Soviet Initiative Towards a Regional Pact
EASTERN PACT NEGOTIATED. TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
BETWEEN THE USSR AND FRANCE
Soviet
Initiative Towards a Regional Pact
The talks which began late in 1933, on the Soviet
government’s initiative, for concluding a regional pact to safeguard the
security of the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, occupy a special place
in the history of the Soviet efforts for peace and against aggression.
"The Soviet Union is interested in strengthening peace everywhere”,
Izvestia wrote on January 29, 1934, "for, with international relations
strained as they are, an armed clash between the Great Powers, wherever it may
break out, would tend to escalate into a world war. More particularly the USSR
is interested in the maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe."
The Soviet government did a lot towards strengthening peace on the Soviet borders. It had concluded non– aggression treaties with many nations. That meant that all of them recognised peaceful coexistence as basic to their relations with the USSR. The signing of agreements about the definition of aggression and a number of other measures went far towards promoting the cause of peace.
However, at a time when certain powers were already
heading for aggression, measures of that kind were not enough to keep the
peace. The aggressors were in no mood to reckon with any treaties or any
standards of international relations. They were intent on using force to carry
out their plans and were preparing for war. It was senseless to try and
admonish them by any peace offers or appeals for peaceful coexistence.
There had to be a different kind of action, the action
that could ensure peace and security in spite of the aggressors’ plans.
Aggressors based their policies on the use of force,”108” and they did not
reckon with the interests of other nations unless these had a requisite force
behind them. Nazi Germany, using her economic potential, was quickly building
up the strength of her war machine as well, developing into the mightiest state
of capitalist Europe. With her predatory foreign policy, she became a
formidable threat to many 50nations of Europe. What made matters still worse
was the emergence of a bloc of aggressor powers, comprising Germany, Japan,
Italy and some oilier countries.
The only way to keep the peace in Europe was for all
the nations facing the danger of aggression to rally together in order to
counter the aggressors with a still greater, overwhelming force. That could be
achieved by the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral treaties of mutual
assistance by the states under a threat of attack, and by setting up an
effective system of collective security in Europe.
That was the course to take if war was to be
prevented. The Soviet proposal for concluding a regional pact met in equal
measure the interests of peoples of the USSR and of the other countries of
Europe. That is exactly why it had fetched widespread response at the time,
being for long in the limelight of European diplomacy and public opinion.
The Soviet government found that with German
imperialism on course for aggression once again, it was a matter of particular
importance for the USSR and France to establish close co-operation in action to
keep the peace.
During his visit to Paris, Litvinov pointed out in a
statement to the French press on July 7, 1933: "Neither our political, nor
our economic interests clash with the interests of France in any point of the
globe, and, therefore, there are no obstacles, in our view, to our closer
co-operation, both political and economic.” The People’s Commissar stated with
satisfaction that the Soviet Union’s peace policy was winning more and more
understanding in France.”109”
In a conversation with the prominent French politician
Edouard Herriot, who was in the Soviet Union in August and September 1933,
Litvinov spoke about the firm determination and desire of the USSR to
"seek closer contact with France".”110” The Soviet government
proposed a gentleman’s agreement about an exchange of information as a step
towards it.
The French people felt deeply concerned over their
destiny. The grave danger hanging over France was clearly sensed by her most
far-sighted politicians as well.
Besides, the French system of alliances with Poland
and some other states of Central and Eastern Europe was gradually losing its
earlier import because as the alignment of forces in Europe changed, so did
their foreign policy orientation. The French government’s attempts to come 51to
terms with Nazi Germany, notably at the expense of the small nations of Central
and Eastern Europe, also greatly undermined relations of those countries with
France and their confidence in her.
At the same time, the rapid economic growth of the
USSR and the enhancement of its defence capability led to it being considered
in France as a possible partner in opposing the danger of Nazi aggression. In
the context of a deep economic crisis, the interests of the French business
community in increased trading links with the USSR was likewise a matter of no
mean importance.
However, there were quite a few personalities in
France’s ruling circles who were in favour of co-operation with Nazi Germany.
Foreign Minister J. Paul-Boncour admitted in a conversation with the Soviet
Ambassador V. S. Dovgalevsky on November 22, 1933, that "there are
influential political, commercial and industrial circles in France seeking an
accommodation with Germany”. He remarked that but for his opposition,
"Daladier would already be conducting direct negotiations with Germany.” “111”
The French government, having overcome the waverings
due to the fierce resistance of reactionary elements which wanted no trucks
with the Soviet Union, finally arrived at the conclusion that there had to be
co-operation with the USSR in action against Nazi aggression. With Germany
having left the League of Nations and walked out of the Disarmament Conference,
Paul-Boncour, talking to the Soviet Ambassador Dovgalevsky, pointed out,
referring to appropriate statements by certain Soviet diplomats, that the
question of supplementing the 1932 Soviet-French non– aggression pact with a
pact of mutual assistance might come up, indeed, in due course. In a
conversation with Litvinov in Paris on October 31, J. Paul-Boncour
"mentioned several times mutual assistance as complementing the non–
aggression pact”. It was he, too, who raised the question of the USSR joining
the League of Nations.”112”
On November 29, 1933, the People’s Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs informed the French government that the USSR was willing to
consider concluding a treaty of mutual assistance with France and joining the
League of Nations. The instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in France was:
"You may open your conversations with Boncour on these grounds.
Communicate the results.” On the following 52day Dovgalevsky informed
Paul-Boncour about it. Litvinov said in those days: "We have set firm
course towards a closer relationship with France." “113” Shortly
afterwards Dovgalevsky was summoned to Moscow to be given circumstantial
instructions regarding subsequent negotiations with the French government.
While welcoming the French proposals in principle, the
Soviet government still considered it more reasonable for safeguarding peace in
Europe to conclude not a bilateral Soviet-French treaty but a multilateral
agreement on collective security with other nations concerned taking part.
On December 19–20, 1933, the Soviet government drafted
the following proposals to be communicated to the French government:
“1) The USSR is willing to join the League of Nations
on certain conditions.
2) The USSR does not object to a regional agreement
being concluded within the framework of the League of Nations about mutual
defence against aggression from Germany.
3) The USSR is willing to see this agreement joined by
Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland
or by some of these countries, with France and Poland in without fail.
4) Negotiations to specify the commitments under a
future convention on mutual defence can begin upon the submission of a draft
agreement by ... France.
5) Regardless of the obligations under the agreement
on mutual defence, the parties to the agreement must undertake to render each
other diplomatic, moral and, as far as possible, material aid also in the event
of an armed attack not envisaged by the agreement itself..." “114”
The document just quoted contained a brief and concise
account of the overriding positions of principle which informed of the struggle
the Soviet state had launched against the growing danger of another world war.
For this reason it is necessary to take a closer look at some of them.
