The tragedy and valor of Afgan - 10
Soviet troops are fighting in Afghanistan
A war that was not expected
From 7:00 on December 25, 1979, in the Termez area, slightly upstream of the combined bridge "Friendship" that was being built at that time, two pontoon-bridge regiments began to build a floating pontoon bridge. It was on this bridge that troops were to be crossed and equipment should go.
The Soviet ambassador in Kabul informed H. Amin in advance of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and he ordered to render them all possible assistance. To clarify the issues of interaction, the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Yu. Tukharinov, met in Kunduz with the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the DRA Armed Forces, General Babadzhan.
At 15:00 Moscow time, in accordance with the order given by the Minister of Defense of the USSR, the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. The scouts were the first to cross, then the rest of the 1st 08th Motorized Rifle Division went across the pontoon bridge under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin (in January 1980 Colonel B.V. Gromov, the future commander of the 40th Army, was appointed chief of staff of this division. , under whose leadership the Soviet troops will leave Afghanistan in 1989). By the beginning of the entry of troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov and the commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel-General Yu. P. Maksimov arrived at the command post of the army.
At the same time, the airlift and landing of the main forces of the airborne division and a separate parachute regiment at the airfields of the capital and Bagram began by military transport aircraft.
The commander of the airborne division stationed in Vitebsk, Major General I. F. Ryabchenko, recalling those events later, said: take-off aerodromes. On December 14, the division was relocated to other airfields in TurkVO, where units for ten days carried out measures to prepare for the combat mission, which was set on the evening of December 24.
On December 25, at 18:00 (15:00 Moscow time. - Note by the author) local time, the airborne assault began with landing at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. On December 26, the division's mission was clarified. It was ordered to go to the facilities in the designated areas of the capital and strengthen their security until 19:30, as well as to prevent the “armed groups” from approaching Kabul.
It can also be seen from this meager narration that the paratroopers were not privy to the nature of their actions in Afghanistan until the last moment.
For the transportation of personnel and equipment, 343 aircraft flights were made, including 66 flights An-22, 76 Il-76, 200 An-12. In total, 47 hours were spent on the landing of airborne units and subunits (landing of the first aircraft at 16:15 on December 25, the last at 14:30 on December 27). During all this time, 7,700 personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1,062 tons of various cargoes were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. Unfortunately, there were some casualties - at 19:33 on December 25, when landing in Kabul, an Il-76 aircraft (commander-captain V.V. Golovchin), with 37 paratroopers on board, crashed into a mountain and exploded.
On December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd Airborne Division, according to the order, went to important administrative and special facilities in the capital (the Central Committee of the PDPA, the buildings of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communications, etc.) and strengthened their security. In essence, they have established their control over these objects.
Parts of the 108th motorized rifle division were to occupy temporary deployment points in the areas of Doshi, Puli-Khumri, Kunduz and Talukan. But during the march, the mission was changed, and the division headed to the area northeast of Kabul, where it concentrated by the morning of December 28 (a couple of days after entering Afghanistan, Colonel V.P. Mironov was appointed the division commander). On December 27, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, measures were considered for propaganda support for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the transfer of power to B. Karmal.
Document
In the Central Committee of the CPSU (General department. 1st sector
Returnable within 3 days)
Workers of all countries, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Central Committee
Top secret
Special folder
Personally
No. P 177/151
T. T. Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, Pelshe, Romanov, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitsky, Aliev, Gorbachev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masherov, Ponomarev, Shchevardov, Rashidov Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov
Extract from Minutes No. 177
meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of December 27, 1979
On our steps in connection with the development of the situation around Afghanistan
Approve the draft instructions to the co-emissaries in Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Havana, Ulaanbaatar, Hanoi (Appendix No. 1)
Approve the draft instructions to all co-emissaries in connection with the development of the situation around Afghanistan (Appendix No. 2).
Approve the draft instructions to the Co-Representative in New York (Appendix No. 3).
Approve the draft TASS message (Appendix No. 4).
To approve the welcoming telegram to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, comrade Karmal Babrak (Appendix No. 5).
To approve proposals for the propaganda support of our action in relation to Afghanistan (Appendix No. 6).
