The tragedy and valor of Afgan - 9

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The final stage of preparation for the introduction of Soviet troops into the DRA

The next day after the political leadership of the USSR made a decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, an Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense) was formed, headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S.F.Akhromeev. This group included generals and officers of the General Staff, as well as representatives from all types and branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense. At 22:00 on December 14, the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez, a city located on the Soviet-Afghan border, and began work in the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO). A little later, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov was appointed the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, where I served at that time, a special group of generals and officers from all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms also worked to ensure the entry of the 40th Army into Afghanistan. They prepared draft directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff on mobilization and ensuring the entry of troops into Afghanistan. The transportation of troops, equipment, weapons and other materiel to the Afghan border was planned and carried out, and various organizational measures were taken. The military-political situation in Afghanistan was monitored and proposals on it were reported. And although this group of "initiates" worked behind "closed doors", many officers of the Main Operations Directorate knew about the essence of the issues they were solving, and therefore, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan for many of them did not come as a surprise. Is it possible to believe that the members and candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee knew nothing about this?

document

Operational groups of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Afghanistan

... During the entire period of the Soviet troops' stay in Afghanistan, various operational groups of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces worked there from time to time. The first such group, headed by the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N.N. time of overthrow of supporters of H. Amin. On January 3, 1980, an Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L.Sokolov (Army General S.F.Akhromeev became his deputy), flew to Afghanistan from Termez, which was there until November of the same year. Then from time to time this group traveled to the DRA to coordinate the hostilities of the Soviet and Afghan troops during the largest operations (for example, in Panjshir) for up to six months. From the second half of 1984, the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the DRA was entrusted to General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, at that time the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. At first, he only periodically traveled to Afghanistan, and from January 2, 1987, until the end of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, he was in Afghanistan permanently.

Generals and officers of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense systematically worked in units and formations of the 40th Army to provide practical assistance to their commanders and staffs in the preparation and conduct of hostilities, organizing combat training taking into account the accumulated experience, as well as coordinating actions and maintaining interaction with the Afghan army. Assistance was provided to the advisory apparatus in planning hostilities, increasing the combat capability of the Afghan armed forces and resolving various issues of combat activities.

In addition, it was this group that solved the most diverse tasks of both military and economic, political and social nature.

Due to the fact that the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense was at first in Afghanistan from time to time, mainly to manage large operations, in March 1985 a group of representatives of the General Staff (consisting of 5 people) was sent to Kabul, led by a general for special orders of the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for Afghanistan, Major General B.V. Gromov (March 1985 - April 1986). Subsequently, it was led by Major General Yu. V. Yarygin (April 1986 - May 1987) and Major General B.S. Kudlai (May 1987 - January 1989).

With the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988, a special Operational Group of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces began to work in Afghanistan under the leadership of Lieutenant General A.G. Gaponenko, which was engaged in the creation of three-month emergency reserves for the RA Armed Forces in key regions of the country (Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, etc.) and at the outposts.

Source of information: General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces,

Operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in DRA-RA, 1979-1989.

At the initial stage of the "Afghan campaign," the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense did an enormous amount of organizational work. She supervised the regrouping, mobilization and deployment of troops to the territory of Afghanistan, as well as the implementation of measures to remove H. Amin from power and the establishment of B. Karmal's regime.

Document

(Secret)

List of orders for the creation of a grouping of troops in TurkVO for entry into Afghanistan

(Given by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR on oral orders of the Minister of Defense of the USSR in December 1979)

December 14 - Relocate the ZakVO fighter-bombers regiment to Mary and hand it over to the TurkVO.

December 16 - Separate from the management of TurkVO and mobilize the field management of the 40th Army. To appoint the first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant-General Yu. V. Tukharinov, as commander of the army. Bring the field administration of the 40th army to full combat readiness. Bring the motorized rifle and tank regiments of another TurkVO division to full combat readiness.

December 19 - Relocate the motorized rifle and tank regiments, whose readiness was increased on December 16, by the end of the day on December 21, to the Takhta-Bazar area. Bring the communications units of the 40th Army to full combat readiness.