First, in distinction from the French proposal for a
bilateral Soviet-French pact, the Soviet Union was pressing for a wider
agreement. The Soviet government considered some action to prevent war and to
check the aggressors to be the major task in hand. The Soviet-French treaty
about mutual aid in resisting aggression could play a tremendous 53part in
tliis respect. But to conclude a multilateral agreement on collective security
would have been a matter of far greater importance for ensuring a safe peace in
Europe. Should Germany have nevertheless launched the war, she would have had
to wage it against all the parties to the pact at once, that is, under
extremely unfavourable circumstances.
Second, it is worth looking through the list of
nations which were projected as parties to the regional agreement which has
gone down in history as the draft Eastern Pact.”115” One condition of
particular importance in the Soviet proposal was that France and Poland were to
have been indispensable parties to this pact.
A word of comment on French participation. The USSR
could have assumed contractual obligations regarding aid to the nations listed
in its proposal only if France had assumed the same obligations. Otherwise,
should France have stayed out in the event of the USSR entering the war against
Germany because of her attack upon the Baltic countries, the Soviet Union would
virtually have found itself alone in a state of war against the Nazi Reich,
while the overriding concern of Soviet foreign policy at the time was to avoid
such a war.
The reactionary circles of the Western powers, above
all, those of Britain, strained every nerve in those years to provoke war
between the USSR and Germany as well as the USSR and Japan. But the Soviet
Union was cautious enough not to fall for that kind of provocation. Naturally,
the Soviet Union could have come to the aid of a victim of aggression even
without having a treaty of mutual assistance with it. It did actually lend such
assistance on more than one occasion, as will yet be shown. This assistance has
been always provided with due regard for the particular situation and by such
means and methods as to keep the USSR from being involved in a war against
aggressors in what would have been extremely dangerous and unfavourable circumstances
for the USSR, without allies.
It would have been a different matter if France had
joined the USSR in helping the victim of aggression, as envisaged in the Soviet
proposal. In such a case, there would have boon enough ground for expecting lliat,
faced by the prospect of a war against the USSR and France at once, Nazi
Germany would not have ventured into acts of 54aggression against other parties
to the pact. Besides, Germany would have had to reckon with the likelihood that
Britain, as France’s ally under the Locarno Pact, might also have entered the
war, following France. If such an attack had still taken place, the aggressor
could have been curbed by the joint efforts of the USSR, France and other
parties to the Eastern Pact.
The participation of Poland in the Pact was also a
matter of tremendous importance, in point of principle, for the USSR. To begin
with, that would have meant that Poland, once actively involved in all
anti-Soviet actions of the imperialist camp, would become an ally of the USSR.
Besides, it was precisely Poland’s participation in the pact that could have
made Soviet participation in it really effective, because the Soviet Union had
no common border with the Nazi Reich and could seriously consider joining a war
against Germany only in close co-operation with Poland, which would have
allowed the transit of Soviet troops through some of her territory towards the
German borders. The main thing, however, was that a coalition involving the
USSR, France and Poland would have virtually deterred the Nazi Reich from
venturing into such a war. Also, the guarantee of Poland’s continued
independence was a matter of great importance, in principle, for the security
of the USSR, because as long as there was an independent Poland, Germany could
have no convenient access to the Soviet border. Therefore, the USSR was
prepared to make its utmost contribution towards safeguarding Poland’s
independence and inviolability.
With such allies as France and Poland, the Soviet
Union would have undertaken to provide assistance to the Baltic countries and
other small nations as well. For example, once an ally of France, the USSR
would not have objected to having these allied commitments extended to France’s
allies—Czechoslovakia and Belgium (Poland was likewise in alliance with
France). At the same time, the Soviet Union was most interested in having the
reciprocal obligations of the parties to the Eastern Pact extended to the
Baltic states as well. That was because, having captured the Baltic states, Nazi
Germany would have obtained a vantagogronncl for a subsequent attack against
the USSH.
Third, a word of comment about the League of Nations.
The institution of the League of Nations was part and 55parcel of the
Versailles system of peace treaties created by the Entente Powers and the U.S.
as a result of their victory in World War I. It was one of the instruments in
the hands of those nations by which to ensure the immutable territorial and
political outcome of the victory they had won, and the dominant position of the
Anglo-Franco-American imperialist alignment in the world. Along with that, ever
since it was founded, the League of Nations had been one of the centres for
organising foreign intervention against the Soviet state and other anti-Soviet
acts. However, by 1933 the role of the League of Nations within the system of
international relations had radically changed. The positions of France and
Britain in the world grew weaker, and the League of Nations stopped being an
instrument of their domination of other nations. Yet it could still play a
certain positive role as one of the means to ensure collective security and to
make its contribution towards the struggle against aggression and for the
consolidation of peace and international security. For example, Article 16 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that in the event of
aggression by one of its members against any other, all the remaining members
were under obligation to apply economic and military sanctions against the
aggressor.”116”
On joining the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was
anxious for it to become effective in strengthening peace and security. In the
event of an attack against the USSR by any state whatsoever, all other members
of the League of Nations were obliged to come to its aid. True, there was no
particular reason to hope that the other members of the League would actually
render assistance to the USSR. Simultaneously, the USSR came under obligation
to render assistance to other members of the League of Nations should they have
fallen victim to an act of aggression. The Soviet state was willing, on its
part, to join the League of Nations’ collective action in providing assistance
to a victim of aggression.
That was what made the Soviet Union’s accession to the
League of Nations worthwhile and possible. The inability of that organisation
to take any effective steps against the Japanese aggressors who had invaded
Northeast China (Manchuria) in 1931, damaged its prestige. But the entry of the
USSR into the League of Nations, prepared to make a tangible contribution
towards action against aggression, 56could have given it a new lease of life.
Therefore, many members of the League of Nations had a stake in Soviet
participation.
The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations
assumed added relevance because all the allied treaties of France, including
the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, were based on the Covenant of the League of
Nations. Under those treaties, France could not have lent assistance to the
Soviet Union without violating, for instance, the Treaty of Locarno and without
a decision by the Council of the League of Nations about the USSR being a
victim of aggression. Therefore, for the USSR to join the League of Nations
proved to be an indispensable precondition for the conclusion of a treaty of
mutual assistance between the USSR and France, as well as of the collective
security pact for Europe proposed by the Soviet Union.
Those were the circumstances behind the invitation to
the Soviet Union from most of the members of the League of Nations in the
autumn of the subsequent year to join that organisation. Once in the League of
Nations the Soviet Union became its most consistent champion against aggression
and for the maintenance of peace.
Fourth, there is yet another important point to note
about the Soviet proposal. It stated that the parties to the agreement should
back up one another also in the event of an attack by a state outside the
agreement. This point clearly intimated the danger that was facing the Soviet
Union at the time from Japan. When France proposed concluding a treaty of
mutual assistance with the USSR, the Soviet government asked at once whether
France meant mutual assistance in the Far East as well. However, all that the
French government was prepared to do in announcing its readiness to conclude a
treaty with the USSR was to act against German aggression alone. “117” The
Soviet government was interested in having certain support, if not outright
military assistance, provided in the event of a conflict in the Far East as
well. It should be noted at the same time that the very fact of such a pact
being concluded even without the abovementioned provision, would have been of
no mean importance for the Soviet Union in the event of a conflict with Japan.
