“APPEASEMENT” POLICY GOING BANKRUPT

 Diplomatic Battles Before World War II - Chapter III

Index Page 

 Will the Nazis March on the Ukraine?

The reactionary ruling circles of Britain and France expected that following the Munich sellout, Germany’s aggressive ambitions would be turned eastwards, ultimately against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union did, in fact, find itself in a very precarious position. By the joint efforts of Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini, the USSR had virtually been forced into a state of total international isolation. The governments of Britain and France, hoping to push Germany into a war against the Soviet Union, stressed openly that they wanted no trucks with the USSR. After Munich, the Foreign Office cut off all contact with the Soviet embassy in London. Britain seriously considered breaking off her trade treaty with the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Bonnet intended to denounce the treaties of mutual assistance with the USSR and Poland.204

French Ambassador Coulondre and British Ambassador Chilston were recalled from Moscow in October 1938 and November 1938 respectively, whereupon the French and British embassies in Moscow were in charge of Charges d’Affaires for several months.

As the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out, political circles in Britain as well as the press set about discussing, right after Munich, the prospect of Hitler "going eastwards and having the Ukraine as his primary major target”. There is no doubt, the Soviet embassy pointed out, that a whole series of influential personalities (including some members of the Cabinet) "directly intimated to Hitler about this 193eastern venture, promising at least, favourable neutrality to him..."“205” The British News Chronicle said that the “die-hards” were seeking to make Russia and Germany take one another by the throat.

British historian Middlemas, who thoroughly studied the declassified documents of the British government referring to the prewar years, had to admit that there was "evidence ... to justify the Soviet charge that Britain planned to set Germany at war with Russia".”206”

The Soviet Ambassador to France, Surits, who held similar views, reported in a dispatch to Moscow on November 11, that the French ruling top leadership was " particularly enthusiastic about the Drang nach Osten version implying that Germany is to be given a free hand in the East. That, in the long run, naturally, meant giving her a free hand for action against the USSR".”207”

The U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, referring to the post-Munich policies of Britain and France, said that they would like it to come to war in the East between the German Reich and Russia, a long and extenuating war between them. In that case, the Western Powers "could attack Germany and get her to surrender".208

When a Franco-German declaration on non-aggression was signed on December 6, 1938, as a result of the visit to Paris by Germany’s Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Daladier and Bonnet became even more confident that the aggressor’s avid eyes would from now on be turned only eastwards. Back in Berlin, Ribbentrop was able to declare, with reference to the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, that the declaration signed in Paris finally " detached France from the USSR and prevents any last traces of risk of Russo-French collaboration." “209”

Having concluded this agreement with Germany, the French ruling circles went into raptures. Bonnet wrote, informing the French ambassadors about his talks with Ribbentrop, that "German policy is now more concerned with fighting Bolshevism. The Reich shows her will for expansion to the East". 1

To pay the ransom and push Germany into a “crusade” against the USSR, the British and French ruling quarters were prepared to leave all the nations of Eastern Europe at the mercy of German Nazis. The allied treaty with Poland, co-operation with the Little Entente and the Franco– 194Soviet pact, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin pointed out as he conferred with the French Ambassador to the USSR Naggiar, on February 9, 1939, were "recognised already at the past stages of the foreign policy of France, something like an asset of history".”211” The Foreign Office also had information that France proposed to get rid of her commitments under the treaties with Poland, and, above all, with the USSR.”212” Such a course of the French and British ruling circles after Munich was still prompted by their hatred of communism whether in the shape of the Soviet state or in that of the revolutionary movement in their own countries. "England has groveled on its belly before Hitler because it is afraid of communism," “213” U.S. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes pointed out in his Secret Diary. The British government even suggested Anglo-German military co-operation in the struggle against the Soviet Union.214

The Munich dealers were backed up in every way by the most reactionary representatives of the U.S. ruling establishment. As a former U.S. President Hoover argued in his speech on October 26, 1938, the West European nations should not have to fear Germany because the opportunities of the dictatorships lie in expansion eastward; so such expansion should not be interfered with.”215” The Soviet embassy in the United States noted in this connection that the reactionary sections of the Republican Party were still "dreaming of a closer relationship with fascist countries and nurturing the illusion and the hope that the European aggressors will act against us".”216” From as early as the summer of 1938, the United States was represented by no more than a Charge d’Affaires in Moscow, and Washington was in no hurry to appoint a new ambassador.

