The tragedy and valor of Afghan - 5 -Party and religion, Islam was too tough for PDPA
The tragedy and valor of Afghan
Party and religion, Islam was too tough for PDPA
Problems of religion occupied an important place in the practical
activity of the PDPA. Afghanistan is a Muslim country, and Islam, which has
deep and firm roots in Afghan society, during a long stage of historical
development, to a large extent determined the entire spiritual life, and also
shaped the way of life and traditions of the Afghan people. And although among
the population there are adherents of different interpretations, directions of
Islam (Sunnis and Shiites), which, in turn, have different currents, for
example, among the Shiites: "Asna Ashar" and "Ismailis",
but in relation to the Gentile, they are all united, regardless of what kind of
Islam they belong to.
According to the information of the Soviet embassy, there were about 300 thousand servants of the Islamic cult in the DRA (2% of the population), the number of operating mosques and places for prayer exceeded 40 thousand, there were thousands of mausoleums, tombs (mazars) and other holy places (ziyarats), where millions of believing Afghan citizens came daily. A characteristic feature of Afghanistan was that there was no supreme religious head in the country. All mullahs completely acted at their own discretion and did not obey anyone. The existing councils of ulema in the provinces and in the center gave only general interpretations of the Qur'an and issued various recommendations that were not binding. Every tenth Afghan made a pilgrimage to Mecca, Medina or Najef. About 20 thousand Afghans were constantly studying in religious educational institutions in the country. The Faculty of Theology at Kabul University trained Sunni theologians. The study of Islam was compulsory in all schools in the country.
Every day in the country began and ended with the call of thousands of
clergy to perform namaz.
Afghan Koran reciters have repeatedly been recognized as the best in
Islamic readings in Mecca.
Sunni Islam is predominant in Afghanistan. Before the Saur revolution,
Islam of this trend was the official religion. Only Sunnis could hold leading
government posts. They are officials and officers. Only Sunnis could get higher
education. Shiism, which was preached by the Hazaras and the mountainous
Tajiks, was in the position of a secondary, almost heretical direction in
Islam. Shiites were discriminated against in various ways. Some of their
rituals (the so-called "Shahsey-Vakhsey") were prohibited. Many
Shiites were forced to resort to using the principle of taqiyya (mental
renunciation of what is said aloud), etc.
As you know, a person's religious feeling is an extremely delicate and
subtle part of his spiritual life. When invading it, it is important to observe
the principle - do no harm. "And ask people who know, if you don't
understand yourself!"
The author of the book, Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, served for a long
time in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and at the final stage of
the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was the closest assistant to the head
of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Republic of Armenia,
Army General V.I. Varennikov, who was actually an adviser Supreme
Commander-in-Chief of the RA Armed Forces Najibullah. This allowed the author
to shed light on many white spots of the war in Afghanistan and to present a
fairly complete picture of the events that took place there.
On the basis of previously unpublished little-known, secret, and top-secret information, as well as the memories of direct participants in the
events, the difficult and contradictory process of making a decision by the Soviet
political leadership on direct military intervention in the internal affairs of
Afghanistan is revealed, and the history of the entry and hostilities of Soviet
troops in this country is shown. The author reveals the deep reasons for the
fatal miscalculations of the top Soviet leadership, as a result of which the
army was held hostage to the "Afghan war", and it is not its fault
that this action did not bring glory to the Soviet Union. The role of the
Islamic factor and its influence on the course of events in Afghanistan are
revealed. An analysis of the actions of Soviet troops and the reasons that led
the PDPA regime to defeat is given.
The book is intended for the general reader and is also of undoubted
interest for researchers and specialists in the problems of local conflicts
that have claimed the lives of many thousands of our compatriots, as well as in
terms of UN peacekeeping activities in various regions of our planet. says the
Quran. But the “revolutionaries” who came to power in Afghanistan did not
follow this precept.
Although in an address to the people in April 1978 it was proclaimed
that the revolution in Afghanistan was carried out in the name of
"protecting the principles of Islam and democracy", and the patriotic
clergy were called upon to cooperate with the new government, in practical
terms, steps were taken to strengthen control over activities clergy and
content of sermons. The fact that criticism of Islam and the desecration of
holy places was tolerated was regarded as a state disrespect for the religious
feelings and traditions of believers. Without carrying out the necessary
explanatory work, the PDPA declared the number one enemy the Islamist extremist
organization "The Muslim Brotherhood". Without exposing the anti-government
activities of individual mullahs, the regime began to carry out harsh
repressive measures against them. At the same time, many clergymen were shot in
front of the faithful. This practice elevated them to the ranks of
"martyrs", which directly damaged the authority of state power and
repelled a significant part of the people from participating in government
reforms, and also multiplied the number of its opponents. After all, Islam was
the worldview of the majority of the population, in whose eyes the priests were
the servants of Allah on earth. In addition, the authority of the religious
leader as a wise advisor and active participant in the Afghan struggle for
independence was very high.
