Stalin, Soviets and Israeli Question - then and now.

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INTRODUCTION

Any historical event should be evaluated in relation to and based on the comparison of conditions of THEN and NOW with the interests of class struggle and lining of forces THEN and NOW in mind.

It is well known practice of anti-communists and their left-disguised "umbrella" ideological groups - 1001 variations of Trotskyites - who never misses any opportunity to attack Stalin and Soviets. Recent events in Palestine gave them another opportunity to do so and in some "Muslim" countries, they echoed and reinforced the claims of religious reactionaries and fascists that “it is all Stalin’s and Soviets fault who supported the formation of İsraeli state”.

Gross disregard to the ideological and historical facts on the question conceals the fundamental fact that the “question of Palestine” was not an internal Soviet question where Stalin and the Party could have played the determining role. It was a question that so many nations were involved, some in order to gain their independence, others as a stooge to the imperialist, and the imperialists (British and French) who wanted to maintain their domination of these carved and colonized region, and in the case of US, to exert their influence at this oil rich region.

One cannot make an objective analysis through equation of a country`s, or a person`s qualitative stand, the character of now and based on that makes determination about the qualitative stand, character of then. With the mechanical logic of equating two different conditions, situation, character, Marxist Leninists who support the bourgeois revolutionaries against the feudalista, anti-colonial struggles, anti-imperialist wars etc., should condemn any given support THEN, based on the fact that most of them have become "bourgeois dictatorships" or even fascist states NOW. Marxist Leninists are perfectly aware of the fact that any anti-colonial struggle or anti-imperialist wars led by the bourgeoisie will eventually transform into being the staunch enemy of labouring masses. However, this fact does not change the attitude of Marxist Leninists toward the cause of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist wars and towards the "right of self-determination."

On the question of Palestine, it was no different in principle as stated;

“Our position on the Palestinian issue is determined by our foreign policy, one of the most important principles of which is the right of nations to self‐determination.”

One has to study the conditions of then, inter and intra relations among the nations involved, and the stands, aims of each nation involved. For this purpose, we should rely on the historical documents, facts not on fabrications, lies, gossips and cheap propaganda dished out by anti-communists of every shade. 

What was Palestine then? A British colony? Who was fighting against the British Imperialism? Who was in alliance with the British, French imperialists?  Where did each nation stand on the question of self-determination and fight against the imperialism at that given time? These questions should be answered in order to make an objective analysis of Soviets' attitude on the question.

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Background summary

In search of help and assistance, the leaders of the Jewish community of Palestine,  in the critically difficult period of the war for independence from British, turned to the Soviet Union. It was both diplomatic and military-political support of Soviet during the period of World War II, and the post-war diplomatic battles at the UN over the future of Palestine had a decisive impact on the course of events. 

The position of the leadership of the USSR and its policy towards the Jewish community of Palestine became especially noticeable when the Nazis came to power in Germany.  Soviet Union chose not to aggravate relations with its  ally because of Palestine during the struggle against Hitler, although even then he closely followed the development of events in the Middle East, as evidenced by the memorandum of the USSR Ambassador to Egypt, and later the head of the Middle East department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, A. Shchiborin:

“The Zionist organizations in Palestine are now in every way seeking to establish contact with our missions in the Middle East, hoping to enlist the support of the USSR in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine ... it is not beneficial for us now to make any promises of support for the Jews, which would be perceived by the British as a step against them ” (Soviet-Israeli relations, 1941-1953. Collection of documents ,Volume 1, p. 75.)

However, already at the end of World War II, when the defeat of Nazi Germany became obvious, the USSR began to revise its policy in the Middle East in general and in relation to Palestine in particular. At the Moscow conference, held on October 9, 1944, Soviet representatives, in conversations with British and American diplomats, for the first time raised the question of Palestine.

