Ukrainian lands on the eve of the First World War
(Not a Marxist Leninist, definitely not a Stalinist - a Historian academician)
Ukrainian lands of the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary on the eve of the First World War: features of the demographic and political situation
The first general census of the population of 1897 contained a clause on the native language and religion, it is this information that modern science uses to draw conclusions about the ethnic composition of the population of the Russian Empire...93% of all Ukrainians/Little Russians belonged to the peasant class, while among the urban population the last accounted for only 30%. At the same time, the smaller the city was, the higher was the percentage of the Ukrainian population in it: in cities with a population of 2,000 to 15,000, Ukrainians made up about 50% of the population, while in large cities (over 100,000) - only 17%. The Russian population lived mainly in the cities (34%), where, together with the Jews (27%), they made up the majority of the population.
Another feature was the disproportionate settlement in the regions of Ukraine (within its modern borders) of representatives of various nationalities. As a rule, Ukrainians lived in the provinces least affected by industrialization and urbanization, while half of the Russian population lived in industrialized areas, developed regions (Ekaterinoslav, Tauride, Kherson, Kharkov, Kiev). At the same time, it should be taken into account that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie did not achieve any significant development (with some exceptions - for example, the family of the Minister of Foreign Affairs M.I. Tereshchenko, known for their sugar factories), and the Ukrainian intelligentsia was mainly rural: according to 1897 city, three-quarters of Ukrainians, by their profession connected with intellectual work, lived in rural areas. By the end of the nineteenth century. Ukrainians were represented by occupation as follows: public administration, court, police, humanitarian professions - about 31%, military service - 30.5%, trade and commerce - 13%, industry, construction, transport - 37%, daily workers and servants - 52% and, about finally, agriculture - 85%.
Indeed, for the Ukrainian peasantry the national question was of less importance than the agrarian question. And among the urban population, Russian culture prevailed (and among workers, and among employees, and among the upper strata of society).
The national idea found support mainly among the intelligentsia (meaning that part of it that felt Ukrainian, because in Ukraine the intelligentsia was mostly Russian). The number of Ukrainian intelligentsias remained small. B. Kravchenko explains this by the fact that the Ukrainian the intelligentsia was replenished mainly by immigrants from the peasants, although its first generation was mainly formed from the ranks of the petty nobility. The predominance of the small peasantry in Ukraine, coupled with Russian-language education system led to the fact that "Ukrainian the intelligentsia constituted a tiny section of the population. In 1897, only 16% of lawyers, less than a quarter of teachers, 10% of writers and artists were Ukrainians. According to the census conducted in Kyiv in 1917, only 11% students considered themselves Ukrainians by nationality.
The difficult domestic and foreign political situation in Russia during the First World War, and then the revolution and civil war, led to an aggravation of social and national problems. Over time, the "Ukrainian idea" gained more and more popularity and was used by various political forces to achieve their own goals - first of all, the creation of a Ukrainian national state entity....
After the revolutionary events of February-March 1917, the Ukrainian national idea gained significant popularity. Thus, in the elections to local self-government held in Ukraine in the summer of 1917, the position of the Ukrainian parties was not yet very stable. Only in 5 out of 20 randomly chosen points did the Ukrainian parties achieve an advantage (Mirgorod, Konotop, Elizavetgrad, Romny, Lokhvitsa) and in five more (Kharkov, Poltava, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Proskurov) they won a third of the votes. In Kiev, Ukrainian parties won only 20% of seats, in Yekaterinoslav - 10%, in Odessa - 4%. At the same time, at the end of November - beginning of December 1917, as the elections to the Constituent Assembly showed, the Ukrainian Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries achieved a clear majority and won 75% of the votes.
