MUNICH SELLOUT

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II - Chapter III

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Chamberlain’s Visit to Berchtesgaden

The British ruling establishment was increasingly inclined to surrender the Sudetenland to Hitler Germany in the hope of reaching an accommodation between the British Empire and the Nazi Reich in that way. The Times of London openly suggested in a leading article on September 7 that the Czechoslovak government ought to think of turning the Sudetenland over to Germany.

A Conservative Party leader, Henry Channon, pointed out in his diary that the Times article had been produced in agreement between Halifax and the Times publisher, Geoffrey Dawson, and was definitely a "ballon d’essai" to see how the public would react, and to prepare them for the Runciman Report containing similar proposals.”135” Halifax said on September 11, 1938, that the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was the only hope to avoid war. He considered it desirable for a conference of four powers— Britain, France, Germany and Italy—to be called to settle the matter.”136”

The prospect of calling such a conference was discussed on the same day by the British Ambassador in Paris, Phipps, with the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, Alexis Leger. The French diplomat expressed his full agreement with the idea of calling such a conference, stressing that there was no point in the Soviet Union being invited to attend.”137” On September 13, the decision that this international conference was well worth-while was taken at a French Cabinet meeting. The news was immediately communicated to London. Bonnet considered that the object of the conference must be to decide on the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany and that it should be attended by the four Western powers.”138” That was the final abandonment of the struggle against aggression and of the allied 177treaties with the USSR and Czechoslovakia by the government of Daladier-Bonnet, and their surrender to the Nazi Reich.”139”

A conference of the British Premier with his "inner group”, called on Chamberlain’s initiative on September 13. with the international situation further strained because of acts of provocation by fascist agents throughout the Sudetenland, decided on the Premier making an urgent trip to Germany. ”14”° On the same day, the British Premier sent a letter to King George VI to inform him that the object of his journey would be "the establishment of an Anglo– German understanding" and the settlement of the Czechoslovak question. He emphasised that his intention was to sketch out to Hitler "the prospect of Germany and England as the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism". ”141”

It was realised in Berlin, quite naturally, that the only thing Chamberlain’s visit could mean under the circumstances was Britain’s willingness to make serious concessions. Besides, the Nazis had succeeded in deciphering some foreign codes and were informed of the negotiations between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Prague on the other. For that reason, the Sudeten Germans came into the open (naturally, on instructions from Hitler) to demand the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany, while Hitler was just “playing” with Chamberlain.”141”

H. Chamberlain, accompanied by H. Wilson and W. Strang, arrived in Berchtesgaden on September 15. The British Premier opened his conversations with Hitler by declaring his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement and for an exchange of general views on the policies of both countries. Hitler, however, demonstrated a manifest reluctance to discuss problems of that kind at all. He reduced the entire negotiating process to a consideration of one particular question that was of interest to him. Being aware of Chamberlain’s position, Hitler emphatically demanded that the Sudetenland should be turned over to Germany, threatening a world war otherwise. Besides, he demanded the abrogation of Czechoslovakia’s treaties of mutual assistance with other countries. Chamberlain accepted these demands, but said he had yet to get the official sanction of his government, and talk the matter over with the French government.”143”

The Berchtesgaden rendezvous gave Hitler an opportunity to draw the conclusion that there was no reason for him to J’oar any British opposition to his plans lor the takeover of the Sudeterdand. Moreover, shortly after that meeting the German Foreign Ministry representative at Hitler’s headquarters, Hewel, received information that "Hitler is further planning the capture of all Czechoslovakia. He is now quite sure that this objective can be achieved without any intervention by the British government.”144”

After informing Lord Halifax, Simon and Hoare about Ins talks with Hitler, Chamberlain said he thought Hitler’s demand for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany could be met. He stressed as the only important point that this had to be done "in an orderly manner”, that is, so as not to provoke an armed conflict. Chamberlain expressed the confidence that the settlement of the Sudeten question would open the way to Anglo-German understanding.”145”

