Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the state of defense of the USSR
Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162.D. 7.L. 101-112.
Appendix No. 1 - OP . to p. 23 ave. PB No. 89.
Top secret
Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the state of defense of the USSR
( Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 15, 29 ).
1... The Politburo states that the assessments of the state of the armed forces of the USSR and the development prospects given by the previous decree (May 1927) were completely correct, which found its expression in the continuous growth of the Red Army's combat capability over the past two years. The internal structure of the army has changed towards an increase in technical troops. In accordance with this, in the use of budget funds, expenditures on equipment grew due to a decrease in consumer spending. The combat training of troops made further strides in mastering modern combat methods. Terrorism, in spite of the aggravated class relations within the country, developed quite normally, once again proving the expediency of the ter-system as one of the organizational forms in the building of the Red Army. Strengthening the command and political cadres went along the line of increasing the workers and peasants, growth of the party stratum, improving the quality of political education and military qualifications. The material and living conditions of the Red Army were generally improving. The political and moral state, in spite of the increasingly complicated internal political situation, remained firm and quite stable.
The main result of the past five years (1924-1929) of the planned development of the armed forces is the creation of a strong, combat-ready army, politically quite reliable, technically standing at the level of development of the country's productive forces.
2 . In the field of preparing the country for defense, on the basis of previous decisions of the Politburo, the first real results were also achieved, mainly in the creation of mobilization bodies that ensure the normal conduct of measures in the state apparatus to prepare the country for defense in peacetime. On the basis of NKVM applications and firm norms, the size of the five-year plan for the development of the armed forces was determined and the needs of the front for the year of the war were established. A positive fact should be considered the introduction of certainty and planning in all work on preparing the country for defense.
3 . At the same time, the Politburo notes a number of major shortcomings both in the preparation of the Red Army and the entire national economy for defense:
a) the technical base of the armed forces is still very weak and far behind the technology of modern bourgeois armies;
b) the material support of the mobilized army according to the current mobilization plan is still far from satisfactory;
c) material reserves of defense (imported and domestic) are completely insufficient;
d) the preparation of the entire industry, including the military, to fulfill the requirements of the armed front is completely unsatisfactory. There are still no plans to mobilize industry to service the war. The partially existing time frames for the deployment of individual industries are extremely long and in no way meet the needs of the army. There is no plan for recruiting those. and the labor force of the mobilized industry. Within industry, there are still a number of sharp gaps between defense needs and production and technical capabilities. The available technical cadres of the entire industry, and especially the military, do not at all ensure the satisfaction of the needs of the Red Army in technology (design and implementation of new types of weapons).
* * *
The five-year plan for the development of the national economy provides favorable conditions for the elimination of these shortcomings, a significant qualitative and quantitative increase in defense capability, since the past five years has made it possible in the development of the armed forces to lay solid foundations for the organization of the army, insofar as a modern military-technical base for defense must be created in the second five years. Accordingly, the Politburo decides:
II. Armed Forces Building Challenges
4 . With regard to the organization of the army, it should be considered that the course towards a further increase in technical troops and a decrease in auxiliary and service units should be continued. It is necessary to achieve, the ratio between the branches of the modern armies, but leaving by the end of the five-year period from the number of 643,700 people. In particular, with regard to national formations, to remain at the level of their current strength, in every possible way increasing their combat quality.
To fully approve all measures of the RVS of the USSR directed over the past two years to a general improvement in the quality of combat training and, in particular, to a decisive increase in the tactical training of troops. The upbringing of broad combat initiative, courage in action, perseverance in achieving the set goals, and agile mobility in the troops should go primarily through the upbringing of strong-willed qualities in commanding personnel.
5 . To recognize that the material and everyday situation of the Red Army still continues to serve as a brake on the normal training and education of troops, and in some shortcomings (barracks location) has a most harmful effect on their political and moral state. Confirm the previous resolution of the Politburo on the need to completely eliminate within three years (by 1930-1931) the foundations of the material and everyday shortcomings of the Red Army. Over the next two years, pay special attention to barracks (for the troops) and apartment (for command personnel) construction.