Approve the text of the letter from the Central Committee to the party organizations of the CPSU (Appendix No. 7).
Approve the text of the letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the communist and workers' parties of non-socialist countries (Appendix No. 8).
Secretary of the Central Committee L. Brezhnev.
Of the entire list of applications, the one that regulated the procedure for covering this action in the press and other media deserves the most attention. It was on the basis of his provisions that the truth about the "Afghan war" was hidden from the Soviet people for a long time. In general, it must be said that the veil of secrecy that accompanied the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan aroused caution in many and caused significant damage to the international prestige of the USSR.
Document
To paragraph 151 of Prot. No. 177
Top secret
Special folder
Appendix No. 6
About the propaganda support of our action in relation to Afghanistan.
When covering in our propaganda work - in the press, on television, on the radio, undertaken by the Soviet Union at the request of the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the aid action against external aggression is guided by the following.
In all propaganda work, proceed from the provisions contained in the appeal of the Afghan leadership to the Soviet Union with a request for military assistance and from the TASS report on this score.
To emphasize as the main thesis that the dispatch of limited Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan, carried out at the request of the Afghan leadership, serves one purpose - to provide the people and government of Afghanistan with assistance and assistance in the fight against external aggression. This Soviet action does not pursue any other goals.
Emphasize that as a result of acts of external aggression, growing outside interference in internal Afghan affairs, a threat has arisen for the gains of the April Revolution, for the sovereignty and independence of the new Afghanistan. In these conditions, the Soviet Union, to which the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has repeatedly asked for help in repelling aggression over the past two years, responded positively to this request, guided, in particular, by the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation ...
The request of the Government of Afghanistan and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union is exclusively a matter for two sovereign states - the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which themselves regulate their relations. They, like any UN member state, have the right to individual or collective self-defense, which is provided for by Article 51 of the UN Charter.
When covering the changes in the leadership of Afghanistan, emphasize that this is an internal affair of the Afghan people, proceed from the statements published by the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, from the speeches of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak.
To give a firm and well-reasoned rebuff to any possible insinuations about the alleged Soviet interference in internal Afghan affairs. Emphasize that the USSR did not have and has nothing to do with changes in the leadership of Afghanistan. The task of the Soviet Union in connection with the events in and around Afghanistan is reduced to providing assistance and assistance in protecting the sovereignty and independence of friendly Afghanistan in the face of external aggression. As soon as this aggression stops, the threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Afghan state will disappear, the Soviet military contingents will be immediately and completely withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan.
The main role in the initial period of the Soviet military presence in the DRA was assigned to the "special purpose" forces. Indeed, in fact, the first military action in Operation Storm-333, which was carried out on December 27 by Soviet units and special forces groups, was the seizure of the Taj-Bek Palace, where the residence of the head of the DRA was located, and the removal of Hafizullah Amin from power. For the general public, for a long time it remained a mystery what happened then in Kabul. I had the opportunity to meet and talk with many participants in those events. Summarizing various versions and facts, based on eyewitness accounts and documentary material, it is possible to restore a certain picture. Although, I think, it does not fully reflect the true course of actions of the Soviet troops in the Afghan capital.
... On December 26, in order to establish closer relations, the "Muslim" battalion hosted a reception for the command of the Afghan brigade. They cooked pilaf, bought all kinds of greens at the bazaar, etc. True, there were difficulties with alcohol. KGB officers helped out. They brought with them a box of "Ambassador's" vodka, brandy, various delicacies (caviar, fish), and other snacks - the table turned out to be great.
Fifteen people came from the security brigade, headed by its commander and political officer. During the reception, they tried to get the Afghans to talk. They proclaimed toasts to Soviet-Afghan friendship, to military cooperation, etc. Themselves drank much less (sometimes the soldiers who served at the reception, instead of vodka, poured water into the glasses of Soviet officers). The brigade's political commander turned out to be especially talkative, who, in the heat of frankness, told “Captain Lebedev” that N. Taraki had been strangled by the order of Kh. Amin. This was then new and very important information. Jandad quickly gave orders, and the political officer was immediately taken away somewhere. The commander said that the deputy drank a little too much and did not know what he was saying. At the end of the reception, we parted, if not friends, then at least good acquaintances.
