On industrialization and the grain problem I. V. Stalin

Stalin
Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 

July 4-12, 1928

Speech 9 July 1928

Comrades! Before turning to the specific question of our difficulties on the grain front, allow me to touch on some general questions of theoretical interest that surfaced here during the debate at the plenum.

First of all, a general question about the main sources of development of our industry, about ways to ensure the current pace of industrialization.

This question was raised, perhaps without realizing it, by Osinsky and, following him, Sokolnikov. This question is of paramount importance.

I think that we have two main sources of nourishment for our industry: firstly, the working class and, secondly, the peasantry.

In the capitalist countries, industrialization usually took place mainly through the plundering of foreign countries, through the plundering of colonies or conquered countries, or through serious more or less enslaving loans from outside.

You know that for hundreds of years England collected capital from all the colonies, from all parts of the world, and thus made additional investments in her industry. This, by the way, explains why England at one time turned into the "factory of the world."

You also know that Germany developed her industry, among other things, at the expense of the five-million indemnity taken from France after the Franco-Prussian war.

Our country, by the way, differs from the capitalist countries in that it cannot, must not engage in plundering colonies and, in general, plundering foreign countries. Therefore, this path is closed to us.

But our country also does not have and does not want to have enslaving loans from outside. Therefore, this path is also closed to us.

What is left in this case? Only one thing remains: to develop industry, to industrialize the country through internal accumulation.

Under the bourgeois order in our country, usually industry, transport, etc. developed through loans. Whether you undertake the construction of new factories or the refurbishment of old ones, whether you undertake the construction of new railways or the building of large electric stations, none of these enterprises could manage without foreign loans. But these loans were enslaving.

Things are quite different with us under the Soviet system. We are building a Turkestan railway 1,400 versts long, requiring hundreds of millions of rubles. We are building the Dneprostroy, which also requires hundreds of millions. Do we have any bonded loans here? No, we don't. All this is done at the expense of internal accumulation.

But where are the main sources of this accumulation? There are two of them, these sources, as I have already said: firstly; the working-class creating value and driving industry forward; second, the peasantry.

Regarding the peasantry, in this case, the situation is as follows: it pays the state not only the usual taxes, direct and indirect, but it also overpays on the comparatively high prices of industrial goods - this, in the first place, and more or less receives less on the prices of agricultural products - this is second.

This is an additional tax on the peasantry in the interest of developing an industry that serves the whole country, including the peasantry. This is something like a “tribute”, something like a supertax, which we are forced to take temporarily in order to maintain and further develop the current pace of development of industry, to provide industry for the whole country, to further increase the well-being of the countryside and then to completely abolish this additional tax, these “scissors” between town and country.

The thing is, to be sure, unpleasant. But we would not be Bolsheviks if we glossed over this fact and turned a blind eye to the fact that, unfortunately, our industry and our country cannot do without this additional tax on the peasantry.

Why am I talking about this? Because some comrades apparently do not understand this indisputable thing. They based their speeches on the fact that the peasantry overpays on goods, which is absolutely true, and that the peasantry is underpaid on the prices of agricultural products, which is also true. What do they require? They demand that replacement prices for grain be introduced so that these "scissors", these underpayments and overpayments, would be abolished immediately. But what does the destruction of the “scissors” mean, say, this year or next year? This means slowing down the industrialization of the country, including the industrialization of agriculture, undermining our young industry, which is still not strong, and thus hitting the entire national economy. Can we go for it? It is clear that we cannot. Is it necessary to destroy the "scissors" between the city and the countryside, all these underpayments and overpayments? Yes, it definitely needs to be destroyed. Can we destroy them now without weakening our industry, and hence our national economy? No we cannot.

What, then, should be our policy? It should consist in gradually weakening these "scissors", bringing them closer from year to year, lowering the prices of manufactured goods and raising the technique of agriculture, which cannot but lead to a reduction in the cost of grain production, so that later, in a number of years, to abolish altogether this additional tax on the peasantry.

Can the peasantry bear this burden? Undoubtedly, it can: firstly, because this burden will be weakened from year to year, and secondly, because this additional tax is collected not in conditions of capitalist development, where the masses of the peasantry are doomed to impoverishment and exploitation, but in conditions of the Soviet order, where the exploitation of the peasantry is excluded from the side of the socialist state, and where the payment of this additional tax takes place in conditions of continuous improvement in the material situation of the peasantry.

That is how matters stand with regard to the question of the main sources of development of the industrialization of our country at the present time.

The second question concerns the problem of the bond with the middle peasants, the problem of the aims and means of this bond.

