The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy - 2

Proletary, Nos. 14 and 15, March 4 and 25, 1907.

Lenin Collected Works, Volume 12, pages 208-218. 

II

Eight days have elapsed since our first article on this subject was published, and a number of important events in political life have confirmed the truth of what we then said, and have cast the glaring light of an “accomplished fact” (or one that is still being accomplished?) on the urgent questions dealt with.

The Cadet swing to the Right has already made itself felt in the Duma. The Rodichevs’ support of Stolypin in preaching moderation, caution, legality, tranquillity, and not arousing the people, and Stolypin’s support for Rodichev, his famous “all-round” support, are now fact.

This fact has fully borne out the correctness of our analysis of the present political situation, an analysis made in the draft resolutions compiled between February 15 and 18, before the opening of the Second Duma. We refused to accept the Central Committee’s proposal and to discuss “immediate political tasks”. We showed that such a proposal was absolutely groundless in a revolutionary epoch, and we substituted the question of the fundamentals of socialist policy in the bourgeois revolution for the question of a policy for the moment.

And a week of revolutionary development has followed the pattern we anticipated.

On the last occasion, we examined the preamble to our draft resolution. The central feature of that part of the draft was a statement to the effect that the weakened party of the “Centre”, that is, the bourgeois-liberal Constitutional-Democratic Party, was striving to halt the revolution by means of concessions acceptable to the Black-Hundred landowners and the autocracy.

It was only yesterday, as it were, that Plekhanov and his Right-wing following in the R.S.D.L.P. asserted that this Bolshevik idea, Which we persistently defended through out 1906 (and even earlier, ever since 1905, ever since the publication of the pamphlet Two Tactics), was a semi-fantastic surmise born of rebel views on the role of our bourgeoisie, or that it was to say the least an untimely warning, etc.

Today everyone can see that we were right. The “striving” of the Cadets is beginning to materialise, and even a newspaper like Tovarishch, which probably more than any other hates Bolshevism for its ruthless exposure of the Cadets, said, with reference to the rumours, refuted by Rech, of negotiations between the Cadets and the Black-Hundred government, that “there is no smoke without fire”.

We can only welcome this revival of “Bolshevik week” in Tovarishch. We can only mention that history has confirmed the correctness of all our warnings and slogans; history has exposed the thoughtlessness (thoughtlessness at best) of those “democrats”—and, unfortunately, of some Social-Democrats—who would not accept our criticism of the Cadets.

Who said, at the time of the First Duma, that the Cadets were bargaining with the government behind the backs of the people? The Bolsheviks did. And then it turned out that a personage like Trepov was in favour of a Cadet ministry.

Who conducted the most energetic campaign of all for the exposure of Milyukov’s visit to Stolypin on January 15 at the height of the election struggle (allegedly a struggle) of the party of so-called people’s freedom against the government? The Bolsheviks did.

Who, at the election meetings in St. Petersburg and during the first days of the Second Duma (see Novy Luch), recalled that in 1906 the loan of 2,000 million francs was actually a gift made to Dubasov & Co., with the indirect aid of the Constitutional-Democrats, who rejected Clemenceau’s formal proposal to come out openly, in the name of the party, against that loan? The Bolsheviks did.

Who, on the eve of the Second Duma, made the exposure of the “treacherous nature of Constitutional-Democratic policy” the corner-stone of their policy of consistent (i.e., proletarian) democracy? The Bolsheviks did.

All talk of supporting the demand for a Duma ministry or a responsible ministry, or the demand to subordinate executive to legislative power, etc., was blown away like down by the first breeze that blew. Plekhanov’s dream of making this slogan the signal for a decisive battle, or the means of educating the masses, proved to be the dream of a well-meaning philistine. Probably no one would now dare give such slogans serious support. Experience has shown— or, rather, is beginning to show—that the issue involved is by no means the “principle” of a fuller or more consistent implementation of “constitutional fundamentals”, but the fact of a deal made between the Cadets and the reactionaries. Experience has shown that those were right who behind the liberal exterior of an allegedly progressive general principle, recognised and demonstrated the narrow class interests of the frightened liberal who gave pleasant names to disgusting and filthy things.

