Draft order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. I. Yezhov "On shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of mass operations" in Ukraine

Archive: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials: In 5 volumes. 1927-1939. Volume 5: 1937-1939. Book 2. 1938-1939. M., 2006, S. 50-56

End of February - beginning of March 1938

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, heads of departments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR for Kyiv, Kharkov, Odessa, Vinnitsa, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Zhytomyr, Dnepropetrovsk and Donetsk regions.

Heads of operational groups of regional departments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

Heads of the UPVO of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 border detachments.

To the heads of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 11th departments of the UGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics.

Heads of departments of the NKVD of the territories and regions of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR.

Heads of the DTO GUGB NKVD.

Heads of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 11th departments of the GUGB NKVD

Over the last eight or nine months of 1937-1938. The apparatus of the UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR did a great job of defeating the espionage-Trotskyist, right-wing, military-fascist, nationalist and other anti-Soviet forces in Ukraine. At the same time, beginning in August 1937, the Ukrainian Chekists carried out, in general, significant work to defeat anti-Soviet and spy bases by the method of mass operations.

In the process of this work, first of all, and mainly in mass operations, some mistakes were made in Ukraine and major shortcomings were made, which until now were not sufficiently realized and understood by the leaders and employees of the UGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. The continued effect of these failures, which have already significantly reduced the effectiveness of the work carried out earlier on mass operations, hinders their further progress and deployment, and prevents the complete completion of the liquidation of the active anti-Soviet spy forces in Ukraine that has begun.

Without a clear understanding of the nature and essence of these shortcomings, without resolute elimination of them in the shortest possible time, the necessary turn of work on the complete liquidation of the kulak-insurgent, Ukrainian-nationalist, White Guard and espionage base in Ukraine is impossible.

I. Drawbacks of conducting mass operations in the Ukrainian SSR

Upon personal acquaintance in Kyiv (survey by the operational brigade of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR), in the second half of February 1938, with the results of the work of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and the regional departments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR in the elimination of kulak, nationalist, White Guard, Polish, German, Romanian and other anti-Soviet contingents - revealed a number of major shortcomings in the conduct of mass work in Ukraine.

Although the overall scope of the operational strike, judging by the number of those who were repressed, was very significant, the operation did not achieve the final political effect, due to the fact that all the work on mass operations was carried out at a low operational-political level. This circumstance, which was a direct consequence of the insufficient party spirit of the NKVD apparatus of the Ukrainian SSR and its leaders, mainly led to the fact that in the work on mass operations in Ukraine there was no purposefulness of Chekist actions, there was no targeted blow to the most dangerous leadership, organizational, active, kulak -nationalist, White Guard and espionage cadres.

From here, the harmful pursuit of bare quantitative indicators of the fulfillment and overfulfillment of "limits" was inevitably born and flourished, the dispersed anti-Soviet grassroots were arrested, and the leading enemy cadres and the anti-Soviet organizations headed by them left the blow.

Given the extreme weakness of accounting and information work at the beginning of the operation, it was necessary to direct and conduct work on operations with particular care, promptly and at a high political level in order to eliminate the really most active and top forces of the enemy.

Instead, for the most part, the anti-Soviet members who were on the surface were arrested (composition of the churches , church activists, individual carriers of anti-Soviet and anti-collective farm sentiments, ordinary insurgent and White Guard members, etc.), while the most conspiratorial and organized kulak-White Guard and espionage formations remained undiscovered.

The lack of the necessary operational-political purposefulness in mass operations also led to the fact that little attention was paid to nationalist formations such as the Makhnovist, Petliurist, their connections with foreign emigrant centers, and interweaving with foreign intelligence services.

Another major drawback of the work on mass operations in the Ukraine was that it was carried out in some isolation from local conditions, without sufficient consideration of the specifics of certain areas, the characteristics of the period of the civil war and subsequent years of the class struggle, without any concrete connection with the political and economic significance of the area. As a result, a significant anti-Soviet and espionage base in the border areas remained undefeated and not completely liquidated, especially in the Kamyanets-Podilsky region, where the operational strike was completely insufficient; regional centers and cities, industry and transport have been very poorly cleaned. In the villages, where the blow was more thorough than in the cities, it fell, first of all, in the areas that were in close proximity to the points of the operational groups;

Finally, the third major shortcoming of the work on mass operations in Ukraine was the completely insufficient deployment of the investigative study of the arrested contingents, the low level of the investigation, even to the extent that it was carried out in some places, and the almost complete absence of it in many cases in others.

