OPPOSITE REACTIONS TO GERMANY’S AGGRESSIVE PLANS AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II - Chapter III

Index Page 

 Operation “Grün”

 After the annexation of Austria, the German General Staff got down, under instructions from Hitler, to laying the ground for the seizure of Czechoslovakia ( Operation “Griin”). In the military sense, the capture of Czechoslovakia was an uneasy task, however. Germany had not yet completed her preparations for a major war. At the same time, the Czechoslovak Army was rightfully considered one of the best armies in capitalist Europe in terms of its equipment and combat training. A fortified belt, patterned after the Maginot Line, had been installed in those regions of Czechoslovakia which bordered on Germany.

Besides, Czechoslovakia had treaties of mutual assistance with the two major powers of Europe—the USSR and France. For that reason, the Nazi foreign service found an international isolation (neutralising) of Czechoslovakia to be its most important objective. Considering that she was a connecting link between various alliances (like the Little Entente), created by France during the inter-war period, the Nazis counted on getting all those alliances dismantled by neutralising Czechoslovakia. Both for the sake of carrying out their operation “Griin” and for facilitating the implementation of other aggressive plans, the Nazis were still pressing for the international isolation of the Soviet Union.”51”

The "Fifth Column" of the Nazis in Czechoslovakia— their agents among the Sudeten Germans—was charged with The mission of blowing the nation up from inside so as to reduce its ability to resist. On March 28, 1938, Hitler gave his instructions to Henlein, the fuhrer of the Sudeten 156German fascists, to get more active and confront the government of Czechoslovakia with demands that would be clearly unacceptable to it. ”55”

Collective Resistance to Aggression Urged

The Soviet government had every reason to believe that the German aggressors could still have been checked, should they have had a united front of non-aggressor nations standing up against them. It considered it necessary, in particular, to prevent the Nazis overrunning Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union was prepared to make its sizable contribution to peace-keeping. It had enough forces and possibilities for that. Following the successful fulfilment of its Second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union came to lead Europe and rank second in the world (after the U.S.) in industrial output.

The USSR was determined to take all the necessary measures to avert a further expansion of the German aggression and, in particular, to carry out its commitments under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1938, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. P. Potemkin assured Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow Zdenek Fierlinger that, in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government would fulfil its allied commitments in full. At the same time, a similar statement by the Soviet government was communicated to the governments of France and Great Britain.”56”

On March 17, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs made an official statement regarding the exacerbation of the situation in Europe. Me noted that the German annexation of Austria, situated in Central Europe, had created an indisputable danger to all European nations. Referring to the obligations devolving on the USSR from the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, the People’s Commissar declared that the Soviet government "is still prepared to participate in collective action that could be decided on in co-operation with it and would have the object of arresting the continued development of aggression and removing the increased danger of another world shambles.

157It is willing to start immediate discussions with other powers in or outside the League of Nations on all practical steps dictated by the circumstances. Tomorrow it may be too late, but today there is still the time for it, if all the nations and, in particular, the Great Powers, take up a firm and unequivocal position with regard to the problem of collective peace keeping.”57”

The texts of this statement were forwarded to the governments of Britain, France, the United States, Czechoslovakia, the Balkan, Baltic, and Scandinavian states as well as Poland, Belgium and Turkey.

The British Ambassador in Moscow Lord Chilston, admitted, as he conferred with Maxim Litvinov on March 19, 1938, that the Soviet government’s statement has touched off a great movement among the British members of parliament. To explain the substance of this statement, the People’s Commissar said that it had to be understood as an invitation to start negotiations and the venue and timing of these negotiations can be considered, depending on reaction from the Western powers. It is necessary, he pointed out, to find out the opinion of the countries concerned in advance so that "the invitations to the conference could be sent out".”58”

The Soviet Union’s proposal for collective action to safeguard peace had, however, no support from the Western powers.

Accommodation with the Aggressor Sought

The British government persisted in its earlier course of action, witness Neville Chamberlain’s utterances at a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee on March 15. "The Prime Minister”, said the minutes of the meeting, "did not think that anything that had happened should cause the Government to alter their present policy, on the contrary, recent events had confirmed him in his opinion that that policy was a right one and he only regretted that it had not been adopted earlier."“59” This opinion was shared by Lord Halifax. He declared in a conversation with Czechoslovak Minister in London Jan Masaryk that he did not want to give up altogether the hope that an accommodation with Germany could still be found some day.”60”

On March 18, Foreign Office presented for the consideration by the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee a thoroughly elaborated Memorandum on the Czechoslovak question, pointing out that the British government had to choose between three options:

1. Conclusion of a "grand alliance" with the participation of France and other countries against aggression (as proposed by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on March 14).