For some comrades, it turns out that the bond between town and country, between the working class and the bulk of the peasantry, runs exclusively along the line of textiles, along the line of personal satisfaction of peasants of consumption. Is this true? This is absolutely wrong, comrades. Of course, the satisfaction of the personal needs of the peasantry in the line of textiles is of tremendous importance. From this we began to build a link with the peasantry in the new conditions. But to say on this basis that the bond along the lines of textiles exhausts the whole matter, that the bond along the lines of the personal needs of the peasantry is the exhaustive or main basis of the economic alliance between the working class and the peasantry, is to fall into a grave mistake. In fact, the bond between town and country goes not only along the line of satisfying the personal needs of the peasantry, not only along the line of textiles, but also along the line of satisfying the economic needs of the peasantry as a producer of Agricultural products.

We give the peasantry not only cotton. We are also giving him machinery of every kind, seeds, plows, fertilizers, etc., which are of the greatest importance in the cause of the development and socialist transformation of peasant economy.

The bond, therefore, has as its basis not only textiles, but also metal. Without this link with the peasantry would be fragile.

What is the difference between a textile bond and a metal bond? First of all, the fact that the textile bond concerns mainly the personal needs of the peasantry, without affecting or relatively little affecting the production side of the peasant economy, while the metal bond concerns mainly the production side of the peasant economy, improves this economy, machinizes it, raises its profitability and paves the way for the unification of scattered and small peasant farms into large public farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the purpose of the bond is to preserve classes, in particular, to preserve the class of peasants. This is not true, comrades. This is not the purpose of the link at all. The goal of the bond is to bring the peasantry closer to the working class as the leader of our entire development, to strengthen the alliance of the peasantry with the working class as the guiding force of this alliance, to gradually reshape the peasantry, its psychology, its production in the spirit of collectivism and to prepare Thus, the conditions for the abolition of classes.

The purpose of the bond is not to preserve classes, but to abolish them. If the bond on textiles has little effect on the production side of peasant economy and therefore, generally speaking, cannot result in the reorganization of the peasantry in the spirit of collectivism and the destruction of classes, then the bond on metal, on the contrary, concerns primarily the production side of peasant economy, its mechanization, its collectivization, and that is precisely why it should result in a gradual reorganization of the peasantry, the gradual liquidation of classes, including the class of peasants.

How is it possible in general to remake, remake the peasant, his psychology, his production in the spirit of rapprochement with the psychology of the working class, in the spirit of the socialist principle of production? What is required for this?

This requires, above all, the broadest agitation among the peasant masses in the spirit of collectivism.

This requires, secondly, the planting of a cooperative community and the ever-expanding coverage of millions of peasant farms by our supply and marketing cooperative organizations. There can be no doubt that without the broad development of our cooperatives we would not have had that change among the peasants in favor of the collective-farm movement which we are witnessing at the present time, for the development of supply and marketing co-operation under our conditions is preparation for the transition of the peasantry to collectivism.

But all this is still far from enough to remake the peasantry. The main force in reshaping the peasant in the spirit of socialism is the new technique in agriculture, the mechanization of agriculture, the collective labor of the peasant, and the electrification of the country.

They refer here to Lenin, quoting a well-known passage from Lenin's writings on the bond with peasant economy. But to take Lenin in one part without wanting to take him as a whole is to distort Lenin. Lenin fully understood that the bond with the peasantry along the line of manufactured goods was a very important thing. But he did not stop there, for at the same time he insisted that the bond with the peasantry should also be carried out along the line of metal, along the line of supplying the peasantry with machinery, along the line of the electrification of the country, i.e., along all those lines that favor reworking and processing of the peasant economy in the spirit of collectivism.

Would you like, for example, to listen to the following quote from Lenin:

“The task of transforming the small farmer, of transforming his entire psychology and skills, is a matter that requires generations. Only the material base, technology, the use of tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, and electrification on a mass scale can solve this problem in relation to the small farmer, improve, so to speak, his entire psychology. This is what fundamentally and with tremendous speed would remake the small farmer” (vol. XXVI, p. 239).

The point is clear: the alliance of the working class and the peasantry cannot be strong and lasting, the bond cannot be strong and lasting, and it cannot achieve its goal of gradually reshaping the peasant, bringing him closer to the working class and transferring him to the rails of collectivism, if there is no textile bond completed with a metal bond.

This is how Comrade Lenin understood the bond.

The third question concerns the question of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the class struggle under the NEP.