For the pact would have been an extra guarantee of peace on the Soviet Western
borders which would have enabled the Soviet government to reserve more strength
and 57give more attention to action against the Far Eastern aggressor.
Speaking at a meeting of the Central Executive
Committee of the USSR on December 29, 1933, Litvinov emphasised that "the
maintenance of peace cannot depend on our efforts alone and demands
co-operation and assistance from other nations”. Seeking, therefore, to establish
and maintain friendly relations with all nations, the USSR was giving
particular attention to strengthening the relations and socuring a maximum
rapprochement with those of them which, like the Soviet Union, were interested
in the preservation of peace and willing to oppose peace breakers. "The
Soviet Union, on its part, is ready to accomplish this task because work in
this direction is dictated by the interests of the working people of the whole
world and by the security of all peoples, including, of course, the peoples of
the Soviet Union. The peoples, like ours, who have provided the fullest
possible evidence of their commitment to peace and their respect for the
security of other nations, have also the fullest possible right to their own
security." “118”
By its proposal for concluding a regional agreement on
mutual defence against Nazi aggression, the Soviet government started a new
stage of active struggle for peace and security in Europe. Soviet action
against aggression, determined and guided by its positions of principle, won
widespread recognition and support by the mass of the people in all European
countries.
The proposals of the Soviet government were handed by
the Soviet Ambassador in Paris Dovgalevsky to the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs J. Paul-Boncour on December 28, 1933. Having looked them through, the
French Minister could not help admitting that they had outstanding importance
for the maintenance of peace. "We are undertaking a job of great
importance with you, today we have begun making history with you," “119”
he told the Soviet Ambassador.
It was not, however, without some hesitation that the
French government accepted the proposal submitted by the Soviet government. In
spite of the danger hanging over France, that country’s reactionary elements
still bestially hated the Soviet state and would not hear of any co– operation
with it. They hoped to come to terms with the Nazis.
It was not until April 20, 1934, that Louis Barthou
(who 58succeded J. Paul-Boncour as Minister for Foreign Affairs in February)
informed the Soviet government that he had been authorised to continue the
negotiations. Barthou worked hard, as he usually did, to make the negotiations
a success. He understood perfectly well what danger was facing France from Nazi
Germany and saw the Soviet Union as the major ally in action to ward it off. At
the same time he believed that, should France decline the Soviet proposal, the
USSR could find itself forced to take steps to resume such relations with
Germany as had existed between the two countries under the terms of the 1922
Treaty of Rapallo. And then Germany would reap the benefit France had rejected.
Late in April 1934 the Secretary General of the French
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, A. Leger informed the Soviet Embassy in Paris
about the outline (sketch) for the pact proposed by the Soviet Union to be
formalised as a treaty. The idea behind that outline was to conclude a
multilateral regional pact of mutual assistance (Eastern Pact) with the USSR,
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic states in it and France out. The
parties to the pact were to have pledged non-aggression and mutual assistance
in the event of aggression. However, only the neighbouring states were to have
afforded mutual assistance under the French scheme.
Another idea was for the USSR and France to conclude a
bilateral treaty of mutual assistance associated with the Eastern Pact as well
as with the 1925 Pact of Locarno. Under that treaty, France would have afforded
assistance to the Soviet Union, had it been attacked by any of the parties to
the Eastern Pact; the Soviet Union would have come to France’s aid, had she
been attacked by one of the Locarno nations. “12”° (Besides France, the parties
to the Pact of Locarno were Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium.)
The outline worked out by the French Foreign Ministry
narrowed down the obligations France was to have assumed in accordance with the
Soviet proposal; she was committing herself to giving assistance to the USSR
only rather than to all the parties to the Eastern Pact. True, France was hound
by allied obligations also with Poland and Czechoslovakia under the treaties
she had earlier concluded. But in the event of a German attack on Baltic
states, France could have stayed out. The Soviet Charge d’Affaires in 59France
M. I. Rosenberg immediately drew A. Leger’s attention to that flaw in the
scheme he had proposed. The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry
replied that the French government could not assume any obligation regarding
aid to the Baltic countries.
The draft treaty worked out by the French Foreign
Ministry differed from the Soviet proposal also in that it provided for Germany
to join the Pact as well. Naturally, such a modification could complicate the
negotiations about the Pact right away, but, considering the importance which
the French government attached (partly under the influence of Britain and
Poland) to Germany being offered to join the Pact, the Soviet government did
not object to its proposal being so amended.
In his conversations with Louis Barthou on June 4,
1934, Litvinov reverted to the issue of aid to the Baltic countries. The French
Minister found the Soviet arguments convincing, but gave no final answer to
them. The draft Eastern Pact was examined on June 5, 1934, at a French Cabinet
meeting which approved it in principle. “121” But on the question of guarantees
for the Baltic countries, it took up a negative stand. Barthou communicated
this decision to the Soviet Foreign Minister on the following day.
The Soviet government continued, however, to insist on
French guarantees being extended to the Baltic states and objected to the
division of the parties to the Pact into neighbours and non-neighbours since no
aid for the latter was envisaged. In the end, the French government recanted
such a division but it still refused to commit itself to aiding the Baltic
states. With the major issues regarding the conclusion of the Eastern Pact
settled between the French and Soviet representatives, it was decided to start
negotiations with the governments of other nations which were to join the Pact.
The outline-text of the Pact consisted of a treaty of
regional mutual assistance, a treaty between the USSR and France as well as a
General Act. It was envisaged that Poland, the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be parties to the treaty of
regional mutual assistance. Tlie treaty, apart from committing the parlies
concerned to aid each other in the event of aggression, provided i’or their
consultations with a view to preventing war or restoring peace. Under the
Soviet-French 60Treaty, the USSR was to become a guarantor of the 192,> Pact
of Locarno, on a par with Britain and Italy. France committed herself to
assisting the USSR in the event of an attack against it by any of the parties
to the Eastern Pact. Under the General Act, the Eastern Pact was to have come
into effect once the USSR joined the League of Nations.
While informing the Soviet ambassadors in the
countries concerned about the outline-text of the Pact, the Soviet Foreign
People’s Commissar emphasised that it was not a draft but a mere outline handed
to him by the French in Geneva. In his letter he noted, in particular, that it
was worthwhile including a definition of aggression in the regional pact. The
People’s Commissar took the view that Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic
countries, havhig signed the convention about the definition of aggression,
"can hardly object to this amendment. Nor is France likely to oppose it,
but Germany must be expected to resist it." “122”
First of all, France informed Czechoslovakia and
Poland about the draft Eastern Pact. On June 6, 1934, the Soviet ambassadors
brought the negotiations to the knowledge of the governments of the Baltic
countries. On the following day, the proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact
was passed on to the German government by the French Ambassador.
