SOVIET-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT
Diplomatic Battles Before World War II - Chapter IV
SOVIET-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT
Soviet diplomacy was doing all it could to create a
collective front to safeguard peace against aggression. It believed that peace
in Europe could still be preserved by joint efforts of all the nations keen on
preventing German aggression. Unfortunately, those efforts by the Soviet
government were not crowned with success because of the policies of Britain and
France.
The USSR remained, in point of fact, in international isolation in which it had found itself in the autumn of 1938 as a result of the Munich deal of Britain and France with German and Italian aggressors. Moreover, the Soviet Union had to take into account the fact that in the event of a German attack, it could be attacked also by certain of its western neighbours, as well as by Japan. So the Soviet state found itself face to face with a threat of war on two fronts. Besides, there was a danger of an anti-Soviet collusion of the entire imperialist camp.
The most important task before the Soviet diplomacy
was to forestall such a war. Since general peace and security could not be
assured through the fault of Britain, France, the United States and some other
countries, Soviet diplomacy had to do everything possible to limit the spread
of German aggression and to keep the USSR as long as possible from being
involved in war. It had to take steps to prevent the Soviet Union finding
itself in a state of war in the West and in the East at once under extremely
disadvantageous international conditions.
German Nazis Fearful of War with the USSR
Ever since the opening days of 1939, the German
government began to show interest in normalizing relations with the USSR in
some way. As one can see from utterances of Hitler and German military
spokesmen, the Soviet Union was the only power whom Nazi Germany really feared
to get into conflict with, and with whose position she reckoned.
Intent on channeling German aggression against the
USSR the bourgeois propaganda machinery of the Western powers kept harping on
the weakness of the Red Army and the fragility of the Soviet home front.
Bourgeois newspapers kept claiming that the USSR was a giant with feet of clay.
They sought to convince Hitler that he would quite easily make short shrift of
the Soviet Union. It must be noted at this point, however, that they did not
succeed in convincing Hitler and it was the ruling circles of the Western
powers themselves that fell for these tales. Lord Halifax claimed at a meeting
of the British government’s Foreign Policy 255Committee on July 4, that
"Hitler rated Russia low from the military point of view”. “153” Hence,
the natural conclusion: Nazi Germany will go East. Subsequently the British
people had to pay in blood for the wishful thinking Chamberlain and his
following substituted for reality.
The Nazis themselves used to write quite a lot in
those years about the weakness of the USSR in an attempt to sustain the hope of
the governing quarters of the Western powers that all the concern of the Nazi
Reich was to do away with the Soviet State. When it came, however, to deciding,
by deed, not by word, who of the opponents was the weaker side, and with whom
it was less dangerous to fight, it turned out that Germany was prepared to
measure swords with anybody but the Soviet Union in 1939.”154”
The German military command, taking into account the
Red Army’s strength, considered that to fight the Soviet Union Germany must
first build up her military potential at the expense of the countries of
Western Europe, to " safeguard the rear”, create the necessary coalition
and create a wide springboard for attack.”155”
This was proved with conclusive evidence by the
testimonials of German generals Keitel and Brauchitsch. Asked by Hitler to say
what would happen if the Reich attacked Poland, and France and Britain would
come to her aid, both generals said they felt that Germany would finish Poland
up within a month. Keitel believed that Germany would then crush France and
Britain as well. Then Hitler put another question, what would happen if the
USSR came out against Germany, too? General Brauchitsch replied that in that
case "Germany would be beaten".”156”
The Nazis realised that had there been close
co-operation between the USSR, Britain and France, Germany would have found
herself in a very tight corner. Referring to Hitler’s comments in his
conversation with Wehrmacht chiefs, the chief of the General Staff of Germany’s
Land Forces, Haider, said: "It’s hard to swallow a pact between the
British and the Russians. . . On the other hand, it’s the only tiling that will
slop Hitler now."“157” Ribbentrop’s representative W. Hewel also quoted
the Nazi Chancellor’s comment that in the event of the Moscow talks ending up
in the conclusion of an alliance between the Western powers and the USSR, he
would have had to give up the idea of attacking Poland. If the Western powers
failed to sign an alliance 256with the USSR, Hitler declared, "I can smash
Poland without any danger of a conflict with the West." “158”
This has been confirmed also by diaries of Weizsacker,
State Secretary of German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He wrote on July 30
that whether or not there was to be a war that summer depended on the outcome
of the Anglo– Franco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow.”159”
Spokesmen of a faction within the German ruling
establishment who believed that Germany was not prepared for a major war as yet
and feared that one more warlike venture by Hitler could end up in Germany’s
defeat, sent their representative to London to warn the British about Hitler’s
plans. The man they had chosen to carry out that mission was an official of the
German Foreign Ministry, Erich Kordt, whose brother Theodor Kordt worked as
counsellor of the German embassy in London. The trip was undertaken under a
perfectly plausible pretext: Erich had decided to pay a visit to his brother.