Located on the outskirts of Kabul in Darul-Aman, the Taj-Bek Palace was located on a high steep hill, overgrown with trees and bushes, which was also equipped with terraces and mined. There was only one road leading to it, heavily guarded around the clock. The palace itself was also a rather inaccessible structure.
On the morning of December 27, preparations began for the storming of the palace of H. Amin. The KGB officers had a detailed plan of the palace (layout of rooms, communications, power supply, etc.). Therefore, by the start of Operation Storm-333, the commandos from the “Muslim” battalion and the KGB group “Thunder” (commander Major Semyonov) and “Zenith” (commander Major Romanov) knew in detail the object of capture No. 1: the most convenient ways of approach; guard duty; the total number of Amin's guards and bodyguards; location of machine gun "nests", armored vehicles and tanks; the interior structure of the rooms and labyrinths of the Taj Beck Palace; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment, etc. Moreover, as a very knowledgeable person said, Before the assault on the palace in Kabul, a KGB special group blew up the so-called "well" - in fact, the central hub of secret communications with the most important military and civilian objects of the DRA. Assault ladders were being prepared. Other preparatory activities were also carried out. The main thing is secrecy and secrecy.
Our military advisers to the commanders of the units of the Kabul garrison received different tasks: on December 27, some had to stay in the units for the night, organize a dinner with those under the Soviets (for this they were given alcohol and some food) and under no circumstances should the Afghan units be against Soviet troops. Others, on the contrary, were ordered not to stay in the units for a long time, and they left home earlier than usual. Only specially appointed people remained, who were appropriately instructed.
... The personnel of the "Muslim" battalion and special forces of the KGB were explained that H. Amin was guilty of mass repressions, that thousands of innocent people were killed on his orders, he betrayed the cause of the April Revolution, entered into an agreement with the US CIA, etc. True, few of the soldiers and officers perceived this version. "Then why did Amin invite our troops and not the Americans?" They asked reasonably. But an order is an order, it must be carried out. And the special forces were preparing for battle.
Assault on the Taj Beck Palace
At this time, Amin himself, not suspecting anything, was in euphoria from the fact that he had managed to achieve his goal - Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. On the afternoon of December 27, he hosted a dinner, receiving Politburo members, ministers and families in his luxurious palace. The formal reason to gather everyone was, on the one hand, the desire to show his comrades-in-arms his new residence, and on the other, the return from Moscow of the secretary of the PDPA Central Committee Panjshiri. He assured him: the Soviet leadership was satisfied with the version of Taraki's death and the change of the country's leader, which he described, the visit further strengthened relations with the USSR. They confirmed that the Soviet Union would provide Afghanistan with extensive military assistance.
H. Amin solemnly spoke to those present: “The Soviet divisions are already on their way here. Everything is going great. I am constantly in contact by phone with Comrade Gromyko, and we are jointly discussing the question of how best to formulate information for the world about the provision of Soviet military assistance to us. " They also discussed how the Chief of the General Staff, Mohammed Yakub, could better establish interaction with the command of the Soviet troops. By the way, Yakub himself, who was also unaware of anything, invited Soviet military representatives to his General Staff to "establish closer cooperation". He will wait for them in the evening, after 19:30, in his office.
In the afternoon, Kh. Amin was expected to speak on Afghan television. Top military officials and heads of political agencies were invited to shoot his speech at the Taj-Bek Palace. However, he was prevented by an action carried out according to the plan of the KGB of the USSR. Unexpectedly, during lunch, the PDPA General Secretary and many of his guests felt unwell. Some have passed out. X also completely passed out. Amin. His wife immediately summoned the commander of the presidential guard, Jandad, who began calling the Central Military Hospital (Charsad Bistar) and the Soviet embassy's polyclinic to call for help. The products and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for examination. Uzbek cooks were detained. In the middle of the day, Colonel V.V. Then the course of action was announced. When we were conducting our reconnaissance, we saw Jandad and a group of officers with him through binoculars on one of the skyscrapers. Lieutenant Colonel O. Shvets went to them to invite one of the battalion officers to dinner, supposedly for the birthday, but the brigade commander said that they were conducting an exercise and would come in the evening. Then O. Shvets asked to release the Soviet military advisers who were in the brigade, and took them with him. Perhaps by this he saved many of their lives.