Active Soviet efforts for peace and security in Europe
had led to a general improvement of Soviet-Czechoslovak as well as
Soviet-Romanian relations by that time. In earlier years, the governments of
Czechoslovakia and Romania, with such influential leaders as Benes and
Titulescu, invariably held extremely anti-Soviet positions. With the
independence of both countries threatened by the Nazi Reich, they had to revise
their policies regarding the USSR which was the principal fighter against
Hitler aggression. By an exchange of notes on June 9, 1934, the USSR
established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Romania.
On being proposed to conclude the Eastern Pact, the
Czechoslovak government immediately announced that it accepted this proposal
and was ready to join the Pact, even in the event of Germany opposing it.
Opponents of the Eastern Pact
Poland’s position was entirely different. In a
conversation with Louis Barlhou in Geneva on June 4, 1934, Joseph Beck said he
was sceptical of the chances of success for this Pact.”123” Litvinov cabled
from Geneva on the same day to say that Beck was ”against the pacts we have
proposed”. On Juno 27, he stated that "Poland is the main hindrance to Ihe
realisation of a regional pact".”124”
The Soviet diplomacy did whatever it could to explain
to the Polish government the immense importance which the Eastern Pact could
have for her independence. Izvestia said on July 16, 1934, that the Eastern
Pact offered Poland some real guarantees of the security of her borders which
could not be regarded as sufficiently ensured by the Polish– German declaration
of friendship and non-aggression. The paper expressed the hope that the Polish
government "on reflection, will find this pact useful both for the Polish
Republic and for universal peace".
pThe position of Finland regarding the Eastern Pact
was also negative. As the German Minister in Finland W. Blticher pointed out,
Finland was looking at the Eastern Pact very negatively and was, on the
contrary, seeking a closer relationship with the countries hostile towards the
Soviet Union.”125”
Right from the outset Nazi Germany set out to wreck
the talks on the Eastern Pact. The German Foreign Minister von Neurath declared
(if tentatively) on June 13 to Litvinov who was passing through Berlin that
"the outline of the Pact is unacceptable to Germany".”126” German
diplomacy was frantically active against the Pact, for it could have been an
obstacle in the way of the Reich’s aggressive designs. The German Foreign
Ministry was summoning, one after the other, the represent Lives of the
countries which were projected as parties to the pact. German diplomats were
just as active in this subversive business in the capitals of the countries
concerned.
Barthou decided to inform Britain, too, about the
plans for concluding the Pact. He passed the outline to the British on June 27.
The position of Britain, which was an influential nation in Europe, was of
great importance in the talks on the Pact. Had Britain supported the idea of
concluding the Eastern Pact, that could have foreclosed the 62successful
outcome of the negotiations, or the more so, if she became a party to the Pact
as well. While giving instructions to the Soviet Embassy in Britain for
discussions with British statesmen, Litvinov wrote on June 28, 1934, that
"there is no means to keep bellicose Germany in check except by concluding
pacts of mutual assistance".”127”
The plans for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact,
howover, did not conform to the basic foreign policy concept of Britain’s
ruling quarters which dreamed of turning the fascist thrust eastward.”128” Therefore,
the British government found itself among the opponents of the Pact right away.
On June 13, 1934, the German Ambassador in London von Hoesch wrote about the
results of his conversation with the British Foreign Secretary John Simon:
"The inclusion of Russia in the European security combination is on the
whole obviously not very congenial to him." “129”
The Soviet Embassy in London had every reason to
report to Moscow, as it qualified the position of Britain, that it was one of
"ill will" towards the Eastern Pact. "The Eastern Pact was to
have strongly consolidated our international positions, ensured the security of
our Western borders and made things easier for us in the Far East. That could
not exactly delight the British government." “13”° The American Baltimore
Sun noted on February 13, 1935, that there were some people in Britain who
hated the USSR more than they loved peace... None of those people could admire
the Eastern Pact which promised peace to communist Russia at least for 10 years.
None of them would regret to see Germany, Poland and Japan attack the USSR
together. They would be gladly selling war equipment to them for that purpose.
The London government did not like that the conclusion
of the Eastern Pact would have strengthened the position of France, Britain’s
ally. It preferred to see France dependent on Britain which offered the British
government a reliable instrument of influencing all French foreign policy and,
by the same token, virtually assured Britain her major role in resolving many
European problems.
Barthou made a special visit to London early in July
1934 to compel a reversal of Britain’s unfavourable attitude towards the
Eastern Pact. British diplomacy ultimately decided to meet the French ally
half-way nominally, but in actual reality there was nothing but a semblance of
63British “support”. The sum and substance of British policy vva.s this: it was
to make public a statement of British support for the idea of the Eastern Pact
with a view to preventing the possible conclusion of a bilateral French-Soviet
treaty of mutual assistance (British diplomacy was particularly averse to such
a treaty), but to do everything possible to make the successful completion of
negotiations on the Eastern Pact impossible by all kinds of backstage tactics.
First of all, British diplomacy called for Germany to be involved in an
agreement between the USSR and France on mutual assistance, although there was
no doubt (rather just because of that) that Germany would not accept that
proposal.
Speaking in Parliament on July 13, the British Foreign
Secretary John Simon declared that Britain supported the Eastern Pact.”131” At
the same time, in private conversations British government officials made it
clear to the German government that they had no sympathy at all, in actual
fact, for the Eastern Pact. On July 19, Simon told the German Ambassador Hoesch
that "the British Government had decided to support the Pact proposals in
view of the threatened alternative of a formal Franco-Russian alliance, which
Britain wished to avoid in all circumstances. . .” “132”
The U.S. government was also opposed to the conclusion
of the Eastern Pact. As American historian Foster Rhea Dulles pointed out in
this connection, the United States of America "hoped that if war broke out
in Europe, it might somehow be channeled into a crusade against Communism and
accomplish the purposes which Allied intervention had failed to achieve in
1918." “133”
Without giving an official answer for the time being
to the proposal to join the Eastern Pact, Germany still did not make any secret
of her negative attitude to it, seeking to frustrate the Pact plans.
The government of Poland, claiming that the pact could
not be concluded without Germany, also stuck to its negative position.
The conclusion of the Eastern Pact was to meet the
national interests of the Baltic countries. But it turned out that neither
France, nor Britain wished to come to their aid in the event of German
aggression. For instance, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs Robert Vansittart told the Secretary-General of the Ministry 64for
Foreign Affairs of Latvia V. Munters that he did not see the slightest prospect
ahead for the British and French governments to assume any ohligations
regarding a guarantee of the status quo in the Baltic region. “134”
In those circumstances Latvia and Estonia took up what
amounted to a wait-and-see position. Lithuania alone, under an immediate threat
from Nazi Germany, was the only one of the Baltic countries to have
unconditionally supported the Eastern Pact.