December 23 - Bring the SAVO motorized rifle division to full combat readiness.

December 24 - The Minister of Defense of the USSR held a meeting of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, at which he announced the decision to send troops to Afghanistan. The meeting was attended by deputy defense ministers, commanders-in-chief of the services of the Armed Forces and the commander of the Airborne Forces, some chiefs of the main and central directorates. The Minister of Defense of the USSR gave the order to send an airborne division and a separate parachute regiment of the Airborne Forces, a motorized rifle division of TurkVO and a separate motorized rifle regiment SAVO into Afghanistan. At the same time, it was ordered to bring to full combat readiness a number of formations and units of the Ground Forces, as well as aviation of TurkVO and SAVO for a possible increase in the grouping of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. On a copy of the theses of his speech at this meeting, preserved in the archives of the General Staff, by the hand of D.F.

December 25 - Bring the artillery and anti-aircraft units of the 40th Army to full combat readiness. Bring the TurkVO aviation to full combat readiness. Bring one more motorized rifle division of the SAVO to full combat readiness. Bring the pontoon bridge regiment of TurkVO to full combat readiness.

December 26 - Send the SAVO motorized rifle division, alerted on December 25, at the disposal of TurkVO. Send to the Takhta-Bazar area all units of the TurkVO motorized rifle division, alerted on December 23.

Source of information: General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, 1979

From this list, one can easily be convinced that from about mid-December the formation of an expeditionary contingent of troops to enter Afghanistan began at an accelerated pace. It was based on the formations and units deployed in TurkVO, which were almost all skipped. They were supplemented with local resources from the reserve. The general directive for mobilization and bringing to combat readiness was not given. The troops were brought to readiness by the administrative order, on the basis of individual orders of the General Staff after receiving the appropriate oral instructions from D.F. Ustinov. In just three weeks, more than thirty such orders were issued. This indicates that until mid-December, the USSR Ministry of Defense did not have any specific plans for the introduction of Soviet troops into the DRA.

In total, about 100 formations, units and institutions were deployed, including the management of the 40th army and the mixed aviation corps, four motorized rifle divisions (three in TurkVO and one in SAVO), an artillery, anti-aircraft missile and airborne assault brigade, a separate motorized rifle and jet regiments, communications, reconnaissance, rear and repair parts. The airborne division, a separate parachute regiment, and parts of the aviation technical and airfield support have been completed to full staff. From the reserve (reservists), more than 50 thousand officers, sergeants and soldiers were called up to staff the troops, about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were supplied from the national economy.

Similar in scale mobilization measures in TurkVO and SAVO have never been carried out before. In this regard, local authorities, heads of enterprises and farms, military registration and enlistment offices and military units were not ready for them. For example, in the early days of mobilization, no one paid attention to the quality of staffing of units with specialists, since everyone was sure that a routine check was underway, which would end after reports on the completion of the recruitment of units with personnel. However, when, in general terms, the commanders and military registration and enlistment offices were oriented about possible further actions, an emergency replacement of those already called up and sent in part of the military service began. At the same time, an acute shortage of scarce specialists began to be felt (mechanics-drivers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, ATGM and radar operators, gunners, etc.).

A large number of persons liable for military service were not found due to their poor registration in military registration and enlistment offices, violations of the passport regime during registration, confusion in the names of streets, etc. ...

Many reserve officers in the army never served and did not have practical skills in military specialties, as they were trained at military departments in universities. This led to the fact that in the first months of their stay in Afghanistan, the troops faced a number of serious problems. And during a war, this is always fraught with unpredictable consequences.

Despite the difficulties, by the end of December 24, the main forces of the 40th Army were still ready for action. Formations and units intended to act as a reserve continued to form. For example, the 201st honey stationed in Dushanbe (commander Colonel VA Stepanov) began to mobilize only in the evening of December 24th. Having accepted mobilization resources for three days, the division, having made a march, by the end of December 28, concentrated in the Termez area, where it conducted combat coordination. However, taking into account the experience of hostilities in Afghanistan, it was decided to replenish the division with personnel from units of groups of forces (GSVG, TsGV). During January, the assignees were replaced, and at the end of the month the 201st honey was introduced to the northern regions of the DRA.