6 . To recognize as correct and timely the wide dissemination of work to strengthen and improve the technical armament of the army. Special mention should be made of the introduction of a planning principle into this area, consisting in the development of a system of artillery weapons corresponding to the country's real economic capabilities and standing at the level of modern world military technology.
To state that the implementation of the plan, the technical rearmament of the army, meets enormous difficulties in the backwardness of our industrial base, as a result of which the Red Army lags far behind in artillery and tank armament, that the unacceptably slow implementation by the industry of prototypes of new weapons in fact leads to the disruption of the plan for the technical rearmament of the army, completely the unacceptably slow pace of the transition to mass production of the models adopted for service actually leads to delays for years in the introduction of new weapons into the army.
Offer:
a) the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR - to strengthen the current pace of work to improve the equipment of the Red Army; along with the modernization of existing weapons, to achieve within the next two years the receipt of prototypes, and then the introduction of them and the army, modern types of artillery, and primarily battalion guns, long-range guns, heavy-duty howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, various mortars, large-caliber machine guns , chemical means of struggle, all modern types of tanks, armored vehicles, etc., for which it is considered expedient to use all possible foreign technical experience and assistance, as well as the acquisition of the most needed prototypes;
b) through the Supreme Council of the National Economy (see the resolution of the Politburo on the military industry of 15.VII.29, pr. No. 89). Recognize it correct to involve the country's scientific research forces in work on military equipment. This attraction should be further developed, especially in the search for new technical means of struggle. RH STO especially consider the issue of providing these works with sufficient funds.
7 . One of the most important results of the past five years is the creation of the red air fleet. But at the same time it is necessary to note its significant backwardness in quality., which negatively affects its combat effectiveness. Particularly difficult is still the situation in the motor industry, which together with the unacceptably slow introduction of new types of motors and aircraft into serial production is the main obstacle to the progress of the air fleet. To consider that the most important task for the coming years in the construction of red aviation is the earliest possible bringing of its quality to the level of the advanced bourgeois countries. RZ STO to specifically consider the entire problem of aircraft construction, to carry out very specific measures, providing them with firm appropriations. Consider it expedient in this area to make massive use of foreign technical assistance by inviting eminent instructors and purchasing prototypes. At the same time, you should plant with all your might,
8 . Consider the development of a firm plan for the development of the armed forces for the next five years as a major achievement. Recognize the basic settings of the plan as correct:
in terms of numbers - not to be inferior to our probable enemies in the main theater of war;
in technique - to be stronger than the enemy in two or three decisive types of weapons, namely in the air fleet, artillery and tanks.
In accordance with the above provision, approve the following activities of the plan.
a) to determine the size of the mobilized army by the end of the five-year period at 3,000,000 people against the previously approved 2,600,000 people;
b) to bring by the end of the five-year period the number of the air fleet to 2,000 operating aircraft, against the existing 1.032; to create a reserve, which will enter service in the first period of the war, in 501 aircraft; increase the number of spare aircraft to 1,000;
c) to make a decisive strengthening of artillery means by a qualitative change towards an increase in howitzers and heavy artillery and by bringing the combat strength of artillery to the following quantities by the end of the five-year period:
according to the current mobplan | according to the mobplan of the spring of 1933 | |
| Light cannons | 4110 | 3759 |
| Light howitzers | 1397 | 2442 |
| Heavy guns | 509 | 798 |
| Heavy howitzers | 459 | 1191 |
| High power guns | 31 | 120 |
| Medium caliber guns | 528 | 1218 |
| Small caliber anti-aircraft guns | 0 | 712 |
| Small-caliber artillery battalion | 270 | 2682 |
And in total, have artillery in combat composition: in light, heavy and anti-aircraft (medium caliber) artillery - 9348 guns, in small-caliber artillery - 3394 guns;
d) to have 1,500 tanks in the peacetime army by the end of the five-year period; to create a reserve, which will enter service at the beginning of the war, in 1.5-2 thousand tanks; have a stock of 1.5-2 thousand tanks. In accordance with this, the industry is obliged to prepare to ensure the constant operation of the specified number of tanks during the war;
e) to strengthen the chemical means of struggle, taking into account the development of these means in the bourgeois armies, demanding from our chemical industry the deployment of various chemical industries in accordance with the full satisfaction of the needs of the army;
f) to accumulate mobilization reserves in amounts that fully ensure the deployment of the mobilized army on a reinforced technical base and the supply of the active army in the first period of the war;
g) in order to strengthen the technical means of the ground army, according to the five-year plan for the construction of the navy, to reduce appropriations from 284.500.000 rubles. up to 200,000,000 rubles;
h) in the plans for the motorization and mechanization of the army in peacetime and wartime, proceed from the need to have in the mobilized army by the end of the five-year period at least 150-160 thousand vehicles (in terms of 1½-torques) and the required number of tractors. In accordance with this, make accurate calculations for the reduction of horse personnel in artillery and transport.