Having arrived in London in the latter half of May, Erich Kordt had a secret
meeting with R. Vansittart. lie warned that Hitler was still sure that Britain
and France did not intend to lend Poland effective help. "What he is
frightened of is Soviet Russia”, “16”° Erich Kordt declared.
Early in August Hitler declared on several occasions
that he would not undertake military operations against Poland before he felt
sure that Russia would not come to her aid.”161”
The USSR Rejected German Proposals
Since Hitler did not consider Germany for the time
being to be adequately prepared to attack the USSR, he told Ribbentrop that it
was "necessary to stage a new Rapallo episode in German-Russian
relations" and that "it will be necessary to pursue a policy of
equilibrium and economic cooperation with Moscow for a certain period of
time".”162” As Weizsacker wrote later on, they had "begun to woo
the Russians". ”163”
That became apparent shortly afterwards from the tone
of German press comments. The German papers gradually stopped publishing all
references to German plans with regard to the Ukraine just as any of their
typical anti-Soviet insinuations. At the New Year’s reception on
January 12, 257Hitler chatted for a few minutes with Soviet
Ambassador A. F. Merekalov, something he had never done before on similar
occasions. Hitler subsequently confessed that at that very reception he set
course towards an accord with the USSR.”164” It was likewise typical of
Hitler’s speeches of January 20 and April 28 that they lacked his earlier
standard invectives against the Soviet Union. On May 12, 1939, the Soviet
Charge d’Affaires in Germany, G. A. Astakhov, reported to Moscow that "the
Germans are striving to create the impression of German-Soviet relations
becoming or having already become warmer. Dismissing all absurd rumors
fabricated here by the Germans or by importune foreign correspondents, one can
state for the time being only one thing as a certain fact, and that is a marked
change of the tone of the German press in dealing with us... But, while noting
these points, we cannot, of course, close our eyes to their outstanding
superficiality and to their character that is in no way binding on the Germans.
. . The motives which make the Germans change their tone in dealing with us are
much too clear to take them seriously enough." ”165”
Representatives of the German government most
cautiously broached the question of a possible improvement of German-Soviet
relations also in their conversations with Soviet diplomats. So, on May 17,
Astakhov conferred with a high-ranking German Foreign Ministry official, an
expert on economic affairs, J. Schnurre, on the question of the status of the
Soviet trade delegation in Prague. During that conversation Schnurre tried to
touch also "the subject of an improvement of Soviet-German relations”. The
German representative started making "assurances that Germany has no
aggressive designs whatsoever in respect of the USSR" and asked what was
to be done to dispel Soviet mistrust. However, Astakhov declared that the
Soviet government had no "evidence about any fundamental change of German
policy”. He remarked tersely that an improvement of the climate in relations
between the two countries depended on the German government.”168”
On May 20, the German Ambassador in Moscow, von
Schulenburg, raised with Molotov the question of resuming economic
conversations. To that end he proposed a visit by J. Schnurre to Moscow. The
Soviet government, however, did not consider it possible, in view of the
strained political 258relations between the USSR and Germany, to conduct
negotiations about increasing trade and economic links between the two
countries. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs indicated as much to the
German Ambassador He pointed out that economic conversations had begun several
times with Germany during the recent period, but invariably proved inconclusive.
