable to grasp Kautsky’s nationalist ministerialism in all its purity.
In the commission Jaurès, with his unconditional defence of ministerial-ism, was more or less isolated, but he found support among a large section of the “marsh” who, under the leadership of Adler and Vandervelde, did every-thing in their power to weaken the resolution in order to make it acceptable to the revisionists. They put forward a number of “improvements” which recom-mended the omission of the word “revisionist” and the substitution of a warn-ing against the dangers and disadvantages of participation in bourgeois gov-ernments for the direct condemnation of such a policy. No less than sixteen-delegates voted for these proposals of reconciliation with reformism. In the commission the greater number of these “conciliators” refrained from voting on the majority resolution. It is true that the irreconcilability of the majority was not extended to organisational measures; that was shown in the unanimous acceptance of a resolution demanding that in any country only one socialist party was to exist, and making it the duty of all comrades and organisations to bring about unity of organisation based on the decisions of the International.
There was therefore no idea of excluding the Jaurèsists in France and the revisionists in Germany from the International; what was considered nec-essary was obedience to the decisions of the International within the frame-work of a united organisation. Vandervelde, who, as reporter for the commis-sion, repeated “objectively” the arguments for and against the Dresden resolu-tion, laid chief emphasis on this point of formal organisational unity. Jaurès made a passionate speech in defence of Millerandism, praising the successes of Millerand‘s governmental activity.
“We have saved the bourgeois republic, we have made a place for freedom of thought, we have defeated clericalism, we ad-vocate world peace, we have repulsed chauvinism, nationalism and caesarism.”
He justified the alliance with the bourgeois radical socialist party by the bold assertion that it was “not a proletarian party, nor was it a party of capital-ist exploitation.” He advocated participation in the government as the way to power which would have to be followed more frequently in all countries, the stronger the proletariat became. That was the position in Italy, Belgium and England. It was a fatal error on the part of the Germans that through their Dresden resolution they wanted to impose their tactics on all other countries.
And then from defence Jaurès proceeded to the counter-attack. It was not the daring attempts of the French socialists, but the political impotence of the German Social Democracy, which stood in the way of the progress of social-ism. The contradiction between apparent power and real power would become the greater, the stronger they grew at elections. The Germans did not under-stand how to make use of the power of three million votes, because they had carried out neither revolutionary nor parliamentary activities. Revolutionary tradition was lacking. The “Red Kingdom” of Saxony had allowed itself to be deprived of the franchise without putting up any resistance, the workers in the Krupp concern had sent a humble address of greeting to the Kaiser. The Ger-man Parliament had no influence on the executive power; even if the socialists got a majority, they would be unable to do anything.
“But you don’t yet know,” he called out to the representatives of the German Party, “which road you are going to take, the revolu-tionary or the parliamentary road. After that great victory we ex-pected an immediate slogan of struggle, a programme of action, definite tactics. You examined the facts, felt about, waited — but your mind was not made up. And so, behind the inflexibility of theoretical formulas which your excellent comrade Kautsky will supply you with in plenty to the end of his days, you concealed from your own proletariat, from the international proletariat, your incapacity to act.”
The greater democracy, the more freedom there was in a country, the more would the development of the proletariat be hindered by the German pro-posal.
Bebel replied with a thorough exposition of democracy, republicanism and government participation which still serves as the sharpest condemnation of the theory and practice of Social Democracy today.
He remarked that the objection raised to the Dresden resolution was that it was designed only for German conditions. It was true that Germany was not only a monarchy — it was made up of nearly two dozen monarchies. With the exception of Russia and Turkey, it had the most reactionary government in Europe. Nevertheless the resolution was applicable to other countries with bourgeois governments.
“We are of course republicans, socialist republicans, but we don’t rave about the bourgeois republic. However much we may envy you French your republic, and wish that we had one, we don’t intend to get our heads smashed in for its sake. Monarchy or bourgeois republic — both are class states, both are a form of state to maintain the class rule of the bourgeoisie, both are designed to protect the capitalist order of society.”