As a result, the repressed kulaks, nationalists, spies were either condemned by those who did not confess (in some regions the number of those who confessed barely reaches 20-30-40%), or, at best, showed only about their personal subversive activities, hiding their organizational ties and leaders of anti-Soviet work. Apparently, some employees of the NKVD of Ukraine decided that the simplified procedure for convicting those arrested in mass operations, established by my orders Nos. 00447 and 00485-1937, exempts them from investigation in these cases. Meanwhile, it was precisely these orders that gave instructions on thorough investigative work, exhaustive identification of the most active and top enemy cadres, and the complete establishment of all criminal connections of the arrested kulaks, White Guards, nationalists, and spies. Forgetting this elementary requirement for a Chekist,

II. Shortcomings in the preparation of further massive operational strikes

Now, when all the apparatuses of the GB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR are in the period of a new stage of mass operations, which should finally ensure the complete liquidation of the most active organizational anti-Soviet cadres (order No. 00447 - 1937) and spy contingents (order No. 233 - 1938 .), — the Ukrainian security officers must learn that the most important condition for the fulfillment of this highly responsible task is a thorough operational and politically targeted preparation of the operation, first of all, the correct identification and accounting of the contingents subject to repression. Meanwhile, a closer acquaintance with the accounting carried out at the present time for the preparation of a further operational strike showed that this accounting is qualitatively unsatisfactory, reflects the former illness of the pursuit of a bare number,

The main shortcomings of the accounting work done now are:

The extreme generality, superficiality and vagueness of accounting for such contingents, the repression of which must be approached strictly differentiated, and often purely individually. So, for example, in all regions of the Ukrainian SSR, about 10,000 people expelled from the CP(b)U have now been taken into account and they are indiscriminately regarded as a category subject to repression. Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks repeatedly pointed out, and this is quite obvious, that expulsion from the party cannot in itself be a basis for arrest. The exclusions must be taken into account by us, but not for indiscriminate repression, but for the systematic study of them by informing, agents in order to identify the processes taking place in this environment and arrest specifically those that manifest certain anti-Soviet intentions.

Just as unsatisfactorily organized is the registration of Russian prisoners of war, that is, persons who served in the tsarist army and were held captive by the Austro-Germans during the imperialist war. The very fact of being in foreign captivity is also by no means a basis for repression, and sweeping registration of all prisoners of war without exception is unnecessary and even harmful: about two and a half million people who have been in captivity live in Ukraine, and general registration of them will only clutter up and clog our accounting work. We must identify, take into account, develop and repress not every prisoner of war, but those who were either kept in specially created by foreign intelligence camps for prisoners of war - Ukrainians, Tatars and others and, therefore, processed by intelligence; or those who maintain contact with foreign countries,

Along with the absolutely correct accounting for the subsequent repression of such a specific category as the kulaks, in Ukraine the category called “counter-revolutionary kulak elements” is completely vaguely taken into account, without due reflection of who exactly is taken into account: a collective farmer, a poor peasant or a middle peasant. We must firmly remember that if we repress the kulak precisely on this basis, then according to the categories of “counter-revolutionary kulak element” and “rural counter-revolution”, in cases where we are talking about a poor peasant, middle peasant, collective farmer, rural teacher or doctor, they can be repressed only on the basis of specific materials incriminating them in anti-Soviet activities.

The account of former Petliurists, Hetmans, Makhnovists, political bandits, participants in anti-Soviet uprisings, and former Whites is also inadmissibly generalized. For these contingents, first of all, officers, commanders, chieftains, organizers and leaders of gangs and uprisings, volunteers of anti-Soviet armies, apprentices who have connections beyond the cordon, persons who have compromising materials, remigrants, punishers, hetmans, Petliura and white officials. The rest of the course of the operation and the repression of the rank and file of these categories should decide the quality of the investigation in the cases of the asset being repressed in the first place. It is absolutely unacceptable that, in order to fulfill the “limits” as soon as possible and formally, a blow should be struck only and indiscriminately at the entire ordinary mass of former Petliurists or third-rate participants in gangs and uprisings.

It is also necessary to clearly define the priority composition of the repressed in the order of order No. 00447 for other categories of accounting, namely:

According to the Ukrainian nationalist elements, all active nationalists who previously received minor punishments, or for one reason or another were not previously held accountable, should be fully taken into account and repressed; former members of nationalist organizations; associated with foreign nationalist organizations and emigre figures; representatives of the Hetman, Petlyura, white rural and city administrations.

As regards the clergy, an operational blow must first of all be struck against the black and white clergy who have penetrated into industry and transport, as well as against the clergy who have connections with the Zakordon, then at the top of the church activists, not allowing believers to be brought under this category at all.

As far as sectarians are concerned, the task is, first of all, to repress the ruling elite of sects and sectarian preachers; the repression of a number of sectarians should be carried out only on the basis of specifically incriminating materials.

With regard to the participants in anti-Soviet parties, it is necessary first of all to take into account and arrest the leading, active and cadre of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists, etc.; arrests of ordinary members of anti-Soviet parties to be carried out on the basis of incriminating investigative and undercover materials. In this category, it is necessary to provide deep investigative work, bearing in mind that the task of repressing the assets of anti-Soviet parties is to open the existing organized Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, Zionist, Dashnak (in the Kharkiv region), etc. anti-Soviet underground.