That was what gave the Soviet government the reason to tell the German side
that it had the impression that the German government meant to stage a kind of
game instead of businesslike negotiations on trade and economic issues. For
this sort of game the People’s Commissar said in his conversation with
Schulenburg, Germany should look for another country as a partner, not the USSR
which had no intention of joining in such a game.”167” Discouraged by that
answer, Schulenburg called on Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin straightaway
and “complained” to him in confusion that he was at a loss about what he should
report to his government. But Potemkin could not “comfort” the Ambassador
either.”168”
That negative reply, although the Germans were
prepared for it, could not but discourage them. The men in Berlin began
planning further “moves” in confusion, but, fearful of yet another setback,
they did not venture to make them. An outline letter to Schulenburg, prepared
by Weizsacker, reflected the apprehension that yet another appeal to the USSR
"risked inviting another refusal”. Tn the final text of the letter mailed
to Moscow on May 27, Weizsacker pointed out that a further German approach
could make Moscow burst into laughter. Therefore Schulenburg was told to
exercise "complete restraint" for the time being.”169”
With Hitler’s approval it was decided to undertake a
further sounding in Berlin. On May 30 Weizsacker pointed out in his
conversation with Astakhov that Germany had taken off the agenda the
"Ukrainian question" thereby removing a pretext for a war between the
two countries. He said there was a chance of improving Soviet-German relations.
"If the Soviet Government wants to talk on this subject,” he continued,
"there is such an opportunity. If, however, it means to ’encircle’ Germany
together with Britain and France and wants to act against Germany, we will get
ready for it." ”17”°
After that conversation Weizsacker put down in his
diary 259that the German government was "making advances" but
the Russians were still "showing mistrust”. ”171”
On June 17, 1939, Schulenburg, coming to Berlin for
more instructions, talked it over with Aslakhov in yet more definite terms.”172” Referring
to Astakhov’s conversation with Weizsacker, Schulenburg asked why the Soviet
government was not reacting to the questions Weizsacker had put. Yet he got no
answer to his own question either. The Soviet government did not reply to the
approaches of Nazi diplomats, while pressing on for an agreement with Britain
and France. Schulenburg had to state in his report about this conversation that
Astakhov had once more emphasised Moscow’s distrust in Germany’s policy.”173”
On his return to Moscow, Schulenburg called on the
Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on June 29. He assured him that
"the German government desires not only to normalise but even improve its
relations with the USSR”. Schulenburg stressed that this statement, which he
made on behalf of Ribbentrop, had Hitler’s approval. In the course of this
conversation he referred, in particular, to the 1926 Soviet-German Treaty of
Neutrality. The Soviet People’s Commissar ironically expressed his amazement at
the fact that the German government still remembered that treaty; the Soviet
government had quite a few doubts on this score. Considering the actual record
of experience, the People’s Commissar pointed out, the validity of treaties
could well be open to doubt. ”174”
On the following day, the German Ministry for Foreign
Affairs cabled an urgent message to Schulenburg to tell him that "in the
political field enough has been said until further instructions and that for
the moment the talks should not be taken up again by us".”175” For a
whole month the Germans no longer ventured to approach the Soviet government on
these matters.
The soundings were resumed late in July when Britain’s
consent to start military conversations with the USSR became known in Berlin.
On July 24 J. Schnurre, with reference to Ribbentrop, told G. A. Astakhov
"about the need to improve political relations between the USSR and
Germany”. He expressed his disappointment over the fact that "the People’s
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs left unanswered all German overtures with the
view of talking this subject over".”176” In a subsequent conversation
with 260Astakhov on July 26, Schnurre repeated these remarks.”177”
On August 3, 1939, G. A. Astakhov was
invited to see Ribbentrop. The German Minister declared that there were no
unresolvable issues between the USSR and Germany "all over the land from
the Black Sea to the Baltic. Agreement on all of these issues can be achieved
if the Soviet government shares these underlying principles”. In an effort to
put up some pressure, Ribbentrop did not conceal that Germany was conducting
secret negotiations with Britain and France. At the same time Ribbentrop
resorted once more to unequivocal threats. "If you have different
prospects”, he said, "if, for instance, you consider that the best way to
adjust relations with us is by inviting Anglo-French Missions to Moscow, that
is, of course, up to you. As far as we are concerned, we do not pay any
attention to all the hue and cry against us from the camp of so-called West
European democracies. We are strong enough to look at their threats with
contempt and derision. We are sure of our strength; there is no war which we
could not win." ”178”
On the same day, German Ambassador Schulenburg put the
same questions to Molotov. After pointing out that normalization of
Soviet-German relations would meet the desire of the Soviet government, the
People’s Commissar declared straight away that it was not through the Soviet
government’s fault that these relations had deteriorated, and pinpointed the
Anti-Comintern Pact as the root cause behind bad German-Soviet relations. The
People’s Commissar went on to cite examples of anti-Soviet foreign policy of
the Third Reich; support for, and encouragement of Japanese aggression against
the USSR and the Munich Agreement. How could all that be reconciled with the
Ambassador’s assurances that Germany had no hostile designs against the USSR?