Spetsnaz prepares to overthrow H. Amin

From about mid-December, a forced transfer of small special forces to Afghanistan began. On December 14, for example, two special groups of the KGB of the USSR, 30 people each, arrived in Kabul (in Afghanistan they were called "Thunder", which included cool athletes, and "Zenith" - it had special forces from the Balashikha school. there were others). Administratively, these groups belonged to foreign intelligence and were prepared to carry out terrorist acts, if necessary, outside the Soviet Union.

On the morning of December 17, the "Muslim" battalion stationed in Bagram also began its advance to the Afghan capital. By the end of the same day, he was concentrated in the Darul-Aman region. When the battalion was advancing on the pass, two armored personnel carriers fell behind. They contained soldiers who had arrived just before entering Afghanistan (representatives of the special department carried out a shake-up of personnel until the last day). Just at that time, a general from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was passing along the road. He reported to Moscow that the battalion was poorly prepared and its commander must be replaced immediately.

In this regard, on the evening of the same day in Moscow, Colonel V.V. Another officer was supposed to fly with him, but at the request of V. Kolesnik, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Shvets was sent. Quickly filling out all the documents necessary in such cases (they brought their foreign passports directly to the plane), at 6:30 on December 18, they departed from the Chkalovsky airfield via Baku and Termez to Bagram. They flew to Termez with a freight forwarder accompanying the military cargo, and to the destination with two more fellow travelers, as it later turned out, employees of the State Security Committee Colonel Yu. I. Drozdov and Lieutenant Colonel E. G. Kozlov. In Termez, there were some problems with the plane, so we had to look for a new one. Well still, what colleagues from TurkVO met. They organized lunch and helped change the plane.

We arrived in Bagram only late at night. The committee members left with some people in civilian clothes, and V. Kolesnik and O. Shvets, having spent the night in the first caponier they came across, went to Kabul on the morning of December 19, where they introduced themselves to the chief military adviser, Colonel-General S.K.Magometov and the GRU resident in Kabul who were warned of their arrival. V.V. Kolesnik, who knew Major Kh. Khalbaev well, took him under his protection, saying that the battalion commander was intelligent, albeit laconic. You can hope for him, in difficult times he will not let you down. After talking on the phone with their superiors in Moscow and spending the night at the embassy, ​​on December 20 they went to the location of the battalion, which was stationed about a kilometer from the Taj Bek Palace, in an unfinished building with glassless windows. Instead, they pulled on a raincoat-tents, put up stoves, "stoves", beds in two tiers. The Afghans gave them camel wool blankets. That year, the winter in Kabul was harsh, at night the air temperature dropped to 30 degrees below zero. Food was bought at the bazaar. In general, we somehow settled down.

The security system of the Taj Bek Palace was carefully and thoughtfully organized. Inside the palace, the personal guard of X. Amin, consisting of his relatives and especially trusted people, was on duty. They also wore a special uniform, different from other Afghan servicemen: white bands on their caps, white belts and holsters, white cuffs on the sleeves. They lived in the immediate vicinity of the palace in an adobe building, next to the house where the headquarters of the guard brigade was located (later, in 1987–1989, the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense would be located there). The second line consisted of seven posts, each of which housed four sentries armed with a machine gun, a grenade launcher and machine guns. They were changed after two hours. The outer ring of the guard was formed by the points of deployment of the battalions of the guard brigade (three motorized infantry and a tank). They were located around the Taj Bek at a short distance. At one of the dominant heights, two T-54 tanks were buried, which could freely fire direct fire from cannons and machine guns to the area adjacent to the palace. In total, there were about 2.5 thousand people in the security brigade. In addition, an anti-aircraft regiment was located nearby, which was armed with twelve 100-mm anti-aircraft guns and sixteen anti-aircraft machine-gun installations (ZPU-2), as well as a construction regiment (about 1,000 people armed with small arms). There were other army units in Kabul - two divisions and a tank brigade. In total, there were about 2.5 thousand people in the security brigade. In addition, an anti-aircraft regiment was located nearby, which was armed with twelve 100-mm anti-aircraft guns and sixteen anti-aircraft machine-gun installations (ZPU-2), as well as a construction regiment (about 1,000 people armed with small arms). 

