SOVIET ACTION FOR PEACE AND FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II -CH1

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The Soviet government invariably followed a policy of peace. That was prompted by the very nature of the socialist state striving to spare the mass of the people the incalculable horrors and calamities that imperialist-bred wars bring with them. The Soviet people were anxious to preserve and strengthen peace also because, with the socialist country still encircled by hostile capitalist powers, a war could spell great danger to its very existence.

To keep the peace was likewise an essential and, indeed, indispensable condition for continued progress in building a new type of society in the Soviet Union. Only in a peaceful environment, could the Soviet people concentrate their efforts on advancing the economy, science and culture. Therefore, to ensure this favourable international environment for the attainment of communism was the top priority of Soviet foreign policy.

Setting off Soviet foreign policy against the policies of imperialist powers and exposing the slanderous inventions bourgeois propaganda was circulating about it, Litvinov said: "The Soviet state, which rejects chauvinism, nationalism, racial or national prejudice, sees its national priorities not as conquest, expansion, or extension of its territory, it sees the honour of the people not in educating them in a spirit of militarism and thirst for blood, but only in achieving the ideal it has emerged for and which it sees as the whole sense of its existence, namely, in the construction of socialist society. It intends, unless obstructed, to devote all of its national energies to this work, and this is the inexhaustible wellspring of its policy of peace".’”6” The People’s Commissar emphasised that the USSR was in no need even of victorious wars.

The Soviet government was guiding itself in its relations with other countries by the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of nations with differing social and economic systems. We have to build socialism, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs said, in one country, surrounded by capitalist countries which occupy five-sixths of the world’s area. Wo cannot ignore this fact and we do not ignore it and, therefore, we strive to discover and apply the methods of peaceful coexistence of both social systems.”57”

While taking steps to safeguard peace on the Soviet borders, the Soviet government was showing concern for world peace in general. That is why Soviet foreign policy was meeting the interests of the Soviet people as well as those of the people of all nations.

In its mud-slinging campaign against Communists and in an attempt to justify the unwillingness of the reactionary circles of the Western powers to co-operate with the USSR, bourgeois propaganda was claiming all the time that Moscow was dreaming of provoking a war between some capitalist countries. It argued that the Communists were interested in another world war because they believed that only from a war would another revolutionary situation arise.

Yet that had nothing in common with the actual policy of the Soviet Union. Lenin emphasised on many occasions that "all our politics and propaganda are directed towards putting an end to war and in no way towards driving nations to war".”58” The Communists have always proceeded from the fact that the working masses are the main war victims.

The communist attitude to war was thoroughly examined at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International (1928). It was proved that the assertion that Communists were encouraging imperialist wars to expedite the revolution was sheer slander. It was stressed that "the Communists, in the interests of the masses of the workers and of all the toilers who bear the brunt of the sacrifice entailed by war, wage a persistent fight against imperialist war".”59”

With the Nazis in power, this issue was re-examined in the new context at the Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in December 1933. Speaking on behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), I). Z. Manuilsky emphasised that it was a mistake to assume that "it is impossible to hinder the coming of imperialist war, that a real revolution will only begin as a result of a new imperialist war”. lie pointed out that it was necessary to do everything to prevent a new war. Thai was, notably, a clear piece of evidence to disprove the spurious assertion of imperialist propaganda that the Soviet Union was dreaming of nothing short of provoking war between imperialist slates.”60”

The Comintern reverted to the matter at its Seventli Congress in 1935. The position of Soviel Communists was set out by V. G. Knorin. "Although war will eventually produce 27a revolutionary crisis in capitalist countries,” he stressed, "it will bring with it incredible hardship, death, hunger and suffering to the working people, wipe out the productive forces of all countries and destroy workers’ organisations. War imperils the life of millions of proletarians and the vestiges of democracy which in some countries still give the working people some opportunity to defend their interests under capitalism. War threatens the independence of small and weak nations. It is the greatest calamity for all peoples. Therefore, the Communists, who are defending the interests of the peoples, are the defenders of peace and must avert war.” “61” This position of Communists found expression in the resolutions of the Congress: "The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International most determinedly repudiates the slanderous contention that Communists desire war, expecting it to bring revolution."“62”

The Soviet Communists, too, were in agreement with the guidelines worked out at the Comintern congresses on the issues of war and peace. The struggle of the USSR for curbing aggressors and safeguarding peace, a matter of vital concern to the mass of the people in all countries, was consistent, wholly and entirely, with the major principle of Soviet foreign policy—proletarian internationalism.

The resolution of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International stated that the peace policy of the USSR was not only directed towards the defence of the Land of the Soviets, "it also protects the lives of the workers of all countries, the lives of all the oppressed and exploited ... it serves the vital interests of humanity.” “63” Therefore, Soviet foreign policy was easy and clear for the great mass of the people to understand, and had the support of the masses and the progressive forces of all nations. And that gave it more opportunity for action to keep and strengthen the peace.