2. Commitment to afford assistance to France in the event of her honoring her contractual obligations with regard to Czechoslovakia.

3. No new commitments to France.”61”

On the same day, the question was carefully examined at a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee. The tune was called by Chamberlain, Halifax and the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Thomas Inskip, who came out against the first two possible options for British policy.

Foreign Secretary Halifax intimated in his statement that there should be no obstacles in the way of an accommodation with Germany. "The more closely we associated ourselves with France and Russia”, he maintained, "the more difficult would it be to make any real settlement with Germany.” At the end of the meeting, Halifax, summing it up, stated the general view that Britain must decline to undertake any fresh commitment, and must try and persuade the Czechs and the French that "the best course would be for Czechoslovakia to make the best terms she could with Ger- many". ”62”

The decisions taken at that meeting were put at the root of the entire subsequent activity of the British foreign service. It saw its main task in preventing France from affording assistance to Czechoslovakia, which could have got Britain involved in a war against the Third Reich. And that would have meant the failure of Chamberlain’s entire foreign policy line directed towards achieving agreement with Germany. It was the "solution of the Sudeten problem”, that is, the incorporation of the Sudetenland in Germany by "peaceful means" that the British government considered to be the major precondition for such an accommodation under the circumstances of the day. That was the course that was "crowned with success" in Munich.

In a note of March 22, 1938, to the French government Britain announced that she did not find it possible to assume any fresh commitments in Europe and that France could not count on Britain’s assistance in the event of her going to war to lend a helping hand to Czechoslovakia.”63”

It was still believed necessary in London to draw Berlin’s attention to the possibility of Britain being embroiled in war contrary to her own will, should Germany resort to acts of outright armed aggression to expand into Central Europe. Speaking in the House of Commons on March 24, Neville Chamberlain made an official statement to the effect that Britain did not propose to assume any further commitments in Europe. But should a war break out, he said, "it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries, besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately be involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven. .."“64” The Chamberlain government was, therefore, “persuading” Berlin to refrain from launching an armed conflict by virtually assuring Nazi Germany that she would be able to achieve her ends by other means.

This position of the British ruling establishment rested on the hope that having carried out their aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia, German aggressors would keep moving east. By building their policies on such false hopes, the British reactionaries left the vital interests of the British people exposed to a mortal danger because the Nazis were planning to go to war against Britain first and against the USSR afterwards. That is why it was Britain, above all, that would be assuring her own security in the event of cooperation with the USSR. That short-sighted approach of British politicians was particularly evident from Ribbentrop’s directive of April 19, 1938, to the State Secretary at the German Foreign Ministry: "Russia should be officially called enemy, but in reality everything must be directed against England." ”65”

The Soviet proposal of March 17 for urgent steps to be taken to resist aggression was not so much as mentioned at any of the meeting of the British government and its Foreign Policy Committee in those days. The negative attitude to it had been shaped in advance by the general foreign 160policy course of Britain’s ruling establishment. However, since the Soviet proposal had fetched widespread response from many nations, Chamberlain found himself constrained to touch on it in his foreign policy speech in Parliament on March 24. He expressed his displeasure with the fact that the object of this proposal was "to negotiate such mutual undertakings in advance lo resist aggression" and declared it to be unacceptable to the British government.”66”

Neither did France support the Soviet proposal of March 17, although the AnschluB represented an outright danger to her ally, Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak question was examined at a meeting of the Permanent Committee of National Defence under the chairmanship of Edouard Daladier on March 15. It was the defeatist standpoint that prevailed in the debate. Ualadier asserted that France was not in a position to lend Czechoslovakia "any immediate assistance”; she can only pin down German forces on the Franco– German border by a mobilisation. Members of the Committee took up a negative stand on the question of possible co– operation with the USSR in affording assistance to Czechoslovakia. The conclusion reached at the end of the meeting was that France "cannot impede action against Czechoslovakia”. French statesmen refusing to co-operate with the Soviet Union were actually leaving their ally, Czechoslovakia, at the mercy of Nazi Germany.”67”