Bebel went on to explain his meaning with a few examples. Nowhere were workers on strike treated in a worse and more contemptible fashion than in the great republic across the ocean. Even in Switzerland the militia were called out against strikers, and there had never been any great strike in France without the military being used against the workers. Even under the Waldeck-Rousseau-Millerand ministry, 70 workers at the labour exchange in Paris had been wounded in a police attack, and when Vaillant, in the Chamber of Depu-ties, demanded the punishment of the guilty police authority, a section of the Jaurèsists voted against the proposal.
“If a workers’ representative in Germany dared to accept a parliamentary ruling which surrendered the most vital interests of the proletariat, he would be deprived of his mandate the following day, and could never again act as a workers’ representative.”
Bebel declared, quite correctly, that revolutionary tactics by no means excluded the struggle for reforms; on the contrary, it was precisely through its tactics of struggle that the party had been able to force concessions from the Bismarck government on the question of social policy.
But in all reforms and concessions, the profound gulf which separated the socialists from their enemies must never be forgotten. The English bour-geoisie always made premature concessions in order to keep back the develop-ment of a socialist movement in England. If the liberals were to win the next election, they might possibly take into the government John Burns, a socialist, not in order to get nearer to socialism, but in order to avoid it.1
1 This prophecy was fulfilled. John Burns, one time radical socialist and later op-portunist trade union leader, entered the Liberal Campbell-Bannerman-Asquith cabinet, and was soon finished as far as the working class movement was concerned. In the com-mission Bebel had declared: “It is therefore a great deception to see in the entry of one or more socialists into a government an approach to socialism; our enemies know quite well that the bourgeois classes do not become friends of the socialists, but that a part of the socialists do become friends of the bourgeois classes, and the socialist representatives are forced to take responsibility for all the acts of a bourgeois government.”
Bebel vigorously contested the assertion that by its policy Jaurès’ frac-tion had served the cause of peace; on the contrary, it had voted for the mili-tary state, for the colonial state, tor indirect taxation for secret funds. Millerand had not sent greetings to the International Socialist Congress of 1900, but to that bloodiest of despots, the Tsar. The consequences of opportunist policy could be seen in the fact that at every vote in the Chamber the Jaurès fraction was split into two or three groups. An end had to be made to this sorry specta-cle, so that French socialism could again take its place in the socialist move-ment.
After this brilliant speech, received with the most stormy applause, Vic-tor Adler came forward with a conciliatory dirge. He took his ground on the principles of the Dresden resolution, hut nobody must be condemned, wounded or damned. The teeth of the Dresden resolution had to be drawn, so that nobody might be hurt. He doubled whether this innovation of international reprimands would serve any useful purpose.
Ferri spoke for the majority of the Italian Party. The three years’ experi-ence of the Italian Party with revisionist practice had been a tragic one. The al-liance with the liberals had been followed by the bitterest suppression of the working class movement by the liberal government. Unity had to be achieved, but it must be socialist unity.
Anseele, who in 1900 had enthusiastically welcomed the “new tactics,” referred to the experiences of the Belgian strike for the franchise in 1902. In spite of the preponderance of opportunist influence in its leadership, the Bel-gian Party, in 1902, under the pressure of the militant masses, had decided on a general strike for universal suffrage. Although the masses entered the strug-gle with the greatest determination, the leaders only waited for a favourable moment to call off the fight and to come to an understanding with the bour-geois parties, and consequently the movement completely collapsed, and heavy losses resulted.
In reference to that struggle this open adherent of reformism said:
“And if one day a fraction of the bourgeoisie were to offer us to introduce universal suffrage, compulsory popular education and legislation for labour protection on condition that we were to take part responsibility for governmental power, then woe to him who refused and thrust the Belgian Party back into new hecatombs. Woe to the Belgian socialists who prefer bloody street battles to re-forms — even though those reforms bear the mark of government.”