It is necessary, first of all, to establish that the foundations of NEP were given by our party not after war communism, as some comrades sometimes assert, but before it, as early as the beginning of 1918, when we were first able to start building a new, socialist economy. I could refer to Ilyich's well-known pamphlet on The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power, published at the beginning of 1918, which outlines the foundations of NEP. Introducing the NEP at the end of the intervention, the party qualified it as a new economic policy because it, this very policy, was interrupted by the intervention and we got the opportunity to carry it out only after the intervention, after war communism, in comparison with which the NEP was, indeed, new economic policy. In confirmation of this, I consider it necessary to refer to the well-known resolution adopted at the 9th Congress of Soviets, where it is said in black and white that the foundations of the New Economic Policy were laid down before War Communism. This resolution “On the Preliminary Results of the New Economic Policy” states the following:

“The so-called new economic policy, the basic principles of which were precisely defined during the first respite, in the spring of 1918*, is based on a strict consideration of the economic forces of Soviet Russia. The implementation of this policy, interrupted by a combined attack on the workers' and peasants' state by the counter-revolutionary forces of the Russian landowners and the bourgeoisie and European imperialism, is possible only after the military liquidation of attempts at counter-revolution, by the beginning of 1921. (See “Resolutions of the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets”, p. 16).

You see, therefore, how wrong some comrades are who assert that the Party realized the necessity of building socialism under the conditions of the market and the money economy, that is, under the conditions of the New Economic Policy, allegedly only after war communism.

And what follows from this?

From this it follows, first of all, that the NEP should not be regarded as merely a retreat.

It further follows from this that the NEP presupposes a victorious and systematic offensive by socialism against the capitalist elements of our economy.

The opposition in the person of Trotsky thinks that if the NEP has been introduced, then there is only one thing left for us - to retreat step by step, as we retreated at the beginning of the NEP, "expanding" the NEP and losing ground. On this misunderstanding of the NEP, Trotsky's assertion is based that the party supposedly "expanded" the NEP and retreated from Lenin's position, allowing land lease and hired labor in the countryside. Would you like to listen to Trotsky's words:

“And what are the latest measures of Soviet power in the countryside - permission to rent land, hire labor, everything that we call the expansion of the village NEP ... But was it possible not to expand the NEP in the countryside? No, because then the peasant economy would have fallen into disrepair, the market would have narrowed, industry would have slowed down” (Trotsky, “8 Years”, pp. 16-17).

That's what you can agree on if you get into your head the wrong idea that the NEP is a retreat and only a retreat.

Can it be argued that the Party, by allowing hired labor and land lease in the countryside, "expanded" the New Economic Policy, "departed" from Lenin's position, etc.? Of course not! People who assert such stupidity have nothing in common with Lenin and Leninism.

I could, here, refer to Lenin's well-known letter addressed to Osinsky dated April 1, 1922, where he directly speaks of the necessity of employing hired labor and leasing land in the countryside. This was at the end of the Eleventh Party Congress, where the question of work in the countryside, the NEP and its consequences was widely discussed among the delegates.

Here is a quote from this letter, presenting a draft resolution for delegates to the party congress:

“On the question of the conditions for the use of hired labor in agriculture and the lease of land, the Party Congress recommends that all workers in this area do not hamper either phenomenon with sticking formalities and confine themselves to carrying out the decision of the last Congress of Soviets, as well as studying exactly what practical measures were it would be expedient to limit extremes and harmful exaggerations in these respects” (see Lenin's collection IV, p. 396).

You see how stupid and empty the talk is about the “expansion” of the NEP, about the “retreat” from Lenin in the introduction of land leases and hired labor in the countryside, etc.

Why am I talking about this?

Because people who talk about the "expansion" of NEP seek excuses in this talk for retreating before the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Because we have people within the Party and around the Party who see in the “expansion” of NEP the “salvation” of the bond between the workers and peasants, who, in view of the lifting of emergency measures, demand the abandonment of restrictions on the kulaks, who demand the unleashing of capitalist elements in the countryside ... in the interests of bonds.

Because against such anti-proletarian sentiments it is necessary to insure the Party by all ways, by all means.

In order not to go far, I will refer to a note by one comrade, an employee of the "Bednota-Poor", Osin Chernov, where he demands a whole series of reliefs for the kulaks, which means nothing more than a real and unvarnished "expansion" of NEP. I don't know if he is a communist or a non-partisan. And here is this friend, Osip Chernev, who stands for Soviet power and for an alliance between the workers and the peasantry, is so entangled in the peasant question that it is difficult to distinguish him from the ideologist of the rural bourgeoisie. Does he see the rank as the cause of our difficulties on the grain front? “The first reason,” he says, “is definitely the progressive income tax system... The second reason is the legal changes in the electoral instruction, the ambiguity in the instruction of who should be considered a kulak.”

What needs to be done in order to eliminate the difficulties? “It is necessary,” he says, “as a first duty to abolish the system of income-progressive tax, as it is now, and replace it with a system of taxation on land, lightly impose draft animals and large agricultural implements ... The second measure, no less important, is this is to revise the instructions for elections, to make more crude indications of where the exploitative, kulak farming begins.