The question was, however, how feasible the prospect of preventing war was. Fatalist concepts of the inevitability of wars were rather current in the communist movement on account of the experience of the First World War. But as a new alignment of forces shaped up in the world, a new approach to the problem of averting the war danger was being worked out and the conclusion made that the battle for peace was not hopeless. By the mid-1980s, the USSR had developed into a mighty power and its foreign policy 28began to exercise a growing influence on the course of events. The forces of peace now had the consistent peaceseeking policy of the Soviet Union to rely on. Therefore, D. Z. Manuilsky pointed out in his report to the Seventli World Congress of the Communist International that "the Communists must abandon the fatalist view that it is impossible to prevent the outbreak of war, that it is useless fighting against war preparations.”64”

 

It was stressed in Manuilsky’s report on the outcome of the Congress that the new situation compelled a somewhat different view of the working people’s prospect in their struggle against war. It is beyond dispute that wars are inevitable as long as capitalism exists. But there are now more opportunities for effective opposition to imperialist wars than there had been before the First World War broke out. This is due, above all, to the existence of the peace-keeping Soviet Union. Small nations whose independence is threatened by war can join the effort to defend peace. Also the big states which do not want war for various reasons can take part in this action against war.”65”

The Soviet Union’s persistent efforts for peace and its policy of peaceful coexistence had nothing in common with supine pacifism. While following a policy of peace, the Soviet government was determined to give a fitting rebuff to any aggressive encroachments by imperialist forces.

The Soviet Union was taking whatever steps it could to discourage the aggressors from any war-like ventures across its borders. At the same time, considering that it was not the Soviet Union alone, but other nations as well that faced such a danger, the USSR attached tremendous importance to rallying as many countries as possible for resistance to aggressors. The greatest danger was hanging over some small or militarily rather weak nations. So the Soviet Union was prepared to lend them its support and assistance and to co-operate with them in action to deter aggression.

The Soviet government took into consideration the fundamental contradictions between the two major alignments of capitalist powers. The plans for a repartition of the world, being hatched by the aggressive bloc with Nazi Germany and militarist Japan in the lead, were a threat to the other alignment of imperialist powers—France, Britain and the U.S. which had won the imperialist war of 1914–1918, divided the world at their own discretion as a result of that war, 29and strove to retain their world positions. The Soviet government was far from regarding as jusl the terms of the Versailles-Washington system of peace treaties created by those powers in consequence ut their victory in the war. But that did not mean, of course, that it considered another world war necessary in order to have them changed. On the contrary, it was opposed to such a war. And this signified that, if there was a will, it was quite possible to find common ground for joint action by the Soviet Union and this alignment of powers to prevent war.

A number of medium-sized and small nations would have joined such a peace front. The Soviet government deemed the co-operation of all those nations in peace-keeping not only quite possible but necessary as well. This viewpoint inspired the Soviet proposals for organising a collective security system in Europe to oppose aggression.

In the circumstances that prevailed at the time the Soviet government thought it to be the most important task to prevent war by the collective efforts of all nations anxious to keep the peace. The Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( Bolsheviks) to the Seventeenth Party Congress pointed out that in an environment of "prewar jitters enveloping a wide range of countries, the USSR continued to abide ... firmly and unshakably by its positions of peace, opposed to the threat of war, acting to preserve peace, and anxious to meet halfway those nations which stand, in one way or another, for the maintenance of peace, exposing and unmasking those who prepare and provoke war."

The Seventeenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party brought out the factors the USSR counted on in its hard and involved battle for peace:

a) its growing economic and political strength;

b) moral support from millions of working people of all countries vitally interested in the maintenance of peace;

c) the common sense of the nations which are not interested, for some reason or other, in a disruption of peace;

d) the Soviet Armed Forces prepared to defend the nation against attacks from outside.”66”

Soviet foreign policy combined an earnest determination to maintain peace with a readiness to offer a determined resistance to aggression. It guided itself by the immutable principle that "peace must not be waited for, but fought 30for”. All that made for the high international prestige of Soviet foreign policy.

The subsequent consolidation of the international positions of the USSR and of its influence on the development of international events were directly connected with the growth of the strength and power of the Soviet Union.

Having rebuilt the national economy devastated during World War I, the Civil War and foreign intervention, the Soviet Union had fulfilled its first five-year economic development plan ahead of schedule, by 1933. That was a giant leap forward. Once an agrarian country, the Soviet Union became a modern industrialised nation. It had 1,500 industrial projects launched due to the heroic labour effort of the Soviet people. From now on the Soviet Union could produce most of the industrial plant and equipment it needed at its own enterprises. The second five-year plan (1933– 1937), still more sweeping in its scope, began to be carried out.

All that combined created the necessary conditions for the country’s defence capability to be strengthened.

As stated in the new Constitution of the USSR, adopted in 1977, the Soviet Armed Forces are called upon to defend the socialist homeland and socialist gains, the peaceful work of the Soviet people, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State and its security.”67” Under the most complicated conditions of those times when the Soviet Union was in a hostile capitalist encirclement, and when imperialist powers went on planning to destroy the world’s first socialist state and some of them openly embarked on the path of aggression, the Soviet Armed Forces were effectively discharging these functions.

Urgent steps were taken to bolster the Soviet Far Eastern defences in the face of an imminent danger of armed attack by Japan. The Soviet Pacific Fleet began to be built in 1932. The building up of the Soviet Air Force in the Far East had a sobering effect on the Japanese aggressors.

The Soviet government did an enormous amount of work to strengthen the international position of the USSR. Back in the 1920s, the Soviet Union managed to normalise relations with almost all the neighbouring states through all kinds of treaties. Diplomatic relations were established with all the Great Powers, except the U.S___The changes in the alignment of forces of the imperialist powers by the 31early 1930s presented further opportunities for more vigorous Soviet diplomatic activity.