In view of the fact that the listed measures in the five-year plan for the construction of the armed forces can be carried out only subject to sufficient annual allocations, it is proposed to the RZ STO to establish the final size of allocations to the military and military industry for 5 years and for years within the limits not lower than the allocations of the five-year plan of the State Planning Commission in its optimal version , and in case of emergency - in excess of these limits.
9 . At present, the Red Army has a reliable, politically stable, class-sustained command staff with good fighting qualities. This was the result of a thorough cleansing of the command personnel from alien, politically unstable and anti-Soviet elements, as well as due to hard work on class selection, education, retraining and raising its political level. However, in terms of quantity, the peacetime army command structure does not in any way provide the mobilized army, which poses the problem of retraining and improving the reserve command personnel for the RVSS.
Consider that as a result of the firm implementation of the principle of one-man command, there was a general strengthening of the Red Army units, strengthening of discipline in it, an increase in the responsibility of the command staff for the general condition of the units and an increase in its authority among the Red Army masses. RVSS to continue the course of further strengthening of one-man command, not allowing any hesitation in this respect.
To recognize the material and living conditions of the command personnel as insufficiently satisfactory and not corresponding to their workload. To propose in the five-year plan to ensure a gradual improvement in the material and living conditions of the command personnel.
10 . To state the unconditional political growth of the Red Army and the strengthening of its political and moral state, the indicators of which are: the qualitative and quantitative growth of the party and Komsomol organizations; the continuous growth of the political activity of the entire mass of servicemen, not only in the framework of general army issues, but also in the social and political life of the country. However, the difficulties accompanying socialist construction also cause a number of negative phenomena in the army: cases of kulak sentiments, anti-Semitism, distortions in disciplinary practice, the presence of some bureaucracy in the work of the military apparatus and command personnel, cases of domestic decay, "collective", etc.
The fight against these negative phenomena over the past period was hampered by the internal army grouping on the basis of the well-known “Belarusian-Tolmachev” sentiments, the main danger of which was that they split the command and political cadres and thereby threatened the combat capability of the Red Army.
To approve the measures carried out by the RVSS to eliminate these negative phenomena. In the future, carry out work, eliminating friction in the environment of command personnel and suppressing with tough measures any attempts to violate its unity and cohesion.
III. Tasks to prepare the country for defense
11 . Consider it necessary to further clarify the organizational system of moborgs, to achieve the necessary coordination in work between various departments, all-Union bodies and union republics, as well as between civil defense bodies and the military apparatus; no later than the spring of 1930, complete the development and put into effect all the most important legal provisions on defense work (provision on the mobilization of the national economy, etc.).
Confirming the previous decision on the personal responsibility for the mobilization of the heads of departments and people's commissariats, pay special attention to the careful selection of the mobilization personnel and their specialization.