He then made it clear that the Soviet government did not trust the peaceful
assurances of the Nazis regarding Poland. A peaceful settlement of the Polish
question, he said, depends, above all, on the German side.”179”
Schulenburg’s conclusions from that conversation were
disappointing once again. In his dispatch to Berlin on August 4, he stated that
the Soviet government "was determined to conclude an agreement with
Britain and France." ”18”° Three days later Schulenburg wrote that in
Moscow "at every word and at every step one can sense the great 261distrust
towards us. That this is so, we have known for a long time.” The unfortunate
part of it is that the mistrust is very easily kindled, "and can only be
allayed slowly and with difficulty.” ”181”
Weizsacker stated on August B that the Germans were
making increasingly hard efforts to reach an agreement, but Moscow left those
feelers unheeded. ”182”
There is enough documentary evidence to indicate that
the Soviet government saw through the insidious designs of the Nazis. For
instance, on August 8, 1939, G. A. Astakhov reported to Moscow that Nazi chiefs
were not, naturally, going "to respect appropriate eventual commitments in
earnest and for a long time. I think only that in the foreseeable future, they
find possible a certain measure of agreement. . . As to the way things may
shape up in the future, everything would depend, of course, not on these
commitments, but on a new environment that would be created.” G. A. Astakhov
pointed out that the Germans were "obviously worried by our conversations
with Anglo-French military men, and they are not stinting any arguments and
promises of the largest possible order so as to forestall an eventual military
agreement. For this sake, they are not prepared, as far as I can see, to make
such declarations and gestures as could have seemed ruled out altogether
several years back".”183”
Even Western students and political journalists have
had to recognise the extreme complexity of the Soviet Union’s position in view
of the reluctance of the Western powers to co-operate with it in the defence of
peace in Europe. Here is, for instance, an excerpt from a book by British
historian L. Mosley about the opening stages of the Second World War. Speaking
of the natural rise of suspicion in the USSR regarding the motives behind
Britain’s and France’s policies, he wrote that the Soviet leaders realised that
they "could trust neither side. They feared that at any moment the
procrastinating representatives of the democracies and the tempting talkers in
Berlin would reveal themselves as tricksters and turn to each other once again
as they had at Munich, leaving the Russians more isolated than ever. It was a
time for caution." ”184”
Without ever reacting to the advances by German
diplomats, the Soviet government persistently strove for the success of the
Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. But in the 262middle of August it became
perfectly obvious to the Soviet government that it was altogether impossible to
come to terms with the governments of Britain and France about the conclusion
of an effective treaty of mutual assistance.
So there was a kind of vicious circle: Britain and
France wanted an accommodation with Germany, but she balked at it; German
strove to get a treaty of non-aggression signed with the USSR, but the Soviet
government turned down the German offers; the USSR was seeking a treaty of
mutual assistance with Britain and France, but they shied away from it.
Incontestable evidence that Britain and France did not
want to co-operate with the Soviet Union was provided by the British
government’s documents about Anglo– Franco-Soviet conversations which have
recently been declassified (although not in their totality) and made available
to researchers. None of the pronouncements of Chamberlain, Halifax and any
other British Ministers at Cabinet meetings or in the Foreign Policy Committee,
nor the memoranda submitted for their consideration contained any statements or
documents to attest to a desire to conclude an effective treaty with the USSR
about mutual assistance in opposing Nazi aggression. On the contrary, as shown
earlier on, these documents prove beyond dispute that the British ruling
quarters pursued entirely different objectives in the conversations with the
USSR.
