The tragedy and valor of Afgan - US assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution- 22

The tragedy and valor of Afghan

 US assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution

The US administration, despite the existence of prospects for reaching mutually acceptable agreements at the indirect Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva, continues to provide broad military, financial and political support for the Afghan counter-revolution.

The policy and practical actions of the United States in the Afghan issue at this stage are primarily aimed at achieving the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, disrupting the implementation of the program of national reconciliation in the republic, maintaining the military potential of the counterrevolution at a level sufficient to ensure the struggle for power in new conditions that will be created in the event of a successful conclusion of the Geneva talks. Under pressure from extremist forces in Congress, some administration officials are trying to make the termination of aid to Afghan anti-government forces dependent on the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan. A demand is being put forward not to stop aid immediately after the signing of the relevant documents in Geneva, to maintain it in proportion to the reduction in the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defense and other US departments are currently involved in planning anti-Afghan actions. The volume of US official assistance to the counter-revolution exceeded $ 2 billion. In 1988, assistance is planned in an amount exceeding $ 700 million. Recently, the Americans have been focusing on supplying the rebels with modern means of fighting air targets. In 1987, about 600 Stinger MANPADS were transferred to the counter-revolution, and more than 100 rebels were trained in training centers and military bases of the US Armed Forces in the states of Texas and California, who underwent an advanced training course as instructors in the use of this type of weapon. US military aid is being implemented directly through the headquarters of counterrevolutionary parties and through US-Pakistani cooperation channels. The bulk of military cargo, intended for counter-revolution, is delivered initially to the port of Karachi. Subsequent operations to store them, transfer them to areas bordering Afghanistan and transfer weapons to the rebels are carried out, as a rule, with the participation of special services and units of the Pakistani Armed Forces.

Since the beginning of 1988, there has been an intensive supply of military cargo from the United States to ports and airbases in Saudi Arabia and Oman, as well as some other countries. Weapons and ammunition are stored for the future.

With the participation of the Americans, measures are being taken to transfer bandit formations to the structure of regular troops. As of 1.3.88, 22 so-called regiments were formed on the territory of Pakistan, and 43 so-called regiments in Afghanistan. New strongholds of counter-revolution are being created in the regions of Afghanistan bordering on Pakistan, the command and control system and communications are being improved.

The number of American advisers involved in training Afghan rebels at military training centers in Pakistan and directly involved in organizing hostilities and engineering work on Afghan territory reaches 250 people. The presence of American advisers is noted in specialized centers located in the areas of the Pakistani cities of Barsak, Kohat, Parachinar, Quetta, Peshawar, Jamrud, Sadda, Miramshah. The presence of American advisers in the rebel gangs stationed in Afghan territory was confirmed by the chairman of Alliance-7, Y. Khales, at a press conference in Peshawar in January of this year, at which he announced the death of one of the military advisers in December 1987 during Afghan army operations to unblock the city of Khost.

With the active participation of Washington, a large-scale psychological offensive was organized against the Republic of Afghanistan, aimed at discrediting the course of national reconciliation pursued by Kabul and preventing the formation of coalition authorities with the participation of PDPA representatives. More than 50 radio stations run or run by the CIA and USIA broadcast subversive broadcasts in various languages ​​of the peoples of Afghanistan. For the training of propaganda cadres from among the rebels, the CIA in 1988 allocated more than $ 1 million.

Source of information: GRU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, March 1988

Although aid has increased since 1980, the real turning point came in 1984, when the US Congress approved an increase in aid and the Reagan administration began supplying modern technology. In particular, in January 1985, the CIA, at the request of Congress and with the consent of the White House, supplied the Mujahideen with a Swiss-made Oerlikon. In the same year, Washington provided the rebels with a Blopepe anti-aircraft missile, made in Great Britain, and in March 1986, it was decided to supply the American-made Stinger.

In November 1985, a Soviet AN-12 aircraft carrying military personnel was shot down. 28 passengers (mostly women) and the crew were killed. The operational group for the search for the remains of people and the aircraft was headed by the deputy chief of staff of the army, Colonel M. Simonov. In the area where the plane crashed, they found an equipped anti-aircraft gunner's position, on which were scattered elements of an anti-aircraft complex unknown to us until that time. Around the same time, 6 foreign-made MANPADS were seized from the rebels. At first, it was decided that the Zhevelin MANPADS had been captured, but after being examined by the 40th Army specialists-armed men (Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Kovriga and Major Fedotov L. M.), they came to the conclusion that it was a “Bloupipe”. They urgently began to look for opposition. In the metrological workshop of the army under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Aleksin V.A.