There is a complete lack of accounting for contingents subject to repression in regional centers, cities in general, and military garrison locations, which can again lead to a repetition and consolidation of one of the most important shortcomings of the previous period of mass operations - weak cleaning of cities. The leading role of the city in our socialist state is especially great and complex, and therefore its purging of elements hostile to Soviet power is of particular political importance and must be fully carried through to the end.

Geographically anonymized and extremely generalized are the new registration data on the contingents subject to repression on the scale of the region, and on the districts - within the regions. This circumstance, especially in connection with the absence of an analysis of the results of the already conducted operation in individual areas, creates the danger that the areas in which the operational strike was the weakest will still remain insufficiently cleared. As a result, the categories provided for by Order No. 00447 - 1937 were poorly taken into account for repression, and new contingents for Polish, German, Romanian operations, which are the main ones for Ukraine in defeating and eliminating spy bases, were completely insufficiently identified.

III. Necessary activities

In order to decisively eliminate the shortcomings noted above and to ensure the high operational and political quality of further work on mass operations

I order:

The existing register of mass operations subject to repression should be replenished immediately, ensuring operations, first of all, in urban centers.

Immediately sum up the results of the operation by districts, specifically identifying the districts most weakly covered by the operation, check with particular care for these districts the new register of those scheduled for arrest and take all measures to replenish it. To carry out the operation as deeply as possible and to ensure the cleansing of areas that were previously the most poorly covered by the operation, deploy operational groups of regional departments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR in these areas.

In addition, conduct a special operation in the Ukrainian SSR on the Czechs, with the consideration of cases in accordance with order No. 00485. Arrest the following categories: a) persons associated with Czech diplomatic institutions located on the territory of Ukraine; b) former Czech legionnaires; c) anti-Soviet, nationalist activists of the Czech colonies, connected with foreign countries; d) the kulaks and clergy of the Czech colonies; e) political emigrants from Czechoslovakia, with the exception of persons who are verified and trustworthy.

In the further conduct of operations along the Polish, German, Romanian and other lines of foreign intelligence, to completely repress, first of all, the following categories: a) special settlers from the border strip; b) defectors; c) prisoners of war of the Polish army; d) prisoners of war of the Red Army who were in Polish camps, in cases where they did not return to their homeland immediately after the conclusion of the Riga Peace; e) prisoners of war of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, especially command and non-commissioned officers; f) prisoners of war of the tsarist army who were in Germany in specially organized camps (German, Ukrainian, Tatar, etc.); g) an asset of previously existing German Pan-German organizations and unions (the Mennonite Union, the German Colonists Union, the Union of the Black Sea Germans, etc.); h) persons, related to foreign embassies, consulates; i) old-time employees of foreign firms and joint-stock companies belonging to the following categories: trusted composition (directors, authorized shareholders, persons maintaining relations with foreign firms after the revolution); j) employees of the so-called. offices for making inquiries about creditworthiness (in this regard, raise all materials about the personnel of such offices in Ukraine), which are known as a cover for the work of German intelligence in the pre-revolutionary period; k) officers and soldiers of the Romanian army who remained on the territory of the USSR. offices for making inquiries about creditworthiness (in this regard, raise all materials about the personnel of such offices in Ukraine), which are known as a cover for the work of German intelligence in the pre-revolutionary period;

The limits established in accordance with Order No. 00447 shall be used exclusively for the repression of the following categories: a) officers and commanders and volunteers of the White, Petliura and Hetman armies; b) chieftains, leaders, organizers of gangs, insurgent organizations and anti-Soviet uprisings, c) re-emigrants, d) representatives of the tsarist, Petliura, hetman and white administrations; e) former active members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations; f) persons associated with foreign Ukrainian nationalist organizations and figures, and in the absence of the prospect of their undercover use; g) black and white clergy who penetrated industrial enterprises, transport, and clergy associated with the zakordon; h) sectarian leaders and preachers; i) the former leadership and personnel of the anti-Soviet parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Cadets, Mensheviks, Zionists, Borotbists, Anarchists) and members of these parties who fought against Soviet power during the civil war and later; j) former counterintelligence officers, policemen, guardsmen, gendarmes and punishers; k) former kulaks; l) former manufacturers and landowners; m) former members of the "Union of the Russian People", "Union of Michael the Archangel" and active Black Hundreds; o) all sub-items that contain specific incriminating materials, if they are not covered by the categories listed above.

When reporting information on the operation, indicate the number of arrests for each category separately, highlighting the number of newly arrested on the basis of materials obtained by the investigation, and giving a brief description of the newly discovered organized anti-Soviet formations.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

General Commissar of State Security

Yezhov