Here it is - the "expansion" of the NEP. As you can see, the seed thrown by Trotsky was not in vain. An incorrect understanding of NEP gives rise to chatter about the "expansion" of NEP, and chatter about the "expansion" of NEP creates all sorts of notes, articles, letters, and proposals on how to give the kulak free rein, free him from restrictions and give him the opportunity to enrich himself freely.

Along the same line, along the line of the question of NEP and the class struggle under NEP conditions, I would like to note one more fact. I have in mind the statement of one of the atom comrades that the class struggle under the conditions of the priesthood in connection with the grain procurements is supposedly only of a third-rate importance, that it, this very class struggle, does not and cannot supposedly have any serious significance in the matter of our difficulties in grain procurement.

I must say, comrades, that I cannot in any way agree with this statement. I think that we do not have, and cannot have, under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a single political or economic fact of any importance that does not reflect the existence of a class struggle in town or country. Does the NEP abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not! On the contrary, the NEP is a peculiar expression and instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Isn't the dictatorship of the proletariat a continuation of the class struggle? (Voices: "That's right!") How can one then say that the class struggle plays a third-rate role in such important political and economic facts as the kulaks' opposition to Soviet policy during the grain procurements, countermeasures and offensive actions of the Soviet government against the kulaks and speculators in ties with the grain procurements?

Is it not a fact that during the grain procurement crisis we had the first serious action under the NEP conditions by the capitalist elements in the countryside against Soviet policy?

Aren't there more classes and class struggle in the countryside?

Isn't it true that Lenin's slogan about reliance on the poor peasantry, alliance with the middle peasantry and struggle against the kulaks is, under present conditions, the main slogan of our work in the countryside? And what is this slogan if not an expression of the class struggle in the countryside?

Of course, our policy cannot in any way be considered a policy of fomenting the class struggle. Why? Because the incitement of the class struggle leads to civil war. Because, as long as we are in power, we have consolidated this power, and the positions of command are concentrated in the hands of the working class, we are not interested in seeing the class struggle take the form of a civil war. But this does not mean at all that the class struggle has thereby been abolished, or that it, this same class struggle, will not be aggravated. This does not mean, all the more, that the class struggle is not allegedly the decisive force in our progress. No, it doesn't.

We often say that we are developing socialist forms of economy in the field of trade. What does it mean? This means that we are thereby ousting thousands and thousands of small and medium traders from trade. Is it possible to think that these merchants, ousted from the sphere of circulation, will sit silently, not trying to organize resistance? It is clear that it is impossible.

We often say that we are developing socialist forms of economy in the field of industry. What does it mean? This means that we are ousting and ruining, perhaps without noticing it ourselves, by our advance towards socialism thousands upon thousands of small and medium capitalist industrialists. Is it possible to think that these ruined people will sit in silence, not trying to organize resistance? Of course not.

We often say that it is necessary to limit the exploitative encroachments of the kulaks in the countryside, that high taxes must be imposed on the kulaks, that the right to rent must be limited, that the right to elect kulaks to the Soviets must be prevented, and so on and so forth. And what does this mean? This means that we are gradually crushing and ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside, sometimes bringing them to ruin. Can we assume that the kulaks will be grateful to us for this, and that they will not try to organize part of the poor or middle peasants against the policy of Soviet power? Of course not.

Is it not clear that all our progress forward, each of our any serious success in the field of socialist construction, is an expression and result of the class struggle in our country?

But it follows from all this that, as we advance, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify, and the Soviet government, whose strength will grow more and more, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of disintegrating the enemies of the working class. and, finally, the policy of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters, creating the basis for the further advancement of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry.

It cannot be imagined that socialist forms will develop, ousting the enemies of the working class, and the enemies will retreat silently, making way for our advance, that then we will again advance, and they will retreat again, and then “suddenly” all without exception social groups, both kulaks and the poor, both workers and capitalists, will find themselves "suddenly", "imperceptibly", without struggle or unrest, into the bosom of socialist society. Such fairy tales do not exist and cannot exist at all, especially in a proletarian dictatorship.

It has not happened and will not happen that the moribund classes voluntarily give up their positions without trying to organize resistance. It has never happened and never will be that the advance of the working class towards socialism in a class society can do without struggle and unrest. On the contrary, the advance towards socialism cannot but lead to the resistance of the exploiting elements to this advance, and the resistance of the exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable intensification of the class struggle.

That is why it is impossible to lull the working class into talking about the secondary role of the class struggle.

The fourth question concerns the problem of emergency measures against kulaks and speculators.

Emergency measures cannot be regarded as something absolute and given once and for all. Emergency measures are necessary and expedient under known emergency conditions, when we have no other measures available for maneuvering. Extraordinary measures are unnecessary and harmful under other conditions, when we have available other, flexible measures for maneuvering in the market. Those who think that emergency measures are always necessary, and expedient are wrong. Such people need a decisive struggle.