The first batch of 3 Stinger MANPADS was captured near Kandahar in the fall of 1986 by a reconnaissance group of the 16th Special Forces Brigade, headed by Major Belov. The Stingers were brought to Kabul to the headquarters of the 40th Army and, having studied the accompanying documents, determined that they were received in Peshawar and were escorted by 13 Mujahideen on five motorcycles into the interior of Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Defense of the USSR promised to confer the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on the one who was the first to get the Stinger MANPADS. However, when they began to prepare an award show for Major Belov in Moscow, an unexpected "obstacle" arose: they found out that he was "not sinless in drinking alcohol and harsh in dealing with his superiors." Instead of a Hero of the Soviet Union, he was awarded the Order of the Battle Red Banner.

According to the GRU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, April 1988

On the eve of the signing of the agreements on the Afghan settlement, the military potentials of the government and opposition forces in Afghanistan were being strengthened.

The policy of national reconciliation pursued in Afghanistan, as well as the positive changes that have taken place in relations between the United States and the USSR, gave a new strong impetus to the Afghan-Pakistani negotiations on the settlement of relations between the two countries. They, as already noted, were conducted through the personal representative of the UN Secretary General, Diego Cordovez.

Many people often ask the question that since the Soviet leaders understood the need to withdraw the OKSV from Afghanistan back in 1985, why did this process drag on for so long. It must be said that there were quite influential forces that prevented this, and the international situation that was taking shape at that time prevented it from doing it earlier. The necessary conditions have not yet been created, the most important of them is overcoming constant rivalry and establishing trust, partnership between the USSR and the United States, because the global confrontation between them was the main breeding ground and the reason for the continuation of the intra-Afghan conflict.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the administration of President R. Reagan then, for strategic reasons, sabotaged and torpedoed the negotiations held under the auspices of the UN. And from the very beginning. In particular, in June 1982, after the first official talks in Geneva, the US President decided to increase the scale of secret assistance to the rebels.

In December 1982, after a conversation between Yu. V. Andropov and Ziya-ul-Haq, during which the latter was told that “the Soviet Union will leave Afghanistan“quickly ”if Pakistan ceases its support of the resistance,” Reagan ordered the CIA to provide the mujahideen more weapons and better quality. And after Diego Cordovez reported in May 1983 that “95% of the text of the preliminary comprehensive decision was ready,” the US administration issued a press release that it had shared the $ 50 million cost with Saudi Arabia. into service for the rebels. Negotiations immediately became complicated. In March 1986, when Cordovez announced that “he now has all the elements of a comprehensive solution to the Afghan problem,” the US government ordered the delivery of Stinger missiles to the Afghan rebels, etc. Yes, and on the eve of the signing of the documents in Geneva, the administration made a number of recommendations, the essence of which was as follows: the main goal of American foreign policy in Afghanistan should be “to ensure a short-term, complete and irrevocable withdrawal of Soviet troops from this country and to give the Afghan people the right to independently decide their own fate "; the US administration should not sign an agreement in which the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops would provide for the simultaneous cessation of all US military-economic aid to anti-government groups in Afghanistan. The White House should insist on a phased cessation of aid, while the withdrawal of a certain part of the troops would be accompanied by a proportional reduction in military and economic supplies to the opposition; the administration should provide for the option of continuing to help the mujahideen even after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops is completed, in case the USSR continues its military supplies to "pro-Soviet and pro-communist groups"; The United States, in cooperation with Pakistan, must preserve for a long time the infrastructure for providing assistance to the rebels and be ready to use it if the Soviet Union breaks all agreements and begins to return troops to Afghanistan; The United States must contractually demand that the Soviet Union pay reparations to Afghanistan to compensate for the damage caused during the war. The number of reparations must be determined by a special international commission. if the USSR continues its military supplies to "pro-Soviet and pro-communist groups"; The United States, in cooperation with Pakistan, must preserve for a long time the infrastructure for providing assistance to the rebels and be ready to use it if the Soviet Union breaks all agreements and begins to return troops to Afghanistan; The United States must contractually demand that the Soviet Union pay reparations to Afghanistan to compensate for the damage caused during the war. 

Former King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah followed the negotiation processes with satisfaction and made an appeal to the Afghan people, refugees, mujahideen and political groups of Afghanistan, which, in particular, said:

“Dear compatriots, faithful and heroic people of Afghanistan!

The development of recent events has prepared a favorable moment for a political solution to the Afghan question. The declaration of the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan within 10 months of 1988 is an effective and constructive step towards eliminating all difficulties and resolving all disputes regarding this problem. The withdrawal of Soviet troops could lead to a solution to the issue of the return of refugees to their homeland, non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the provision of international guarantees for the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, as well as to the successful completion of the process of national reconciliation.