 

With the Soviet Union having become one of the world’s strongest nations, a number of capitalist countries had to revise much of their earlier policies towards it. While in earlier days, back in the 1920s, the imperialist powers often attempted to settle various international issues without the USSR and contrary to its interest, now more and more nations, also facing a threat from aggressors, were coming to look at the Soviet Union as a nation capable of making a sizeable contribution towards strengthening peace and international security.

The resurgence of aggressive German imperialism and its plans to redraw the map of Europe and of the rest of the world could not but provoke some grave concern in France and, along with that, some of the well-known changes in her foreign policy. The most striking indication of those changes was the revision of the position France held in respect of a non-aggression treaty with the USSR. While in previous years, France had repeatedly declined the relevant proposals of the Soviet government, in 1931 she declared herself willing to conclude such a treaty with the USSR. In 1932 the Soviet government succeeded in concluding non-aggression pacts not only with France, but also with Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland which took France’s stand on the matter as their guide.

The Soviet-French treaty of non-aggression provided the ground for the subsequent improvement of relations between the two countries. The re-emergence of a danger of aggression from Germany brought with it some objective premises for co-operation between the USSR and France in action to keep the peace in Europe. The Soviet government clearly saw the danger from Nazi Germany that was hanging over Europe.

The Nazi Reich, possessing fairly large economic and manpower resources, could create large armed forces in a matter of years and begin to carry out its foreign policy programme of aggrandizement. The danger of war in case of a fusion of the forces of the aggressor powers would have been particularly great.

The Soviet government was consistently and tirelessly pressing for effective measures to deter the aggressors. It found it necessary to raise a reliable barrier in the way of 32the aggressors, rallying togetiier the forces of the nations that wanted to prevent war.

Certain possibilities for a collective peace-keeping front lo be formed in Europe did exist. But those possibilities had to be translated into a reality.

Indivisibility of Peace

The Soviet government, considering it necessary to nip the aggression in the bud, put forward the principle of " indivisibility of peace”. It proceeded from the assumption that it was easier to prevent a fire than to put it out, or the more so when it would have engulfed many countries, if not entire continents. It was the maintenance of world peace that served best to ensure the peace of every particular country, that of the Soviet Union, among them.

Had it proved possible to stamp out the hotbeds of war in Europe and in the Far East as soon as they had emerged, and to curb the German and Japanese aggressors, the Soviet Union would not have had to fear their attack. That would have been an optimal course of events for the USSR, and the best guarantee of its security. It would have been entirely different if the aggressors, taking advantage of the lack of co-operation between the non-aggressor nations, would have overrun them one by one, thereby building up their own forces. Such a course of events would have contradicted the vital interests of the people of all nations, including the USSR. So the principle of indivisible peace responded to the interests of all nations under a threat of attack.

While on this subject, one cannot fail to mention that historical publications in Western countries have given much currency to the argument that the Soviet Union dreamed of a war between the two imperialist alignments.”68” The earlier account of the Soviet Union’s attitude to war as well as the Soviet policy based on the principle of indivisible peace show such contentions to be utterly baseless.

Soviet diplomacy produced a series of specific proposals for strengthening peace and security.

Definition of Aggression

To lay down well-defined and clear-cut standards of reference to identify aggression was a matter of great importance. Therefore, on February 6, 1933, the Soviet government 33brought before the Geneva Disarmament Conference a draft declaration to identify the attacking side. To work out generally acceptable principles to define aggression was of great importance, above all, to the nations facing an immediate threat of attack. The aggressor countries were seeking all kinds of excuses to justify their attack on other states. To have accepted the Soviet-proposed definition of aggression would have made it impossible for an attack on other nations to be justified by any excuse and easier to identify the guilty party promptly and properly in the event of an armed conflict, and, thereby, to apply the necessary joint measures against the aggression. The Soviet draft was examined by the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference and approved by it with some amendments.”69”

However, when the Soviet draft declaration was referred to the General Commission of the Conference, it became obvious that its passage was being dragged out. Some imperialist powers did not conceal that they found this definition of aggression “inconvenient” and “embarrassing”. Reporting to Moscow on March 11, 1933, on the consideration of the Soviet proposal, the Soviet representative at the Conference V. S. Dovgalevsky wrote that it had been supported by the delegates of France, of the Little Entente, Scandinavian and some other states. But other imperialist powers —Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.S. and Britain took up a different stance.”70” Britain’s position, which was presented by Anthony Eden, was particularly negative.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet government decided to press for the acceptance of its proposal in a different way. On April 19, Litvinov, on instructions from the Soviet government, handed to the Polish Minister in Moscow Juliusz Lukasiewicz, the proposal to call a conference so as to sign the protocol on the definition of aggression between the USSR and the nations of the Eastern Europe which had concluded non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Union. The People’s Commissar said that such a protocol would strengthen mutual confidence between the nations of Eastern Europe. It would be a reassuring factor in the "troubled international situation" and would likewise stimulate the acceptance of the definition of aggression by other states.”71” The Polish government, however, took a negative line on this question, thus frustrating the proposed conference.