Was it a mistake to use emergency measures in the conditions of the grain procurement crisis? Now everyone admits that it was not a mistake, that, on the contrary, emergency measures saved the country from a general economic crisis. What made us take these measures? A shortage of 128 million poods of grain by January of this year, which we had to make up before the thaw and at the same time create a normal rate of grain procurement. Could we not take emergency measures in the absence of grain reserves of that millions of 100 poods, which are necessary in order to wait and intervene in the market, in the sense of lowering the price of bread, or in the absence of sufficient foreign exchange reserves necessary to import from large batches of bread abroad? Clearly they couldn't. And what would happen if we did not fill this gap? We would now have a most serious crisis of the entire national economy,

If we had a reserve of 100 million poods of grain in order to wait it out and then starve the fist out by intervening in the market in order to lower the price of grain, we would not, of course, take emergency measures. But you know well that we did not have such a reserve.

If we had then had a foreign exchange reserve of 100-150 million rubles in order to import grain from abroad, we probably would not have taken emergency measures. But you know well that we did not have this reserve.

Does this mean that we must continue to be left without a reserve and resort again to the help of emergency measures? No, it doesn't. On the contrary, we must take all measures in our power to accumulate reserves and eliminate the need for any emergency measures. People who think of turning emergency measures into a permanent or long-term course for our Party are dangerous people, for they are playing with fire and endangering the bond.

Does it not follow from this that we must renounce once and for all the use of emergency measures? No, it doesn't leak. We have no grounds to assert that extraordinary conditions requiring the application of extraordinary measures cannot ever be repeated. Such a statement would be empty quackery.

Lenin, who substantiated the New Economic Policy, however, did not consider it possible, under the conditions of NEP, to renounce even Kombedov's methods under certain conditions and under certain conditions. All the more so, we cannot renounce once and for all the use of emergency measures, which cannot be put on the same level with such an acute measure of struggle against the kulaks as the Kombedov methods.

It may not be out of place to recall one episode with Preobrazhensky at the Eleventh Congress of our Party, which has a direct bearing on this matter. We know that Preobrazhensky, in his theses on work in the countryside at the Eleventh Congress, attempted to reject "once for all" the policy of the Kombedov's methods of combating the kulaks under the NEP. Preobrazhensky wrote in his theses: “The policy of not accepting this (the kulaks and prosperous peasantry) stratum and of its crude non-economic suppression by the Kombedov methods of 1918 would be a most harmful mistake” (§2).

It is known that Lenin answered this as follows:

"The second phrase of the second paragraph (against the 'Combedian methods') is harmful and incorrect, because war, for example, can force the use of the Kombedian methods." This must be said in a completely different way, for example, as follows: in view of the prevailing importance of developing agriculture and increasing its products, at the present moment * the policy of the proletariat in relation to the kulaks and the prosperous peasantry should be directed mainly to limiting their exploiting aspirations, etc. e. How to limit these aspirations, how our state should and can protect the poor, this is the whole point. This must be studied and made to be studied practically, but general phrases are futile” (see Lenin's collection IV, p. 391).

It is clear that emergency measures must be considered dialectically, for everything depends on the conditions of time and place.

That is how matters stand, comrades, with regard to the questions of a general nature that surfaced during the debate.

Let me now turn to the question of the grain problem and the fundamentals of our difficulties on the grain front.

I think that a number of comrades have made the mistake of lumping together the various causes of our difficulties on the grain front, confusing temporary and opportunistic (specific) causes with long-term and basic causes. There are two kinds of causes of grain difficulties: long-term, basic causes, the elimination of which requires a number of years, and specific, opportunistic causes, which can be eliminated immediately if a number of necessary measures are taken and carried out. To lump together all these reasons is to confuse the whole question.

I think that a number of comrades have made the mistake of lumping together the various causes of our difficulties on the grain front, confusing temporary and opportunistic (specific) causes with long-term and basic causes. There are two kinds of causes of grain difficulties: long-term, basic causes, the elimination of which requires a number of years, and specific, opportunistic causes, which can be eliminated immediately if a number of necessary measures are taken and carried out. To lump together all these reasons is to confuse the whole question.

What is the basic meaning and fundamental significance of our difficulties on the grain front? In that they confront us in full force with the problem of grain, grain production, the problem of agriculture in general, the problem of grain production in particular.

Do we have a grain problem at all, as a topical issue? Certainly, there is. Only the blind can doubt that the grain problem is now hitting all the pores of Soviet public opinion. We cannot live like gypsies without grain reserves, without certain reserves in case of crop failure, without reserves for maneuvering in the market, without reserves in case of war, and finally, without some reserves for export. Even the small peasant, for all the poverty of his economy, cannot do without reserves, without certain reserves. Is it not clear that a great state occupying one-sixth of the land cannot do without grain reserves for internal and external needs?