Undoubtedly, the choice of the political and socio-economic system of Afghanistan depends only on the will of the Afghan people, and whatever the choice, it must be carried out without interference and pressure from outside. The free right of such a choice should be exercised in accordance with the basic provisions of the sacred religion of Islam and on the basis of national traditions. In the course of this great national cause, no political group or other force has the right to impose its party or personal will on the Afghan people.

I am convinced that, as before, when in the most acute life situations the Afghan people, relying on religious convictions and national feelings, united their thoughts and actions, so now, when the current situation requires understanding by all Afghans both inside the country and abroad its historical responsibility and national duty, it is necessary to eliminate all contradictions, create a national union based on a coalition government, which will become a manifestation of the will of all the heroic people of Afghanistan, refugees, the absolute majority of fighters for the faith and political groups.

Those who, through terrorism, sowing discord, are trying to prevent the normalization of the situation, will be held responsible for foreign intervention, the continuation of military tensions and the general deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. As I have expressed my opinion several times before, so today I declare that in the current difficult situation, despite my situation, I will not spare my efforts and even my life itself, in order, acting together with the Afghan people, to fulfill my sacred duty, and precisely to ensure national unity, permanent peace in a free, Islamic, independent, non-aligned and neutral Afghanistan.

In conclusion, I appeal to the great Allah with a request to bestow good luck in the realization of this great dream.

Muhammad Zahir ".

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a package of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed in Armenia. The USA and the USSR acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements. The most significant thing in these agreements, as it seemed to us, was that in principle they made it possible to resolve the main issue of the Afghan situation - the cessation of armed or other interference in the affairs of Afghanistan from outside. After all, a bilateral agreement on the principles of relations determined that Afghanistan and Pakistan undertake to ensure that their territory is not used in any way to violate sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or to undermine political, economic and social stability of the other side; refrain from facilitating, encouraging or supporting, directly or indirectly, insurgency or separatist activities, or from any other action aimed at undermining the unity or overthrowing the political order of the other party; prevent the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries of any origin in their territory for the purpose of conducting hostile actions or sending such mercenaries into the territory of the other side and, accordingly, refuse to assist, including financing the training, equipment and transit of such mercenaries; not allow any assistance, use or tolerance towards terrorist groups, saboteurs or saboteurs; do not allow presence, shelter in camps and bases on their territory,

The bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees obliged both sides to take the necessary measures to address this complex issue. In accordance with these agreements, the Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within nine months, beginning on May 15, 1988. At the same time, during the first few months, half of all Soviet troops were withdrawn.

Pakistan and the United States had to stop all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The Pakistani authorities also pledged not to create military bases and camps hostile to Afghanistan on their territory, not to train, not to arm them, not to finance them, not to transfer weapons, equipment and combat units across Pakistani territory to the RA, and also not to take any other measures to destabilize there. internal environment.

To monitor the fulfillment of the obligations of the parties, a monitoring mechanism was created under the auspices of the UN.

The leaders of the Mujahideen, not being invited to Geneva, said that the agreements concluded there did not seem to concern them. In particular, G. Hekmatyar announced: “The treaties in no way affect and do not bind us to anything. Even if the Soviets begin to withdraw their troops, we will still attack. "

It should be said that the Soviet leadership made a significant mistake when it refused the American proposal to simultaneously stop military assistance to the Najibullah regime and the Mujahideen. Then they judged that it was wrong to put the PDPA and the opposition on the same level. But the opportunity is very rarely presented twice. When they came to their senses, it was already too late.

The signing of the Afghan-Pakistani agreement in Geneva had a significant impact on the development of the internal political situation in the Republic of Armenia, gave a new impetus to the process of national reconciliation, and accelerated the political solution of a number of acute problems of a regional nature.

In general, the decisive step of the Afghan government increased the authority of the state power as a force not only interested in establishing peace in the country, but also making concrete efforts in this direction.

However, in private conversations and consultations with Soviet representatives, Afghan officials expressed fears about the inevitable unrest following the withdrawal of the OCSV. Of particular concern was the possibility of exacerbation of internal party disagreements, which could seriously undermine the position of state power in the fight against the opposition.

After the signing of the Geneva Agreements, Soviet representatives in Afghanistan began their direct implementation, and first of all, to organize the withdrawal of the OKSV. They also took care of creating the necessary conditions for the preservation of the traditional friendship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, and organized propaganda support for the withdrawal of troops.