In a letter of April 4, to the Soviet embassy in Paris, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, describing the policy of France, pointed out that in spite of the extreme tension of the international situation, the French government was not changing anything about its position of indecision, inactivity and credulity in the face of the events creating a direct danger to general peace and outright menace to France proper. Neither the annexation of Austria by Germany, nor the critical situation of Czechoslovakia, or the Polish ultimatum to Lithuania, or the appearance of German and Italian troops on the border between Spain and France, nor, ultimately, the arrogant pronouncements of Mussolini who was threatening war against Europe, "could wake the French up, make them change their mind and do something at least for their own self-defence".”68”

The position of the United States was likewise of essential importance under the circumstances of the day. The U.S. Government left the Soviet proposal of March 17 161unanswered. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, retracing the background to this issue in his Memoirs, wrote that in view of the fact that the American response, "under the limitations of our policy against entanglements, must be negative and might therefore discourage Russia”, it was found that the best course would be to send no answer at all.”69” In a directive letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, commenting on the U.S. stand, said: "Roosevelt and Hull keep treating the world to their homilies while doing nothing for the sake of peace. Seen against the background of the Neutrality Act still in force and unlimited arms supplies to Japan, the afore-said homilies look revolt- ing."“70”

It was hoped in Washington that the Nazi Reich, engaged in its aggression against the East, would not represent any particular danger to the United States. American historians Langer and Gleason pointed out that Roosevelt was "not particularly bothered" by the AnschluB. "lie was convinced that Hitler would embark on his Eastern venture."“71”

The Soviet Union True to Its Commitments

The Soviet government attached paramount importance to preventing Germany from overrunning Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Minister in the USSR, Zdenek Fierlinger, reported to Prague on April 23, 1938, that he had received a message from the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, S. S. Alexandrovsky, who was in Moscow at the time, for transmission to the Czechoslovak government, which said, in particular: "The USSR, should it be asked for it, is prepared to take all the steps required, together with France and Czechoslovakia to ensure the security of Czechoslovakia. It has all the necessary means at its disposal for this purpose. The condition of the Army and the Air Force permitted it to do so." ”72” On April 27, the Czechoslovak Minister stressed in a conversation with Potemkin that this position of the Soviet government was "very encouraging for the Czechoslovaks".”73”

The People’s Commissar for Defence, Kliment Voroshilov, told the British military attaché in Moscow, R. 162Firebrace, on May 2, 1938, that the Soviet Union would certainly loyally honour all its commitments under the treaty with Czechoslovakia.”74” In virtue of that treaty, the Soviet Union was to provide assistance to her only if France did likewise. That did not mean that the Soviet government could not afford any assistance to Czechoslovakia without waiting for France to enter into the war beforehand, should Czechoslovakia have offered resistance to the aggressor and asked the USSR for help against the German aggression. Although, consequent upon the Nazi annexation of Austria, the situation in Europe had seriously deteriorated, the position of Czechoslovakia was not hopeless. In a crucial moment, should Czechoslovakia have given a determined rebuff to the aggressors, there could still have been a collective front of struggle against the fascist invaders.

The matter was brought up, for example, by Mikhail Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in his report on April 26, 1938. After setting out the terms of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, he added: "Naturally, this Pact does not forbid either party to come to the other’s aid without waiting for France to do so."“75” The same issue was touched upon by Stalin during his conversation with Klement Gottwald, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the middle of May 1938.”76”

Describing the Soviet position, the French Ambassador in Moscow, Coulondre, wrote to Paris that the USSR was earnestly striving for co-operation with the Western powers over Czechoslovakia.”77”

Big Stick Mediators

 In the meantime, the governments of Britain, France and the United States went ahead with the policy of abetting German aggression.

The British government’s foreign policy course showed itself once again quite clearly in connection with the Anglo-French talks. A British Cabinet meeting on April 27 was to work out the British position at these talks. Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax proposed telling the French that Britain was "anxious to pursue the interrupted negotiations" with Germany.”78”

The same Cabinet meeting heard a clear exposition of Britain’s attitude to the issue of military commitments in relation to France. We shall yet see how persistently Britain was avoiding any commitment to the USSR during the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks in the summer of 1939. It was reaffirmed at the Cabinet meeting that the Chamberlain government did not want to assume any commitments whatsoever with regard to France either. So, in summing up the discussion during the Cabinet meeting, Lord Halifax declared that, by common consent of the Cabinet members, Britain "could not undertake any commitment to send troops to the continent”. While considering it necessary to keep France on the leash, he pointed out that the French should not be told that the British would not send troops under any circumstances. It was likewise decided that should the British still find it necessary to send their troops to France, the strength of the troops to be sent at the start of the war would not exceed two divisions, although that would shock the French very strongly. As to Czechoslovakia, it was decided to tell the French once more that Britain could not undertake any military commitment to send troops to the continent.”79”

A new French government was formed on April 10, 1938, with the key posts filled by the partisans of an accommodation with Germany—Edouard Daladier as the head of government and Georges Bonnet as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The position of France was increasingly defeatist.