And, anticipating an argument which has since been repeated in unend-ing variation by the coalition politicians of all countries, he declared that there was no means of getting entire governmental power immediately; if in the meantime a part of that power was refused, it meant leaving the enemy class with the monopoly of governmental power.
Nor was the famous argument of “responsibility” lacking from his speech. It was easy enough for the socialists of Russia, Bulgaria, Spain, Poland and Japan to deny responsibility for the actions of their governments.
“If I were a representative of one of those countries, I should hold back on this question, and hesitate to condemn socialist tac-tics which I would be too weak to translate into action in my own country.”
Thus spake this worthy internationalist. He understood the inflexibility of
a minority, but that minority was not to be allowed to thrust its inflexibility on to the parties which were not so diminutive as itself and for whom governmen-tal responsibility became a greater necessity from day to day. “In the face of re-sponsibility, inflexibility must yield.”
On behalf of the parties attacked by Anseele in his chauvinist speech, Rosa Luxemburg put forward the following statement:
“In the name of the Russian Social Democracy, the Polish Social Democracy, the Spanish Workers’ Party and the Social De-mocratic Party of Japan, we protest against this attempt to divide the members of the Congress into the active and passive and to form, so to speak, a European Concert of the great socialist powers which alone has the right to decide on the fundamental questions of international socialism.
“Signed: Plekhanov, Luxemburg, Iglesias, Katayama, Rakovsky.”
When the vote was taken the conciliatory proposal of Adler and Van-dervelde was rejected, votes for and against were equal.
The Dresden resolution was passed by 25 votes against 5, with 12 ab-stentions.
Of the debates in the tactics commission it is instructive to note the atti-tude adopted on the question of the necessity or possibility of laying down in-ternational tactical rules and on the question of unity in the party. Jaurès de-clared that it was impossible for the Congress to lay down rules which should be binding in all cases. Kautsky replied that the application of tactical princi-ples was constantly being changed, and therefore the principles themselves could still remain the same. Bebel pointed out that the resolution did nothing more than prescribe for tactics those boundaries which were determined by the class character of the state. “It is essential to have unity and determination among the Social Democrats in all countries, but that is only possible if, in ad-dition to upholding the same principles, we take up the same tactical stand-point in all questions of general policy.” MacDonald, as the unprincipled philis-tine which he already was, stated on behalf of the I. L. P. that the whole ques-tion was a matter of personal disputes, which were unimportant for an interna-tional congress. The acceptance of the Dresden resolution would lead to a split, and that would be a crime.
The veteran of the Spanish working class movement, Iglesias, pointed out that in other countries the anarchists would use the case of Millerand in order to discredit the socialists. It was therefore necessary to say:
“That man does not belong to us. II is said to be normal for a right and left wing to exist even in socialism, but we must take care lest one day that right wing stands right outside of the party.”
The Dutch reformist Troelstra spoke of the injustice which had been done to revisionism, since it was after all only a “literary tendency.” “Both ten-dencies belong to the party, and together form its being.”
Adler gave a more profound analysis: “There are two tendencies in every human being; there is as much revisionism in Bebel as there is in me.”
To the motion which called for unity among the different tendencies in a party, Rosa Luxemburg moved the amendment that unity could only be achieved on the basis of the class struggle. She reminded the delegates that Jaurès had repeatedly violated congress decisions.
“What else can we do but put forward regulations for tactics? If we omit to do that, what meaning will there be in our congresses, what will become of international solidarity? Jaurès sees nothing but words in the class struggle, in international solidarity. Renaudel is only a shield for Jaurès. If a socialist minister in a bourgeois government cannot act according to his principles, it is a matter of honour for him to resign; if a revolutionary in a moderate party has to deny his principles, his honour bids him leave. I don’t want Renaudel’s sort of unity.’’
Guesde declared that to renounce uniform international action in social-ism was to introduce nationalism into the International.