Taking advantage of the arrival of representatives of all 34neighbouring states in London in June 1933 (for the economic conference which was meeting there) Litvinov called on them to sign a convention about the definition of aggression right there, in London. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs cabled to the People’s Commissar to say that "we are most of all interested in a pact with adjacent countries, including Poland and Finland".”72” However, Poland continued to stick to her earlier negative position at these negotiations. Poland’s representatives were trying in every way to play down the importance of such an agreement and, among other things, to limit the range of its signatories. The Polish envoy in Britain E. Raczynski declared, on behalf of his government that Poland agreed to sign only such a convention about the definition of aggression as would include only the neighbours of the USSR, without any other nations having the right to accede to it. That meant ruling out the possibility of Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and other countries ever joining the convention although they had already declared themselves willing to sign it. As a result, the talks to sign the convention were dragged out.

The Polish government also objected to the convention remaining open to China and Japan, although they were the neighbours of the USSR. Even the Romanian representative at the talks N. Titulescu stated that "Poland is telling by her behaviour to the whole world that she does not want any peace between the USSR and Japan".”73”

The government of Finland was also dragging its feet in defining its attitude to the Soviet proposal, producing all kinds of reservations, including the one about its right to withdraw from the convention at any moment. Germany and Britain were also opposing the signing of the convention.

Yet the Soviet government’s efforts had their effect. On July 3, 1933, the convention on the definition of aggression was signed by the USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. A similar convention, comprising the USSR, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and open to any other nation, was signed on July 4, and a convention between the USSR and Lithuania was signed on July 5; Finland subscribed to the convention on July 22.

The conclusion of that convention was a tangible contribution towards opposing aggression and working out international legal principles designed to help prevent 35aggression. The definition of aggression contained in the convention has since been widely used in international law. At the same time, that convention, signed by a number of countries of Eastern Europe, was a kind of counterweight of the Four Power Pact which the ruling quarters of the Western powers had at one time tried to set up.

Litvinov told the World Economic Conference in London that the USSR, consistently abiding by the principle of peaceful coexistence, was willing to develop its relations with all nations, guided by this principle.”74” The British Spectator stated with full reason on July 14, 1933, that the creation of a system of treaties about the definition of aggression was a great success for Soviet diplomacy and a logical upshot of the Soviet Union’s policy of peaceful coexistence.

The Soviet government brought before the World Economic Conference a thoroughly drafted proposal to sign a protocol on economic non-aggression. Under the Soviet draft, all the parties to the protocol were to abide in their policies by the principle of peaceful coexistence of nations irrespective of their social and political systems. They were to renounce discrimination of every shape or form in their economic relations with each other.”75” However, representatives of a number of powers, opposed to the Soviet proposal regarding the definition of aggression, did not want to accept the proposal about economic non-aggression either.

Belated Recognition

The normalisation of Soviet-American relations was one of the major problems of Soviet foreign policy. Describing U.S. policy, Litvinov said at a session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR that America had for many years "carried on the war declared by the capitalist world after the October Revolution against the new Soviet system of state aiming to create a socialist society. That was a war against the peaceful coexistence of the two systems".”76” The growing intensity of American-Japanese contradictions in Asia and in the Pacific and the increased danger of an armed conflict between Japan and the U.S. compelled the American ruling circles, however, to change their attitude to the USSR. Some convincing arguments in favour of diplomatic relations with the USSR were produced by the American Nation magazine: "The Russian issue is very real 36today, and must be faced immediately . .. recognition already means more to the United States than to the Soviet Union.... Mr. Hoover’s attitude on Russia has jeopardized the position of the United States in the Paciiic area, where the fate of nations may he decided during the next decade. If his policy is not quickly reversed, the loss may be irretrievable. ... Now America needs Russia’s aid in the Pa- cific." “77”

The absence of any contact with the USSR in international affairs could not but weaken the U.S. position in front of Japan. This issue gave rise to a good deal of controversy in the U.S. ruling circles. It was summed up most clearly by the Washington Post on December 30, 1933: the basic argument in favour of recognition is that a strong Russia would be an effective counterweight to Japan in East Asia and would, therefore, lessen the danger of war between Japan and the U.S. The strongest argument against recognition is that it would strengthen Russia and in that way help her preach Communism of which she is the birthplace.

Large sections of American opinion, including influential industrial and commercial quarters interested in expanding economic links with the Soviet Union were pressing hard for diplomatic relations to be opened with the USSR.

At the same time, there were still quite influential forces at work in the U.S. against the recognition of the USSR. When Secretary of State Henry Stimson was advised in 1932 to meet the Soviet delegate at the Disarmament Conference, he, raising his hands, exclaimed: "Never, never! It will be centuries before America recognises the Soviet Union”. As Henry Morgenthau, who was then in the U.S. government, pointed out in his reminiscences: "The State Department in 1933, frankly, was unsympathetic, if not hostile to the whole idea of opening relations with the Soviet Union" “78”

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became U.S. President early in 1933, found it right and proper to take the initiative in normalising relations with the Soviet Union. The basic factor that made it imperative for the United States and, especially at that particular moment, to change its mind about opening relations with the USSR, was the threat to U.S. interests from Japanese aggressors in the Far East.   [36•*

The consistently peace-seeking character of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet Union’s increasingly active involvement in the resolution of pressing international problems, including its readiness to make a sizable contribution towards combating aggressors, and the rapid growth of the Soviet Union’s strength and international prestige played an important part in compelling the ruling circles of the United States to decide that they had to co-operate with the USSR. Information about the importance the U.S. was attaching to relations with the USSR appeared in the American press over and over again. The New York Times stated in January 1933 that relations between the U.S. and Japan were extremely strained. The policy of nonrecognition of the USSR drastically weakened the U.S. position in the Far East. The League of Nations and the U.S. would not be in a position to establish a proper relationship with Japan if they maintained a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union which was the third side to the Pacific triangle.

