NAZI GERMANY TRIGGERS OFF WORLD WAR - Conclusion

 Diplomatic Battles Before World War II - Chapter IV

 Index Page 

 “We Want War"

 Hitler called a conference of Wehrmacht Commanders on August 22, 1939, to tell them lie wanted the war to be started immediately. He claimed, and not without some reason, that although Britain and France had assumed certain obligations in respect of Poland, they would not actually fulfil them.”207”

The German Nazis were no longer satisfied with their bloodless victories. They were preparing for a world war and wanted their recruits to be tried out in a local conflict, that is, in the war against Poland.

Therefore, when the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Ciano asked Ribbentrop: "What do you want: the Corridor 270or Danzig?"—the German Minister cynically declared: " Neither the one, not”1” the other. . . We want war." “208” Hitler informed the Italians that, in the opinion of the German General Staff, it would take from four to six weeks to put Poland to rout. Since autumn rains and slush begin in Poland on October 15, "the last date for the beginning of the operation is the end of August." “209”

In the course of the war with Poland, the Nazis planned to intimidate all of their other possible adversaries, particularly the small nations of Europe, with acts of vandalism without precedent in human history, to get them to surrender without resistance. The Nazis contemplated an inhuman extermination of the population of Poland also with a view to securing "living space" (Lebensraum) for the German "race of masters”. When it came to an armed struggle between Germany and Poland, Hitler told Ribbentrop, "the German Army will be acting cruelly and mercilessly. Throughout the world . . . the Germans are known as Huns, but what will take place in case of war with Poland will outmatch what the Huns did." “21”

Anglo-German Deal Projected at Poland’s Expense

With the world swiftly drifting to war, the British and the French governments made yet another attempt at colluding with the Nazis. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson arrived at the conclusion that, just as in advance of Munich, Chamberlain had to get down to business himself once again. On Henderson’s initiative the British Premier sent a message to Hitler on August 22 which clearly revealed the hypocrisy of Ghamberlainean diplomacy. While pretending that the British government proposed to fulfil its obligations to Poland, Chamberlain pointed out that he was ready to enter into negotiations both to consider the issues in dispute between Germany and Poland, and to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest of Britain and Ger- many. “211”

The action undertaken by the British government was an unequivocal indication that, for the sake of a "general settlement" with Germany, it was ready for another Munich 271situation, this time at the expense of Poland. W. Bullitt, having read Chamberlain’s message, arrived at a far from casual conclusion that "it sounded to me like the preparation for a new Munich".”212” As he informed the U.S. Ambassador in London, Kennedy, of the substance of his message, on the following day, Chamberlain himself confessed that Britain’s policy on Poland was the same as it was on Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich. “213”

Instead of affording assistance to Poland, in co-operation with the USSR, the British government drastically intensified pressure on her to make her surrender to Germany without waiting for a war to break out.

The United States also decided to do its bit towards yet another Munich, because it did not hope that Britain and France could hold out in case of war. On August 23, Kennedy urged in a message to the U.S. government that some pressure should be brought to bear on Poland urgently. "I see no other possibility”,”214” he concluded. Joseph Kennedy, therefore, did not even suggest that Britain, France and the U.S. should exercise any pressure on Germany, that is, the aggressor, and found Poland’s surrender to be the only "way out".

On August 23, Roosevelt addressed a message to the Italian king, and on August 24 to the Nazi Chancellor and the President of Poland, calling on them to work towards a peaceful settlement of the disputes that had developed.

With the arrival in London of the British Ambassador to Germany, Henderson, who was, like Chamberlain, a committed partisan of an accommodation with Germany, there was yet more speculation about another shameful deal with the Fiihrer in the making. Bullitt, for instance, cabled to the Department of State that, according to his information, the British Premier had agreed with his ambassador in Berlin about "preparing a careful betrayal of Poland using a variation of the technique that they employed so successfully on Czechoslovakia." “215”

Describing the situation as it shaped up, I. M. Maisky pointed out on August 26 that "there is certainly some Munich mood in the air”. The British government, Roosevelt, the Pope, the Belgian king, to mention just a few, he wrote, are feverishly groping for some ground on which to “compromise” on the Polish issue.”216” It was likewise noted in the Diaries of Oliver Harvey (Assistant to Halifax) on 272August 27 that "another attempt at a Munich and selling out on the Poles" were in preparation. "Horace Wilson and A. A. Butler are working like beavers for this”, he stressed.”217”

As one can see from the minutes of British Cabinet meetings, which have now become available to historians, Halifax declared at one of them that the capture of Danzig, of itself was not yet providing a casus belli for Britain.”218” That meant that Britain did not intend to come to Poland’s aid if the war began over Danzig. Chamberlain still believed, as late as August 26, that it was possible to reach an accommodation with Hitler. Setting out the Fuhrer’s position as he saw it, the British Premier said at a Cabinet meeting: "The basic idea was that if Britain would leave Herr Hitler alone in his sphere (Eastern Europe), he would leave us alone".”219” London was prepared for a new deal with the Fiihrer on the same terms.