The success of nationally minded political forces in conditions of social tension is not surprising. Dreaming of land and peace, the Ukrainian peasantry became disillusioned with the Provisional Government, which delayed the solution of the agrarian problem and continued the war. Therefore, the national idea began to find more and more support both in the city and in the countryside. In rural areas, the peasantry was ready to believe the promises of Ukrainian politicians. In the cities, as the Italian specialist in Soviet history A. Graziosi points out, there was a stratum of the population "who, together with the rural intelligentsia, stood at the head of the nationalist movement" - petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, as well as part of the troops stationed in cities.
However, if we talk about the Ukrainian city, then it should be taken into account that after the October events, a stream of refugees poured in from the north, seeking protection from the Bolsheviks...In Ukraine, the landowners sought protection from the Bolsheviks. In addition, the population of Ukrainian cities was constantly replenished by Jewish families who sought refuge from pogroms. This circumstance further deepened the difference in the national image of the village and the city in Ukraine. Thus, in Kyiv, the population increased from 468 thousand people in 1917 to 544 thousand in 1919, the percentage of the Jewish population increased from 18% to 28%. The number of the Ukrainian population first went up, and then began to fall, and in 1920 it was only 14%. A. Graziosi even concludes that “Ukrainian nationalism could not take deep roots in cities with such composition”
In addition, contemporaries note rather strong pro-Russian sentiments in the south and east of Ukraine. So, one of the representatives of the command of the Austrian army at the Ukrainian Central Rada, Major General Waldsteten reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna on May 16, 1918:
“There is no Ukrainian national thought, at least in southern Ukraine. Everyone lives, thinks, and speaks Russian. Nobody understands Ukrainian.
The main intelligentsia - not excluding its Jewish part - is for an alliance with Russia". "However," the Austrian major general further reported, "it seems to me that the union between Ukraine and Russia will sooner or later come again". Waldsteten explains this by the fact that between Ukraine and Russia has a lot in common - "language, religion, economy".
There was a considerable amount of truth in the statements of the Austrian general. Indeed, before the revolution, the dominant role was played by the liberal-democratic wing of the intelligentsia, focused primarily on national-cultural autonomy for Ukraine.
Although the main political parties in Ukraine put forward the demand for national-territorial autonomy as a perspective, until 1917 they did not play a leading role. Only after the February events, the well-known Ukrainian scientist and politician, who headed the Central Rada, M.S. Grushevsky insisted on the need to move from cultural and educational requirements to political ones, i.e. to the slogan of national territorial autonomy of Ukraine within federal Russia. And only under the influence of the turbulent events of the war and revolutions, especially October 1917, the political alignment has changed significantly. The weakness of the liberal center was compensated for by the strengthening of left-radical tendencies. As already mentioned, in 1917 the positions of the Ukrainian national parties, which often had a socialist coloring, strengthened. Thus, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist- Federalists were represented in the Central Rada, created after the February Revolution. In the future, under the influence of the revolution and the civil war, these parties experienced splits and transformations more than once.
The Bolsheviks took advantage of this situation and gradually replaced the term "Little Russian" with "Ukrainian". The Bolsheviks began to talk about Ukrainians and Ukraine long before October 1917, the term began to take root in the Bolshevik vocabulary after the intensification of the Ukrainian movement in the revolutionary period of 1905-1907, after the “Ukrainian question” began to attract the attention of the State Duma.
If it was about the parties, then, of course, the term "Ukrainian" was used in accordance with their names. For example, in the speech of V.I. Lenin on the issue of practical agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, delivered at the III Congress of the RSDLP on April 12-27 (April 25-May 10), 1905, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, Ukrainian socialist party. Mention of Ukrainian political parties have become commonplace. For example, in the work “The first results of the political grouping”, published in October 1905, mention was made of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, etc.
However, when it came to the population, the Bolshevik leader was in no hurry to use the name "Ukrainians" for the time being. For example, in a leaflet written by Lenin and printed on November 23, 1906
"Whom to elect to the State Duma?" RSDLP positioned itself as "a party of conscious workers of all nationalities of Russia, Russians, Latvians, Poles, Jews, Little Russians, Armenians, Georgians, Tatars, etc. .