At 15:00, the embassy reported that the start time of the assault (time "H") was set at 22:00, then postponed to 21:00. Later, it was periodically updated and eventually became - 19:30. Apparently, the leaders of the operation hoped that the plan to eliminate X. Amin by poisoning him would work, and then, perhaps, there would be no need to storm the Taj-Bek palace. But due to the strict secrecy of this plan, Soviet doctors were not allowed to see it and unknowingly thwarted its implementation.
A group of Soviet doctors who were then in Kabul arrived at the palace at the request of the head of the Main Political Directorate M. Ekbal Vaziri and the insistence of the head of the political department of the chief military adviser in the DRA, Major General SP Tutushkin. It included the head of the medical service, the adviser therapist, the commander of the surgical reinforcement group, the infectious disease doctor from the Central Military Hospital of the Afghan Army, the doctor from the Soviet embassy polyclinic, two women - a doctor and a nurse - nutritionists who worked in the medical center located on the first floor of the Taj Palace -Beck. An Afghan doctor, Lieutenant Colonel Veloat, arrived with them.
When the Soviet doctors, therapist Colonel Viktor Petrovich Kuznechenkov, the commander of the surgical reinforcement group of the hospital, Colonel Anatoly Vladimirovich Alekseev, other doctors at about two o'clock in the afternoon drove up to the external security post and, as usual, began to surrender their weapons, they were additionally searched, which had never been done before. It was. Moreover, they applied in a rather harsh form. Upon entering the palace, the documents were checked more thoroughly than usual and they were searched again. Something happened? They understood exactly what it was when they saw people lying and sitting in unnatural positions in the lobby, on the steps of the stairs, in the rooms. Those who "came to their senses" writhed in pain. Our doctors determined at once: mass poisoning. They decided to render assistance to the victims, but then an Afghan medic, Lieutenant Colonel Veloat, ran up to them and took them along - to Kh. Amin. According to him, The secretary general was in a grave condition. We went up the stairs. X. Amin was lying in one of the rooms, stripped down to his underpants, with a drooping jaw and rolling eyes. He was unconscious, in a severe coma. Died? They felt a pulse - a barely perceptible beat. Dies?
Colonels V. Kuznechenkov and A. Alekseev, not thinking that they were violating someone's plans, proceeded to rescue the head of the "friendly USSR country." First, the jaw was inserted into place, then breathing was restored. They took him to the bathroom, washed him and began to do gastric lavage, forced durez. After that they carried X. Amin back to the bedroom. They began to administer the medicine. Injections, again injections, droppers, needles were inserted into the veins of both hands ...
This work lasted until about six o'clock in the evening. When the jaw stopped falling off and urine began to flow, the doctors realized that their efforts were crowned with success and the life of X. They managed to save Amin. But, feeling that some alarming events were brewing, A. Alekseev sent the women out of the palace in advance, citing the need to urgently analyze the wash water in the laboratory.
It will take quite a long time before X. Amin's eyelids tremble and he comes to his senses, then he will ask in surprise: “Why did this happen in my house? Who did this? Accident or sabotage? "
This incident greatly alarmed the officers responsible for organizing the protection of the chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA (Jandad, Ekbal). They set up additional (even external) posts of Afghan soldiers and called the tank brigade to be ready to provide assistance. However, they had nowhere to wait for help, since our paratroopers had already completely blocked the Afghan troops stationed in Kabul. Here is what, for example, Colonel V.G.Salkin, who was in Kabul in December 1979, told many years later: “In the evening, at about 18:30, the brigade commander, Captain Ahmad Jan, received an order to send one battalion into the city. I and the adviser to the brigade commander, Colonel Pyasetsky, were constantly with the commander at that time. He gave the order to the commander of the first tank battalion to bring the battalion into a state of full combat readiness, stating that the order to withdraw the battalion would be given later. The personnel, having received the order, literally rushed to the tanks. The tank engines roared instantly. The first battalion was ready for action. Pyasetsky looked at his watch from time to time, waiting for new commands to the brigade. At 19:10, Viktor Nikolayevich himself will ask Akhmad Dzhan to contact his command and clarify the instructions for the battalion to enter the city. However, the commander was unable to call due to lack of communication. 10 Viktor Nikolaevich himself will ask Akhmad Dzhan to contact his command and clarify the instructions for the battalion to enter the city. However, the commander was unable to call due to lack of communication. 10 Viktor Nikolaevich himself will ask Akhmad Dzhan to contact his command and clarify the instructions for the battalion to enter the city. However, the commander was unable to call due to lack of communication.