This discussion gave evidence of all the contradictions which necessarily led later on to the disintegration of the Second International. The narrow ma-jority against revisionism when the vote was taken showed that the revolution-ary wing was still preponderant, but it also showed how deeply the reformist poison had eaten into the ranks of the International.
This process was also to be seen in the treatment of the colonial ques-tion. In this case openly opportunist formulations found unanimous accep-tance. The English Fabians, those typical bourgeois socialists, moved a resolu-tion directed against the cruelty practiced in India by the British government; it called upon the workers of Great Britain to force their government to give up its wicked and disgraceful colonial system and to introduce self-government for the Indians under English supremacy, a matter which would present no great difficulty.
The theoretical basis for this renunciation of the right to complete self determination was given in the colonial resolution, which, it was true, con-firmed the resolution of 1900, but included the words:
“To demand for the natives that extent of freedom and Inde-pendence which is in accord with their level of development, bear-ing in mind that the complete emancipation of the colonies is the goal to be achieved.”
This was a recognition of the imperialist theory that the natives can only be educated up to independence by a period of capitalist serfdom.
The question of the general strike again aroused lively discussion; it had been brought from the realms of grey theory into those of actual practice by the Belgian mass strike.
The Dutch Marxist Roland-Holst moved a resolution which contained a warning against anarchist propaganda for the general strike, declared an “absolute general strike” to be impracticable, because it would make the existence of the proletariat itself impossible, and called upon the workers to strengthen their organisation, on which the success of the strike, once it was realised to be necessary and useful, would depend. In that resolution the political strike was described as the “most extreme method” to be used for “bringing about impor-tant social changes or for withstanding reactionary attacks upon the rights of the worker.” The Berlin delegate, Dr. Friedeberg, who was flirting with anar-chism, objected to the resolution on the ground that it deepened, instead of mitigated, the differences between the socialists and the anarchists. He was in favour of the general strike because parliamentarianism was showing itself more and more to be an obstacle in the way of the working class movement.
The outlook of the narrow-minded trade union bureaucrat was voiced by the representative of the German woodworkers’ union, Robert Schmidt. The question of the general strike could not even be discussed as far as the great German trade unions were concerned. The road of parliamentary struggle and trade union organisation was the correct road.
The Dutch reformist Vliegen followed the same line. The general strike was not a weapon. (Pfannkuch, German member of the presidium, interjected: “A knife without a blade.”)
Beer, secretary of the Vienna metal workers, demanded that the sharpest protest should be made against propaganda for the general strike and that its danger should be made clear.
Briand, for the Jaurèsists, spoke again in support of the general strike. The general strike was the last weapon of resistance against the political dis-franchisement of the working class. If the socialists were to decide against it, the anarchists would gain in influence. The fact that there were still higher forms of struggle than the general strike was mentioned by only one delegate, a Russian Socialist-Revolutionary, who recalled the saying of Marx that the weapon of criticism must not replace the criticism of weapons.
The French resolution was rejected by a large majority and the Dutch resolution accepted, against the votes of Switzerland and Japan, the French delegates and the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries abstaining.
The infection of a part of the socialists by chauvinism was shown m the discussion on the question of immigration and emigration. The Dutch, Ameri-cans and Australians moved a resolution against the immigration of workers from backward countries, such as the Chinese and Negroes.
The American social-chauvinist Hillquit, representative of the opportun-ist Socialist Party of America, defended the practice of the American trade un-ions in refusing membership to the Chinese and stated that it was to the vital interest of the American working class to reject Negroes and coolies.
A delegate of the Socialist Labour Party of America, which was led by Daniel de Leon, protested against this chauvinist conception. He pointed out, correctly, that it was in utter contradiction to the whole realm of socialist thought, and to the saying; “Proletarians of all countries, unite.”
Paeplow, of the Building Workers’ Union, only too well known to the German workers, objected to this use of the Marxist saying, but wished to dissociate himself from the American resolution. At last it was agreed to deal with this question at the following Congress.
OPPORTUNIST DEGENERATION
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