The Chief of the French General Staff, general Gamelin, told British War Secretary Hore-Belisha two weeks later that it was "impossible for France to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia".”80”

The Anglo-French conversations, held in London on April 28 and 29, showed both countries to be inclined to stick to their former policies on the Czechoslovak question. Chamberlain, for example, flatly declared to the French that in case of France providing assistance to Czechoslovakia, Britain would stay out.”81” The British ministers were also pressing for the French to "become more aloof from the Russians". ”82” Daladier and Bonnet declared that they were determined to press "any solution" on Czechoslovakia to the extent of making her neutral if only they could avoid war in that way.”83”

It was agreed that the British would intensify their " 164mediation" between Berlin and Prague with a view to " settling" the Czechoslovak question without war. The sum and substance of the agreement reached was formulated by Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Gadogan in the following way: "Agreed we should both urge Benes to do his utmost and that we should ask Berlin what they want." ”84”

The British government did intensify its “mediation”. Under its instructions, the British Minister in Prague, C. Newton, called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia and made a statement trying hard to prove the "absolute necessity" of yielding ground to the Nazis.”85” On the other hand, the British embassy informed the German Foreign Ministry on May 9, 1938, that should the Germans confidentially advise what solution of the Sudeten German question they were striving after, "the British Government would bring such pressure to bear in Prague that the Czechoslovak Government would be compelled to accede to the German wishes". ”86”

Although France had a treaty of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia, the French government considered it possible to honour its commitments to Czechoslovakia only if Britain declared herself to be willing also to come to Czechoslovakia’s aid. Since there was no intention in London to lend any assistance to Czechoslovakia, neither did France intend to come out in her support. The French government had virtually abandoned an independent foreign policy of her own by that time and was meekly following in the wake of Britain’s policy of seeking an accommodation with Germany. Yet the French ruling circles did not venture to renounce in public their obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia. Having admitted in a conversation with the U.S. Charge d’Affaires that without Britain France did not intend to afford any assistance to Czechoslovakia, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Bonnet said, however, that "publicly he would have to state the opposite" just as the French government did.”87”

The Czechoslovak ruling circles were also increasingly inclined to take up a defeatist stance. On May 17, President Benes said in a conversation with British Minister Newton that Czechoslovakia’s relations with the USSR "had always been and would remain a secondary consideration, dependent on the attitude of France and Great Britain. 165If Western Europe disinterested herself in Russia, Czechoslovakia would also be disinterested.”88”

While in Geneva in mid-May 1938, at a session of the Council of the League of Nations, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, met the French and British foreign ministers, Bonnet and Halifax. Bonnet, in particular, wanted to know what position the USSR would take in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. As the People’s Commissar reported to Moscow, the French Minister put the matter in such a way as to betray his desire to get an answer that would be tantamount to a Soviet refusal of assistance to Czechoslovakia. He clearly wanted to take advantage of that answer in order to make it easier for France to escape her commitments with regard to Czechoslovakia.”89” Replying, the People’s Commissar said it was desirable for representatives of the French, Soviet and Czechoslovak General Staffs to consider some military action that could be taken by the three nations. ”90” Yet Bonnet did not respond to that important initiative.

Neither did Halifax display any interest in co-operation with the USSR. When Litvinov reminded him of the Soviet statement of March 17, 1938, about the Soviet readiness to join in collective action against aggression and to take part in a conference of the nations concerned in order to agree on the necessary steps to be taken, Halifax ignored them. After criticising Britain’s policy on Germany, the People’s Commissar set out the Soviet "concept of collective security which, if put into effect, would have saved Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and China".”91”

Meanwhile, the Nazis set about their business with more dispatch. There was to be a municipal election in Czechoslovakia on May 22. With that date drawing nearer, the Nazi organisations of Sudeten Germans had drastically intensified their action. They attempted to make the election look like a referendum on the future of Sudeten region. In the meantime German troops began to be concentrated in secret across the border of Czechoslovakia.”92” There was enough reason to fear that Sudeten Germans might provoke some disorder on May 22 which would come about together with a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. That entailed a quite natural, though partial, call-up in Czechoslovakia. It was carried through swiftly and in an organised way, and the Czechoslovak Army was determined to beat back the aggressors.