After making sure that there was no communication, V.N.Pyasetsky advised the commander to check the condition of the telephone wire on the brigade's territory. A communications platoon was urgently called, and the soldiers began to carefully check the condition of the cable. This took about 30 minutes.
... Suddenly, four BMDs at full speed knocked down the gates of the military town and, without slowing down, surrounded the brigade headquarters building. The Soviet captain got out of the first car. He entered the building, introduced himself, called Pyasetsky aside, talked to him, then took out a flask of alcohol and offered to drink. The captain, addressing the brigade commander, said that the city was restless and that the brigade's exit to the city was undesirable. The commander, after consulting, gave the command to "retract" the first battalion ... According to V. Kolesnik, at about six in the evening the chief military adviser, Colonel-General S.K. Literally fifteen to twenty minutes later, the capture group led by Captain Satarov drove out in a GAZ-66 car in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. The battalion officers watched him closely. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in the barracks located 150-200 meters from them. One of the companies of the "Muslim" battalion lay down in the area indicated to it in readiness to support the actions of Satarov's group with fire. The officers saw that when the car drove up to the location of the third battalion, they suddenly heard small arms fire, which suddenly intensified.
Colonel V. Kolesnik immediately gave the command: "Fire" and "Forward." At the same time, the Kabul sky was split by two red rockets - a signal for the soldiers and officers of the "Muslim" battalion and special groups of the KGB. A flurry of fire rained down on the palace. This happened at about a quarter past seven in the evening.
Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 “Shilki” were the first to open fire on the palace at the command of Captain Pautov, bringing down a sea of shells on him. Automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 began to fire at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the tanks. Subdivisions of the "Muslim" battalion began to move to the destination areas. On the way to the palace, a company of infantry fighting vehicles (BMP) of Senior Lieutenant Sharipov moved. On ten BMPs, two KGB special groups were deployed as a landing. The general management of them was carried out by Colonel G.I.Boyarinov. The combat vehicles shot down the outer guard posts and rushed towards the Taj Bek. The only road climbed steeply like a serpentine uphill with an exit to the site in front of the palace. The road was heavily guarded, and other approaches were mined. As soon as the first combat vehicle passed the turn, heavy machine guns struck from the building. The BMP was hit. The crew members and the landing force left her and began to climb up the mountain using the assault ladders. The second BMP on the way pushed the wrecked car off the road and cleared the way for the rest. They quickly rushed out onto the platform in front of the Taj Bek.
First, KGB special groups went into the assault, followed by some soldiers from the special forces. To intimidate the defenders, and maybe even out of fear, the attackers of the palace shouted loudly, mostly obscenities. The battle in the building itself immediately took on a fierce and uncompromising character. If they did not leave the premises with their hands raised, then the doors were broken, grenades were thrown into the room. Then they fired indiscriminately from machine guns. "Shilki" at this time transferred fire to other objects. The BMPs left the area in front of the palace and blocked the only road.
Everything seemed to go according to plan, but the unexpected happened. When the battalion units were moving into the combat area, one armored personnel carrier fell from the bridge built across the ditch and overturned. The hatches were closed, and the crew could not get out of it. The squad leader began to call for help over the radio. He switched on the transmission, non-stop calling his senior commander. This paralyzed radio communication at the most crucial moment. The battalion command had to use other means and signals. It's good that they were provided in advance.
Another company and two platoons of AGS-17 fired at the tank battalion and prevented its personnel from reaching the tanks. They then captured the tanks and at the same time disarmed the personnel of the construction regiment. The special group captured the armament of the anti-aircraft regiment, and took the personnel prisoner. In this sector, the leadership of the hostilities was carried out by Lieutenant Colonel O. Shvets.