The British, French and American reaction in every way egged on the German, Japanese and other aggressors. The Western press carried no end of reports about the " weakness" of the Soviet Union in the military as well as economic respects.

Information was obtained in London to the effect that Germany had got down to a detailed study of the possibilities of "settlement of the Ukrainian question" and that Hitler had given orders to the German General Staff to start preparations for an attack on the USSR. The creation of a "Great Ukraine" which would have consisted of Soviet and Polish regions inhabited by Ukrainians, as well as of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, was viewed by the Nazis as the most important component of Gorman Eastern policy. The "Great Ukraine" by itself could exist in their opinion, "only if it unconditionally relied on Germany, which eventually must turn it into a German vassal".”217”

Hitler: with Poland or Against Poland?

The Nazis opened negotiations with Poland, in particular, on the "Ukrainian question”. Their hopes for success in negotiating a joint action against the USSR with the Polish government of the day were not unfounded. There lies already been a reference earlier on to German-Polish co-operation in March 1938 when, following the AnschluB of Austria, Poland was particularly anxious to capture Lithuania. The talks about co-operation, including military co-operation, for the "full dismemberment of Czechoslovakia" and its liquidation as a state began between Polish Ambassador Lipski and Goring back in the middle of June.”218”

On September 27 Beck directed the Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski to come to terms with Goring about Poland being informed in advance of the start of the German military actions against Czechoslovakia. "For your confidential information”, Beck wrote, "I add that we have at our disposal forces under arms capable of action. Relative to the development of the situation we could take prompt action following the outbreak of a German-Czech conflict." ”219”

Lipski met the State Secretary of German Ministry for Foreign Affairs Weizsacker to concert action by the two countries and agree on the "military demarcation line in the event of a Polish-Czech war”. Right after the Four– Power Munich deal, in the night of September 30, Poland addressed an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia for the immediate transfer of the Teszyn region and on the following day started to move her troops into that region.

The German and Polish aggressors concluded what amounted, in point of fact, to an anti-Soviet military alliance to come into force if, with the Soviet Union coming to Czechoslovakia’s aid in defence against Nazi Germany 196and Poland, they would find themselves at war against the USSR. On September 30, the Polish government asked the Nazis whether it could count on Germany’s benevolent reaction in case of an armed conflict between Poland and the USSR arising from an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Polish troops. On the following day, Lipski relayed to Warsaw the reply he got from von Ribbentrop: "In the event of a Polish-Soviet conflict, the government of Germany would take a more than benevolent position in respect of Poland.” Besides, he made it quite clear that the government of Germany would be helpful. ”22”° Goring also assured Lipski on October 1, that "in the event of complications with Russia Poland can count on most effective assistance from Germany".”221”

The "Ukrainian question" came under intense study in Poland right after Munich. The Biuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski, published by Polish elements close to Beck in the territory of the Western Ukraine, seized by Poland in 1920, carried an article on October 2, 1938, about the plans of Polish imperialists. It called for the Soviet Union to be divided into a number of independent state entities with Kiev, Tbilisi, and Samarkand as capitals.