Fearful of an armed conflict, the British and French ruling circles were in utter confusion. The French government found it necessary to make yet another public statement to the effect that it would support Czechoslovakia. The British government, too, had to react, willy-nilly, to the events which were taking place. It decided, however, not to go beyond its statement of March 24 whose essence was that Germany had to engage in “guess-work” about Britain’s position in case of war breaking out. The Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cadogan, had put it down in his Diaries that his discussion of Britain’s position with Halifax produced the following result: "Decided, we must not go to war.” After that, Cadogan pointed out, he sent the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, the text of a statement to the German government which did not, however, have any serious meaning.”93”

The British government, therefore, virtually avoided considering the situation as it shaped up. There was no decision to change its earlier course. The British diplomatic service did not propose to warn the Nazis seriously about anything, still less threaten them with the possibility of Britain entering the war. Cadogan had a perfect idea that there was no point in one more British “demarche”.

On May 21, the German government was handed a British statement saying that in the event of a German– Czechoslovak conflict, France would be obliged to intervene, and under those circumstances British government "could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstances to become involved also. This point was quite clearly expressed by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on March 24.” Meanwhile, the British government assured Hitler that it was doing its utmost to promote a "peaceful solution" of the Sudeten question and for that reason urged it to "exercise patience".”94”

Consequently, the British had virtually assured the Nazis that they would help them achieve their aims without war. Hitler’s aide, Captain F. Wiedemann, pointed out that the British had let the Germans know: "Bombs on Prague mean war. Tactics against the Czechs: not to shoot but to strangle." ”95”

At the same time, Britain’s ruling establishment was doing everything to forestall possible assistance to Czechoslovakia from France. Having studied the French 167government’s statement of May 21, to the effect that it was prepared to honour its commitments to Czechoslovakia, the British decided to call their French allies to order. Halifax told British Ambassador in Paris Phipps to warn the French that Britain on her part would not go beyond the statement made by the Prime Minister in Parliament on March 24." ”98” On May 22, Phipps officially declared to Bonnet that the British government was not obliged or inclined to assist France unless she joined the war to defend Czechoslovakia from German aggression. Moreover, the British government demanded that, before taking any steps which were likely to exacerbate the situation and lead to war, the French should consult the British government.”97”

The Chamberlain government undertook, besides, yet another demarche in Prague to force Czechoslovakia into surrender. Alluding to a meeting at the Foreign Office Cadogan said it had "decided to use big stick on Benes".”98”

The French government was also exerting mounting pressure on Czechoslovakia. The Nazis were immediately informed about those moves and took them as evidence that Czechoslovakia would have to surrender even without war.

The Soviet Union was still the only country that was, indeed, ready and willing to render assistance to Czechoslovakia under the terms of the treaty with her in that hour of danger.

In a conversation with the Czechoslovak Minister in the USSR, Fierlinger, Litvinov welcomed the steps taken by Czechoslovakia. People’s Commissar of Defence K. Y. Voroshilov "earnestly spoke about the full readiness of the USSR for cooperation" when he met the Czechoslovak General 0. Husak.”99”

The government of Czechoslovakia had more than once thanked the Soviet government for having supported Czechoslovakia in what were extremely hard times and dangerous circumstances for her. The Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky, pointed out in the transcript of his conversation with Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Minister on May 30, 1938: "Krofta has repeatedly expressed his unreserved gratitude in rather warm terms for the steady and sure support he has had from the USSR during the recent critical period. The certainty that the USSR intends quite seriously and without any hesitation to offer assistance to 168Czechoslovakia in case she should really need it, has a very reassuring and encouraging effect on Czechoslovakia.” ”100”

The May crisis showed with striking evidence once again that the British ruling circles did not intend to offer any resistance to the Nazi aggressors. They had actually brought the action of the French and Czechoslovak governments under their own control. Chamberlain and his fellow thinkers thereby counted on acting as supreme judge capable of making the victim of the aggression surrender without any resistance.

Although, as the material just referred to indicates, the British government did not exercise any restraining influence on Germany during the May crisis, after the crisis British propaganda worked hard to prove that Germany had yielded ground because of Britain’s resolution. Even British historians admitted that "British minister proved not unwilling to claim credit for the stand which they had not actually made".”101”

To sum up, the May crisis confirmed that Britain and France, far from countering the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, were, in fact, aiding and abetting it. It became obvious that in spite of public declarations, the French government had actually recanted its treaties both with Czechoslovakia and with the Soviet Union.