Right until mid-August 1939, that is, so long as the
slightest hope remained for the conclusion of an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement,
the Soviet government left all German approaches unanswered. Yet because of the
breakdown of the Three-Power talks, it was no longer possible to ignore the
German overtures.
Since the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks were clearly
inconclusive, the Soviet government faced, in point of fact, the following
alternative:
either to watch passively how Germany was overrunning
or otherwise bringing into submission all the East European countries bordering
on the USSR, occupying advantageous strategic vantage grounds for a subsequent
attack on the USSR, and that at a time when any armed conflict breaking out
near Soviet frontiers could erupt into full scale hostilities;
or, taking advantage of Germany’s indisposition to go
to 263war against the USSR at the time, to do everything possible under
the circumstances for limiting the spread of German aggression so as to
safeguard to the utmost the interests of the USSR as well as those of other
nations and peoples of Eastern Europe, and to avert the possibility of
spontaneous unpremeditated hostilities between Germany and the USSR.
Meanwhile, German diplomacy grew increasingly active.
On August 14, 1939, Schulenburg got instructions
from Ribbentrop to call on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on
an urgent mission to make a statement that Britain and France were trying again
to drive the Soviet Union into war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had
serious consequences for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both
countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and Russia in
the interests of Western powers. By drawing such a prospect of Germany’s war
against the USSR, the German government expressed its willingness to conclude a
non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. On the following day, the German
Ambassador read out this statement to Molotov. Reporting to Berlin about it,
Schulenburg pointed out that although the People’s Commissar had welcomed
Germany’s intention to improve relations with the USSR, he still gave no
straight reply to the questions asked, including the one about a possible
arrival of Ribbentrop in Moscow.”185”
Berlin grew manifestly impatient. On August 17
Schulenburg called on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs once
again to confirm that Germany was prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact
and ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the USSR, also the German
government promised to exercise influence on Japan for normalizing
Japanese-Soviet relations. Schulenburg reported that Germany’s Minister for
Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop was prepared to come to Moscow on August 18 or on
any subsequent day.”186” Hitler declared that he was prepared to come to
Moscow personally if need be.”187”
The reply given to the German Ambassador was that
Soviet-German relations should be improved through a series of practical steps,
while the coming of the German Minister was impossible without preliminary
thorough arrangements. Moreover, the People’s Commissar again referred to
Germany’s anti-Soviet foreign policy down the years.”188”
On instructions from Ribbentrop, Schulenburg,
conferring with Molotov on August 19, once more insisted on the immediate visit
by the German Minister to Moscow, only to be refused once again. ”189”
Non-Aggression Pact Signed
On August 20,
1939, Hitler addressed a message to Stalin to say that a "crisis may arise
any day" and it might involve the Soviet Union unless it agreed to sign a
non– aggression treaty with Germany. "1 therefore again propose”, the
message said, "that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22,
but, at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has the
fullest powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact." “19”°
It was impossible to decline the German overtures any
longer. For it was necessary to forestall the outbreak of war across the Soviet
Western border, when Soviet forces in the Far East were already engaged in
fierce fighting against the Japanese aggressors in the area of the Khalkin-Gol
River, that is there was a serious danger of war breaking out in the West and
in the East at once, with the USSR having to fight it without any allies. In no
way overestimating the value of the treaties signed with Germany, the Soviet
government still found it necessary to accept the German offer this time.
It was in the evening of August 21, following the
inconclusive last session of the conversations between the British, French and
Soviet military missions, that the Soviet government finally agreed to the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs coming to Moscow on August 23.