V. Molotov's proposal  to E. Eden, was that the British troops were completely withdrawn from Egypt and Palestine, and in return the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Northern Iran. However, E. Eden and the American Ambassador to Moscow, W. Harriman, rejected this proposal. The United Kingdom and the United States created a joint commission charged with the task of working out proposals and recommendations for the governments of both countries regarding the future of Palestine. The report of the Anglo-American Commission was published on April 30, 1946, it recommended that Britain retain a mandate that could later be transferred to the United Nations. The Soviets criticized the conclusions of the commission, but has not yet defined its clear position on the Palestinian problem. As the head of the Arab department of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency E. Sasson noted in his letter dated June 28, 1946 stated:

“they [the leaders of the USSR] do not want to determine their place in the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine,” however, “they want to be an influential factor in The Arab East, to intervene in the problems of the region and participate in decision-making ... " ( Soviet-Israeli relations, 1941-1953. Collection of documents Volume 1, p. 154.)

Immediately after the end of the Moscow conference, Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) to develop proposals on a possible policy of the USSR in the Middle East. For a detailed study of the issue, three commissions were formed, headed by I. Maisky, M. Litvinov and S. Lozovsky. None of the conclusions of the commissions was approved by the NKID, so at this stage the position of the Soviet Union was reduced to two fundamentally important points: 1) the earliest possible withdrawal of the British mandate and 2) the establishment of the UN mandate.

In January 1947, Great Britain made a last attempt to independently resolve the question of Palestine and convened a conference in London (London Conference), in which all interested parties participated. Foreign Minister E. Bevin proposed a fundamentally new plan for resolving the situation in Palestine, based not on the principle of dividing the country, but on the principle of cantonization - the creation of Jewish and Arab administrative units and a triple Jewish-Arab-British government in Jerusalem. The proposals were rejected by both Jews and Arabs. As a result of the failure of the negotiations, on February 14, 1947, E. Bevin announced the transfer of the question of the future of Palestine to the UN. On April 28, 1947, a special session of the UN General Assembly began to work  on the agenda of which was the question of the future of Palestine. Considering the post-war balance of power in the world, reflected in the structure of the United Nations, this or that decision depended on the positions, mainly of two superpowers - the USSR and the USA.

With the transfer of the question of Palestine to the UN, the Middle East department of the USSR Foreign Ministry adopted a new concept of Soviet policy towards Palestine. Now the position of the Soviet Union was that it was necessary not only to remove the British mandate for Palestine as quickly as possible, but also to create a unified Arab-Jewish state there. According to the plan of Soviet diplomats, the UN should develop a “statute of a single independent democratic Palestine with the provision of equal national and democratic rights to the peoples inhabiting it. "

Speaking at a meeting of the special session of the UN General Assembly on May 14, 1947, the representative of the USSR A. A. Gromyko said that "the British mandate regime turned the country into a paramilitary police state, living in constant tension", and, taking into account all the disasters that befell the Jewish people during the Second World War, it is necessary to find an early solution to  the fate of the surviving Jews. Speaking about the future of Palestine, A. A. Gromyko noted that "the legitimate interests of the Jewish, as well as the Arab people of Palestine can be protected only on condition of the creation of an independent joint democratic Arab-Jewish state."

However, as the Soviet representative emphasized, the final decision on the future of Palestine should be taken only after considering the conclusions of the UN special commission. If she confirms that relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine are so damaged that the creation of a two-pronged state is impossible, then “then it would be necessary to consider the second option, which provides for the division of Palestine into two independent independent states: Jewish and Arab” (Soviet-Israeli relations, 1941-1953. Collection of documents, volume 1, p. 217.)

Thus, in May 1947, the Soviet Union officially supported the possibility of creating an independent Jewish state in Palestine only if the creation of a two-pronged state is impossible. Thus, for the first time the USSR clearly defined its position on this issue of Middle East policy.

The day after the meeting of the UN General Assembly, May 15, 1947, a special commission was created from representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The commission was responsible for reviewing the current situation in Palestine and submitting recommendations to the UN. After three months of work, on September 1, 1947, the commission presented its report in which, the abolition of the mandate for Palestine and granting it independence were approved by all members of the commission. Meanwhile, regarding the issue of the future structure of an independent Palestine, there were disagreements, formalized in the so-called "Majority Plan" (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay spoke for it), which assumed the division of the country into two independent states and bringing Jerusalem under international control, and the "Minority Plan" (supported by Iran, India and Yugoslavia), which provided for the creation of a single federal state with the capital in Jerusalem.