 

On May 16, 1933, two months after it came into office, the new American government established its first direct contact with the USSR. On that day, Franklin Roosevelt sent his messages to the 53 heads of state participating in the World Economic Conference in London, and the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, including the Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee M. I. Kalinin. Urging specific moves to strengthen peace, the U.S. President called for all nations to conclude a non-aggression pact between them. Kalinin’s message in reply to Roosevelt, which was sent three days later, contained a brief account of the Soviet Union’s consistent action for peace and disarmament. "The Soviet Government”, the message said, "has concluded non-aggression pacts with most of the nations it has official relations with and it cannot but welcome your 38099-1.jpg proposal for concluding a non-aggression pact by all na- tions." “79”

Considering that certain powers, above all Japan and Germany, were harbouring land-grabbing plans, there was no prospect, however, for Roosevelt’s offer coming to fruition.

Roosevelt’s message had no tangible effect either for concluding a general non-aggression treaty, with the USSR and the U.S. among the parties to it, or for direct contact being established between the two countries in international affairs.

On October 10, Roosevelt sent a second message to Kalinin to say that he thought it desirable to put an end to the "abnormal situation" between the U.S. and the USSR. He expressed his readiness to discuss the matter with a representative of the Soviet government. Replying, Kalinin pointed out that the abnormal state of relations between the two countries had an ill effect on the overall international situation, impeding the consolidation of peace and encouraging the aggressors. The message said that Litvinov had been appointed to represent the Soviet government in the talks with Roosevelt.”80”

The exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Kalinin fetched a widespread response. The Soviet press noted with satisfaction that this meant putting an end to the 16– yearold period of non-recognition of the USSR by the United States of America. On October 21, Pravda said in a leading article that the Soviet Union occupied too prominent a position in the world for it to be any longer ignored by other countries "without doing damage to themselves”. The American press highlighted the positive effect which the normalisation of Soviet-American relations might have on the situation in the Far East. For example, the New York American newspaper wrote on September 27 that if Japan ever intended to establish her domination of the Pacific, violate American rights or threaten American territory on the islands or in the continent, America would have an ally, or at least, a friend in the person of Russia. The San Francisco Chronicle pointed out on October 21 that it was, above all, the situation in the Far East that had prompted Roosevelt to take that step.

Isolated voices of American opponents of establishing relations with the USSR were drowned in a loud chorus of those who favoured a change of the United States’ earlier 39manifestly bankrupt policy towards the Soviet Union.

As a result of Litvinov’s talks with Roosevelt, there was an exchange of notes in Washington on November 16, 1933, formalising the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the U.S. The notes recorded the hope that relations between the two nations would forever remain normal arid friendly and that the two nations "henceforth may co-operate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world". “81”

For the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR meant admitting the failure of its policy of ignoring the world’s first socialist state. So farsighted a politician as Roosevelt could not have failed to take steps towards ending the abnormal situation that existed at the time, and revise U.S. policy regarding the Soviet Union. "It is necessary to do justice to President Roosevelt’s farsighted approach”, Litvinov said, "because soon after taking office or, perhaps, even before that, he saw the futility of any further action against us for the sake of capitalism, and the benefit of relations with us for the sake of American national interests and those of international peace."“82”

The Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to the Seventeenth Party Congress described the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S. as an essential achievement of the Soviet policy of peace. "There can be no doubt”, J. V. Stalin said in the Report, "that this act is one of most serious importance in the entire system of international relations. The point is that it does not only serve to increase the chances of peace-keeping, improve relations between the two countries, strengthen trading links between them and create a base for mutual co-operation. It is a landmark between the old times when the U.S. was seen in different countries as a base of support for all kinds of anti-Soviet trends, and the new times when this base has been removed by its own good will from the way to the mutual advantage of both nations." “83”

[36•*]   The first Soviet Ambassador in Washington A. A. Troyanovsky subsequently pointed out in a letter to Moscow that the main factor that had prompted Roosevelt to recognise the USSR was the ageravation of relations between the U.S. and Japan (USSR FPA, s. Of;, r. 14, f. 79, pp. 81–82). The American Ambassador to the USSR W. Bullitt, who was Roosevelt’s closest adviser on relations with the USSR in 1933, also said that the U.S. had recognised the USSR out of political considerations arising from the situation in the Far East (USSR FPA, s. 05, r. 14, f. 80, pp. 69–75). The following events showed bow essential that factor was for the U.S.: only eight years later (in December 1941) tbe U.S. was openly attacked by Japan, thus being plunged into a bitter armed struggle for domination of the Paciiic, which was part and parcel of World War II.

Pacific Pact Drafted

With the establishment of Soviet-American diplomatic relations, the USSR sought to invite the U.S. to play its part in stabilising the situation in the Far East. The Soviet government considered it necessary to conclude a 40Pacific pact to this end. It took into account the fact that the consolidation of peace in the Far East would create optimal conditions for the maintenance of peace in Europe, and, conversely, a war in the Far East would rouse other aggressor powers to action as well.