But that did not mean that the Soviet government had
given up all further attempts to get an agreement concluded with Britain and
France. On the following morning, foreign news agency reporters in Moscow were
told that Ribbentrop’s arrival for the conclusion of the non-aggression pact
was not inconsistent with the continuation of negotiations between the British,
French and Soviet military delegations with a view to organising resistance to
aggression. On the contrary, the conclusion of the non-aggression pact was
quite compatible with the conclusion of a triple alliance between France,
Britain and the USSR, These acts 265did not cancel each other out at all. The
Anglo-Franco– Soviet pact, supplemented with a military agreement, had the aim
of checking Germany, if she persisted in her aggressive designs. For the USSR
and Germany to have concluded a non-aggression pact would have meant reducing
the tension between the two countries. “191”
Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on August 23 to sign the
non-aggression pact.
One cannot help noting in this context a difference of
principle between the approach of the governments of Britain and France, on the
one hand, and that of Germany, on the other, to negotiations with the USSR. The
German government unequivocally declared through its Ambassador in Moscow that
it wished to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR. The German head of
government addressed a special message to Stalin on this matter. There was the
German Foreign Minister in Moscow. These facts could not but point to Germany’s
true desire to conclude a treaty with the USSR without any delay. But all that
was in sharp contrast to the attitude of London and Paris to the negotiations
with the Soviet Union. While the Soviet government had spent months on end for
inconclusive negotiations with Britain and France, it took but one day to draw
up the text of the Soviet-German Treaty of Nonaggression and sign it.
The Treaty, signed in the small hours of August 24,
contained the commitments of non-aggression (Article I) and a statement on
refusing assistance to a power attacking one of the contracting parties
(Article II). Both parties undertook to inform one another on matters involving
their common interests (Article III) and to stay out of any group of powers,
directly or indirectly spearheaded against the other party. The Treaty was
concluded for a term of 10 years.
The Soviet government’s decision to conclude this
treaty was an enforced, but the only right one, too, under the circumstances of
the day because there had been no chance of ever creating an
Anglo-Franco-Soviet coalition.
Conferring with the French Ambassador on August 23,
1939, Molotov emphasised that the Soviet government had decided to conclude the
treaty with Germany only after it had definitely found that it could achieve
nothing positive through the Anglo-Franco-Soviet conversations.”192”
In an interview for Izvestia, People’s Commissar for
Defence Voroshilov also pointed out that the USSR had concluded a
non-aggression pact with Germany because the "military conversations with
France and Britain have reached a deadlock because of insurmountable
differences." “193”
Even the French military attache in the USSR, Palasse
admitted that throughout the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, the Soviet government
showed its sincere interest in the conclusion of the Three-Power agreement and
that to sign a treaty with Germany was the only right step for it to take under
the circumstances. Writing on August 27 about the position of the Soviet
government, he said: "1 still believe that fearful of the excessive
strengthening of Germany, it would have preferred an agreement with France and
with Britain, should it have proved possible at all.” “194”
The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, declared at a session of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR a few days later that since the negotiations with Britain
and France showed there was no grooving for expecting to conclude a mutual
assistance pact with them, the Soviet government could not fail to consider
other ways of removing the danger of war between Germany and the USSR.
"Our duty”, he stressed, "is to think of the interests of the Soviet
people and of the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The
more so since we are firmly convinced that the interests of the USSR coincide
with the basic interests of the people of other countries." “195”
The German government, while concluding the treaty of
non-aggression with the USSR, pledged itself not to encroach on Soviet land. At
the same time, it was to relinquish its plans of alienation of the Soviet
Ukraine and to create a vassal "Ukrainian state" as, equally, the
plans for its domination of the Baltic states including the idea of turning
them into a springboard from which to attack the USSR.
By signing the non-aggression pact with Germany, the
Soviet government contributed towards peace-keeping in the Far Eastern border
areas of the USSR. The conclusion of the treaty caused confusion among the
governing quarters of Japan which counted on Germany as their main ally in a
war against the USSR. "The news of the conclusion of the non-aggression
pact between the USSR and 267Germany has produced a staggering impression over
there, causing obvious disarray, particularly among the militarists and the
fascist camp”,”196” said a message from the Soviet Embassy in Japan. The
Hiranuma government, which was building its policy on anti-Soviet collaboration
with Germany fell. Japan had to reconsider her plans and to refrain from
invading the Soviet Far East for a while.