To oppose Islam, or even more so to fight it in Afghanistan, meant to
oppose our own people. The ignorant treatment of him, the manipulation of Islam
for selfish purposes turned out to be the most serious consequences. Islam was
taken by the opposition as a unifying ideology as opposed to the ideology of
the PDPA.
By a special government decree in October 1978, women were given equal
rights with men. It also provided for the abolition of kalym, the prohibition
of early marriages (the so-called marriage reform). In the struggle for the
elimination of illiteracy, forced education of women was allowed (and the
Muslim clergy always preached that literacy was useless for a woman and even
harmful to her), mixed educational groups were created: old people, women,
children. From the point of view of a civilized person, these were progressive
measures. However, by illiterate and religious Afghans, especially in the
kishlak zone, all this was regarded as interference with personal life, an
encroachment on traditional foundations and way of life. But even in such
conditions, the proclamation of the equality of women played (especially in
large cities) its role.
The Shiites were dealt with especially cruelly. Indicative in this
regard is the fate of the family of the leader (feast) of the
"Ismailis" Sayd Mansoor Naderi. His three siblings Said Rounaga
(poet), Said Anwar and Said Hasein were killed on the orders of X. Amin.
The repressive steps of the regime against the higher clergy and mullahs
led to the fact that under the flag of Islam and speaking on its behalf, they
led all the forces hostile to the new government and moved to actively oppose
the PDPA, skillfully using Islamic Values as a weapon in the struggle for
political power. That is why the party's ostentatious events showing respect
for Islam (allocating funds for the repair and construction of mosques and
prayer houses, the introduction of benefits for pilgrims to Mecca, an increase
in the salaries of mullahs, etc.) did not give the expected results.
Practical and organizational measures taken by the DRA government to
forcibly reorganize society have led to the severing of economic ties. This was
especially felt in the central regions of the country, where previously there
was a system for processing livestock products and supplying them to large
cities, in which the Hazaras and nomads played the main role. This entailed a
drop in the living standards of the population and, at first, latent and then
explicit resistance of the population. The main slogan under which the party
came to power - improving the life of the common people - turned out to be an
empty phrase.
In June 1978, the first armed uprisings against the "democratic and
anti-feudal measures" of the central authorities took place in the
provinces of Badakhshan, Bamyan, Kunar, Paktia and Nangarhar. They were headed
by the landlord-feudal circles, the comprador bourgeoisie and the higher
Islamic clergy who consolidated with them. Unlike the PDPA, they skillfully
used in their activities the almost complete illiteracy of the population,
complex interethnic and tribal contradictions, religious fanaticism, and
extreme nationalism. But the country's leadership was not particularly alarmed
by this turn of events. It considered that it could easily suppress by force
individual pockets of resistance, and gave the appropriate order to the army.
The actions of army units against the rural opposition, the use of
artillery and aviation to suppress its armed uprisings resulted in civilian
casualties, the destruction of villages and irrigation systems, and the
destruction of crops in the fields. This led to the fact that the rebellious
movement gradually began to expand. Under the influence of mullahs and
landowners, the spontaneous resistance of the villagers acquired an organized
character and assumed an Islamic tinge. But the government, continuing to rely
only on force, put into operation more and more combat units, including using
them in those areas in which traditionally the army had never even appeared
before (the zone of settlement of free Pashtun tribes).
Punitive measures against internal opposition and the population caused
a flood of refugees from Afghanistan. Rescuing children and relatives, people
left the country with their families, and sometimes whole villages. As the
hostilities escalated, the number of refugees increased, and soon this process
took on a mass character. For example, if in 1973 several hundred people
emigrated to Pakistan, and in 1978 - 110 thousand people, then only in
September - December 1979 there were already 750 thousand people. Subsequently,
the number of refugees began to number in the millions.
The external opposition also intensified its activity, the main base of
which was Pakistan. Indeed, after the failed uprising in 1975, Islamic groups
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood international organization united under
the leadership of G. Hekmatyar in Pakistan to form the Hezbeh
Islami-e-Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan) party and soon accepted the
ranks of many members of the higher clergy and mullahs. Among them were
Burhanuddin Rabbani, Muhammad Yunus (Khales), Said Mansur, Jalaluddin Khakani,
Ahmad Shah (Masud) and others.
Strongly influenced by contemporary Muslim fundamentalist thinkers,
including the founder of the Pakistani Jamite-Islami and the leader of the
movement for a “more Islamic” Pakistan, Sayed Maududi, the founders of the
Islamist extremist organization “The Muslim Brotherhood” Sayed Kutab and
Hassan-ul-Bana, and also Iranian Ali Shariati, the leadership of the Islamic
Party of Afghanistan (IPA) led the fight against the PDPA regime from extreme
right-wing Islamist positions.