On the following day, August 27 Chamberlain and Halifax informed Hitler again—through their unofficial mediator, the Swedish industrialist Dahlerus, who plied between London and Berlin, that they "desired a settlement with Germany". “22”°

Meanwhile, the Nazis were about through with their preparations for war. On August 23, the Danzig Nazis declared their Fiihrer Vorster to be the head of municipal authorities. That was a premeditated act of provocation designed to invite the retaliation by the Polish government which was to serve as a pretext for Germany’s "defensive measures" against Poland, that is, for the launching of hostilities.

Under those circumstances, the British government signed a mutual assistance agreement with Poland on August 25. Yet, it did not so much as suspect that so belated an agreement could save Poland from defeat. On the very next day Henderson said at the British Cabinet Meeting that "the real value of our guarantee to Poland was to enable Poland to come to a negotiated settlement with Germany". “221” However, even this evaluation proved exaggerated.

The British government made further attempts to come to terms with the Nazis. On August 28, Chamberlain sent another message to Hitler, urging him to settle the German Polish conflict so as to get down to drafting a “broad” Anglo-German agreement. He expressly pointed out that he had a "sincere desire to reach agreement".”222”

The full meaning of that message was revealed, for instance, in a dispatch Hitler sent to Mussolini who was in close contact with the British government in those days. "II Duce" wrote that Chamberlain’s message contained "the pre-requisites and elements of what Germany would find as a favourable solution of all the problems of interest to her".”223”

Although it became known in London by that time that the Nazi Reich had concentrated a large number of divisions to strike at Poland in a matter of days, it was agreed at a British Cabinet meeting on August 30 that "these military concentrations afforded no valid argument against further negotiations with the German government". “224” On the same day, Chamberlain admitted in talking to Kennedy that he was "more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans”, considering that it was the Poles that had to yield ground. The British Premier declared that "what really needs to be done is to work out the whole European economic political problem" which he was " willing to do with Hitler".”225”

The French government proceeded along the same lines. Daladier reminded the Fiihrer in a message: "No Frenchman has done more than 1 did for strengthening not only peace between our countries, but sincere co-operation".”226”

However, Hitler did not propose to change his plans. The only reason why he kept up contact with the British government and even offered to conclude an Anglo-German alliance, “227” was because he wanted the impending armed conflict between Germany and Poland to be localized. He had no intention of concluding any agreement with Britain at all. Back on August 22 the German government issued an instruction about the line to take on various soundings for the possibility of opening negotiations: entering any negotiations was strictly forbidden.”228”

Nazis Go to War

Preparations for an attack on Poland were in full swing in the meantime. To attack Poland, Germany had concentrated 57 divisions and 2 brigades (including 6 armoured and 8 motorized divisions), which had strength of over one 274and a half million, more than 2,500 tanks and up to 2,000 combat aircraft.”229”

At daybreak on the 1st of September 1939, the German forces invaded Poland at three points. All the attempts of the British and French governments to come to agreement with Nazi Germany failed ignominiously. They had to face an extremely daunting task. They had themselves put England and France into an appallingly precarious predicament. The British and French governments could not count on a victory over Germany. Yet they presumed that to shirk their allied commitments to Poland would be still worse, as that would mean that Germany would swallow up Poland, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, one by one, and, with the resources of all these countries at their disposal in addition to their own, the aggressors would turn against France and England. “23”°

England and France had to declare a state of war with Germany. It was now a world war.

CONCLUSION

The invasion of Poland by the forces of Nazi Germany was the opening act of the Second World War which involved all the Great Powers and many other nations. The war began as an imperialist war, and the responsibility for its outbreak lies with imperialism as a social-economic system.

Three imperialist powers were the major fire-brands of the Second World War: militarist Japan which had launched a drive for the domination of the Asian continent back in 1931; Nazi Germany which, as the strongest and, therefore, the most dangerous vulture, led the aggressor bloc’s struggle for a redivision of the world; and fascist Italy which set out in 1935 to expand her colonial empire in Africa and then, to bring the Mediterranean area under her control.

Co-operation of Britain and France with the Soviet Union could have forestalled the war. But the British and French governments did not wish to co-operate with the USSR. They were dreaming of a war between Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other, in which their imperialist rivals would have worn themselves out, while the Soviet state would have been weakened or even destroyed.

To channel German aggression against the USSR, the ruling circles of Britain and France sought to put this country into a state of international isolation. That was one of the aims behind the Munich sellout. By trying to isolate the Soviet Union, Britain and France got themselves isolated, however, having undermined their own international positions.

The Soviet Union was the only country to have done whatever it could throughout the prewar years towards a collective effort by a number of nations to keep the peace and curb the increasingly arrogant aggressors. That was the concern behind the Soviet proposal for a definition of aggression, the draft Eastern Pact, the offer to conclude the Pacific Pact, the determination to reinforce the League of Nations, and the effort to bring about a dependable collective peace-keeping front during the Three-Powers Talks in Moscow in 1939. However, the Soviet proposals were not supported by the governments of the Western Powers.

Taking advantage of the disunity of the nations they had aggressive designs on, the fascist powers triggered off the Second World War.

Co-operation between the USSR, Britain and France in setting up a collective peace-keeping front could have raised dependable barriers in the way of the fascist aggressors. By their ignominious policy of connivance at aggression, and by their class-inspired imperialist policy of abetting German and Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union, the reactionary circles of the Western Powers made it possible for the fascist aggressors to start the Second World War.