December 21 Colonel V.V. They were ordered to take up defensive positions between the guard posts and the line of the Afghan battalions.

We immediately began to carry out the combat mission. We quickly established contact with the commander of the security brigade, Major Jandad (who is also Amin's assistant), agreed with him on the location of the defensive positions of the battalion units and all questions of interaction. To communicate with him personally, Jandad provided them with a small Japanese radio station. The brigade commander himself spoke Russian (although he hid it), as he studied in the Soviet Union, first in Ryazan at the airborne school, and then graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. According to legend, Colonel V. Kolesnik acted in the role of "Major Kolesov" - deputy battalion commander for combat training, and Lieutenant Colonel O. Shvets - "Major Shvetsov" - an officer of a special department. One of their fellow travelers (Colonel Y. Drozdov) became "Captain Lebedev" - Kh. Khalbaev's deputy on technical matters.

After agreeing on all the issues with the Afghans, they began to carry out practical activities. They made a decision, planned military actions, and assigned tasks to companies. We retraced the exit routes and the positions of the subunits, etc. In particular, on one of the routes there was a natural obstacle - a ditch. Together with the soldiers of the brigade, they built a bridge across it - they laid concrete trusses, and put slabs on them. This work was carried out for two days.

In the second half of December 23, V. Kolesnik and Kh. Khalbaev were summoned to the Soviet embassy. There they first reported to Colonel-General Sultan Kekezovich Magometov the results of the work done, and then went to the office on the second floor, where the representative office of the KGB of the USSR was located. There was a man in civilian clothes, whom everyone called Boris Ivanovich or just among themselves BI (head of the USSR KGB apparatus in Afghanistan), as well as other employees. At the beginning of the conversation, Boris Ivanovich inquired about the plan for protecting the palace. After Colonel V. Kolesnik made a report on his decision, he suggested that he think about an option of action in case he suddenly had to seize the palace instead of guarding it. At the same time, he added that part of the battalion's forces can perform another task, and they will be assigned a company of paratroopers and two special KGB groups. In general, they said, go think and tomorrow morning come and report your views. Colonel Popyshev, the adviser to the commander of the security brigade, also received the task of developing his own version of the battalion's action plan as a person who knows the palace security system well. On that and parted.

We established contact with the Airborne Forces task force that arrived on December 23, led by Lieutenant General N.N. overthrow of supporters of X. Amin. The decision on the new problem was taken all night. They counted for a long time and meticulously. They understood that this was the real task for which they were here. And they came to the conclusion that if two companies and one company (without a platoon) were taken away in the battalion, as the head of the KGB mission had warned about, then the battalion would not be able to capture the palace, even taking into account the amplification and the factor of surprise. The ratio of forces and resources in all directions was approximately 1:15 in favor of the Afghans. It was necessary to use all the forces of the battalion and the means of reinforcement. Based on this, we developed a plan.

On the morning of December 24, Colonel Popyshev was the first to report. It immediately became clear that he approached his mission purely formally, about the principle of "what you please" - after all, he had to carry out the task. He argued that the allocated forces and resources were enough for the battalion, but he could not confirm his statements with calculations. Then the decision to seize the Taj-Bek Palace was reported by Colonel V. Kolesnik. He substantiated the need for participation in the assault of the entire battalion with the attached forces and means, detailed the plan of action. After long discussions, the battalion command was told: "Wait." We had to wait a long time. Only in the second half of the day it was reported that the decision was being approved and the battalion would carry out the task at full strength. But they did not sign this plan. They said: "Go ahead!" Major X.