But a year later, in the work written by Lenin in November-December 1907, “The Agrarian Program of the Social-Democrats in the first Russian revolution” it was already about Ukrainians:
“Of the representatives of non-Russian nationalities in the Duma, Poles, Belarusians, Latvians and Estonians spoke out on the agrarian question, Lithuanians, Tatars, Armenians, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, Ukrainians."
It should be recognized that such a transition from “Little Russians” to “Ukrainians” was not accidental: it was due to the Bolsheviks’ intention to use the national question (and the Ukrainian national movement, in particular) to their advantage to destroy the Russian Empire. Indeed, during the period of the "first Russian revolution" there was a revival of the activities of national parties that put forward various options for solving national problems. The State Duma of the 1st and 2nd convocations has repeatedly addressed the problems of non-Russian peoples. During the discussion, questions were raised about the reform in the field of education, about solving the agrarian issue, etc.
After 1907, the national question continued to play a prominent role in the socio-political life of the Russian Empire, and if the Bolsheviks initially paid much attention to the Polish, Jewish question, relations with workers' organizations in the Baltics and the Caucasus, later in the works of the Bolshevik leaders Ukrainians began to be mentioned increasingly often. In the work of I.V. Stalin “Marxism and the National Question” (written in January, published in March-May 1913), it was about the “awakened to independent life” nations, among which the Ukrainians were named:
“While in the West, nations developed into states, in the East there were international states, states consisting of several nationalities. These are Austria-Hungary, Russia. ... This peculiar way of forming states could take place only under the conditions of feudalism that had not yet been liquidated, under the conditions of underdeveloped capitalism, when the nationalities relegated to the background had not yet had time to consolidate economically into integral nations. But capitalism is beginning to develop in the Eastern states as well...But the ousted nations that have awakened to independent life no longer form into independent nation-states: on their way they encounter strong opposition from the leading strata of the commanding nations, who have long since become heads of state. They were late! This is how the Czechs, Poles, etc., are formed in the nation. in Austria; Croats, etc. in Hungary; Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. in Russia”.
Thus, the Ukrainians (not the Little Russians) were recognized as an independent nation, separate from the Great Russians. The term "Ukrainian", according to the logic of the Bolsheviks, should have been associated with the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national equality (and this slogan was supported by the Bolsheviks), and the term "Little Russian" - with the policy of the tsarist government. For example, on December 4, 1913, Lenin's article "The Poverty of Public Teachers" was published, which dealt with the first volume of the "One-Day Census of Primary Schools in the Empire" published by the Ministry of Public Education. Lenin argued:
“As a result, for example, on the question of the native language of students, there is only a general column about the “Russian” language: the division into Belarusian, Little Russian (Ukrainian) and Great Russian is clearly prohibited.”
A few days later, on December 14, 1913, the article "The national composition of students in the Russian school" appeared.
Ukrainian (“Little Russian”, according to the official name) ". It should be recognized that the article touched on a difficult issue. During the 19th century - the beginning of the 20th century, a fierce debate was conducted in Russian literary and scientific journalism about the status of the Little Russian language, about the possibilities of its use in the educational and cultural spheres, and church life.
Lenin sided with the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, which concluded in 1905:
“The Little Russian population should have the same right as the Great Russian population to speak publicly and print in their own language."
In 1917, the Bolsheviks spoke increasingly actively about the Ukrainians and Ukraine. For example, in the article "Ukraine" written in connection with the adoption of the universal of the Central Rada in June 1917, Lenin argued:
"No democrat can also deny the right of Ukraine to free secession from Russia: it is the unconditional recognition of this right that alone makes it possible to agitate for the free union of Ukrainians and Great Russians, for the voluntary union of two peoples into one state. ... Damned tsarism turned the Great Russians into the executioners of the Ukrainian people, in every conceivable way nurtured in its hatred for those who forbade even Ukrainian children to speak and study in their native language.