Let us assume that we would not have had the loss of winter crops in the Ukraine, and we would have ended the grain-procurement clan "so on so" - can we consider that this would be enough for us? No. We can't continue to live like this. We must have at our disposal a certain minimum of reserves if we want to defend the positions of Soviet power on the internal line, as well as on the external line.

First, we are not guaranteed against a military attack. Do you think that it is possible to defend the country without having any reserves of grain for the army? The comrades who spoke were absolutely right when they said that the peasant of today is no longer the same as he was six years ago, when he was afraid of losing his land to the landowner. The peasant is already forgetting the landowner. Now he demands new, better living conditions. In the event of an attack by enemies, can we wage war both with an external enemy at the front and with a peasant in the rear for the sake of urgently obtaining bread for the army? No, we can't and shouldn't. In order to defend the country, we must have known reserves to supply the army, at least for the first six months. Why are these six months of respite necessary? In order to let the peasant, come to his senses, to get used to the danger of war, understand the events and catch up for the sake of the common cause of defense of the country. If we are content to go out "like this," we will never have any reserves in case of war.

Secondly, we are not guaranteed against complications in the bread market. We absolutely need a certain reserve for intervention in the affairs of the grain market, for carrying out our price policy. For we cannot and must not resort to emergency measures every time. But we will never have such reserves if we walk each time along the edge of the ravine, content with the fact that we have the opportunity to end the procurement year “just like that”.

Thirdly, we are not guaranteed against crop failure. We absolutely need a certain reserve of grain in order to ensure, in the event of a crop failure, the hungry regions, at least to a certain extent, at least for a certain period of time. But we will not have such a reserve if we do not increase the production of marketable grain and do not abruptly and decisively abandon the old habit of living without stocks.

Finally, we absolutely need a reserve for grain exports. We need to import equipment for industry. We need to import agricultural machinery, tractors and spare parts for them. But it is impossible to do this without exporting grain, without accumulating certain foreign exchange reserves by exporting grain. Before the war, they exported from 500 to 600 million poods of grain annually. They took out so much because they themselves were malnourished. It's right. But we must understand that, nevertheless, in the pre-war period, we had twice the amount of marketable bread more than now. And it is precisely because we now have half as much marketable grain that grain is now being excluded from exports. And what does the loss of bread from export mean? This means the loss of the source by which we imported and must import equipment for industry, tractors and machines for agriculture. Is it possible to live like this without accumulating grain reserves for export? No, you can't.

This is how unsecure and unsustainable the condition of our grain reserves is.

Not to mention the fact that not only do we not have grain reserves along all these four lines, but we also have enough of a certain minimum of reserves in order to pass painlessly from one procurement year to another procurement year and to supply the cities uninterruptedly in such difficult months like June - July.

Can we then deny the acuteness of the grain problem and the seriousness of our difficulties on the grain front?

But in connection with the grain difficulties, we also had difficulties of a political nature. On no account should we forget this, comrades. I have in mind the discontent among a certain part of the peasantry, among a certain part of the poor peasants, as well as among the middle peasants, which took place in our country, and which created a certain threat to the bond.

Of course, it would be completely wrong to say that we already have a disconnect, as Frumkin says about this in his note. This is not true, comrades. Breakdown is a serious matter. The bridge is the beginning of the civil war, if not the civil war itself. No need to scare yourself with “terrible” words. No need to panic. This is unworthy of the Bolsheviks. A break-up means a break between the peasantry and Soviet power. If the peasant has really broken with the Soviet government, which is the main purveyor of peasant grain, he will no longer expand your crops. Meanwhile, we see that this year the spring wedge has expanded in all grain regions without exception. What kind of a break is this? Is it possible to call such a state of "unpromising" peasant economy, as Frumkin, for example, says about this? What is this "unpromising"?

What is the basis of our grain difficulties, if we keep in mind the long-term and basic causes of difficulties, and not temporary, opportunistic causes?

The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the growing dispersion and fragmentation of agriculture. It is a fact that agriculture is shrinking, especially grain farming, becoming less profitable and less commercial. If before the revolution we had about 15-16 million peasant farms, now we have them up to 24-25 million, and the process of fragmentation tends to further intensify.

It is true that we now have crops that are not much smaller than those before the war, and that the gross output of grain is only some 5 per cent less than the pre-war output. But the trouble is that, in spite of all this, the production of marketable grain in our country lags behind pre-war production by half, that is, by 50 percent. That is the root of the problem.