In the palace, officers and soldiers of Kh. Amina's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100–150 people) fiercely resisted, not surrendering. The "Shilki" again transferred fire and began to hit Taj-Bek and the area in front of him (there was a pre-order - no one from the KGB special forces and special forces should not leave the palace on the site, because they would not let anyone out alive). But not all of this installation was carried out and paid for it with their lives. A fire started in the building on the second floor. This had a strong moral impact on the defenders.
However, as the special forces moved to the second floor of the Taj Bek, gunfire and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guard, who at first took the special forces for their own rebellious unit, having heard Russian speech and obscenities, surrendered to them as the highest and just force. As it turned out later, many of them were trained at the airborne school in Ryazan, where, apparently, they remembered Russian swearing for the rest of their lives.
Later, I often heard the opinion that the Taj-Bek palace was taken by the special groups of the KGB, and the army men were only present. In my opinion, this is not entirely true. The Chekists alone could not have done anything. Of course, in terms of the level of personal training, it was difficult for the special forces to compete with the professionals from the KGB, but it was they who ensured the success of this operation.
The Soviet doctors hid wherever they could. At first, it was thought that the mujahideen attacked, then the supporters of N.M. Taraki. Only later, when they heard Russian obscenities, they realized that Soviet servicemen were acting. A. Alekseev and V. Kuznechenkov, who were supposed to go to help the daughter of X. Amin (she had a baby), after the start of the assault, found a "refuge" at the bar. After some time, they saw X. Amin walking down the corridor, all in the reflections of fire. He was in white shorts and a T-shirt, holding vials of saline in his hands, wrapped high in tubes, like grenades. One could only imagine what efforts it cost him and how the needles threaded into the cubital veins were pricked.
A. Alekseev, having run out of hiding, first of all pulled out the needles, pressed his veins with his fingers so that blood would not ooze out, and then brought him to the bar. X. Amin leaned against the wall, but then a child's cry was heard - from somewhere in a side room, X. Amin's five-year-old son was walking, smearing tears with his fists. Seeing his father, he rushed to him, grabbed him by the legs, X. Amin pressed his head to him, and the two of them sat down against the wall.
Many years after those events A. Alekseev told me that they could no longer stay near the bar and rushed to leave, but when they walked along the corridor, an explosion rang out and they were thrown by a blast wave to the door of the conference room, where they took refuge. The hall was dark and empty. Cold air siphoned from the broken window and the sound of gunfire came. V. Kuznechenkov stood in the pier to the left of the window, A. Alekseev to the right. So fate divided them in this life.
X. Amin ordered his adjutant to call and warn the Soviet military advisers about the attack on the palace. At the same time, he said: "The Soviets will help." But the adjutant reported to Kh. Amin that the Soviets were shooting. These words pissed off the General Secretary, he grabbed the ashtray and threw it at the adjutant, shouting irritably: "You're lying, it can't be!" Then he himself tried to call the Chief of the General Staff, the commander of the 4th Tank Brigade (Tbr), but there was no longer any connection with them. Then X. Amin said quietly: "I guessed about it, everything is correct."
Meanwhile, the KGB special group broke through to the room where Hafizullah Amin was, and during the shootout he was killed by an officer of this group. The corpse of the head of the DRA government and the leader of the PDPA was wrapped in a carpet ... The main task was completed. Valentin Bratersky (an employee of the former Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB of the USSR), recalling those days, shared some of his impressions of the assault on the Taj-Bek Palace:
“There were five of us from PSU and two groups of 30 people, who carried out the operation. The unique group "Thunder", which included great athletes, was to act directly in the palace. Group "Zenith" - to provide access to the palace. There were guys from the Balashikha school, where special forces are trained. Of the 60 guys, 14 remained in the ranks.
On the other hand, there were heavy losses. There were 300 people in Amin's guard. 150 surrendered. The killed were not counted. Amin also drove a two thousandth regiment, and they dug in around the palace. We cut the regiment like a dagger. During the assault, he somehow dispersed. Karmal promised that we would be supported by 500 militants loyal to him. They brought weapons for them, grenades - waited. Out of 500 people, only one came.