The question of a joint war of aggression by Germany and Poland against the USSR arose soon afterwards. Ribbentrop, speaking to Polish Ambassador Lipski on October 24, 1938, suggested "a general settlement of all possible points of friction between Germany and Poland . The suggestion implied the incorporation of Danzig (with economic privileges preserved in Danzig for Poland) to the Third Reich, the construction of a German extra-territorial autobahn and multiple track railroad through the Polish Corridor; the extension of the Polish-German Declaration of friendship and non-aggression to 25 years; the provision of guarantees by Germany relative to the Polish-German border. Ribbentrop suggested that, having thus reinforced Polish-German friendship, the two countries should conduct a "joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact”. ”222”

Japanese imperialists, planning for a joint three-power war against the Soviet Union, were also extremely interested in German-Polish co-operation against the USSR.”223”

The Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, maintained in a conversation with Poland’s Vice-Minister for 197Foreign Affairs Szembeck that "Soviet Russia is getting progressively weaker" and "the Russian problem is looming”. Grzybowski declared that Poland "must have influence on this problem”, recalling that there had already been a historical precedent with Poland having "the final say in Russian affairs”. He also quoted Pilsudski’s words: "I shall march on Russia myself.” Grzybowski spoke up for the restoration of the Polish frontiers of 1772. Nazi Germany considered, not without reason, that—on a par with Italy and Japan—"Poland will be Germany’s natural ally in the future German-Russian conflict".”224”

The settlement of the German-Polish imperialist contradictions, connected with the realisation of their conspiracy against the USSR, proved far from simple, however. Nazi Germany, while urging the continued consolidation of German-Polish “friendship”, saw it as Poland’s full submission to German domination. Whereas the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was the first step towards the Nazis overrunning the whole of Czechoslovakia, the incorporation of Danzig was seen by the Nazis as a test of Poland’s readiness for co-operation with Germany as would mean voluntary surrender. The Soviet military intelligence officer, Richard Sorge reported to Moscow on October 3, 1938, that the "Polish question" was the next foreign policy problem for Germany, but Germany and Poland were expected to settle it "amicably because of their joint war against the USSR".”225” The Commissar of the League of Nations in Danzig C. Burckhardt also wrote on December 20 after his visit to Germany that the Ukraine was much of a talking point there: "Poland is being associated with such plans to a certain extent on the understanding, of course, that Warsaw will have to pay for it, that it will submit, that it will be ’reasonable’ and will follow the way of the Czechs." ”226”

One indicative statement was made by General Coestring, the German Military Attaché in the USSR, in a conversation with the Lithuanian military attaché: "Poland is a poor horse harnessed by Germany for a time. ... If Poland counts on Germany’s assistance in her war against the USSR, she must know anyway that German troops, once in the Corridor and Silesia, will stay there."“227”

The ruling circles of Poland were prepared to co-operate with Germany in the imperialist plunder of foreign lands, particularly in action against the Soviet state. At the same 198time they could not take delight in the prospect of Poland turning into a rightless vassal of Hitler Germany or of the Nazis capturing Polish lands. Still less so since it would have produced a storm of indignation among the Polish people. Nor did the Polish government like the idea of a German-controlled "Ukrainian state" being created because it feared that the Nazis would want to annex to it also the Ukrainian lands which formed part of Poland (that is, the lands alienated by Poland from the Soviet state in 1920). Thus, the Vice-Director of the Political Department of Poland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, T. Kobylanski, emphasised in a conversation with the German Embassy Counsellor in Poland, von Scheliah, on November 18, that if the Germans refrained from their idea of creating a "Great Ukraine”, "Poland would be willing subsequently to join Germany in a march on the Soviet Ukraine”. Otherwise, such action could turn out to be impossible, he pointed out.”228”

It was, therefore, the reverse side of the medal that began to show itself little by little as did the “price” which the Nazi Reich wanted Poland to pay for her part in plundering foreign lands. Yet quite a few individuals among the ruling circles of Poland were prepared to co-operate with the Nazis almost under any terms. J. Beck declared, for instance, to U.S. Ambassador Biddle that Poland "might have" to co-operate with Germany in creating a Ukrainian state at the expense of some of the territory of Poland, the USSR and Romania.”229”