The new phase in the negotiations about the Eastern
Pact began in the autumn of 1934. Hitler and Neurath, talking with the Polish
Ambassador Lipski in Berlin on August 27, 1934, proposed secret Polish-German
co-operation with the aim of preventing the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. At
the same time the Nazis made clear the ground on which far-reaching
Polish-German co-operation was possible. Hitler declared that if Poland’s
outlet to the sea had been cut east of Eastern Prussia in Versailles in 1919,
Poland and Germany would long since have been allies and Poland could be
turning her eyes East.”135” A few days later Lipski communicated Poland’s
consent to “undeclared” co– operation with the Nazi Reich with a view to
scuttling the Pact.
On September 8, 1934, Germany sent an official
memorandum to the other projected parties to the Eastern Pact announcing that
she did not intend to participate in a multilateral treaty providing for mutual
assistance. The German government indicated that it preferred bilateral agreements.
Still, considering it politically disadvantageous to turn down unconditionally
the idea of concluding a multilateral treaty at all, it expressed its consent
to the signing of a treaty that would contain nothing beyond obligations about
nonaggression and consultations.”136”
The Polish government followed in the footsteps of the
Nazi Reich. On September 27, 1934, it officially declared that it could not
adhere to the Eastern Pact unless Germany was in it. Poland said also that she
would not bo a party to a pact together with Czechoslovakia and Lithuania.”137”
That was a clear indication of the Polish rulers’ ill designs in respect of
those two states.
The USSR Joins the League of Nalions
Ever since it was founded, the League of Nations had
been one of the centres for planning and plotting anti– Soviet acts of
imperialist powers. Therefore, the Soviet Union had, quite naturally,
maintained a negative stand with regard to the League until the early 1930s.
However, by 1933 the international situation had materially changed. The
Anglo-French imperialist alignment was coming under mounting pressure from
Japan and Germany. London and Paris had to revise much of their policy towards
the Soviet Union. That told on the League of Nalions as well. Moreover, many
members of the League found it desirable for the USSR to participate in that
ogranisation so as to make it more effective in resisting aggression.
The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations
was first brought up by the French government when it began to show interest
late in October 1933, in co– operation with the USSR in the struggle against
aggression from Germany.
The Soviet government found it possible to join the
League of Nations, the more so since the aggressive powers— Japan and
Germany—had left it. While handing the Eastern Pact proposal to J. Paul-Boncour
on December 28, 1933, the Soviet Ambassador Dovgalevsky informed him about the
Soviet consent in principle to join the League of Nations.
Setting out the Soviet Union’s position with regard to
the League of Nations, Stalin said in a conversation with American journalist
Walter Duranty: "In spite of the withdrawal of Germany and Japan from the
League of Nations or, perhaps, just because of that, the League can become a
certain brake to hold up military operations or impede them. If that is so, if
the League can turn out to be something like a little hurdle to make things
somewhat more difficult for war and somewhat easier for peace, then we are not
against the League. Should that be the course of historical events, it cannot
be ruled out that we may support the League of Nations in spite of its glaring
shortcomings." “138”
The French government reverted to the question of the
USSR joining the League of Nations in June 1934. The Soviet Union gave a
positive reply. The French Foreign Minister was handed a statement by the
Soviet government 66to the effect that the USSR had earlier linked its
accession to the League with the conclusion of the Eastern Pact, but was now
prepared to join the League subject to an appropriate invitation and a
guarantee of a permanent seat in the Council. The USSR, it was pointed out,
expected that this step "will facilitate the conclusion of pacts to
strengthen peace".”139”
Most of the members of the League of Nations reacted
positively to the Soviet Union’s accession to that international organisation.
The British government also declared, not without some hesitation though, that
it was ready to support the idea of the Soviet Union joining the League of
Nations. However, the governments which held an extremely hostile position with
regard to the USSR, reacted to that step of the Soviet Union unfavourably.
Poland’s position could not but call for vigilance.
The Polish ruling establishment always was after an international isolation of
the USSR so as to create a favourable setting for its anti-Soviet designs. With
the USSR in the League of Nations (just as with the Eastern Pact concluded),
the position of the Soviet Union would have changed appreciably. The plans for
an international isolation of the USSR would also have been frustrated. There
was a very painful reaction in Warsaw, besides, to the idea that on joining the
League of Nations, the USSR was likewise to become a permanent member of the Council.
The Polish leaders had for years pressed hard for Poland to be recognised as a
Great Power and a dominant force in Eastern Europe. To this end, they strove to
secure, notably, a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations. The
Soviet Union’s accession to that organisation and the granting of a permanent
seat to it in the Council, that is, the recognition of its immense role in
international affairs, combined to strike at the great-power ambitions of the
Polish government. On July 4, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs
reported from Geneva that the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs J. Beck was
active behind the scenes conducting "virulent propaganda against our
joining the League". “14”°
The position of Finland with regard to the Soviet
Union’s accession to the League of Nations also proved to be unfriendly. The
question of the USSR joining the League of Nations was taken as an excuse for
yet another anti-Soviet campaign in the Finnish bourgeois press.
A negative stance was taken up also by certain
countries whose ruling quarters, just because of their class hatred for the
Soviet state, did not find it possible to establish even diplomatic relations
with the USSR (Portugal, Switzerland).
On September 14, 1934, the Soviet People’s Commissar
on his arrival in Geneva, concerted with the French representatives the outline
invitation for the USSR to join the League of Nations and the Soviet
government’s reply to this invitation.
On the following day, representatives of the 30
membercountries of the League of Nations sent a message to the Soviet
government pointing out that they, "considering that the task of
maintenance and organisation of peace, which is the basic purpose of the League
of Nations, demands the cooperation of all nations, hereby invite the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to join the League of Nations and to bring in its
valuable co-operation.” “141”
The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations
was examined at an Assembly session on September 18. There had to be a
two-thirds majority for the admission and a unanimous vote for the election to
Council membership. 39 members of the League voted for the admission of the
USSR to the League, 3 against (the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland), and
7 abstained. There was not a single vote against the inclusion of the USSR in
the Council, but 10 nations abstained.”142” So the USSR was admitted to the
League of Nations and became a permanent member of its Council.
Speaking in the Assembly in connection with the Soviet
Union’s accession to the League, the Soviet Foreign Commissar declared that
unfortunately the League of Nations had no means at its disposal for the
complete abolition of war. However, given the firm will and close co-operation
of all its members, much can be done to prevent war. "The Soviet
government has never stopped working to achieve this end ever since it came
into existence”, he declared. "Henceforward it wants to join its efforts
with those of other nations represented in the League.” The Soviet
representative said that mere declarations were not enough to keep the peace,
it took some more effective means to do so.”143”
The Soviet Union’s entry into the League of Nations
substantially reinforced that international organisation and its potentialities
for the maintenance of peace. The Soviet 68defence capability and economic
resources materially increased the League’s potential powers and possibilities
essential to the struggle against aggression. The Soviet government’s
determination to do everything possible to check aggression and strengthen
peace could increase the efficiency of the League of Nations and enhance its
role in resolving the problems of war and peace.
The Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations
Francis Paul Walters of Britain, admitted that Soviet participation in that
international organisation was "an event of first-class importance in the
political evolution of the post-war world".”144” Even bourgeois politicians
and historians had to admit that the Soviet Union became the most active
partisan of the policy of collective security in the League.”145” Once in the
League of Nations, the Soviet Union became a full-fledged party to what was the
major international organisation in those years, where it could play an active
part, on a par with Britain, France and other countries, in resolving
international problems, including the problems of peace and security. All that
opened up further opportunities for the Soviet government to intensify the
battle for peace and against aggression.
Soviet-French Protocol
In view of the negative position of the Nazi Reich and
Poland, the Soviet government decided to press for the conclusion of the
Eastern Pact without them, that is, with tho countries willing to participate
in it.
The French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou kept up his
active stand in favour of the conclusion of the pact. It was not for nothing
that he was one of the European statesmen the Nazi secret services decided to
“remove”. The assassination of Barthou was entrusted to the Assistant German
Military Attache in Paris Speidel. A detailed plan for the assassination,
codenamed "Teuton Sword”, was worked out. The killing of Barthou in
Marseilles on October 9, 1934, was a serious blow at the plans for concluding
the Eastern Pact.
Laval, who became the French Foreign Minister, made
some fundamental changes in the country’s foreign policy since he considered an
understanding with Germany to be 69his main concern. Even at the Barthou
funeral, Laval told the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Eduard Benes that there
was no point in being in a hurry to develop a closer relationship with the USSR
since it was more important to reach agreement with Germany.”146” The French
Minister declared that "of all the French political leaders he, Laval, had
done most for a rapprochement with the Germans,” and that he was "ready to
reach agreement with Germany”.”147”
All that meant an end to the process of consolidation
of Soviet-French relations which had been going on until then. Taking into
account the prevailing mood in France, Laval kept saying that he would carry on
Barthou’s policy, while working underhand towards “freezing” relations between
the USSR and France. It was not for nothing that the French Foreign Minister
should have been christened the "balancing Laval".
The most important task before Soviet diplomacy at the
time was to forestall a German-French deal which meant, above all, that the
Nazis would be getting a free hand in the East in return for Germany’s pledge
not to attack France. The Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
proceeded from the assumption that, should the Eastern Pact be concluded, it
would be, apart from everything else, a certain guarantee against an
anti-Soviet collusion between France and Germany. Since there was no reason to
expect the Pact to be signed soon, it was decided to offer to the French
government to sign an accord about a "reciprocal commitment of the USSR
and France to conclude no political agreements with Germany without prior
mutual notification as well as about informing each other about all political
negotiations with Germany".”148”
The Soviet government succeeded in having a Soviet
French protocol signed on December 5, 1934, whereby both governments pledged
themselves not to enter into any negotiations about any agreements that could
damage the preparations for, and the conclusion of, the Eastern Pact. A few
days later Czechoslovakia acceded to the Soviet-French protocol.
Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and
France
Once it had
become finally clear from Hitler’s statements in March 1935 that Germany and
Poland were opposed to the draft Eastern Pact, the Soviet government brought up
on March 29, the question of concluding a trilateral Soviet French-Czechoslovak
treaty of mutual assistance.”149” Paris, however, favored the conclusion of
bilateral Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties.
The difference between these proposals was essentially
that the French one urged that France and the USSR should assume separate
commitments in front of Czechoslovakia, while the Soviet proposal called for a
joint commitment of the two powers. Such a joint guarantee by the two major
powers of Europe would have been more substantial for Czechoslovakia. Another
thing a trilateral treaty would mean for Czechoslovakia was that she was not
obliged to afford assistance to the USSR single-handed, unless such assistance
was provided by France. Czechoslovakia thought it impossible to conclude a
treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR without such a reservation. A similar
consideration was of no lesser significance for the USSR because it was also
anxious to avoid being bound by a treaty obligation regarding assistance to
Czechoslovakia without any guarantee that France would come to her aid.
However, the French government did not want to commit
itself to concert its position regarding assistance to Czechoslovakia with the
Soviet Union. It sought to retain full freedom of action in deciding whether or
not to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet government still considered it most
reasonable to conclude the Eastern Pact in one form or another. On April 2,
1935, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed its
Ambassador in France that the Soviet position "is to have a pact of mutual
assistance in the East with Germany and Poland as parties to it and, should
Germany refuse to participate, with, at least Poland and, in case of Poland’s
disagreement, with France, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries as parties
to it.. . As to Laval’s new proposal about a bilateral pact of mutual
assistance, it is not clear to us what we can gain from it so that was yet to
be cleared up.”150”
The Soviet Union still could not fail to attach major
importance to the Eastern Pact safeguarding the Baltic states as well from
German aggression. On this subject, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs indicated that "the occupation of those countries by Germany would
be the start of her attack on the USSR”. Therefore, France must lend assistance
to the Soviet Union as soon as the German Armed Forces crossed their Eastern
border. Should the Baltic countries be left without the guarantees of France
and other parties to the Eastern Pact, and should the Soviet Union want to come
"to the aid of those countries”, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs stated, "we would be deprived of French assistance as well in the
course of further hostilities and with Germany developing her offensive against
our borders, because we would have been the first to go to war against Germany
to defend the Baltic countries. We would, evidently, have to confront France
and Britain in a major dispute on this account".”151”
On April 6, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, V. P.
Potemkin, made an appropriate statement to the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs. However, the French government did not support the Soviet proposal for
concluding the Eastern Pact without Germany and Poland. Besides, Laval told the
Soviet Ambassador that Franco had never agreed to guarantee aid to the Baltic
states. Therefore, the only option was to conclude bilateral agreements. On
April 9, the French government officially announced that France was willing to
conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR.”152”
In view of the worsening international situation and
impossibility of a larger agreement, the Soviet government decided to sign a
bilateral Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance. On April 10, the Soviet
Ambassador in France Potemkin received appropriate instructions from Moscow.
These called, in particular, for including a provision about the USSR and
France affording immediate assistance to one another in case of aggression,
without waiting for any decision by the Council of the League of Nations.”153”
In mid-April 1935 Litvinov and Laval held negotiations
in Geneva to draft Hie treaty. But these negotiations showed that Laval could
not be relied upon. His ambition to come to terms with the Nazis was only too
obvious. Litvinov pointed out that Laval would be glad to see the
72Soviet-French pact "wrecked without him being personally reproached for
it”. "But Laval himself would not want to stop the negotiations and
renounce the pact unless the outlines of a collusion with Germany emerged. The
best thing for Laval to do was to drag out the negotiations in the hope that
Germany would make some attractive offer to France with assistance from
Britain."
Litvinov found from his discussions with Laval that
"one should not pin any serious hopes on the pact in the sense of real
military aid in the event of war. Our security will still remain the exclusive
concern of the Red Army. The pact has predominantly political significance for
us, reducing the chances of war both from Germany and from Poland and
Japan." “154”
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and
France was signed on May 2, 1935. The preamble pointed out that the treaty had
the aim of strengthening peace in Europe and that the two nations would work
for an appropriate European agreement. They undertook to consult one another in
the event of a danger of aggression against the USSR or France, and to lend one
another immediate assistance in the event of an attack by any European state.