It is the summit conference between Britain and France in London on September 18 that decided in favour of Hitler’s demand for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. That embarrassed even some representatives of the British ruling establishment. "One of the extraordinary things to me is how we, with calculated cynicism, sign away the liberty of 9,000,000 people," ”146” said General Ironside in his Diaries. The French Charge d’Affaires in London, R. Cambon, admitted that the decisions taken by the British and the French were "the most painful possible experience for his government for many years." ”147”

On the following day, the British and French accomplices of the Nazi aggressors handed the Czechoslovak government their notes which amounted to a joint ultimatum from Germany, Britain and France demanding that the Sudeten region should be turned over to the Reich. At the same time, the British and French governments urged Czechoslovakia to agree to her treaties of mutual assistance with other nations being replaced by a common guarantee against unprovoked aggression, expressing their willingness to share in giving such a guarantee.”148”

President Roosevelt, having invited the British Ambassador for a top secret conversation on September 20, could not hut admit that Britain and France wanted Czechoslovakia to make "the most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had ever been demanded of a state”. At the same time 179Roosevolt declared that if the policy the British had embarked on proved successful, "who would be the first to cheer”. ”149” When, however, the Czechoslovak Charge d’Affaires asked the U.S. government on the same day to publish any statement whatsoever in support of Czechoslovakia, the request was left unheeded. ”15”

The USSR Ready to Resist Aggression

 The position of the USSR was entirely different. On September 19, 1938, the Czechoslovak government asked the Soviet government to reply as soon as possible to these questions: a) will the USSR, in conformity with the Treaty, afford prompt and effective assistance if France remained loyal and afforded assistance as well?; b) will the USSR help Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations?”151”

The following instructions were given to the Soviet Ambassador in Prague on September 20:

 “1. You may give an affirmative answer on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union to the question from Benes as to whether the USSR will render prompt and effective assistance if France remains loyal to her and affords assistance as well.

2. You may give a similar affirmative answer to the other question, too. ..." ”152”

The Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky, immediately passed this reply to the Czechoslovak government. France was informed about it as well. So in those difficult and dangerous conditions for Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government once more officially reaffirmed that the USSR would fulfil its obligations under the pact providing for assistance to her in the event of an attack by Germany. In accordance with this decision, Litvinov, speaking before the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 21, 1938, restated the Soviet government’s position on resistance to aggression. He stressed that measures outlined by the Covenant of the League of Nations had to be taken against the aggressor resolutely, consistently and without hesitation, and in that case the aggressor would not be tempted and "peace will be preserved by peaceful means”. Litvinov, in his speech, exposed the disgraceful policy of 180abetting aggression, to the extent of getting "directives and ultimatums at the cost of the vital interests of any particular slate”. The head of The Soviet delegation read out the statements which the Soviet government had passed to the government of France on September 2 and to that of Czechoslovakia on September 20.

However, London and Paris were still deaf to the Soviet proposals. How absurd that has been most strikingly shown in the memoirs of Winston Churchill. "The Soviet offer was in effect ignored,” he wrote. ".. .They were treated with an indifference—not to say disdain. . . Events took their course as if Soviet Russia did not exist. For this we afterwards paid dearly." ”153”

In fulfilment of the emergency instructions of their respective governments, the British and French Ministers in Czechoslovakia emphatically declared to the Czechoslovak government in the night of September 21 that should it fail to accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government "will not honour its treaty" with Czechoslovakia. "If the Czechs join forces with the Russians,” they emphasised, "the war can become a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then, it will be very difficult for the governments of England and Franco to stay out." ”154”

Submitting to Anglo-French pressure, the Czechoslovak government gave up by consenting to Hitler’s Berchtesgaden demands.

Litvinov repeatedly confirmed the Soviet readiness to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia also in his conversations with foreign diplomats and politicians.

For example, Litvinov conferred in Geneva with Lord Privy Seal de la Warr and Deputy Foreign Secretary Butler in the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva.