In order to bring complete clarity to the national economic plans for the duration of the war, raise the question of the foundations of economic policy for wartime in the Politburo in the near future.
12 . To regard the situation with the material reserves of defense as completely unsatisfactory. To instruct RZ STO in the coming years to bring the availability of material reserves in full compliance with the needs of defense, and in particular:
a) in 1929/30, create two-month food supplies for the Red Army for the mobilization period and for the first period of the war;
b) to form fuel reserves and carryover stocks of agricultural raw materials, ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the most important sectors of the national economy during the mobilization period and in the first period after it;
c) in the import plans for the coming years, provide for the import of import reserves in amounts that fully ensure the work of the industry in fulfilling the government-approved mobilization request, as well as the work of transport in wartime;
d) develop a plan for providing the most important economic and political centers at the expense of the state grain fund being created;
e) categorically prohibit the spending of defense mob funds for peaceful purposes, as well as temporary borrowing from them.
13 . In view of the enormous and decisive importance of industry in meeting the needs of war, the question of its mobility plays an exceptional role in the defense of the country. Considering the situation in this area very difficult, suggest:
a) VSNKh submit by September 1 the current mobilization plan with the timing of the deployment of military production, with the number and points of delivery of finished products. When drawing up the next mobilization plan, proceed from the most rational distribution of mobilization tasks between industrial enterprises from the point of view of taking into account the military-economic significance of individual regions, the connection of civilian factories with the military (deployment), the maximum approximation to raw material bases, full provision of labor, elimination of unnecessary rail transport and strict specialization of factories for the production of critical elements of weapons;
b) The Supreme Council of the National Economy, within three months, to develop the issue of cooperation and assimilation of military production in the civilian industry, providing for the necessary measures when approving the industrial financial plan for 1929/30;
c) immediately carry out the most energetic and tough measures to reduce as much as possible the timing of the mobilization deployment of the entire industry and precisely establish not only the timing of the release of individual elements of weapons, but, mainly, the timing of receiving a single shot and complex items;
d) oblige the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the NKTrud by October 1, 1929 to submit a plan for providing mobilized factories, enterprises and state farms with labor and technical personnel, taking into account the necessary saturation of the mobilized army with a proletarian stratum of at least 7%;
e) starting from 1929/30, to conduct periodic checks of the mobilization readiness of enterprises in the form of experimental and verification mobilizations of industrial enterprises, for which the RZ STO shall consider and approve the corresponding plan.
14 . With regard to transport, propose to precisely carry out the special works scheduled for the years. By the spring of 1930, to bring the irreducible fuel reserves to 100% of the required standards. In the coming years, special attention should be paid to further increasing the capacity of railways in the western border zone.
Attaching great importance to trackless roads, especially in connection with the automobile construction and motorization of the army, and noting the difficult situation in this area, instruct the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the governments of the Union republics (especially the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR) to raise the problem of trackless roads in its entirety and take organizational and economic measures, guaranteeing the ordering of this most important part of the national economy, with the wide involvement of the population in this matter.
15 . Attaching particular great importance to the issues of surrogacy during the war and at the present time, in connection with food and commodity difficulties, instruct the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the near future to set specific tasks for all sectors of the national economy and ensure the resolution of this issue both in scientific and organizational terms ...
16 . To draw the attention of all Council of People's Commissars of the Union republics to the need for full coverage of defense planning issues in their work. Propose to take real measures to drastically improve the economic and cultural situation in the border areas.
17 . Approving the government's measures to ensure the interests of defense in the five-year plan for the development of the national economy. The Politburo proposes to accelerate the pace of construction in the sectors of defense importance in the first 3 years of the five-year plan in order to quickly eliminate bottlenecks and imbalances, and especially, to strengthen its own production of non-ferrous metals, chemistry and mechanical engineering.
This decree was reproduced in 3 copies. and is sent:
RVS USSR - Comrade Voroshilov,
RZ STO - t. Rudzutaku
and the secret department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
Due to its special secrecy, it should be stored as a cipher .
I. Stalin
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