Soon after the UN special commission formulated its proposals, discussions on the proposed project began in Moscow. V. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, sent a telegram to his deputy A. Vyshinsky in New York:

“You should bear in mind that when the directive for Gromyko, known to you, proposed the creation of a two-pronged state as the first option for resolving the Palestinian issue, it was done by us for tactical reasons. We cannot take the initiative in creating a Jewish state, but our position is better expressed by the second version of our directive, that is, an independent Jewish state. Since the majority of the commission spoke in favor of the creation of a separate Jewish state, you should support the opinion of this majority, which corresponds to our basic directive on this issue ”. (Y. Strizhov, USSR and the creation of the State of Israel, International Affairs No. 11–12, 1995, p.94)

Vyshinsky's telegram to Molotov dated October 15, 1947 stated:

“Our statement on Palestine was greeted by the Jews with great approval. The Arabs are disappointed, although after Gromyko's speech at the emergency session they had very little hope for the possibility of changing our position ”. ("International life", No. 11–12, 1995. P. 97.)

Thus, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its previous position: if the UN Commission considers the creation of a unified Arab-Jewish state is impossible, then the division of Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab states is necessary. On October 26, 1947, Stalin gave his consent to support the partition of Palestine.

The Soviets officially voiced its position through its representative to the UN A.A.Gromyko. In response to criticism from the representatives of the Arab countries, A. A. Gromyko said that the Arabs “indicate that the division of the territory is a historical injustice. But one cannot agree with this point of view, if only because the Jewish people were associated with Eretz Yisrael for a long historical period of time ...In addition, we cannot lose sight of the situation in which the Jewish people found themselves as a result of the last world war ... The Jews as a people suffered more than any other people ... In Western Europe there was not a single state that could defend properly the extent of the interests of the Jewish people from arbitrariness and violence on the part of the Nazis ... The proposal to divide Palestine into two independent states and the position taken by the Soviet Union on this issue are not directed against the Arabs, in our deep conviction, such a solution to the issue corresponds to the fundamental the national interests of not only Jews, but also Arabs. " 

Three days later, on November 29, 1947, a UN resolution was adopted, providing for the partition of Palestine and the creation of two independent states. 

The leadership controlled the votes of five UN member states at once: the USSR, Ukraine (Ukrainian SSR), Belarus (BSSR), Czechoslovakia and Poland. One vote was not enough to secure a qualified majority of two-thirds. Therefore, at the initiative of the Americans, representatives of the Philippines and Paraguay, who were absent from the preliminary vote, were urgently brought to New York. Before the second decisive vote, A. A. Gromyko made a clear and firm proposal on the creation of two states. Ultimately, in a decisive vote, the five countries of the Soviet bloc secured the required two-thirds majority.

In resolution 181/11, the UN General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine and agreed to the formation of two states on its territory: an Arab and a Jewish. 

	Jews	Arabs
The Jewish State	498 000	407 000	905 000
The Arab State	10 000	725 000	735 000
City of Jerusalem	100 000	105 000	205 000

Jewish was allocated an area of ​​14.1 thousand square km (56% of the entire territory of Palestine), inhabited ; 

Arabs  was allocated  11.1 thousand sq. km,  and an international zone was established. 

Although United States voted for the partition of the mandated Palestine, and immediately recognized Israel de facto, and imposed an arms embargo on the Middle East in March of the following year and declared that such a partition could not be carried out. Even on the eve of Britain's formal withdrawal from Israel in May, US was still urging Israeli leaders not to declare independence. 

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, not only voted for partition, but also became the first state to recognize Israel de jure three days after independence, and came out in support of the Jewish state.