Butler cabled to the Foreign Office quoting Litvinov as having said that "if French came to the assistance of the Czechs Russians would take action”. He said that "he had for long been hoping for conversations between Great Britain, France and Russia, and he would like to suggest to us in this informal conversation that a meeting of the three Powers mentioned, together with Romania and any other small Power ... should take place preferably in Paris, and so show Germans that we mean business." ”155”

Chamberlain was almost horrified by the comments of the People’s Commissar in his conversation with de la Warr 181and Butler. He saw them as a "great danger" (!?) since to follow them through would have meant, in his opinion, "to strengthen Bolshevism in the whole world".”156”

For the next few days the British government was almost continuously in session to consider the increasingly involved situation, but Chamberlain and Halifax did not even mention Litvinov’s proposal, thus withholding it from the Cabinet members. De la Warr, who attended all these sittings, also kept silent.

Although the Soviet government was not in a position to know about Chamberlain’s reaction to the People’s Commissar’s offer, it gave a perfectly correct assessment of the situation as it had shaped up and of the possible prospect ahead. On September 23, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the report from the People’s Commissar about his conversation with de la Warr and Butler, wrote it was doubtful that France and Britain could agree to a conference with Soviet involvement because they had so far been ignoring the Soviet Union.”157”

Even many Western politicians and historians had to admit that the Soviet stand on assistance to Czechoslovakia was impeccable. For instance, a prominent British Conservative Party leader L. S. Amery pointed out that "Russia’s attitude throughout the crisis was perfectly clear”. The Soviet Union, he wrote, "consistently backed the conception of collective security." ”158” American historian Arthur H. Furnia also admitted in his study The Diplomacy of Appeasement that unlike Britain and France, "the Soviet Union actually showed a ... willingness to render military assistance to Czechoslovakia." ”159”

The Soviet government held an adamant and determined position also because Polish aggressors were acting hand in glove with those of Hitler Germany against Czechoslovakia.

Back on April 17, 1938, Stomonyakov stated that " Poland is coming into the open as an actual party to the aggressor bloc. In a hurry not to be too late she presented her ultimatum to Lithuania right after the AnschluB and enforced the establishment of diplomatic and all other relations with Lithuania which she ... regards as nothing but (lie beginning of her gradual colonization of Lithuania. Poland is playing an active role in the German plans to resolve the Czechoslovak question. She is openly stirring up the Teszin question... Poland, as is now obvious to 182everybody, is closely bound up with Germany and will go on following in her footsteps." ”160”

On May 25, 1938, Daladier informed the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Surits, that his sounding of Poland’s position in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia had produced the most negative result possible. Not only was there no reason to count on support from Poland, Daladier said, but "there is none to feel sure that Poland will not strike in the back.”161”

J. Beck informed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, on September 19, 1938, that within two days Poland would have considerable forces brought up to the Czechoslovak border, and that he was prepared to contact Hitler or Goring personally about co-ordinating the action by Germany and Poland against Czechoslovakia.”162” On the following day Lipski said as much to Hitler, stressing that Poland "would not shrink from resorting to force" to have her demand met. Hitler assured Lipski that in that case the Third Reich would take Poland’s side.”163”

On September 21, the Polish rulers presented an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government demanding that some areas of Czechoslovakia should be turned over to Poland, and also denounced the 1925 Polish-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty.”164” In the meantime, Polish forces continued to be massed close to the Czechoslovak border. The Polish military attaché in Paris informed the French General Staff that if German troops should attack Czechoslovakia, Polish troops at once would seize the whole of Slovakia which would then be split between Poland and Hungary.”165”

On September 22, the Czechoslovak government, reporting the immediate danger of an attack from Poland, turned to the USSR for support. In response, the Soviet government passed a statement to the Polish government on the very next day to the effect that if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia, the USSR would consider that to be an act of aggression arid would denounce her treaty of non– aggression with Poland.”166” The Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow, Fierlinger, was immediately informed of that statement.”167” That is to say, the Soviet Union once more confirmed its resolute stand in defence of Czechoslovakia.