The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs stressed in a conversation with French statesmen on July 6, 1933, that "if one wants peace in Europe, one cannot stand by looking indiflerently at the events in Asia" since any conflict in the Far East can be used by Germany and some other countries "in order to create difficulties in Europe." “84”

The Soviet Union, on its part, held a firm position with regard to the aggressive plans and ambitions of the Japanese militarists.

The Soviet government took into account the fact that the Japanese war party was guiding itself with increasing evidence towards a "prospect for a preventive war against the Soviet Union”. "In the face of such a situation, our policy,” the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in Japan, K. K. Yurenev on September 17, 1933, "while keeping up our basic commitment to peace, cannot be one of concessions and favours to Japanese militarists or one of ignoring the acts of provocation and outrage which the Japanese government is indulging in. We are projecting and pursuing a firm line of resisting Japanese importunities.. ..” Such a line follows from the assumption, the letter pointed out, that "we can offer quite effective resistance if the worst comes to the worst, that is, if Japanese militarists really tried to attack the Soviet Union. Because of the measures we have taken in the last two years or so, we do not find ourselves by any means defenceless in case of the enemy’s attempt to put us on our mettle." “85”

 

In the Far East Japan, as stated earlier on, threatened not only the Soviet Union, but the U.S. interest as well. Roosevelt did not conceal in his conversations with Litvinov in Washington, during the talks about the establishment of diplomatic relations, that America was seriously concerned over the aggressiveness of the Japanese militarists. In that connection, the Soviet representative suggested that it would be expedient to have a Pacific non-aggression pact concluded by the USSR, the U.S., China and Japan, but Roosevelt limited himself to instructing Bullitt to deal with the matter and report to him.

 

The People’s Commissar suggested during the conversations with the U.S. President that the USSR and the U.S. could likewise conclude an agreement on joint action to meet a threat to peace. However, President Roosevelt declared that he preferred to make unilateral declarations whenever necessary. So, the U.S. gave no support either to that far-reaching Soviet proposal which, if accepted by the U.S., could have changed the worsening international situation for the better.

 

So these facts indicate that the Soviet government was ready and willing to establish active co-operation with the U.S. in opposing Japanese aggression, but the U.S. government did not intend to take really effective steps against the aggressors at the time, and hoped that Japan would begin by going to war against the USSR, and that would make the U.S. position easier. The American journalist Knickerboker who had close contact with Bullitt and other influential American officials, told a Soviet diplomat in Berlin in November 1933 that the U.S. did not contemplate effective co-operation with the USSR in opposing Japanese aggression. That was due, in part, to a fear of an eventual full victory of the USSR over Japan and a revolutionary outburst in Japan and China. “86”

 

In the very first conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Bullitt on December 11, 1933, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Soviet government, reiterated the Soviet proposals for concluding a Pacific Pact and for possible co-operation between the USSR and the U.S. to meet a threat of war. However, Bullitt passed it over. Two days later the same issues were discussed between Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. M. Karakhan and Bullitt. Recording the U.S. Ambassador’s remarks in bis transcript, Karakhan pointed out that one could guess from Bullitt’s words that a study of the question of a Pacific Pact in Washington had Jed to " negative conclusions”. A few days later Bullitt told the People’s Commissar that he foresaw "great difficulties" about the matter. The Soviet government still considered it necessary to press for the conclusion of the Pacific Pact. Troyanovsky, appointed as Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. in December 1933, was instructed to "uphold the desirability of the proposal for a non-aggression pact to be concluded between the USSR, the U.S., Japan and China."“87”

 

On February 23, 1934, Troyanovsky was received by President Roosevelt. The Soviet Ambassador said that it was desirable for the USSR and the U.S. to co-operate in opposing Japanese aggression. He pointed out that "it will not be an easy thing to deter Japan and get her to reduce her appetites. Japan will not listen either to America or to the USSR separately, but she will listen to them both even at the eleventh hour, that is why we must be in contact."“88” Roosevelt, however, dodged the subject. The issue of the Pacific Pact was once more raised by Litvinov with Bullitt in March 1934 after the U.S. Ambassador returned from a trip to the U.S. However, Bullitt "has not given a reasonable answer". “89”

 

By the spring of 1934 it had become obvious that Japan did not yet consider herself sufficiently prepared for war against the Soviet Union. That was indicated, for example, by the fact that the Japanese government had chosen China as the main target of her further aggression. On April 17, 1934, it published a statement clearly indicative of her intention to establish her control over all of China to the extent of crowding out Britain, France and the U.S. In that connection, the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out in a letter of May 11, 1934, to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that, as British political circles believed, the general strengthening of the USSR, its achievement in international affairs, and the defence measures it was taking in the Far East, above all, its powerful Air Force capable of wiping out Japan’s major centres in a matter of hours, all those facts persuaded the Japanese ruling establishment that to attack the Soviet Union under those objective circumstances would be a rather risky enterprise.”90” Although the immediate danger of Japan attacking the USSR was no longer there, the Soviet Union went on pressing for the Pacific Pact to be concluded. On May 13, 1934, Litvinov told W. Bullitt that so long as the U.S. and Britain stuck to their policies in the Far East, Japan could do whatever she pleased. "The only effective method of restricting the Japanese is to arrange at once joint action by all powers having interest in the Pacific." “91”

 

However, the U.S. government did not support the Soviet proposals for strengthening peace in the Far East, while keeping up its policy of abetting Japanese aggression.