Japan found her position weakened in respect of China
as well. On August 26, 1939, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, Yang Chieh said
in a conversation with S. A. Lozovsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, that he welcomed the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of
non-aggression because that treaty "will, no doubt, be a blow to Japan.” “197”
The Soviet Government did, naturally, realise that it
was impossible to rely on the non-aggression pact with Germany providing safety
from aggression. It was clear that as soon as Nazis found themselves strong
enough to do so, they would bring all their forces into action against the
USSR.”198”
When the Soviet-German non-aggression pact came up for
ratification in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it was stressed that it
"cannot blunt our vigilance".”199”
The USSR Wanted Talks with Britain and France Continued
Even after the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of
Non-Aggression, the Soviet government was still interested in co-operating with
Britain and France. As the French Ambassador, Naggiar communicated to the U.S.
Ambassador in Moscow, L. Steinhardt on August 23, Molotov had told him that
"the non-aggression pact with Germany is not inconsistent with an alliance
of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union”. The
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars noted, however, the difficulties
arising from Poland’s refusal to accept Soviet aid. “20”° Molotov also
emphasised that the SovietFrench Treaty remained in force as it stood.”201”
The French military attache in Moscow, Palasse, cabled
to Paris on the same day: "I still consider that for the USSR to have
settled the matter by concluding an 268agreement with Germany was nothing but
the best of the two evils, and, perhaps, a means of exercising pressure with a
view to bringing about a sound and integrally well-welded coalition as soon as
possible which, as it has always seemed to me, is an object of the Soviet
leaders’ desire."“202” On August 24, the Foreign Office informed the
British embassy in Washington about Molotov’s statement that "
negotiations with France and Britain could be continued somewhat later, say in
a week".”203”
However, the British and French military missions were
ordered back to London and Paris. When they paid a courtesy call on Voroshilov
on August 25, the latter told them: "Unfortunately, we have not succeeded
in coming to agreement this time. But let us hope that on another occasion our
work will be more successful." “204”
The matter came up again during the conversation the
Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, S. A. Lozovsky, had with
Yang Chieh, the Chinese Ambassador, on August 26. Replying to the Ambassador’s
question as to whether the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations would continue, the
Deputy People’s Commissar declared that "negotiations with Britain and France
went on for five months, and the departure of the delegation is but an episode
in these talks. Delegations come and go, but the issue of the battle for peace
remains. This departure is not due in any way to the conclusion of the
non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany, but to a lack of agreement on
a number of issues. Should Britain and France accept the proposals of the
Soviet government, the possibility of a treaty being concluded with them cannot
be ruled out.. . At the present time, the negotiations are being suspended, but
their resumption depends on Britain and France".”205”
What was to be done further on was an issue that came
up for debate at a French government meeting on August 24. Daladier expressed
the view that negotiations with the Russians should be resumed. On the
following day, one of his assistants, R. Genebrier suggested that a former
French Air Minister Pierre Cot (who had consistently advocated co-operation
with the USSR ever since 1933) should be sent to Moscow, in the hope that he
could bring off the process of concluding an agreement. Doumenc also suggested
that it was still possible to conclude an alliance 269with the USSR. Yet no
positive decisions on the matter were taken by the French government.”206”
The Chamberlain government made feverish attempts in
those days, however, to secure a last-minute agreement with the rulers of the
Nazi Reich, having lost all interest in the negotiations with the Soviet Union.
So the events in the closing week of August of 1939 finally confirmed that what
London and Paris sought was not an agreement with the USSR, but yet another
imperialist collusion with the Nazi Reich.
The course of events made it quite clear how
far-sighted and correct the Soviet government’s policy was. Just as it feared,
Britain and Prance did not offer the slightest aid to Poland after she had been
attacked by the Nazi Reich. As long as there was a war going on in the Fast of
Europe, the French forces were sitting it out behind the Maginot Line. That was
the beginning of what came to be called the "phony war”. Had the USSR
imprudently assumed any unilateral commitments at the time of the Anglo–
Franco-Soviet talks while the British and French governments dodged all
concrete obligations regarding active opposition to the aggressor in the West
with fairly large forces, the Soviet Union could have found itself in a state
of war with Germany without any true allies.
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