Referring to the policy of the Soviet Union, British historian John Wheeler-Bennett wrote: "She look every opportunity to prove her willingness to fulfil her obligations to 183France and to Czechoslovakia: again and again this was emphasised in London, in Paris, in Prague, in Geneva and also in Berlin, to the acute embarrassment of the British and French governments. According to all available evidence, the conduct of Russia was exemplary throughout the Czech crisis. She even went beyond the letter of her bond, threatening to denounce her non-aggression treaty with Poland, if that state joined in an attack on Czechoslovakia." ”168”

All that was taking place at a time when the situation was most dangerous for the Soviet Union itself since the Polish government was harbouring the idea of a joint crusade by German and Polish forces against the USSR. The Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, told Bullitt on September 25 that "a war of religion between fascism and Bolshevism was about to begin" and that in the event of the Soviet Union lending assistance to Czechoslovakia, Poland was prepared to go to war against the USSR shoulder to shoulder with Germany. The Polish government was confident, Lukasiewicz declared, that "within three months the Russian Armies would be in complete rout and Russia would no longer preserve even the semblance of a state".”169”

Romania, too, took up a stand to favour the aggressors. Informing the Italian government about Romania’s position, the Romanian Minister in Rome, Zamfirescu, told the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Ciano, that Romania had objected, continued to object and would be objecting to Soviet troops passing through her territory to render assistance to Czechoslovakia. As regards the deterioration of relations between Poland and the USSR over Czechoslovakia, the Romanian Minister said that "Romania would side with Warsaw and in any event the alliance with Poland would take precedence over any pledge to Prague." ”17”° That meant that in case of an armed conflict breaking out because of the German and Polish aggression against Czechoslovakia, with the Soviet Union involved, Romania could, in spite of her alliance with Czechoslovakia, side with the aggressors.”171”

Japan also kept up a threatening posture with respect to the USSR. On September 26 Goring informed the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, that in the event of a German-Soviet conflict, Japan had pledged herself to attack the USSR.”172” The Soviet embassy in Japan also communicated to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on 184September 21 that Japanese newspapers went altogether along with the Nazis over the Czechoslovak question. Some were calling for the Anti-Comintern Pact to be transformed into a military agreement of Germany, Italy and Japan. ”173”

Yet all that notwithstanding, the Soviet Union was still prepared to fulfil its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. The necessary military measures in preparation for such a contingency had been taken well in advance.

On September 21, some Soviet military units were put on the alert in the face of a sharply exacerbated crisis. At the same time, other measures were taken to reinforce the units stationed in the western borderland military districts and enhance their combat preparedness. Altogether, the units on the alert comprised 1 armoured corps, 30 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, 7 armoured brigades, 1 motorized infantry brigade and 12 air brigades, etc. 548 combat aircraft were on hand to be flown to Czechoslovakia. ”174”

On September 25, 1938, the People’s Commissariat of Defence instructed the Soviet Air Attaché in France, Vasilchenko, to communicate the following to the Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin:

 “Our Command has so far taken the following preliminary measures:

1. 30 infantry divisions have been moved into areas in the direct proximity of the western border. So have cavalry divisions.

2. The units concerned have been adequately reinforced with reservists.

3. Our technical forces—Air Force and armoured units are in full fighting trim.” ”175”

This information was passed to the French General Staff on the following day. It was also communicated to the British government in the course of the Anglo-French negotiations then in progress.

A further 17 infantry divisions, 22 armoured and 3 motorised infantry brigades were put on the alert in the closing days of September. A total of up to 330,000 men had been called up for service in the Soviet Armed Forces additionally. ”176”

The facts just cited indicate that the position of all the major parties involved in the events under review became quite clear. The Nazi aggressors were acting with 185increasing impudence day by day. The Polish ruling circles acted in alliance with them. The position of Britain and France, on the other hand, was increasingly defeatist. Not only did they refuse all support for Czechoslovakia, but, on the contrary, they were helping the Nazi Reich annex the Sudetenland and did it so as not to provoke a general war in Europe involving the Western powers as well. It was the Soviet Union alone which stuck to its firm and consistent position and emphatically declared its readiness to fulfil its obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia and lend her effective assistance.

Hitler Mocks His “Appeasers”

On September 22, Chamberlain, in company of Wilson and Strang arrived in Bad-Godesberg, for yet another meeting with Hitler. The British Premier, with a satisfied air, informed Hitler that he had succeeded in obtaining the consent for the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany not only from the British government, but from the French and Czechoslovak governments as well.