With the position of Britain and France, as it was, the Nazi Reich went on preparing for its aggression against Czechoslovakia. At a conference with Goring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Brauchitsch, and some more of his associates, on May 28, 1938, Hitler declared that he was determined that "Czechoslovakia shall disappear from the map of the world”. That would, he said, "clear the rear for advancing against the West, England and France”. Two days later, on May 30, Hitler endorsed a new plan to seize Czechoslovakia. It opened with his words: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."“102” The issue of these directives was followed by feverish preparations in the Nazi Reich for an attack on Czechoslovakia. The precise date—"Day X"—was chosen and fixed for these preparations to be completed so that Hitler could decide on the invasion at any moment afterwards, depending on the general situation. The original date was October 1, but the final "Day X" was September 28, 1938.

Pressure Turning into Threat

 British diplomacy did everything possible to help Nazis carry through their plan for an international isolation of Czechoslovakia. The British Conservatives believed that the best means of achieving that end was by keeping France in every way possible from lending assistance to Czechoslovakia. The more so since French involvement in war could lead to Britain getting involved as well. ”103”

Britain’s policy in relation to Czechoslovakia was set out in the above-mentioned statement by the British Ambassador in Paris, Phipps, to the French on May 22. Replying to it, Bonnet gave firm assurances that France would not resort to any military action without having consulted the British government. He emphasised that should Czechoslovakia turn out to be “unreasonable”, "the French Government might well declare that France considered herself released from her bond". ”104”

Halifax brought the question of Britain’s subsequent political course before the British Cabinet meeting on May 25. After pointing out that the French government was constantly expressing its apprehension lest they should face a dilemma of having to choose between the risk of war and dishonor, Halifax considered it necessary "to obtain a release for the French from their obligation”. He suggested that Czechoslovakia should be made neutral. Britain found it inconvenient to urge that the treaties of alliance between Czechoslovakia and France and Russia should be scrapped, but, he said, with Czechoslovakia neutralized, "the Alliances would automatically disappear”. Chamberlain and the rest of the Cabinet approved the course of action Halifax had proposed.”105”

The U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, back in London from a visit to the United States, assured German Ambassador von Dirksen that the U.S. government supported the Chamberlain cabinet, including "its desire for a settlement with Germany".”106”

Paris, following in the wake of London, was increasingly inclined to seek agreement with Germany or, to be exact, to surrender to her. Quai d’Orsay gave no thought to any co-operation with the USSR in providing assistance for Czechoslovakia. In a conversation with Polish Ambassador, ..I. Lukasiewicz, Bonnet declared that the Franco-Soviet pact 170was very “vague” and that the French government "was not at all inclined to rely upon it”. He personally "was no adherent of collaboration with Communism”. Bonnet pointed out that he would be very pleased if, on making sure of expanding co-operation with Poland, he could "tell the Soviets that France does not need their assistance".”107”

When the Czechoslovak Minister in France, S. Osusky, took up with Bonnet the question of military negotiations with the USSR, the reply he got was that "in view of successful co-operation between Britain and France, such negotiations are inopportune now".”108”

A British government representative Lord Runciman arrived in Prague early in August as a “mediator” in the negotiations between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten German Nazis. From then on, the British and French pressure on Czechoslovakia was intensified. As Assistant Foreign Secretary Oliver Harvey pointed out, " Runciman is being brought into action to help the Government in the dirty work." ”109”

Naturally, the British government could not expect Runciman to settle the conflict. But it presumed that at a crucial moment he could have prepared some proposals which the British government would have backed and which could have been acceptable to Germany. In that case they would have been offered to Czechoslovakia as a “constructive” solution. Should the Czechoslovak government have refused to accept those proposals, the full blame would have been laid on it and there would have been the excuse for Britain and France to forswear assistance to Czechoslovakia.”110”

American Ambassador in Berlin Hugh Wilson arrived in Prague almost simultaneously with Lord Runciman. His pronouncements in Prague boiled down essentially to the idea that the Czechs could hope for their relations with Germany to be normalized only if Czechoslovakia renounced her pact with the USSR.”111” In that way U.S. diplomacy backed up the London plans.