Some pronouncements by Karszo-Siedlewski, a former Polish Embassy Counsellor in Moscow, who was appointed as Minister in Iran in December, were particularly noteworthy in this respect. Karszo-Siedlewski said in a conversation with von Cheliah on December 28, 1938, that in a few years Germany would be fighting the Soviet Union and "Poland will support . . . Germany in that war. It will be better for Poland to side with Germany quite definitely before the conflict breaks out since Poland’s territorial interests in the West and Poland’s political objectives in the East, above all in the Ukraine, can be secured only through a Polish-German agreement achieved well in advance". ”23”°

The Nazis missed no opportunity, in meeting Polish diplomats afterwards, to raise the question of anti-Soviet cooperation between the two countries. Hitler remarked in his 199conversation with Beck on January 5, 1939, that there was a full community of interests between Germany and Poland with regard to Russia.”231” As he answered a question from Ribbentrop on the following day whether or not the Polish government had forsworn Pilsudski’s claims against the Ukraine, Beck, reaffirming Poland’s aggressive designs, stressed that the Poles "had even been in Kiev, and that these aspirations were doubtless, still alive today."“232”

During his visit to Poland on January 26, 1939, Ribbentrop raised the matter again. Hitler’s Minister once more offered to Beck to establish collaboration between Germany and Poland with regard to the Soviet Union and also in creating the "Great Ukraine”. "Mr. Beck made no secret,” the transcript of that conversation said, "of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed toward the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea.” On hearing such a statement from the Polish Minister, Ribbentrop raised the question of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, so that she could find herself "in the same boat" with Germany. Beck promised him that "he would give further careful consideration" to this question. ”233” At the end of the visit, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, H. Moltke, declared, replying to the question about Poland’s position in the event of a clash between Germany and Russia: "The situation is quite clear. We know that Poland will be at our side in the event of a German-Russian conflict. That is quite definite."“234”

In case of a joint war with Germany against the USSR, Poland’s ruling quarters preferred to see German troops moved against the Soviet Union through the territory of other countries, rather than through Poland. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs pointed out on February 19, 1939, that Poland was dreaming of turning the Soviet Ukraine into her own sphere of influence. "She will, however, be ready to give up her dreams, in case of necessity, and would not object to Hitler passing through Romania on his way to Russia. . . . Nor would Poland object to Hitler marching through the Baltic states and Finland to leave her free to act against the Ukraine in time to coincide with the policy of Japan."“235”

However, while in the first few months following Munich the Nazis did consider joint action with Poland against the Soviet Union, that did not prevent them from 200circumstantially working out another version, that is, the plans of war against Poland as well as against Franco and Britain. By the end of December 1938, the further Nazi plans of aggression had been, in fact, finally clarified. It was decided to do away with Czechoslovakia in the spring of 193!) and then with Poland so as to act against France and Britain in the subsequent year, having collected enough strength and strengthened the rear.”236”

True, the German press went on discussing for a while the "Ukrainian question" but that was nothing short of misinformation designed to withhold the actual Nazi plans.

In the meantime the Nazis got down to some specific action in preparation for an attack on Poland. At a conference which Ribbentrop had with Nazi generals on January 22, it was stated that the German-Polish declaration of 1934 would be observed only as long as it was found worthwhile. It was envisaged that steps would be taken to "strain relations with Poland to such an extent as to make nothing but a military solution of the issue possible." ”237”

The Attack on the USSR Postponed

As the subsequent events had shown, the expectations of reactionary elements in Britain, France and the United States for aggression to be turned towards the Soviet frontiers were found to have been built on quick-sand. The aggressors had a fairly good idea of the strength and might of the Red Army and could not venture into anti-Soviet gamble. Besides, Japan got bogged down deep in the war against China. Before that war was over, she could actually consider attacking the USSR only in the event of a Soviet-German conflict. Germany, on her part, did not consider herself to be prepared sufficiently enough in the military sense to venture into a war against the USSR.