The correctness of the conclusions of our first resolution has, therefore, been confirmed much sooner than we could have expected, and confirmed much more satisfactorily— by history and not by logic, by deeds and not by words, by the events of the revolution and not by the edicts of the Social-Democrats.

First conclusion: “the political crisis that is developing before our eyes is not a constitutional but a revolutionary crisis leading to a direct struggle of the proletarian and the peasant masses against the autocracy.”

Second conclusion, proceeding directly from the first: “the forthcoming Duma campaign must therefore be regarded merely as one of the episodes in the people’s revolutionary struggle for power, and must be utilised as such.”

What is the essential difference between a constitutional and a revolutionary crisis? The difference is that the former may be resolved on the basis of existing fundamental laws and institutions of the state, while the latter requires the smashing of those laws and feudal institutions. Until now, the idea expressed in our conclusions has been shared by all Russian Social-Democrats, irrespective of group.

It is only recently that there has been a growth of that tendency among the Mensheviks which inclines to the opposite view, to the view that all thought of a revolutionary struggle should be abandoned, that we should stop at the present “constitution”, and use it as ground to work on. Here are some noteworthy points from the draft resolution on the attitude to the State Duma compiled by “Comrades Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Negorev and others, with a group of practicians participating”; it was published in Russkaya Zhizn, No. 47 (and also as a separate leaflet):

“...(2) the task of the direct struggle for power that is becoming the central feature of the Russian revolution, is, under the existing alignment of social forces [?], reduced [?] mainly to the question [?] of the struggle for [?] popular representation;

“...(3) the elections to the Second Duma, by revealing a considerable number of consistent [?] supporters of the revolution, have shown that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for this [?] struggle for power....”

No matter how muddled and evasive the wording of these points may be, the trend is clearly visible—instead of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry for power, reduce the tasks of the workers’ party to that of the liberal struggle for the existing popular representation or on the basis of it. We must wait and see whether all Mensheviks, at the present moment or at the Fifth Congress, really accept this presentation of the question.

In any case, the rightward swing of the Cadets and Stolypin’s “all-round” approval of them will soon compel the Right wing in our Party to make an issue of the question: either continue the policy of support for the Cadets and thereby irrevocably enter on the path of opportunism, or discontinue all support of the Cadets and accept the policy of the socialist independence of the proletariat and of the struggle for the liberation of the democratic petty bourgeoisie from the influence and hegemony of the Cadets.

The third conclusion drawn by our resolution is that, “as the party of the advanced class, the Social-Democratic Party cannot under any circumstances at present support the Cadet policy in general or a Cadet ministry in particular. The Social-Democrats must bend every effort to expose the treacherous nature of this policy to the masses; they must explain to them the revolutionary tasks confronting them; they must show the masses that only when they attain a high level of political consciousness and are strongly organised can possible concessions by the autocracy be converted from an instrument of deception and corruption into an instrument for the further development of the revolution.”

We do not altogether deny the possibility of partial concessions, and do not say that we shall not take advantage of them. The text of the resolution does not leave any doubt on this score. It is also possible that a Cadet ministry will in some way or another come under the heading of “concessions by the autocracy”. But the party of the working class, while not rejecting this “payment on account” (Engels’s expression), must under no circumstances forget the other particularly important aspect of the matter, which is often lost sight of by the liberals and opportunists—the role of “concessions” as an instrument of deception and corruption.

If the Social-Democrat does not want to turn into a bourgeois reformist, he must never forget this aspect of the matter. The Mensheviks unpardonably forget it when, in the aforementioned resolution, they say “...Social-Democ racy will support all efforts of the Duma to subordinate executive power to itself...”. “Efforts of the Duma” means the efforts of the majority in the Duma. The Duma majority may, as experience has shown, be formed from Rights and Constitutional-Democrats against the Lefts. “The efforts” of such a majority could subordinate “executive power” to itself in such a way as to worsen the condition of the people, or deceive them outright.

Let us hope that the Mensheviks are merely over-enthusiastic in this respect: that they will not support all the efforts of the majority in the present Duma in this field. It is typical, of course, that prominent leaders of Menshevism could have accepted such a formulation.

The Cadets’ swing to the Right actually compels all Social-Democrats, irrespective of group allegiance, to adopt the policy of refusing to support the Cadets, to adopt the policy of exposing their treachery, the policy of an independent and consistent revolutionary party of the working class.