British and French diplomacy was bringing intensified pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia in an effort to get it to meet the Nazi demand about the Sudetenland. The London and Paris “appeasers” went out of their way to compel Czechoslovakia "to commit suicide in order to forestall murder".”112”

Reporting the comments by the Czechoslovak Minister in 171London, Masaryk, Maisky communicated to Moscow that "the British government had been pressurizing Czechoslovakia in every way persuading her to make maximum concessions to the Sudeten Germans. Halifax summoned Masaryk to his office almost every week and advised him, called his attention, pointed out to him, warned him, and even threatened him, demanding more and more concessions" to the Czechoslovak Germans.”113”

The blow that France, Czechoslovakia’s ally struck at her was still more telling. On July 20, Bonnet told Czechoslovak Minister Osusky that "France would not go to war for the Sudeten affair. . . In no case should the Czechoslovak government believe that if war breaks out we will be at its side”. That was the first time the French government unequivocally warned the Czechoslovaks that it did not propose to honour its allied commitments.”114”

Soviet Proposals Ignored

 Considering the policy of Britain and France to be extremely dangerous to the cause of peace in Europe, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said in its message to Soviet diplomatic representatives in Prague, Berlin, London and Paris on August 11, 1938: "We are extremely interested in the independence of Czechoslovakia being preserved and Hitler’s thrust southeast being checked.” However, the Western powers "do not find it necessary to seek our co-operation, are ignoring us and deciding among themselves whatever issues arise from the German– Czechoslovak conflict." ”115”

Under instruction from the Soviet government, Ambassador Maisky in London said in a statement to British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax in August 1938 that "the USSR is increasingly disappointed about the policy of Britain and France" and considered it to be "weak and shortsighted”, capable of doing no more than encouraging the aggressor to make his further “leaps”. Thus, he said, the Western powers were "assuming the responsibility for another world war being brought nearer and launched”. The policy of Britain and France was described by the Soviet Ambassador as an attempt at "checking the victim of the aggression, rather than the aggressor himself”. In Prague, 172British and French representatives, he said, "are speaking so loud that the Czechs see it, not without reason, as manifest unfairness, while in Berlin they are speaking so softly that Hitler is ignoring all their overtures. We cannot have any sympathy for such a policy and we believe that the fate of Czechoslovakia depends, first and foremost, on whether or not Britain and France prove capable of taking up a firm stand against the aggressor in this crucial hour." ”116”

Unlike the Western powers, the Soviet Union was ready to fulfil its obligations under its treaty with Czechoslovakia. Maisky told the Czechoslovak Minister in London, on August 16, that if Czechoslovakia was attacked the USSR "will fulfil her treaty obligations." ”117” A similar statement was made by the Soviet Ambassador to Lord Halifax on August 17.”118” On the same day, the Ambassador met the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Britain, Johnson. After reaffirming the Soviet government’s readiness to fulfil its commitments under the treaty, the Ambassador pointed out that Czechoslovakia was the major factor behind the situation in Central Europe. Therefore, "Hitler should not be allowed to destroy Czechoslovakia and that the time to prevent that destruction was now".”119”

As Zden\vek Fierlinger reported to Prague, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Lord Chilston, informed him that he had once more found out what sort of action the USSR would take in the event of a conflict and received a "very positive reply that the USSR will fulfil its treaty obligations". ”12”°

The French Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, J. Payart, referring to a conversation with Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin to the danger of an armed conflict, asked him, on September 1, 1938, what the Soviet position would be in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. In putting that question, he stressed that Poland and Romania were not willing to let Soviet troops pass through their territory. ”121” Informing the Soviet Ambassador in Prague about that conversation, Potemkin pointed out that what had attracted his particular attention was the special accent Bonnet made on the difficulties which Soviet military aid through the territory of Poland and Romania would have run into. In all probability, Bonnet, by underscoring those difficulties, wanted to get such an answer from the USSR 173as the French government could use "as an excuse for its own refusal to assist Czechoslovakia". ”122”

On September 2, 1938, Payart officially raised the question of the Soviet stand with Lilvitiov. In that connection, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs remarked that "France is under obligation to help Czechoslovakia regardless of our assistance, whereas our assistance is conditional on French and, for that reason, we have a greater right to show interest in assistance from France".

Replying afterwards to a question from the French representative, the People’s Commissar declared: "Provided French aid will be forthcoming, we are determined to fulfil all our obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact, using all avenues open to us for this purpose.” "So far as specifying aid is concerned,” the People’s Commissar went on to say, "we consider that a conference of representatives of the Soviet, French and Czechoslovak armies must be called to do it."