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Looking at the documents, Soviets had the preference of one state solution but seeing that it was not possible they had to choose the only viable option of two state solution which was better than the alternative - US Dominion, or the continuation of British mandate. British and French had already divided the Middle East - Arab Land in small pieces based on the oil production and already had set up its puppet leaders who were ready to fight each other with the arm supply by British. As Vyshinsky put it; two state solution could make it “possible to eliminate the enmity between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. This plan turned out to be unfulfilled not because it is bad, but because the states that could have implemented this plan did not want to do it”

It is not that Soviets was not aware, did not know or expect the Israel will at the end side with the US; in one of the document clearly states;

"The fact that at the moment the leading group (Zionists) of Palestinian Jews "are turning their eyes to the USSR," is caused by purely opportunistic circumstances. By virtue of their class nature, the Zionists will support the United States, not the USSR."

However, this did not let them betray the Marxist Leninist principle; Gromyko states;

"The Soviet Union supports and cannot but support the aspirations of any state and any people, no matter how small its weight in international affairs, aimed at fighting against foreign dependence and the remnants of colonial oppression."

I am not sure if any of these has already been translated to English, regardless comrade Svitlana translated some selected related documents presenting the conditions and the reasons for the stand of Soviets on the issue of Palestine. 

Erdogan A

CONTENTS

P14- INTRODUCTION

P27- NOTE OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN October 26, 1947

US proposal to establish guardianship over Palestine does not correspond to the current cultural and political level of development of the Jewish and Arab population, due to which it meets with a negative attitude and resistance from both Jews and Arabs

P30-RECORDING A CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR F.T. GUSEVA WITH EGYPTʹS AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR BINDARI‐PASHA December 13, 1947

In his opinion, one should vote only for the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine and the abolition of the mandate. The question of the future structure of Palestine should be left to the population itself.

P33- FROM THE RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S. MALT WITH PRIME MINISTER AND INTERIM MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF LEBANON R. SOLKH December 23, 1947

..the British intention to settle a number of issues with the Arab countries were true, Solkh replied that to a certain extent these newspaper reports were true, since the Iraqi leaders had informed him that they had begun negotiations with the British..

P36- PRESENTATION BY THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULIN AND DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR January 5, 1948

Bindari, in the period before Egypt submitted the issue of Anglo‐Egyptian disagreements to the UN, tried more than once to find out in detail the position of the USSR

P38- FROM THE RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S. MALT WITH PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SYRIA J. MARDAM BEEM 5 and 7 January 1948

the Arabs were hiding something. Therefore, it is likely that the current Arab leaders have come to an agreement with the British

P42- CONCLUSION OF COUNSELOR OF THE USSR MFA B.E. STEINʹS DRAFT STATUTE OF JERUSALEM DRAFTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES ʺ March 1, 1948

The main flaw in the project is to give the Governor of Jerusalem almost unlimited power to the detriment of the rights of the Legislative Council… the British are doing their best to expand the authority of the governor.

P47- NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA S.A. Vinogradov and Counselor of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs B.E. SHTEIN TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. VYSHINSKY ʺON THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE UN SECOND GENERALʺ, ʺRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN COMMISSION OF THE UN AND THE SC ʺ March 15, 1948

It runs counter to the American view that the Security Council does not have the power to impose a political solution by force on the recommendation of the General Assembly or the Security Council itself.

P49- NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA S.A. VINOGRADOVA DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. VYSHINSKY March 19, 1948

P55- FROM THE LETTER OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULINA April 8, 1948

the Syrian proposals in their practical implementation will inevitably result in the formation of one of the types of the Eastern Bloc, completely subordinate to the Anglo‐Saxons.

P57- NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN April 9, 1948

I present for approval the draft directive of Comrade Gromyko to session of the General Assembly

P60- SUMMARY OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA ʺSITUATION IN PALESTINE AFTER UN DECISION ON DIVISION OF THE COUNTRYʺ April 13, 1948

The ʺneutral” position of the British on the Palestinian question cannot hide their aspirations, provoking the internecine struggle of Jews and Arabs, to thwart the UN decisions on the partition of Palestine and remain in Palestine as a third force, alone or together with the United States,

P70- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky with a messenger LEBANON IN THE USSR H. TAKI ED-DINOM April 13, 1948

P72- LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULINA April 14, 1948

As for the Arabs, according to the representative of the Jewish Agency, “Arabs demand from the Jews complete surrender and nothing else satisfies them.

