Stalin- On the Bond Between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms

Stalin

Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

July 4-12, 1928

From the Speech Delivered on July 11, 1928

Some of the comrades reverted in their speeches on the state farms to yesterday's dispute on the question of the grain procurements. Well, let us revert to yesterday's dispute.

What was the dispute about yesterday? First of all, about the "scissors" between town and country. It was said that the peasant was still overpaying for manufactured goods and being underpaid for his agricultural produce. It was said that these overpayments and underpayments constitute a supertax on the peasantry, something in the nature of a "tribute," an additional tax for the sake of industrialisation, a tax which we must certainly abolish, but which we cannot abolish at once if we have no intention of undermining our industry, of undermining a definite rate of development of our industry, which works for the whole country and which advances our national economy towards socialism.

There were some who did not like this. These comrades apparently fear to admit the truth. Well, that is a matter of taste. Some think that it is not advisable to tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee. But I think that at the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party it is our duty to tell the whole truth. It should not be forgotten that the plenum of the Central Committee cannot be regarded as a mass meeting. Of course, "supertax," "additional tax" are unpleasant words, for they hit hard. But, in the first place, it is not a question of words. In the second place, the words fully correspond to the facts. In the third place, they, these unpleasant words, are intended to hit hard and to compel Bolsheviks to set to work seriously to do away with this "supertax," to do away with the "scissors."

And how can these unpleasant things be done away with? By systematically rationalizing our industry and lowering prices of manufactured goods. By systematically improving agricultural techniques and raising harvest yields, and gradually lowering the cost of agricultural produce. By systematically rationalizing our trade and procurement apparatus. And so on and so forth.

All this, of course, cannot be done in a year or two. But it has to be done without fail in the course of a few years if we want to save ourselves from all sorts of unpleasant things and from facts that hit us hard.

Some of the comrades yesterday pressed hard for the abolition of the "scissors" at once and as good as demanded the establishment of replacement prices for agricultural produce. I, as well as other comrades, objected to this and said that this demand was contrary to the interests of the industrialisation of the country at the present moment, and, consequently, was contrary to the interests of our state.

That is what our dispute was about yesterday.

Today, these comrades say that they no longer insist on a policy of replacement prices. Well, that is very good. It appears that yesterday's criticism was not without effect on these comrades.

A second question concerns the collective farms and state farms. I remarked in my speech that it was unnatural and strange that, when speaking of measures for promoting agriculture in connection with the grain procurements, some comrades did not say a single word about such weighty measures as developing collective farms and state farms. How is it possible to "forget" such a serious thing as the task of developing collective and state farms in agriculture? Do we not know that the task of developing individual peasant farming, important though it is at the present moment, is already insufficient, and that if we do not supplement this task in practice with the new tasks of developing collective farms and state farms, we shall not solve the grain farming problem and shall not escape from our difficulties, either in the sense of the socialist transformation of our entire national economy (and, hence, of peasant farming), or in the sense of ensuring the country definite reserves of marketable grain.

In view of all this, how can the question of developing collective farms and state farms be "forgotten," evaded, passed over in silence?

Let us pass now to the question of large state farms. The comrades who assert that there are no large grain farms in North America are mistaken. In point of fact, there are such farms both in North and South America. I might quote such a witness as Professor Tulaikov, who made a study of American agriculture and published his findings in the magazine Nizhneye Povol-zhye 15 (No. 9)

Permit me to quote from Tulaikov's article.

"The Montana wheat farm is owned by the Campbell Farming Corporation. It has an area of 95,000 acres, or about 32,000 dessiatins. The farm is one continuous tract, divided for purposes of operation into four sections, what we would call khutors, each of which has a separate manager, the whole farm being managed by one person, the director of the corporation, Thomas Campbell.

"This year, according to a press report, which emanates of course from the farm itself, about half the total area is under cultivation, and it is expected to secure about 410,000 bushels of wheat (about 800,000 poods). 20,000 bushels of oats and 70,000 bushels of linseed. The income from the enterprise is expected to total 500,000 dollars.

"On this farm, horses and mules are almost totally replaced by tractors, motor lorries and automobiles. Ploughing, planting and all field work in general, and harvesting in particular, are carried on day and night, the fields at night being flood-lit to enable the machines to work. Because of the vast extent of the fields, the machines can cover long distances without making a turn. For instance, reaper-threshers with a 24-foot header, if the state of the crops permits their use, travel 20 miles, that is, a little over 30 versts. Formerly, 40 horses and men would have been required for this work. Four sheaf-binders are hitched to one tractor, and cover a strip 40 feet wide and 28 miles long, that is, a distance of roughly 42 versts. Binders are used if the grain is not dry enough to be threshed at the same time as it is reaped. In that case, the binding device is removed from the reapers and the cut stalks are laid in rows with the help of a special conveyer. The rows are left lying 24 or 48 hours, during which time the grain dries and the seeds of the weeds-cut together with it fall to the ground. After this, the grain is taken up with a reaper-thresher the cutter of which has been replaced by an automatic lifting device which delivers the dried grain straight into the thresher drum, The machine is operated by only two men, one driving the tractor and the other tending the thresher. The grain pours straight from the thresher into six-ton trucks which carry it to the elevator, trains of ten trucks each being drawn by one tractor. The report says that in this way from 16,000 to 20,000 bushels of grain are threshed daily" (see Nizhneye Povolzhye, No. 9, September 1927, pp. 38-39).