At a conference with Keitel and Brauchitsch on November 16 Hitler set out his plan to sign a military alliance with Italy for a war against France and Britain. Italy would confront them in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, while German forces would attack France.”238” One of fascist “experts” on the problems of Eastern Europe, W. Markert had information that prior to November and 201December 1938, the Nazis had intended to hasten a "clash with Moscow and to that end get Poland to serve as an ally against the Soviet Union”. Ribbentrop and Rosenberg "were in favour of war against the Soviet Union by exploiting the Ukrainian question. The decisive change in the evaluation of the political situation and the chances for war in Eastern Europe came about somewhere around Christmas.” After his long sojourn in Obersalzberg, Hitler declared, referring to war against the USSR, that some time was still needed for its thorough preparation.”239”

The progressive change in the alignment of forces in Europe in favour of the aggressive powers and more particularly, the swelling tide of information that Germany was preparing to direct her blow not against the USSR, but against Poland, France and Britain, ultimately began to worry the Western powers.

However, in the Diaries of Oliver Harvey, personal secretary of the British Foreign Secretary, wo find the following anxious entry dating from as early as November 13, 1938: "Every scrap of information, secret and public, we get from Germany now shows that the German Government is laughing at us, despising us and intending to dispossess us morally and materially from our world position." “24”° On the following day Lord Halifax, addressing a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee, made a summary of confidential reports indicating that the Nazi Reich was "becoming increasingly anti-British and that their intention was to work for the disintegration of the British Empire and, if possible, for the domination of the world by the German nation." “241”

The First Secretary of the British Embassy in Berlin, I. Kirkpatrick, arrived in London in mid-December with some material to prove that the Nazis were planning aggression not only eastwards but westwards as well.

Chamberlain, however, still hoped for a success of the course he had mapped out. With reference to the proposed measures to strengthen Britain’s ability to resist German aggression, he declared at a Cabinet meeting that these proposals "did not tally with his impression of Hitler’s next move, which would be eastwards, in which case we might well not be involved at all.”242”

A Foreign Office memorandum submitted to the British government on January 19, 1939, summarized the available 202information about the Nazi plans which was obtained from various secret sources. In the introductory note to the memorandum Halifax pointed out that "hitherto it had been generally expected that Hitler’s designs would lead him (eastward, and more particularly that he was planning something in the Ukraine. More recently, we have been receiving reports showing that he has decided that the moment is propitious for dealing an overwhelming blow at the Western powers."“243” The Foreign Office had information at the lime that the Nazis intended to start large-scale armed action by smashing Poland.”244”

The French General Staff also arrived at the conclusion that Germany would rather launch an attack in the West than a war against the USSR.”245”

Nevertheless, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, told Hitler on March 2, 1939 (on his return from a trip to London) that Chamberlain and Halifax "are still thinking on lines of Munich”. Henderson expressed his readiness to start negotiations with Fiihrer on that basis.”246” The Nazi Chancellor, however, did not honour the Ambassador with a reply. He did not want any agreement with Britain, nor did he intend to concert any of his action with her. Still less so since Henderson’s offer clearly indicated that the British government did not mean to put up any resistance lo the Nazi Reich’s aggressive aspirations.

To sum up, by early 1939, the Nazi Reich, enjoying the benefit of the policy of abetting German aggression that was pursued by Britain, France and the United States, came to occupy the dominant position in Central Europe. The expectations of Chamberlain and his fellow thinkers that they could strike a deal with the Nazis so as to push them into an act of aggression eastwards, against the USSR, turned out to have been unfounded. The Nazis, while planning their further land-grabbing plans, preferred to have to deal with weaker opponents for the time being. They did not as yet make as bold as to confront the USSR.

Next

Chapter IV

ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR, NAZI ACTS OF AGGRESSION. POSITIONS OF THE USSR AND WESTERN POWERS