However, in one party, several leaders were cramped. Each of them strove
to create his own party. The first to break away was B. Rabbani, who formed the
Jamiat-e-Islam-e-Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan). Several former
IPA members followed, including Ahmad Shah Massoud. And although outwardly the
leaders of the opposition acted as allies, gradually disagreements arose
between them, which then grew into enmity, which intensified over the years.
By the beginning of the April Revolution in Afghanistan, the centers of
two main fundamentalist opposition organizations, the Islamic Party of
Afghanistan (IPA) under the leadership of G. Hekmatyar and the Islamic Society
of Afghanistan (IOA), led by B. Rabbani, were already located, and operated on
Pakistani territory. They were created after the collapse of the Muslim Youth
organization from its surviving members. These parties took the positions of
Islamic fundamentalists. But as the rebellious movement developed, the village
Afghans involved fought mainly under the leadership of local mullahs who held
traditionalist views and opposed new interpretations of Islam, considering them
to be a deviation from true Islam. On this basis, the Khudam-ul-Furkan (Servant
of the Quran) party arose.
In the second half of 1978, attempts were made to unite all these
parties into a single party, which was to be headed by the religious authority
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. However, this was contrary to the traditional Afghan
social system based on individual freedom and equality. This association did
not last long and soon fell apart.
In 1979, new opposition centers, parties and organizations created in
Pakistan appeared in the political arena: Hezbe Islami Khales (Islamic Party of
Khales - IPH), which broke away from the IPA due to personal differences
between Hekmatyar and Khales; “Mahaz-i-milli Islami Afghanistan” (“National
Islamic Front of Afghanistan” - NIFA), organized by a prominent religious
figure, spiritual leader (feast) of the Qadiriya Sufi order S. A. Gilani, who
advocated the restoration of the monarchy in the country;
"Harakat-i-ikilab-i-Islami Afghanistan" ("Movement of the
Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan" - DIRA), created on the basis of the
group of Orthodox clergy "Servants of the Quran" under the leadership
of M. Nabi. All these organizations were resolutely disposed towards armed
struggle against the republican regime and began to form combat detachments,
The main efforts of all opposition forces were focused on working with
tribes and refugees. The goal is to attract already trained militants from the
self-defense units that are available in each tribe and have their own weapons
to their side. In the propaganda of the opposition, a differentiated approach
began to be applied to various strata of the population and national-ethnic
groups. Special efforts were made to ensure that the religious and nationalist
coloring of political slogans and programs corresponded to the established
traditions, social and national psychology of the population and met the
interests of those strata represented by the opposition leaders.
On the territory of Pakistan, in the areas of Peshawar, Kohat, Quetta,
Parachinar, Miramshah, near many settlements bordering on the DRA, the centers
of opposition organizations, their military camps, weapons depots,
transshipment bases, and training centers for militants have settled. The
opposition systematically began to create a bridgehead for the deployment of
full-scale military operations on the territory of Afghanistan.
At the same time, opposition leaders carried out extensive propaganda
work among the highest clergy, recognized tribal authorities and elders living
in Pakistan. The emissaries of their organizations operated in almost all
regions of the country, without encountering opposition from local authorities.
The appearance of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran has become
"heavenly manna" for the opposition parties, since before that they
did not have any serious "support base". With the formation of the
refugee camps, the leaders of these parties were allowed by the Pakistani
authorities to distribute among the refugees the aid received from other
countries, mainly from the West.
After the appearance of refugees in Pakistan, IPA, IOA, DIRA, IPH, NFSA
began to train, with the help of Pakistani military specialists, fighters from
peasant youth, whom they recruited in camps for money or forced them under
threat of death and punishment of their parents. By the end of 1978, a mass
dispatch of armed detachments and sabotage groups trained in Pakistan began to
the DRA. Since that time, the scale of resistance to the government of N.M.
Taraki began to grow rapidly.
In early January 1979, the situation in the country deteriorated
sharply. Armed resistance to the authorities developed in the central provinces
- Khazarajat, where Kabul's influence was traditionally weak. The Tajiks of
Nuristan opposed the government. The emissaries of the fundamentalists who
arrived from Pakistan began recruiting men from the local population into the
armed opposition units. Anti-government propaganda has sharply intensified,
especially among the military, aimed at the collapse of the Afghan army, the
creation of new armed opposition detachments from deserters, as well as an
increase in emigration to Pakistan and Iran.
In many provinces of Afghanistan, sabotage actions of opposition groups
have been launched to block roads, destroy power lines, and telephone
communications. Terror against citizens loyal to the government increased. The
leaders of the IPA and IOA by such actions tried to destabilize the situation,
undermine the new DRA regime. They tried to keep the government in constant
tension, to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear.
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