There you have a description of one giant wheat farm of the capitalist type. There are giant farms of this kind in both North and South America.

Some comrades said here that in the capitalist countries conditions for the development of such giant farms are not always favourable, or not altogether favourable, and therefore such farms are sometimes divided up into smaller units ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 dessiatins each. That is quite true.

These comrades conclude from this that large-scale grain farming has no future under Soviet conditions either. There they are quite wrong.

These comrades evidently fail to understand, or do not see, the difference in conditions between the capitalist system and the Soviet system. Under capitalism there is private ownership of land, and therefore absolute ground rent, which increases the cost of agricultural production and creates insuperable barriers to its serious progress. Under the Soviet system, however, there is neither private ownership of land nor absolute ground rent, which cannot but lower the cost of agricultural production and, consequently, cannot but facilitate the advance of large-scale agriculture along the road of technical and all other progress.

Furthermore, under capitalism the object of large grain farms is to obtain the maximum profit, or, at any rate, such a profit on capital as might correspond to what is known as the average rate of profit, without which, generally speaking, they cannot carry on or exist at all. This circumstance cannot but increase the cost of production, thereby creating the most serious obstacles to the development of large grain farms. Under the Soviet system, on the other hand, large grain farms, being at the same time state farms, do not at all require for their development either the maximum profit or the average profit, but can content themselves with a minimum profit (and sometimes do without any profit at all for a while), and this, coupled with the absence of absolute ground rent, creates exceptionally favorable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Lastly, whereas under capitalism there is no such thing as credit privileges or tax privileges for large grain farms, under the Soviet system, which is designed to give the utmost encouragement to socialist economy, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

All these and similar factors create under the Soviet system (as distinct from the capitalist system) very favorable conditions for promoting the development of state farms as large grain farms.

Finally, there is the question of the state farms and collective farms as strong points for strengthening the bond, as strong points for ensuring the leading role of the working class. We need collective farms and state farms not only in order to ensure our long-range aim of the socialist transformation of the countryside. We need collective farms and state farms also in order to have socialist economic strong points in the countryside at this moment, these points being necessary for strengthening the bond and for ensuring the leading role of the working class within the framework of the bond. Can we count at this very moment on being able to create and develop such strong points? I have no doubt that we can and should. Khlebotsentr reports that it has contracts with collective farms, artels and co-operatives, under which it is to receive from them 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 poods of grain. As to the state farms, the data show that this year our old and new state farms should provide another 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

If we add to that the 30,000,000-35,000,000 poods that the agricultural co-operatives should obtain from the individual peasant farms with which they have contractual arrangements, we shall have a full guarantee of over 100,000,000 poods of grain capable of serving as a definite reserve, at any rate in the home market. That, after all, is something.

There you have the first results given by our socialist economic strong points in the countryside.

And what follows from this? It follows that those comrades are mistaken who think that the working class is powerless in the matter of defending its socialist positions in the countryside, that only one thing remains for it to do, namely, endlessly to retreat and continuously to surrender its positions to the capitalist elements. No, comrades, which is not true. The working class is not so weak in the countryside as might appear to a superficial observer. That cheerless philosophy has nothing in common with Bolshevism. The working class has quite a number of economic strong points in the countryside, in the shape of state farms, collective farms, and supply and marketing co-operatives, relying on which it can strengthen the bond with the countryside, isolate the kulak, and ensure its leadership. The working class, lastly, has a number of political strong points in the countryside, in the shape of the Soviets, in the shape of the organized poor peasants, and so on, relying on which it can strengthen its positions in the countryside.

Relying on these economic and political bases in the countryside and utilizing all the means and resources (key positions, etc.) at the disposal of the proletarian dictatorship, the Party and the Soviet Government can confidently carry on the work of the socialist transformation of the countryside, step by step strengthening the alliance of the working class and peasantry, and step by step strengthening the leadership of the working class within that alliance.

Particular attention in this connection should be paid to the work among the poor peasants. It must be taken as a rule that, the better and more effective our work among the poor peasants is, the greater will be the prestige of the Soviet Government in the countryside, and, on the contrary, the worse our relations with the poor peasants are, the lower will be the prestige of the Soviet Government.

We often speak of the alliance with the middle peasants. But in our conditions in order to strengthen this alliance a determined struggle must be waged against the kulaks, against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was therefore quite right when it issued the slogan of intensifying the offensive against the kulaks. But can a successful struggle be waged against the kulaks if work among the poor peasants is not intensified, if the poor peasants are not roused against the kulaks, if systematic aid is not rendered the poor peasants? Obviously not! The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If our relations with the poor peasants are bad, if the poor peasants are not yet an organized support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is strong, and the middle peasant swings towards the kulak. And on the contrary: if our relations with the poor peasants are good, if the poor peasants are an organized support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is in a state of siege, and the middle peasant swings towards the working class.

That is why I think that it is one of the most vital immediate tasks of our Party to intensify the work among the poor peasants, to organize the rendering of systematic assistance to the poor peasants, and, lastly, to turn the poor peasants themselves into an organized support of the working class in the countryside.