What's the matter? Yes, in that small-scale farming is less profitable, less marketable, and less stable than large-scale farming. The well-known proposition of Marxism that small-scale production is less profitable than large-scale production retains its full force in agriculture as well. Therefore, small-scale peasant farming yields much less marketable grain from the same area of ​​land than large-scale farming.

Where is the way out?

We have three exits, as the Politburo resolution says.

1. The way out is to raise the productivity of small and medium peasant farms as far as possible, to replace the plow with a plow, to provide a machine of a small and medium type, to provide fertilizer, to supply seeds, to provide agronomic assistance, to co-operate the peasantry, to conclude contracts with entire villages, giving lend them the best seeds and thus ensure collective lending to the peasantry, and finally give them large cars for rent through rental centers.

The comrades who assert that small-scale peasant farming has exhausted the possibilities for its further development and that, therefore, it is not worth helping it any further are wrong. This is completely false. There are still quite a few development opportunities for individual peasant farming. You just need to be able to help him realize these opportunities.

Krasnaya Gazeta is also wrong in asserting that the policy of cooperating individual peasant farms in the area of ​​marketing and supply has not justified itself. This is absolutely wrong, comrades. On the contrary, the policy of cooperation in supply and marketing has fully justified itself, creating a real basis for a turning point among the peasantry in the direction of the collective-farm movement. Undoubtedly, without the development of supply and marketing cooperatives, we would not have had that turning point in the relations between the peasantry and the collective farms that we have now, and which is helping us to carry on collective-farm construction.

2. The way out is, further, to help the poor and middle peasants gradually unite their scattered small farms into large collective farms on the basis of new technology and collective labor, as more profitable and marketable. I have in mind all forms of association of small farms into large, public ones, from simple partnerships to artels, which are incomparably more marketable and productive than scattered small peasant farms. This is the basis for solving the problem. The comrades are wrong when, in their support of the collective farms, they accuse us of "rehabilitating" small peasant farming. They obviously think that the relationship to individual peasant farming should be one of struggle and annihilation, and not a relationship of helping and pulling one towards oneself. This is absolutely wrong, comrades. The individual peasant economy does not need "rehabilitation" at all. It's not profitable, that's true. But this does not mean that it is completely unprofitable. We would destroy the bond if we took the standpoint of fighting and destroying individual peasant farming, abandoning the Leninist position of everyday help and support from the collective farms for individual peasant farms.

Even more wrong are those who, while extolling the collective farms, declare that individual peasant farming is our "curse." This already smacks of downright war on peasant farming. Where do they get this idea from? If peasant farming is a "curse," how do they explain the alliance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry? Alliance of the working class with a "curse"—can there be anything so fantastic? How can they say such things and at the same time preach in favour of the bond? They recall what Lenin said about the necessity of our gradually changing over from the peasant nag to the steel steed of industry. That is very good. But is that the way to change over from one horse to another? To proclaim peasant farming a "curse" before a broad and powerful base has been created in the shape of a ramified system of collective farms—would not the upshot be that we should be left without any horse, without any base at all? (Voices: "Quite right!") The mistake of these comrades is that they counterpose collective farming to individual peasant farming. But what we want is that these two forms of farming should not be counterposed to one another, but should be linked together in a bond, and that within the framework of this bond the collective farms should assist the individual peasant and help him little by little to go over to collectivist lines. Yes, what we want is that the peasants should look upon the collective farms not as their enemy, but as their friend who helps them and will help them to emancipate themselves from poverty. (Voices: "True!") If that is true, then you should not say that we are "rehabilitating" individual peasant farming, or that peasant farming is our "curse."

It should have been said that small-scale peasant farming is less profitable, or even the least profitable, in comparison with large-scale collective farming, but still not devoid of a certain, no small advantage. But it turns out that small-scale peasant farming is generally unprofitable and, perhaps, even harmful.

This is not how Lenin viewed small-scale peasant farming. Here is what he said about this in his speech “On Tax in Kind”:

“If peasant economy can develop further, it is necessary to secure a further transition, and a further transition inevitably consists in the fact that the least profitable and most backward, small, isolated peasant economy, gradually uniting, organizes a social, large-scale agricultural economy. This is how the socialists have always imagined it all. This is precisely how our Communist Party also views” (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

It turns out that individual peasant farming nevertheless represents a certain advantage.

It is one thing when the highest form of economy, large-scale economy, fights against the lowest and ruins it, kills it. That is how things stand under capitalism. And it is a completely different matter when the highest form of economy does not ruin, but helps the lowest to rise, to go over to the rails of collectivism. That is how things stand under the Soviet system.

And here is what Lenin says about the relationship between collective farms and individual peasant farms:

“In particular, we must strive to ensure that the law of Soviet power (on collective farms and state farms. I. St.) is really implemented and, moreover, completely, requiring from Soviet farms, agricultural communes and all similar associations to provide immediate and comprehensive assistance to the surrounding and middle peasants . Only on the basis of such aid, actually rendered, can an agreement with the middle peasantry be realizable . This is the only way to win his trust” (Vol. XXIV, p. 175).