What caused such a delay was revealed much later. The fact is that in Moscow the USSR Minister of Defense was holding a meeting of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense at that time, at which he announced the decision to send troops to Afghanistan. According to E. I. Chazov: “His only mistake, which, as it seems to me, he did not fully realize, was the Afghan war. A bad politician and diplomat, he, as a representative of the old Stalinist "guard", believed that all issues could be resolved from a position of strength. If I saw Andropov rushing about in connection with the Afghan war, who eventually realized his mistake, then Ustinov always remained unperturbed and, apparently, convinced that he was right. "

In directive No. 312/12/001, signed by USSR Defense Minister DF Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff NV Ogarkov and sent to the troops on December 24, 1979, he determined specific tasks for deployment and deployment on Afghan territory. In particular, it provided the following explanation for the step taken: “Taking into account the military-political situation in the Middle East, the last appeal of the Afghan government was considered positively. It was decided to send some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states ... "

The grouping of troops was determined by the directive as follows:

40th A (108th, 5th honey, 860th OMSB - SAVO, 56th odshbr and 2nd zrbr) TurkVO;

103rd Airborne Division and 345th Airborne Division of the Airborne Forces;

34th sak;

reserve - 58th med of TurkVO, 68th and 201st med of SAVO, 106th Airborne Division of the Airborne Forces.

Further, the troops were assigned tasks for the march and deployment on the territory of Afghanistan. Participation in hostilities was not provided. Specific combat missions to formations and units to suppress the resistance of the rebels were set a little later, in the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR on December 27, No. 312/12/002.

Very little time was allotted to carry out all the activities related to the introduction of troops into the DRA - less than a day. Such haste could not but have a negative effect in the future. Much turned out to be unprepared and ill-considered. At 12:00 on December 25, an order was received to cross the State Border.

Document (Secret)

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force

Commander of the troops of the Turkestan Military District

Commander of the Airborne Forces

Copy:

Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country

To the Chief of the Operational Group of the General Staff. (Termez city)

The crossing and flight of the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by troops of the 40th Army and Air Force Aviation will begin at 15:00 on December 25 this year. (Moscow time).

D. Ustinov, No. 312/1/030 12/25/1979

S. K. Magometov and V. V. Kolesnik arrived at the field telephone office, which was deployed at the stadium near the American embassy, ​​on the evening of December 24. We entered the government communications booth and began to call General of the Army S.F. The telephone operator refused to connect Colonel V. Kolesnik for a long time, said that he was not on special lists, but then, apparently, having asked S. Akhromeev, she nevertheless connected. The first deputy chief of the General Staff ordered the decision to be reported. After listening, I began to ask questions about its justification and calculations. He was interested in the smallest details. In the course of the conversation, he made comments and gave instructions. Then with S.F. S. Magometov spoke to Akhromeev. He was given the task to report the decision in cipher by the morning of December 25 with two signatures (his own and V. Kolesnik's). When leaving the negotiation booth, S. Magometov said to V. Kolesnik: "Well, Colonel, now you have either a chest in crosses, or a head in the bushes."

A report was immediately written at the communication center, and by two o'clock in the morning the encryption was sent. We drove together to the embassy, ​​and then V. Kolesnik hurried to the battalion. It was necessary to prepare for the axial mission ... He was appointed head of the operation, which was codenamed "Storm-333".

Many different opinions are expressed about this operation, and the most incredible ones. Even the participants in those events perceive them differently. Much is left unsaid or omitted altogether. Summing up the eyewitness accounts and the available documentary material, it is possible to restore approximately the following picture.

H. Amin, despite the fact that in September he deceived L. Brezhnev and Y. Andropov (he promised to save N. M. Taraki's life when the latter was already strangled. As a result, the Soviet leadership "bargained" with H. Amin for two or three days because of the already dead leader of the April Revolution), oddly enough, trusted the Russians. Why? If you do not discard the version that he was associated with the CIA, then most likely he received such instructions or, perhaps, believed that the winners are not judged, they are ... friends. Or maybe he had no doubts that "the Russians recognize only force." One way or another, but he not only "surrounded himself" with Soviet military advisers, consulted with high-ranking representatives of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense under the relevant agencies of the DRA, but also completely trusted ... only doctors from Russia and ultimately hoped for our troops. Didn't trust the parchamists, expected an attack either from them or from the Mujahideen. However, he became a victim of political intrigue from a completely different direction from which he expected.