The protocol to the treaty made it clear that the contracting parties were under
obligation to afford assistance to one another subsequent to an appropriate
recommendation from the Council of the League of Nations; if the Council still
did not produce any recommendation, the obligation regarding assistance would
nevertheless be fulfilled. The treaty was concluded for a term of five years.
Both governments declared in the protocol that they considered it desirable to
conclude a regional agreement containing the terms of mutual assistance to
replace the Soviet-French treaty.”155”
The government of Czechoslovakia declared its desire
to conclude a similar treaty with the USSR. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance
between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was signed on May 16, 1935. It had a
reservation, included upon the initiative of the Czechoslovak government, to
the effect that the obligations of the USSR and Czechoslovakia to provide
assistance to one another would remain valid only in case of assistance from
France as well to the USSR and Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression.”156”
The conclusion of the treaties of mutual assistance with
France and Czechoslovakia was a result of the Soviet 73Union’s vigorous and
consistent struggle for peace and against aggression. The Soviet-French and the
Soviet– Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance could have become a major
factor for peace and security in Europe. What was required, however, for that
to be so, was for all the parties to the treaties to fulfil the commitments
they had assumed in good faith. These treaties could also have been the nucleus
for other European nations threatened by Nazi aggression to rally round the
USSR, France and Czechoslovakia. But the French government, under Laval, never
thought of earnest co-operation with the USSR. Laval’s major preoccupation was
to reach an accommodation with Germany. Being unable to avoid signing the
treaty with the Soviet Union, since that was demanded by the largest sections
of the French people, Laval saw it as, above all, a means of making Germany
enter into an amicable agreement with France. Laval said he was signing the
pact with the USSR to have more trump cards in playing for agreement with
Berlin.”157” At the same time Laval feared lest the USSR, knowing about the
intention of British and French reactionary elements to arrive at an
understanding with the Nazi Reich, should find it necessary to work for normalizing
relations with Germany. The desire to prevent the revival of "
Rapallo" was one of the major reasons why Laval did not venture to break
off negotiations with the USSR and agreed to sign the treaty.”158”
Laval affirmed on various occasions that he did not
propose to turn the Pact with the USSR into an effective agreement, that is,
supplement it with a military convention. For instance, he assured German diplomats
that he had not thought of developing the pact with the USSR "into a
closer alliance".”159” During his meeting with Goring in the latter half
of May of 1935, Laval assured him that he was doing everything to lessen the
significance of the treaty with the USSR. “16”°
Although the position of Czechoslovakia was
particularly precarious, her ruling circles attached but limited importance to
the treaty. In a letter of information to the Czechoslovak ministers abroad, E.
Bones, explaining his government’s position regarding the treaty with the
Soviet Union, wrote that should Russia be once more kept out of European
affairs as she had been at the 1922 Genoa Conference, that could again
automatically entail a German-Russian 74rapprochement. So it was necessary that
co-operation with Russia should be maintained and that she should not be kept
out.”161” The day before treaty was signed, Benes argued with the British
Minister in Prague that the treaty changed nothing about the situation in
Europe, but would keep Germany and Russia away from each other.”162”
The approach to the Eastern Pact after the conclusion
of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty and the Soviet-French treaty had to be
different. The Soviet government considered that a multilateral treaty of a
more limited substance, with Germany acceding to it, would have a certain sense
as a complement to those treaties. On May 16, 1935, the governments of the USSR
and France put forward their proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact
containing obligations about nonaggression, consultations and refusal of aid to
the aggressor. The Soviet government told the government of France that it
considered it desirable for the treaty to be signed by the USSR, France,
Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries that would wish to
joint it.”163”
The French government transmitted a memorandum to the
government of Germany proposing that the Eastern Pact should be concluded on
the foregoing terms.”164”
However, Laval once more showed himself as cunning as
he was shortly afterwards. On June 25, 1935, the French Ambassador in Berlin
Francois-Poncet, meeting the Secretary of State at the German Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, von Billow, told him that in the event of an Eastern Pact
being signed, even without the provision for mutual assistance, the
Soviet-French treaty "would become invalid".”165” During his
conversation with the German Ambassador in Paris von Koster on July 27, Laval
said he attached major importance to a Franco-German understanding and was
prepared to make certain concessions to bring it about. He emphasised the
identity of views of the two countries on the struggle against Bolshevism.
Pointing out that the Franc Soviet treaty had been concluded for a short term
of five years, Laval stressed that this alone showed that France was not
desirous of binding herself up with the USSR for too long. He declared that
should Germany agree to co– operate and undertake, by concluding a multilateral
pact, to refrain from attacking any of its signatories, France "would hand
her paper back to Russia”,”166” that is, would abrogate her treaty with the
USSR.
That is to say that right after the signing of the Soviet
French treaty, the French foreign service entered into negotiations with the
Nazis which meant, to all intents and purposes, that in the event of agreement
with Germany, France was prepared to betray her ally and renounce the treaty
she had just concluded with the USSR.
However, the German government decided to reject the
Eastern Pact in its new form as well. It self-righteously declared that because
of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, its earlier
statements on the matter were null and void.
It was, beyond dispute, Hitler Germany that played the
leading role in thwarting the plans for concluding the Eastern Pact. Not only
did she refuse to be a party to it, but exerted pressure on other possible
parties to the pact as well. And yet, should the governments of all other
nations, projected as parties to the pact, have really shown themselves
far-sighted enough and concerned about the security of their respective
countries, they ought to have signed the Pact even without Germany in it. Much
of the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations about the Eastern Pact lay,
therefore, with the ruling circles of bourgeois-landlord Poland.
A large measure of responsibility for wrecking the
conclusion of the Eastern Pact rested, besides, with the government of Britain
whose policy hampered the effort to strengthen the security of Europe. Even the
Polish diplomatic service referred to the "double-dealing of England"
which, while paying lip-service to the idea of the Eastern Pact was, in
reality, wholly appreciative of Poland’s negative stand.”167”
Although the Soviet-French treaty had been signed,
Laval, who became the French head of government in June 1935 (along with
retaining his post of Minister for Foreign Affairs), was deliberately
sabotaging it.
Under the French Constitution, the treaty could have
been endorsed and put into effect by the President of France without delay, but
Laval had it referred to parliament notorious for its unwieldly multitier
procedure. As long as Laval remained head of government, the Treaty of Mutual
Assistance between the USSR and France never came into effect.
The matter was taken off the ground only after a new
76government (led by right-wing radical Albert Sarraut) was formed in France in
January 1936, and the situation in Western Europe was once more strained
because of the Nazi preparations for moving German forces into the demilitarized
Rhineland. On February 27, 1936, the Chamber of Deputies of the French
Parliament finally ratified the treaty by 353 votes to 164. The treaty came into
effect on March 27, 1936.