There was another group under the command of a KGB major. Their task was to bring some representatives of the Afghan leadership to confirm the version of an internal coup. The version that was instilled in us - Amin is connected with the Americans, we will get another dangerous neighbor from the south. No documents supporting this version have ever been presented.
Everything became completely clear to me when the man who shot Amin told me that the order was: not to take Amin alive. By the way, at the same time, in a shootout, Amin's son, eight years old, was wounded in the chest and died. I was bandaging his daughter's wound with my own hands - she was wounded in the leg. We left the palace, where the carpets were soaked in blood and squelched under our feet. It's hard to imagine ...
Before leaving, we were all promised the stars of Heroes. Two, as far as I know, received, one - posthumously, in total 400 people were awarded for this case in the KGB, including typists and secretaries.
... The guys who survived after that night agreed that they would meet every year on December 27 at seven o'clock in the evening at the grave of the unknown soldier. Kryuchkov forbade - they say, there is nothing to dissolve snot ...
Captain Satarov's group arrived at the palace in two tanks captured from the Afghans. He reported to Kolesnik that when they drove past the third battalion of the guard brigade, they saw an alarm in the battalion. Afghan soldiers received ammunition. The battalion commander and two more officers were standing next to the road along which the commandos were passing. The decision came quickly. Jumping out of the car, they grabbed the commander of the Afghan battalion and both officers, threw them into the car and drove on. Some of the soldiers, who managed to get cartridges, opened fire on them, and then the whole battalion rushed in pursuit of the car - to free their commander. Then the commandos dismounted and began firing machine guns at the fleeing infantry. The soldiers of the company providing the actions of the Satarov group also opened fire.
They put in a lot - about 250 people, the rest fled. At the same time, the sentries near the tanks were "removed" from the sniper rifles and captured them a little later. The battle in the palace did not last long. Soon it was all over there. The company commander, senior lieutenant Sharipov, reported that the palace had been captured. Colonel Kolesnik ordered a ceasefire and moved his command post directly to Taj Bek.
After hiding for a long time in the "Muslim" battalion, three members of the future government of the DRA came their supporters and took away somewhere.
That evening, the general head of the special groups of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel G.I.Boyarinov, was killed in a shootout, he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Kozlov. According to the testimony of the participants in the assault, Colonel V.P. Kuznechenkov was struck down by a grenade fragment in the conference hall. However, AV Alekseev, who was next to him all the time, claims that when the two of them were hiding in the conference room, some submachine gunner, jumping in there, gave a turn into the dark just in case. One of the bullets hit V. Kuznechenkov. He screamed and died immediately. A. Alekseev took the dead comrade onto himself and carried him out into the yard, where he put him on an armored personnel carrier that was taking out the wounded. “We don’t take the dead,” shouted some submachine gunner to A. Alekseev. “He’s still alive, I’m a doctor,” objected the colonel. Subsequently, the body of V. Kuznechenkov was taken to the hospital, and A. Alekseev stood up to the operating table.
In the "Muslim" battalion, 5 people died, 35 were wounded. Moreover, 23 people who were injured remained in the ranks. The rest of the wounded battalion medic, Captain Ibragimov, was taken to the BMP in the Kabul hospital.
During the night, special forces guarded the palace, as they feared that the divisions and a tank brigade stationed in Kabul would attack it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers working in units of the Afghan army and airborne troops deployed to the Afghan capital did not allow them to do this. In addition, the control of the Afghan forces was paralyzed by the special services in advance.
Not without curiosities. At night, everyone's nerves were strained to the limit. They were expecting an attack by the troops loyal to Kh. Amin. It was assumed that an underground passage leads to the palace. Suddenly a rustle was heard from the elevator shaft. The commandos jumped up, began firing from machine guns, threw grenades, but a cat, mad with fear, jumped out of there.
It is likely that some of our compatriots suffered from their own people: in the dark, the personnel of the "Muslim" battalion and the KGB special group recognized each other by the white armbands on the sleeves and ... mat. But after all, everyone was dressed in Afghan military uniforms, and they often had to shoot and throw grenades from a decent distance. Try to keep track at night, in the dark, in such a mess - who has a bandage on his sleeve, and who does not?
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