In the first half of December, the PDPA General Secretary was assassinated by "disgruntled party members from opposition factions." He was slightly injured, and his nephew Abdullah, the chief of the security service, was also injured. X. Amin, having dealt with the terrorists, sent his nephew to the Soviet Union for treatment, and he himself changed his residence in Arga and on December 20 moved to the Taj Bek Palace.

Returning at about three o'clock in the morning on December 25 from the embassy to the location of the battalion, Colonel V.V. Kolesnik led the preparation for military operations to capture the palace. Lieutenant Colonel O. U. Shvets rendered active assistance in this.

The operation plan provided for at the appointed time (initially, the operation was scheduled to begin on December 25. Subsequently, the assault on the palace was postponed to December 27) with three companies to occupy defense sectors and prevent Afghan battalions (three motorized infantry and a tank battalion) from advancing to the Taj-Bek palace. Thus, a company of special forces or paratroopers had to act against each battalion (the tank battalion was located with one of the motorized infantry). The commander of the attached paratrooper company was V.A.Vostrotin, in the future Hero of the Soviet Union. A platoon of ATGM Fagot (anti-tank guided missiles) was also deployed against the tank battalion. Another company was intended for the direct assault on the palace. Together with her, two special groups of the KGB of the USSR were supposed to operate. Part of the forces was supposed to capture and disarm the anti-aircraft and construction regiments. Provided also protection and reserve.

One of the most important tasks was the capture of two buried tanks, which held at gunpoint all approaches to the palace. For this, fifteen people were allocated (among them there were tank specialists), led by the deputy battalion commander, Captain Satarov, as well as two snipers from the KGB. The success of the entire operation largely depended on the actions of this group. They started first. The battalion's leadership was well aware that the task could be accomplished only on condition of surprise and military cunning. Otherwise, no one will leave them alive. Therefore, in order to teach the Afghans not to arouse suspicion ahead of time, they developed an appropriate scenario and began to conduct demonstration actions: shooting, alarm and occupation of established defense areas, deployment, etc. At night, flares were fired.

At first, this caused concern to the command of the palace guard brigade. For example, when the missiles were fired for the first time, the location of the battalion was instantly illuminated by the searchlights of the anti-aircraft regiment and Major Jandad arrived. It was explained to him that routine combat training was under way and that training was being held to fulfill the task of protecting the palace, and the area was illuminated to exclude the possibility of a surprise attack on the palace by the mujahideen. Subsequently, the Afghans asked all the time that the engines of military equipment should not make too much noise at night, as they interfere with Amin's sleep. The battalion commander and "Major Kolesov" themselves went to the security brigade commander and reassured him. Gradually, the Afghans got used to and ceased to react cautiously to such "maneuvers" of the battalion. And they lasted for 25, 26 and the first half of December 27. Only V. Kolesnik, O.

On December 25, at the Hadji Ravash airfield, a meeting of the leaders of the advisory teams was held. During the briefing, all the advisers received instructions to prevent Afghan units from speaking against Soviet troops in Kabul. Soviet military advisers and specialists working in the air defense forces of the DRA, in order to prevent possible hostile actions by Afghan servicemen during the transfer of airborne units, established control over all anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition storage areas, and also temporarily disabled some anti-aircraft installations (removed sights, locks etc.). Thus, the smooth landing of aircraft with paratroopers was ensured. The plan of the operation for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, developed by the General Staff, provided for the introduction of two motorized rifle divisions in two directions: 5th honey - Kushka, Herat, Shindand; 108th honey - Termez, Puli-Khumri, Kunduz. At the same time, the 103rd Airborne Division and the 345th Airborne Division were landing at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.