It follows, therefore, that the collective farms and state farms must help the peasant farms precisely as individual farms. Finally, the third quote from Lenin:

“Only if we manage to actually show the peasants the advantages of social, collective, comradely, artel cultivation of the land, only if we succeed in helping the peasant with the help of comradely artel farming, then only the working class, holding state power in its hands, really he will prove to the peasant that he is right, he will really win over to his side the many millions of peasant masses in a firm and real way” (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how highly Lenin valued the importance of the collective-farm movement in the cause of the socialist transformation of our country.

It is extremely strange that some comrades in their long speeches focused all their attention on the question of individual peasant farms, without saying a single word, literally not a single word about the task of raising the collective farms as an urgent and decisive task of our Party.

3. The way out, finally, is to strengthen the old state farms and raise the new, large state farms as the most profitable and marketable economic units.

These are the three main tasks, the fulfillment of which enables us to solve the grain problem and thus eliminate the very basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

The peculiarity of the current situation is that the first task of developing individual peasant farming, which is still the main task of our work, has already become insufficient for solving the grain problem.

The peculiarity of the current moment is that the first task should be supplemented with practically two new tasks of raising the collective farms and the raising of the state farms.

Without a combination of these tasks, without persistent work along all these three channels, it is impossible to solve the grain problem, either in the sense of supplying the country with marketable grain, or in the sense of transforming our entire national economy on the basis of socialism.

How did Lenin view this matter? We have a well-known document showing that the resolution of the Politburo brought to the attention of the plenum coincides entirely with the practical plan for the development of agriculture which Lenin outlined in this document. I have in mind the "Order of the STO" (Council of Labor and Defense), written by Lenin's hand. It was published in May 1921. In this document, Lenin analyzes three groups of practical questions: the first group concerns questions of trade and industry, the second group deals with the development of agriculture, and the third group deals with all sorts of economic and regional conferences on the regulation of the economy.

What is said there, in this document, about agriculture? Here is a quote from the “STO Mandate”:

“The second group of questions. The rise of agriculture: a) peasant farming, b) state farms, c) communes, d) artels, e) partnerships, f) other types of social economy” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 374).

You see that the practical conclusions of the Politburo's resolution on resolving the grain problem and the agricultural problem in general coincide entirely with Lenin's plan outlined in the "Instruction of the STO" in 1921.

It is very interesting to note the purely youthful joy with which Lenin, this giant who moved mountains and pushed them against each other, met every news about the foundation of one or two collective farms or about sending tractors for this or that state farm. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a letter to the Society for Technical Assistance of Soviet Russia:

“Dear comrades! Extremely favorable information has appeared in our newspapers regarding the work of members of your society in the Soviet farms of the Kirsanov district, Tambov province, and at the Mitino station, Odessa province, as well as the work of a group of miners from the Donetsk basin ... I am entering with a petition to the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on recognizing the most outstanding farms as exemplary and on providing them with special and extraordinary assistance necessary for the favorable development of their work. Once again, on behalf of our republic, I express my deep gratitude to you and ask you to keep in mind that your assistance in tractor tillage is especially timely and important for us. It gives me particular pleasure to be able to congratulate you on your proposed organization of 200 agricultural communes” (Vol. XXVII, p. 309).

And here is another excerpt from a letter to the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia in America:

“Dear comrades! I have just checked with a special survey of the Perm Gubernia Executive Committee the extremely favorable information that was published in our newspapers regarding the work of members of your society, headed by Harold Ware, with the tractor detachment of the Perm Gubernia at the Toikino state farm (Soviet farm). . . I am entering with a petition to the VNIK presidium to recognize this Soviet economy as exemplary and to provide it with special and extraordinary assistance both in relation to construction work and in the supply of gasoline, metal and other materials necessary for organizing a repair shop. Once again, on behalf of our republic, I express my deep gratitude to you and ask you to keep in mind that no type of assistance is as timely and as important for us as the one provided by you.”(Vol. XXVII, p. 308).

Such was the joy with which Lenin caught every slightest piece of news about the development of collective farms and state farms.

Let this serve as a lesson to those who think of deceiving history and doing without collective farms and state farms in the cause of the victorious building of socialism in our country.

I'm done, comrades. I think that the grain difficulties will not be in vain for us. Our Party has learned and advanced, overcoming difficulties and all sorts of crises. I think that the present difficulties will temper our Bolshevik ranks and compel them to take up the solution of the grain problem. And to solve this problem means to remove from the road one of the greatest difficulties standing in the way of the socialist transformation of our country.