P74- LETTER FROM COUNSELOR E.R. LEMBERG TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. VYSHINSKY April 15, 1948

P75- MINUTES RECORD OF THE SPEECH OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF THE USSR TO THE UN A.A. Gromyko AT THE SESSION OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE A OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY April 20, 1948

The change in the position of the United States on the Palestinian issue is dictated by its oil and military interests. Well‐known influential circles, reflecting these interests, are trying to turn Palestine into their strategic and military base, and economically into an American semi‐colony.

P82- CONCLUSION OF COUNSELOR OF THE USSR MFA B.E. STEIN ON THE REPORT E. R LEMBERG, SENT TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. VYSHINSKY April 22, 1948

P85- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND SYRIA D.S. MALT WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF LEBANON H. FRANGIER April 30, 1948

P89- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND SYRIA D.S. MALT WITH A. GEYLANI May 10, 1948

Touching upon the position of Lebanon in relation to the future Greater Syria, Geylani said that, according to the general opinion of the majority of the Bolsheviks, including Abdullah himself, Lebanon should remain independent outside Greater Syria

P95- NOTE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT USSR MFA I. N. BAKULINA TO DEPUTY MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN May 15, 1948

In 1922, having received a mandate for Palestine, England captured the building of the consulate general in Jerusalem (only one of this building is the property of the USSR) and used it at its own discretion.

P96- TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR V.M. MOLOTOV May 15, 1948

for her expression of genuine sympathy for the suffering of the Jewish people in Europe at the hands of Nazi torturers and for her support of the principle that the Jews of Palestine are a nation deserving of sovereignty and independence.

P98- TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAIL M. SHERTOKU May 18, 1948

The Soviet Government hopes that the creation by the Jewish people of their sovereign state will serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East and expresses confidence in the successful development of friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel.

P99- EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER DEJ OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND THE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV May 24, 1948

the State of Israel fully shares the wishes so generously expressed by you and reaffirms its firm hope, based on the events that led to the creation of our government,

P100- Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov May 25, 1948

The Provisional Government of Israel in its present composition has not in fact renounced a pro‐British orientation and, as a tribute to the times, is ready to cooperate in many respects with the United States

P101- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsko with the EGYPTʹS MESSENGER IN THE USSR BINDARI‐PASHOY July 1, 1948

then said that Egypt is determined to defend the principles of its foreign policy, which are based on the desire of the Egyptian people to free themselves from the influence of Western European imperialism.

P106- FROM THE REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA ʺTHE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AFTER THE UN DECISION ON THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND THE END OF THE ENGLISH MANDATE (NOVEMBER 29, 1947 ‐ JULY 20, 1948) July 22, 1948

Broad criticism of the British plan to expand the territory of Transjordan at the expense of Palestine will cause a certain split among the Arab states, which will facilitate the defense of the UN decision to partition Palestine.

P109- SPEECH BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN Ya.A. MALIKA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION July 27, 1948

They are looking for workarounds for nonfulfillment of this decision, for consigning it to oblivion in order to preserve the previous position in Palestine, to prevent a peaceful settlement in Palestine, to continue to maintain a state of instability and uncertainty there, which is harmful for both the Arab and Jewish population.

P113- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORINA WITH EGYPTʹS MISSION TO THE USSR BINDARI‐PASHA August 5, 1948

everyone knows that Soviet policy is a policy of noninterference in the affairs of other countries.

P116- CONVERSATIONS OF THE ADVISOR OF THE MISSION OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL ML. MUKHIN WITH ISRAELI CITIZEN S.V. TSIRULNIKOV August 13, 1948

P119- M.P. FEDORINA ABOUT THE MEETING OF A LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR August 14, 1948

P121- LETTER OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE BSSR K.V. KISELEVA DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN August 20, 1948

P122- NOTE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR G.M. MALENKOV ʹTO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC CPSU (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN September 18, 1948

P126- RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORINA WITH THE ENTRY OF SYRIA IN THE USSR F. ZEYNEDDIN September 21, 1948

The situation in Palestine, Zeyneddin concluded, is becoming intolerable and requires immediate consideration.