Hitler decided, however, to harden his demand so as to take one more step forward towards the liquidation of the Czechoslovak state. “177” Quite unexpectedly for Chamberlain, Hitler struck a blow at him that he had prepared well in advance. He mockingly uttered: "1 am very sorry but now this is no longer enough for us”. In a take-it-or-leave-it tone, he demanded that the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany should be started at once, that is, on September 26, and finished by September 28.”178” At the same time, he now strongly insisted on some areas of Czechoslovakia being turned over to Poland and Hungary. Finally, he declared that there were no more conditions for the existence of the Czechoslovak state. Should his demands be declined, Hitler threatened, there would be war.”179”

In his report on this visit to Bad-Godesberg, Chamberlain had to admit at a British Cabinet meeting that Hitler’s latest demands had been a "considerable shock to him". “18”° In spite of the increasingly brazen demands from the Nazis, the British Premier never gave up his attempts at reaching agreement with them on the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany being carried out "in an orderly 186 manner" so as not to spark off a war. As he was about to leave Bad-Godesberg, Chamberlain assured Hitler that he would do everything possible to have his demands complied with.”181”

Projected Conference of Aggressors and Their Patrons

Britain and France once more considered calling a conference of the Western powers and the Nazi Reich to decide on the "peaceful transfer" of the Sudetenland to Germany, that is, on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Bonnet declared at a French government meeting on September 27 that agreement with Germany had to be sought "at any cost".

On September 28, Chamberlain informed Hitler that he was prepared to come to Germany for the third time to discuss the terms of the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. He pointed out that if the Chancellor so wished, representatives of France and Italy could likewise take part in the negotiations. At the same time, the British Premier expressed his conviction, that is to say, he was actually assuring Hitler, that in this way the Nazi Reich could get its demands met forthwith without war.”182” The U.S. President, on receiving a telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in London, Kennedy, about Chamberlain’s proposal, sent the following message to the British Premier on September 28: "Good man!”. Kennedy, on his part, told Halifax that he was "entirely in sympathy with, and a warm admirer of everything" Chamberlain was doing.”183” So Britain and the U.S. were acting in full harmony.

Following agreement to call a conference of the four powers—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—Halifax informed about this the Czechoslovak Minister in London who, naturally, could not conceal a feeling of surprise.

“But this is a conference to discuss the fate of my country? . . . Are we not being invited to take part?"

“This is a conference of the Great Powers only."

“Then I take it that the Soviet Union is also being invited. After all, Russia has a treaty with my country, too."

“We had no lime to invite the Russians,” the British Lord cut off with irritation.”184”

Winston Churchill gave a very striking description of the 187position of the USSR and Britain in talking with the Soviet Ambassador in London on September 29. "Today Churchill, in a conversation with me,” Maisky wrote, "spoke with great respect and satisfaction of the conduct of the USSR in the present crisis. In particular, he put a very high value on Litvinov’s speech in the Assembly, and on your Note to Poland. The USSR, Churchill said, is doing its international duty, while Britain and France are surrendering to the aggressors. For this reason, the sympathy towards the USSR is fast rising.. .” As to the position of the British government, Churchill criticised it in very strong terms, pointing out that it was leading to the inevitable outbreak of war. Chamberlain’s resolve to "ignore and push away" the USSR, according to Churchill, was "not only absurd but criminal”, and the Anglo-French plan for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was outrageous. “185”

The West German historian Niedhardt, who had thoroughly studied British Public Record Office documents about the Chamberlain government’s policy towards the USSR, slated that it was "downright ignoring and isolation of the Soviet Union".”186”

The Munich Deal

 The conference of Britain, France, Germany and Italy was hold in Munich on September 29 and 30. It ended with the alienation of a largo strip of Czechoslovak territory all along the German-Czechoslovak border and its incorporation in the Reich.