Soviet-French Military Co-operation as a Point at
Issue
The conclusion
of treaties of mutual assistance usually brought with it the establishment of
close contact between the General Staffs of the countries concerned. That was
what France always did. While exchanging notes with the British government on
April 1, 1936, reaffirming Britain’s obligation to assist France in the event
of a German attack on her, French diplomacy compelled a provision about
negotiations to be started forthwith between the General Staffs of the two
countries.”168” On military co-operation with the USSR, however, France took a
different line.
Immediately after the signing of the Soviet-French
Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Soviet government, seizing the opportunity
offered by Laval’s arrival in Moscow, raised the question of military
co-operation. Laval cabled from Moscow on May 16, 1935, that the Soviet
government, in view of possible aggression, proposed "considering now the
technical arrangements to give the pact its full effect".”169” The Soviet
military attaché in France informed the French General Staff late in May that
the Soviet General Staff was ready for "contacts to be established with
the French General Staff". “17”°
The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces began
planning action with a view to lending military assistance to France in the
event of her being attacked by Germany. “171” In June 1935 the Soviet
Ambassador in France Potemkin took the matter up with the French War Minister
Jean Fabry. However, as the latter admitted, Laval "did not relish the
brutal automatism of a military convention".”172”
The Deputy Chief of the French General Staff, General
Loizeau attended a military exercise in the Ukraine in the autumn of 1935 at
the invitation of the General Staff of the 77Red Army. He came to the
conclusion that Soviet service’* men had a high morale and great stamina and
that the Soviet forces wore capable of holding back enemy forces in the event
of a conflict and even in the opening stages of war.”173”
In spite of general Loizeau’s favourable evaluation,
the French General Staff looked upon the Soviet-French treaty as a purely
diplomatic document without ever considering it right and proper to complement
it with a military convention. As the French historian M. Mourin pointed out,
the French General Staff proceeded from the following considerations: "If
the French forces remained orientated, following the concepts of the
government’s general policy, only towards defensive action behind the Maginot
Line, military accords with the Soviet Union would be of little use, taking
into account the absence of a common frontier between Russia and Germany and
the refusal of Poland and Romania, confirmed in September 1935, to accord
Soviet troops the right of passage through their territory." “174”
Instead of taking steps towards an understanding with
the Polish and Romanian governments, the French authorities decided to shelve
the issue of military co-operation with the USSR. The Chief of the French
General Staff, General Gamelin, arranged with the French Ministry for Foreign
Affairs that the methods of French-Russian military co-operation "will not
be discussed".”175”
Objectively, France should have been even more
interested than the USSR in making the treaty really effective by having it
supplemented with agreement on military co– operation, for the Soviet Union had
no common border with Germany. So it was more probable for the Soviet-French
treaty to come into play when the Nazi Reich attacked France’ (Germany had a
common border with her and had invaded! her territory more than once) or any of
the weaker European countries with whom France was linked by allied
commitments, that is, Czechoslovakia or Poland. Once at war with Germany, in
consequence, France would, naturally, be interested in getting assistance from
the USSR. But while a German attack on the USSR was impossible without German
forces having to pass through the territory of East European countries, it was
just as impossible for the Soviet Union to lend effective assistance to France
without Soviet forces having to pass through the territory of certain
78countries of Eastern Europe. Therefore, the question of how the USSR could
afford assistance to France did arise several times.
Early in 1937 the Soviet military attaché in France was
asked by the French General Staff about the form and amount of aid the USSR
could provide in case of a German attack on France or Czechoslovakia. On
February 17, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet military attaché in
Paris communicated the answer from the Soviet General Staff to the Chief of the
French General Staff and then to the Prime Minister of France:
“There can be two versions of Soviet military aid.
1. If Poland, which was in alliance with France, and
Romania, which was in alliance with France and Czechoslovakia, fulfil their
duty and give consent to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory
under a decision taken at their own discretion or in compliance with a decision
by the Council of the League of Nations, the USSR will have an opportunity of
providing its aid and support by all the services...
2. Should Poland and Romania object, for unclear
reasons, to the USSR affording assistance to France and Czechoslovakia, or
should they refuse to permit the transit of Soviet troops through their
territory, assistance from the USSR in such a case would inevitably be limited.
The USSR will be in a position to dispatch its troops
by sea into the territory of France and its Air Force units to Czechoslovakia
and France.
The size of this assistance should be stipulated under
a special agreement between the states concerned.
In both cases, the USSR will offer naval assistance.
The USSR will be able to supply France and
Czechoslovakia with petrol, fuel oil, lubricants, manganese, foodstuffs,
armaments, engines, tanks, aircraft, etc."
The Soviet General Staff put the following questions
on its part:
“1. What aid could France afford to the USSR in the
event of an attack by Germany?
In what way should the size of this aid be fixed?
2. What arms could France deliver to the USSR?"“176”
There was, however, no reply to these counter-questions.
This document shows that the Soviet government was
determined to have the closest possible co-operation with 79France in resisting
possible aggression by Nazi Germany, in particular, the Soviet Union was
prepared to conduct negotiations with France lo draw up specific terms for the
provision of mutual assistance. Unfortunately, the government of France did not
support this initiative in spite of the nation’s vital interests.
On handing this document, the Soviet government
officially raised the "cardinal question" about effective Soviet
French military co-operation as early as 1937, which arose subsequently (in
August 1939) during the Soviet– British French military negotiations in Moscow.
Effective Soviet involvement in war against the Nazi aggressors was possible
only in case of a positive solution to the issue of Soviet troop transit
through the territory of the countries lying between the USSR and Germany. [79•*
And it was sheer hypocrisy on the part of military representatives of
Britain and France to pretend in 1939 that for Soviet military representatives
to have raised such a question was something unforeseen which they had no
possibility to prepare for in advance.
In the course of the Soviet-French negotiations about
the Eastern Pact and the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between
the USSR and France, the governments of all the nations concerned carefully
analysed all the issues fundamental to curbing the aggressors which cropped up
again in 1939 right before the outbreak of war. Of course, it would have been
far better for peace in Europe, if the ruling circles of the Western powers had
realised in good time, back in the mid-1930s, the full gravity of the danger
the aggressors posed to all nations of Europe. In the national interest of
their countries, they should have got down to setting up a dependable common
front to safeguard peace together with the Soviet Union instead of working out
their insidious plans for a collusion with Germany so as to set her against the
USSR. The Soviet Union was determined to do its best to safeguard peace.
Notes
[79•*] The
importance of the position of Poland and Romania was indisputably realised in
Britain and France. This was to be seen from the memorandum compiled for the
British government on November 12, 1937, by the Chiefs of Staff of Britain’s
Naval, Air and Land Forces. It stated that intervention of Russia on the side
of France and Britain can quickly become a real danger for Germany only in case
Poland maintains a friendly position and shows desire for co-operation. (I.
Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet, London, 1971, p. 60).
Next
Chapter II
NAZI AGGRESSORS AND THEIR BACKERS GERMAN AND ITALIAN FASCISTS
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