P130- FROM THE NOTE OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA ʺ CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS ON THE REPORT OF THE UN MEDIATOR IN PALESTINE, BERNADOTTA ʺ October 1, 1948

.. essentially mean the transfer of 4/5 of the Palestinian territory to Transjordan, i.e., under the full control of the British and the refusal, to please the Anglo‐Americans, from the creation of an Arab independent state in Palestine

P135- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE ATTORNEY OF THE USSR AFFAIRS IN SYRIA I.A. ISAGULOVA WITH THE P124- DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA OF SYRIA I. ISTUANI October 4, 1948

However, the fact that not a single Arab country, including Syria, has so far officially recognized the Palestinian government indicates that the British are seriously hindering this

P138- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN M. ORENSHTEIN October 13, 1948

From the conversation with Orenstein it became clear that the Jewish government is inclined to agree with the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan and to refuse the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine

P145- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN D. LIFSHITS October 14, 1948

The Jews are against the international statute for Jerusalem

P144- ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR ON EXIT TO ISRAEL RUSSIAN SPIRITUAL MISSION October 14, 1948

P154- NOTE ʺPRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE POSITION OF JEWS IN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION ʺ October 16, 1948

The Jews are positive about our proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine and consider it the main condition that can ensure peace in Palestine.

P160- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL P.I. ERSHOVA WITH HEAD OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAEL MFA SH. FRIEDMAN October 17, 1948

P166- TELEPHONOGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN October 19, 1948

P168- NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR VMMOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY. CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN October 20, 1948

…replacing the existing temporary truce between the parties with an official peace or such a truce, which is accompanied by the complete withdrawal and demobilization of the armed forces or the creation of a demilitarized zone between them under UN supervision.

P172- LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL P. IERSHOV TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN October 20, 1948

P174- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE Ukrainian SSR D.Z. MANUILSKY WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK October 22, 1948

refineries owned by private companies in Haifa with capital invested by the US, France and the UK should remain in the hands of these companies.

P176- TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D. BENGURION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN November 5, 1948

P177- NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULIN TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN November 24, 1948

P179- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. Vyshinsky with PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON R. SALKH December 2, 1948

Our position on the Palestinian issue is determined by our foreign policy, one of the most important principles of which is the right of nations to self‐determination.

P181- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORINA WITH F. ZEYNEDDIN December 29, 1948

The principles of freedom and self‐determination of nations, supported by the Soviet Union, are of vital interest to Syria as a small power

P185- FROM THE INFORMATION LETTER OF THE MISSION OF THE USSR IN LEBANON TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN April 14, 1949

A very lively Anglo‐American struggle was waged around these negotiations all the time, into which both sides involved their agents and extremely nationalist reactionary elements of the Arab countries.

P191- LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULINA June 28, 1949

quite clearly reflects all the growing Anglo‐American contradictions in the Near and Middle East, caused by the desire of each of these imperialist powers to strengthen their positions and influence in these countries to the detriment of each other.

P193- ABSTRACTS ON THE SPEECH BY THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES July 15, 1949

The problem of Palestinian refugees is the result of the policy of certain monopoly circles in Britain and the United States, interested in delaying a general settlement of the question of Palestine and seeking to revise the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947.

P195- DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATUTE OF JERUSALEM AND THE PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES July 15, 1949

Broad democratic freedoms for the cityʹs population, including freedom of religion and worship, freedom of access to holy places, freedom of conscience, language, education, speech, press, organizations, meetings, petitions, etc.

P198- FROM THE REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION September 3, 1949

England is taking all measures to ensure that this part of Palestine is annexed to Transjordan, and is trying to persuade Israel to transfer the southern part of the Negev to the Arabs of Transjordan and receive in return, all of Galilee.

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