Chamberlain and Daladier arrived in Munich, well prepared to surrender. They did not even try to oppose the demands made by Hitler (technically, those had been presented by Mussolini). On the contrary, Chamberlain and Daladier tried hard to outdo each other in paying compliments about something like a generosity of that offer. Hitler boasted later on that Czechoslovakia had been offered to him in Munich on a platter by her friends.”187”

The representatives of Czechoslovakia wore told about the outcome of the Munich deal by the Four Powers as something like a verdict not subject to appeal. The first announcement was made by Horace Wilson even before the 188conference was over. On entering the "waiting room”, where Czechoslovak representatives, summoned to Munich, had spent hours waiting for this verdict in excitement, he decided to make them happy:

 “It is almost over. You will be glad to know that we have reached agreement on practically everything."

 “And what is to be our fate?"

 “It is not as bad as it might have been."

And Wilson pointed to a strip on the map painted with red ink covering almost half the territory of Czechoslovakia, from the North, West and South, and including almost the whole of the country’s defence line.

 “But this is outrageous! It is cruel and it is criminally stupid!"

 “I am sorry. It is no use arguing." ”188”

That was how Chamberlain and Daladicr struck a deal with the aggressors in Munich, shamelessly letting Czechoslovakia down and helping the fascist aggressors carve her up.

Naturally, the Four Powers did not have the slightest legal ground for arrogating the right to make any decision on that carve-up. Since the deal was a gross violation of the sovereign rights of the Czechoslovak state and was imposed on Czechoslovakia under threat of force, it was illegal.

Roosevelt sent a message of congratulation to Chamberlain through his Ambassador in London Kennedy. Although Kennedy had also totally supported the policy of connivance with German aggression, he did realise that it would eventually do its makers no honour. He showed a certain measure of caution, therefore. On receiving the cable, he read it out to Chamberlain at 10 Downing Street, instead of handing it to him. "I had a feeling that cable would haunt Roosevelt someday, so I kept it." ”189”

With the Four-Power talks in Munich over, Chamberlain offered to confer with Hitler eye-lo-eye. Hitler consented. The British Premier attached paramount importance to that chat. For he saw the Munich deal about the carve-up of Czechoslovakia more as a means to achieve his own ends than anything else. His object was an understanding between the British Empire and the Nazi Reich on all problems of interest to both sides so as to turn German aggression from West to East. Britain’s ruling circles hoped that 189with Hitler’s pressing demand on the Sudetenland gratified, the situation was most propitious for an effort to take the bull by the horns. ”190”

In the course of that conversation with Hitler, Chamberlain gave a fairly transparent account of his own foreign policy programme. Finding it necessary to demonstrate his negative attitude to the USSR, the British Premier pointed out that Hitler did not have to fear any longer that Czechoslovakia would be used as a springboard for "Russian aggression”. He went on to stress that neither did Hitler have to fear that Britain would pursue a policy of military and economic encirclement of Germany in Southeast Europe. What preoccupied him most was an improvement of Anglo-German relations. And he offered Hitler to sign an Anglo-German declaration of non-aggression in recompense for all that Britain had already done for the German aggressors and promised to do later on.

Hitler did not balk at it, and the declaration was signed there and then. That was, in point of fact, an agreement between Britain and Germany on non-aggression and consultations. The Nazi Chancellor found it possible somewhat to sugar the pill of the Munich sellout for the British Premier because it was very important for him to strengthen Chamberlain’s hand. "You don’t refuse a thirsty man a glass of lemonade,” Mussolini remarked on the occasion.”191”

By signing the declaration Nazi Germany did not mean to stick to it, however. On the contrary, right there in Munich the Nazis went on discussing with Mussolini the idea of a German-Italian-Japanese alliance to prepare for war against Britain and France. As the conference ended, Ribbentrop declared that Chamberlain "has today signed the death warrant of the British Empire and left it to us to fill in the date".”192”

What preoccupied the ruling circles of Britain and France most about the Munich deal was to make it as anti-Soviet as possible. This can be seen quite well from the earlier references to the British Cabinet debates on the major foreign policy issues. As much can be seen from some of the diplomatic documents of the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and other countries at the time. On October 4, 1938, the French Ambassador in Moscow, Coulondre, pointed out that the Munich agreement "is particularly menacing to the Soviet Union".”193” Lord Lothian, appointed as 190British Ambassador to the United States shortly afterwards, said that because of Munich the political circles of London believed that Hitler, with Czechoslovakia captured, would inarch on the Ukraine. Everybody was waiting for that to happen, he emphasised.”194”