 

The British government considered concluding a bilateral 43treaty of non-aggression with Japan so as, by ensuring its self-seeking interests in the Far Fast, to push Japan into armed action against the USSR. It was Chamberlain acting for Premier Baldwin while he was on leave, who took the initiative on September 1, 1934. Even some of the Foreign Office staff had serious doubts about the expediency of such a move. The Chief of the Far Eastern Department, Orde, pointed out in his memorandum on the subject that such a pact "will surely bring nearer the day when she will attack Russia”. However, Japan’s aggressive ambitions were directed not only against Russia and so it was "after a successful settling of accounts with Russia and a pause for recovery that Japan may become a real danger to our own possessions in the Far East." “92” The British ambassador to Japan was instructed to find out the price Japan was ready to pay in return for Britain’s consent to conclude a pact that was of so much benefit to Japan. Chamberlain and Simon took up the cudgels for a pact with Japan.”93” However, because of the impending talks with Japan on matters arising from her reluctance to prolong the existing agreements about the balance of the naval forces of the imperialist powers, the negotiations with her on that subject were adjourned.

For Peace in the Baltic

It was a matter of particular concern to Soviet diplomacy to resolve the problems of Northeast Europe, to ensure peace and security in that region because the capture of the Baltic states by the Nazi Reich or the establishment of German domination over them by any other means was bound to spell the most immediate danger to the Soviet Union.

 

Until 1917, the Baltic states had formed part of Russia. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet government was established also in the Baltic states but it was brought down through foreign armed intervention (German, above all). The Soviet government agreed in 1920 to conclude peace treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and to recognise them on the understanding that they would allow no foreign military presence on their ter- ritory. “94” The USSR had unfailingly attached tremendous importance ever since to having this provision of the peace treaties complied with.

The Soviet Union put forward a series of most important 44specific proposals which, once carried out, could have ensured the maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe, including the Baltic slates. The general idea behind all of them was to unite and rally the forces of East European nations under threat of aggression from Hitler Germany. "The organisers of anti-Soviet intervention”, Izvestia pointed out on October 15, 1933, "have always regarded the Baltic states as springboards for attacking the Soviet Union. The present trumpeters of German nazism are looking at them in exactly the same way... That is why the Soviet Union cannot, of course, remain indifferent in the face of intensified Nazi activities in the Baltic states."

In a conversation with the Latvian Minister in Moscow, on December 11, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs stressed that the USSR was very closely watching the course of events in the Baltic states and that in all international negotiations Soviet diplomats kept those states in mind, and that the Soviet Union would "always do its best to act in common with them”. The Minister expressed his gratitude for the Soviet stand.”95”

pThe USSR attached no less importance to preserving the independence and inviolability of Poland and preventing German aggression against her. Had the aggressive plans of Hitler Germany in relation to the Baltic states and Poland been thwarted and had those states become parties to a collective security system to oppose German aggression, no Nazi forces would ever have gained an access to the Soviet borders.

Realising the sharply intensified danger across Poland’s Western frontiers upon the advent of Nazis to power in Germany, the Polish government also began to show interest in a certain improvement of relations with the USSR in 1933. True, by the end of 1933, the Nazis were reported to be seeking an amicable agreement with Poland’s reactionaries headed by Pilsudski, so as to make it harder for all the nations of Europe, threatened by aggression from the Nazi Reich, to unite and rally together.

On December 14, 1933, the USSR informed Poland of its proposal to publish a joint Soviet-Polish declaration stating their adamant determination to safeguard and defend peace in Eastern Europe. In the event of a threat to the Baltic states, the USSR and Poland, under that draft declaration, undertook to consider the situation.”96”

Since the USSR and Poland wore two largest nations of Eastern Europe, the publication of such a declaration would lias’e had tremendous positive importance for peace in this region. The idea behind the Soviet proposal was to give the Baltic states under a threat of German aggression a sense of confidence in their own strength and stiffen their resistance to German expansionism; to reduce the force of Germany’s pressure on the Baltic states; lay a material base for negotiations between representatives of Poland and the USSR about co-operation in promoting peace. Although Germany was not mentioned in the Soviet proposal, it did imply action against the threat to the Baltic states from the Nazi Reich. Should Poland have accepted the Soviet proposal, that would have been a warning to Germany and would have deterred her acts of aggression against the Baltic states.”97”

 

True, the Polish government announced that it was not opposed, in principle, to considering the Soviet proposal,”98” but it was not its intention to put it into practice. The Polish reactionary ruling quarters did not want any co– operation with the USSR. While planning to create a "Greater Poland”, they had chosen to co-operate with the Nazi Reich and other aggressors in the hope that they could carry out their plans of aggrandizement, above all, at the expense of the Soviet Union.

The Nazis decided to exploit the mood of Polish governing circles to further their own interests. Above all, they strove to prevent the projected rallying of the nations of Europe in opposition to the expansionist ambitions of German imperialism. The Nazis told the Poles that they were prepared to pledge non-aggression and broached the subject of co-operation between Germany and Poland in seizing some of Soviet land and sharing the Baltic states between them. The Polish rulers were delighted by the offer. Pilsudski, talking to Hitler’s emissary Rauschning on December 11, 1933, suggested an alliance between Germany and Poland, pointing to the inevitable prospect of war between them and the USSR. "

A German-Polish declaration of friendship and non– aggression was published on January 26, 1934.