The People’s Commissar went on to stress the need for "using all the means available to avert an armed clash”. He recalled that right after the AnschluB of Austria, the USSR recommended a conference of representatives of the nations interested in maintaining peace to be called. "We believe that such a conference, with the participation of Britain, France and the USSR, at the present moment, and the adoption of a general declaration . . . have more chances to deter Hitler from a war adventure than any other measure." ”123”

Referring to the above-mentioned “difficulties”, Fierlinger asked the People’s Commissar whether the USSR could give a guarantee of territorial inviolability in case of Soviet troops passing through the territory of Poland and Romania. The Soviet People’s Commissar replied that "this goes without saying".”424”

The situation in Europe was growing more menacing day by day. On September 3, 1938, the Nazis decided to get their forces ready for action by September 28.”125” Three days later, the British government received relevant information.”126”

With a new crisis fast brewing, Chamberlain held the conferences of his "inner group" on September 8 and 9, and a full Cabinet meeting on September 12 to consider the worsening situation. However, at none of those 174conferences and meetings were the Soviet proposals so much as mentioned. British historian Middlemas pointed out that they were ignored by the British Cabinet.”127”

Having arrived in Geneva on September 11 for the Assembly of the League of Nations the British Under– Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, R. A. Butler, told Bonnet that the British government would not, probably, agree to a joint Anglo-Franco-Soviet gesture.”128” When the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs met Bonnet on the same day, the latter limited himself to stating that he had passed the Soviet proposals to the British, but they declined them. Bonnet did not even make any reference to the position of the French government itself. "Bonnet shrugged it off—nothing doing,” the People’s Commissar reported to Moscow.”129”

So the Soviet proposals of September 2 were not seconded by the governments of Britain and France. Yet, to have carried out those proposals, providing for political and—if need be—for military measures, could have played an important part in forestalling aggression and strengthening the peace. That did not mean, however, that the ruling circles of Britain and France were not deeply worried both by the balance of forces and, to no small extent, by class considerations. For a German invasion of Czechoslovakia could have sparked off a war between the capitalist nations of Europe, and their own hopes for using Nazi Germany as a strike force to fight the USSR would have been dashed. Along with that, the reactionary forces of the Western powers were fearful of such a war generating revolutionary upheavals in the German-occupied countries involved.

Things reached a point where French government spokesmen began appealing to the Nazis to take into account common class interests, before anything else. For example, the French Premier Daladier emphasised during his meeting with the German Charge d”1” Affaires, on September 7: "After the end of a war, the outbreak of a revolution, irrespective of victors or vanquished, was as certain in France as in Germany and Italy." ”13”°

British journalist and historian Leonard Mosley has pointed out with good reason that the French ruling circles were panic-stricken in fear of the menace of Nazi Germany, although the French Army was stronger than the German. "In France this clique [ruling],” he wrote, "was riddled with 175corruption and defeatism; hagridden by the menace of Nazi Germany from outside their borders and by the threat of domestic Communism within, many of them were increasingly ready to make an accommodation with Germany in the hope that accord with National Socialism would throttle the threat of Red revolution." ”131”

It would be wrong to believe that Paris underestimated the gravity of the German danger and the significance of Czechoslovakia as a military factor. This is what one can gather from the Memorandum of September 9, 1938, by the Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin. The Czechoslovak state, he wrote, is of certain interest, from the French point of view, in the event of military operations in Europe. By its very geographic position, Czechoslovakia is an obstacle in the way of German expansionist plans against the East. Besides, the Czechoslovak Army is strong enough to pin down a large proportion of German forces, thus draining them off from the Western Front. Czechoslovakia has 17 infantry divisions—this number could be swiftly doubled, and 4 motorized divisions. Finally, Czechoslovakia has some airfields to threaten Germany, especially if she got some air force reinforcements. For Germany to occupy Czechoslovakia would mean appreciably expanding the German military potential (with Skoda factories, etc.); helping Germany take possession of the national wealth of Hungary and Romania; and giving her an outlet to the Black Sea ports.”132” Yet, all these considerations notwithstanding, the French government was prepared to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to the Nazis.

It was not by the national interests either, but by their narrow class interests that the British ruling circles, too, guided themselves. Of course, none of their spokesmen ever revealed that in public, but some touched on that problem now and again, for example, in their diaries. British politician Harold Nicolson made the following entry in his diary on September 11, after his conversation with a Cabinet member, Oliver Stanley. "Oliver agrees that the conflict really nothing to do with Czechoslovakia. . . At the same time any reference to Russian assistance makes him wince, and at one moment he sighed deeply and said, ’You see, whether we win or lose, it will be the end of everything we stand for’. By ’we’ he means obviously the capitalist classes." ”133” A similar entry could be found somewhat later 176in the diary of Assistant Foreign Secretary Oliver Harvey: "Any war, whether we win or not, would destroy Hie rich idle classes and they are for peace at any price." ”134”

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