The anti-Soviet lining of the Four-Power Munich deal has not been passed over by some Western historians either. British historian Wheeler-Bennett pointed out that at the time of Munich in the ruling circles of Britain "there was a secret hope that if the tide of German expansion could be turned eastward, it would dissipate its force on the steps of Russia in a struggle which would exhaust both combatants".”195”

The same was evidenced by a well-known American columnist Walter Lippmann. He wrote that Britain’s Munich policy was rooted "in a last vain hope that Germany and Russia would fight and exhaust one another".”196”

West German historian B. Celovsky admitted that throughout the pre-Munich period the Soviet government had tried to compel a change in the "appeasement policy" so as to create a united front against the aggressors. "Chamberlain and Bonnett did all they could to keep the Soviet Union out. For ideological reasons and for considerations prompted by power politics they were against cooperation with the Soviets”. It was not "the principles of democracy and law, but anti-Bolshevism that the governments of France and Great Britain guided themselves by in their foreign policies."“197” Even Lord Halifax’s biographer Birkenhead had to admit that it was extremely important to deal with the Soviet Union openly as an ally, and "it must be counted a glaring error that more realistic efforts were not made to secure this end".”198”

The Soviet Union clearly saw the danger arising from the Munich deal of the four imperialist powers. The Soviet press pointed out that within a short space of time Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia had fallen victim to fascist invaders. Along with denouncing the aggressors’ action, the press criticised the policy of abetting aggression, which was pursued in London and Paris, and which led to the Munich deal to carve up Czechoslovakia. "The surrender of the so-called democratic countries to the aggressor”, Izvestia wrote, "having ostensibly put off the outbreak of war, is actually bringing it nearer.” ”199”

In summing up the latest course of events, the Soviet head of government V. M. Molotov slated in his report on November 6 that "German imperialism has sliced off more of Czechoslovakia than it could itself have counted on. Some of the spoils went to Poland, as the ally of German fascism in the carve-up of Czechoslovakia.” Only the Soviet Union, he said, has demonstrated its loyalty to the treaties and international commitments it had entered into, and its willingness to oppose aggression. "Only the Soviet Union, the socialist country, has unshakably stood and does stand for lighting fascist aggression and for defending peace, freedom and independence of the peoples from fascist attack." ”20”°

The Munich deal fundamentally changed the situation in Central Europe. Having captured Austria and then some of Czechoslovakia, Hitler Germany substantially strengthened her positions.

Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to the Nazis in Munich. She was forced into accepting an illegal decision whereby she lost much of her territory including economically most important areas, and a considerable proportion of her population. Because of the mixed population of the regions annexed to Germany, 1,161,610 Czechs and Slovaks found themselves under the rule of the Nazi Reich.”201” The newly drawn frontiers cut and disrupted the country’s major transport arteries. Czechoslovakia was deprived of her natural borders and frontier fortifications and found herself utterly defenseless in the face of the fascist aggressor.”202” Half a year later all this was exploited by the Nazi Reich for the complete liquidation of the Czechoslovak state.

The strategic and political positions of France and Britain also turned out to be greatly weakened because of the Munich deal. The Anglo-French hegemony in Europe, which rested on the Treaty of Versailles, was finally done away with. And so was, in point of fact, the system of military alliances France had concluded with other nations of Europe. The League of Nations was buried. The Soviet French Treaty of Mutual Assistance in action against aggression as a means to ensure peace and security in Europe was virtually invalidated. Nazi Germany got the best opportunities for continued expansionism, and, for aggression against Britain and France in particular. French Ambassador in Warsaw Leon Noel admitted in his recollections that "the Munich accords and the betrayal of 192Czechoslovakia arising therefrom represent one of the most pitiful, shameful and humiliating episodes of the policy conducted in the name of France during the period between the two world wars, which led to the most destructive catastrophe in our history.” ”203”

The Munich deal brought nearer the outbreak of the Second World War.

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“APPEASEMENT” POLICY GOING BANKRUPT