By that declaration the Nazis, with Pilsudski’s men aiding them, raised serious obstacles in the way of establishing a front to defend peace in Europe and drove a wedge 46between the nations objectively interested in resisting Nazi aggression. Poland had virtually broken with the bloc of nations created by Krance in the 1920s and was actually becoming an element of the aggressive bloc of fascist powers. The declaration gave rise to the closest ever co-operation between Poland and Germany.

All the assurances of the Nazis to the effect that they had no aggressive plans whatsoever against Poland were perfidious in their character, of course. Poland still remained among the first few countries the Nazis planned to include in the German "living space”. It was for that reason, as evidenced by the documents of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs then published, that the Nazis decided to limit themselves to signing a joint German-Polish declaration rather than a non-aggression pact as was usually done in such cases. The Nazis acted on the assumption that the declaration would subsequently be easier to break than a treaty. At the same time, the declaration avoided the question of Germany recognising the existing German-Polish frontier and contained nothing beyond an obligation to resolve all issues in dispute without resort to force. Soon after the declaration was signed, Hitler told his closest associates that "all the agreements with Poland are transitory" 100

Referring to the lessons of German-Polish relations, the Foreign Minister of Romania, Gafencu subsequently remarked with good reason that Hitler’s assurances, when he gave them, "bound the assured, not himself".”101”

What claimed attention, besides, was the absence of a provision, common to agreements of this kind, that in the event of an attack by one of the parties to the declaration against a third state, the other party had the right to consider it null and void. That meant, for instance, that in the event of a German attack on Austria, Poland was to keep out.

Following the publication of the Polish-German declaration of non-aggression, the Polish government no longer found it necessary to conduct any negotiations with the USSR about co-operation in opposing German aggression. On February 3, 1934, it informed the Soviet government that it considered the issue of a Soviet-Polish declaration to have lapsed.”102”

Representatives of the Polish government asserted in 47their foreign policy statements that they adhered to art “even-handed” approach in relations with Poland’s two great neighbours—Germany and the USSR. In actual fact, however, such statements were no more than diplomatic cover for the actual course of Polish foreign policy, that is, the course towards closer dealings with Hitler Germany on an anti-Soviet ground.

A Standing Peace Conference Proposed

 The Disarmament Conference resumed in May 1934 However, after Germany had declared back on October 14, 1933, that she would no longer attend the conference and set about feverishly rearming herself, the efforts to draw up a convention on arms limitation turned out to have been finally wrecked. "The conference on disarmament”, Lloyd George wrote, "will soon be put from hospital bed to death bed".”103”

Speaking at a meeting of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference on May 29, Litvinov suggested that the conference might look for some other guarantees of peace (in addition to disarmament). The People’s Commissar pointed out in that connection the possibility of sanctions being applied against peace breakers as well as of Furopean and regional pacts on mutual aid in action against aggression. He went on to set out a proposal by the Soviet government to transform the Disarmament Conference into a standing Peace Conference which would be averting the outbreak of war, seeing to the security of all nations and universal peace, working out, amplifying and improving the methods of promoting security and responding in good time to the warnings about a war danger and to the appeals for aid to the nations in danger and " lending well-timed possible assistance to them, whether moral, economic, financial or of any other kind".”104”

Objecting to the Soviet proposal, the British Foreign Secretary John Simon declared that Britain did not want the Disarmament conference transformed into a security conference. The Soviet proposal was, however, seconded by France and a number of other slates. On June 8, it was decided to refer it to the governments of all nations.

In that connection the People’s Commissariat for Foreign 48Affairs sent a letter to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States giving a detailed motivation of the Soviet proposal as well as the draft statute of a standing Peace Conference. The Ambassador was instructed to explain to the Americans the aims the Soviet government pursued by its proposal. The letter stressed, in particular, that since with the disarmament conference adjourned, there was no more ground for co-operation between the members of the League of Nations and the U.S. in matters of peace keeping, the standing Peace Conference would again "create the possibility for such permanent co-operation. ..” It goes without saying, the letter said, that in the face of an absolutely negative U.S. attitude to the whole idea, the Soviet Union would hardly do as much as table its draft in the League of Nations, "because America’s co-operation is one of the main objects pursued by us".”105”

On receiving this letter, the Soviet Charge d’Affaires B. Y. Skvirsky talked the matter over with U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull who declared that "he cannot bind himself by a definite position for or against the draft" explaining this by saying that the U.S. was careful about the possibility of being involved in an international political or- ganisation.”106” Hull’s answer, in fact, meant that the U.S. rejected the Soviet proposal. It was impossible under the circumstances to bring it to fruition.

Churchill wrote, regarding the role the U.S. could have played in safeguarding peace, that "if the influence of the United States had been exerted it might have galvanised the French and British politicians into action. The League of Nations, battered though it had been, was still an august instrument which would have invested any challenge to the new Hitler war menace with the sanction of international law. Under the strain the Americans merely shrugged their shoulders."“107” The United States, joining Britain and France in abetting aggression, had made impossible a rallying of the forces which could have barred the way to aggression.

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 Soviet Initiative Towards a Regional Pact