The positions of the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine were not very strong at first. By August 1917, it had a little over 22.5 thousand members in Ukrainian lands, two-thirds of which were in the Donbass. At the same time, only about 16% of their total number worked in the countryside. Perhaps that is why, in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks managed to collect only 10% of the Ukrainian votes of voters, while the Ukrainian Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries - 75%.
It should be noted that before the revolution there was no territorial Ukrainian Bolshevik organization. The CP(b)U was formed only in July 1918: the urgent need for its existence became felt only after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918.
Having gained power, the Bolsheviks removed the ethnonym “Little Russian” from official circulation and replaced it with “Ukrainian”. The Bolshevik leadership convinced both ordinary party members and the population as a whole of the existence of Ukrainians as an independent, separate from the Russian people. The Bolsheviks were not talking about Little Russians as part of the Russian people, but about Ukrainians, who are an independent nation, which corresponded to the national slogans of the RSDLP (b).
As is known, the Bolsheviks needed the slogan of self-determination of nations, up to secession and the formation of an independent state, mainly at the stage of the destruction of the autocracy. One should agree with the conclusion of A.I. Widow that "the proletarian state, replacing the bourgeois and pre-bourgeois", Marxist-Leninists saw, first of all, "a single and indivisible republic." “Such a vision determined their negative attitude towards the dismemberment of Russia and any weakening of centralism by dispersing power over the federal and autonomous parts of the state,” the historian writes, “and if it allowed it, then only in certain cases: if it was impossible to do without federation as forms of transition “to a completely unified the state."
The general democratic demand for “the right to self-determination belongs to all nations that make up the state”, formulated as early as the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP in 1903, was an important tactical step of the Bolsheviks, which to a large extent determined their success in the domestic political struggle. The party program proclaimed the equality of citizens regardless of gender, religion, race and nationality, stipulated the right to receive education in this language, use it in meetings, and even the right to introduce it along with the state language in all institutions.
The Bolsheviks supplemented the principle of the right of nations to self-determination with a provision on self-determination up to the state branch. In his work On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Lenin stressed that "recognition of the right to secession reduces the danger of the 'disintegration of the state'". Self-determination was considered by Lenin as a forced measure and a prerequisite for the subsequent transition to a centralized unitary democratic state of the socialist type:
“... We stand for the right to secession in view of the Black Hundred Great Russian nationalism, which so ruined the cause of national cohabitation that sometimes more communication is obtained after secession!! The right to self-determination is an exception to our general premise of centralism.”
At a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP with party workers on September 23 - October 1, 1913 in Poronin near Krakow, the Bolsheviks' adherence to the principle of the right of nations to self-determination up to state secession was once again confirmed, since
“this is required both by the basic principles of international democracy in general and in particular unheard of national oppression of the majority of the population Russia by the tsarist monarchy".
At the same time, the resolution contained a call not to confuse the question of the right to self-determination (“that is, the provision of a completely free and democratic way of resolving the issue of secession by the constitution of the state”) with the question of the expediency of secession of a particular nation.
“This last question of the Social-Democrats the party must decide in each individual case completely independently from the point of view of the interests of the entire social development and the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism,” the resolution said.
In the same year, “Critical Notes on the National Question” appeared, in which Lenin emphasized:
“A centralized large state is a huge historical step forward from medieval fragmentation to the future socialist unity of the whole world, and otherwise than through such a state ... there is and cannot be the way to socialism". At the same time, it was about democratic centralism, which “not only does not exclude local self-government with the autonomy of regions that differ in special economic and living conditions, a special national composition of the population, etc., but, on the contrary, necessarily requires both”.
In a letter to S.G. To Shaumyan on December 6, 1913, Lenin spoke out more sharply:
“We are against federation in principle - it weakens economic ties; it is an unsuitable type for one state.... We are for autonomy for all parts, we are for the right to secession (and not for the secession of all!) autonomy is our plan for the organization of a democratic state. Separation is not our plan at all. We do not preach secession at all. In general, we are against secession. But we stand for the right to secession in view of Great Russian Black-Hundred nationalism, which has so ruined the cause of national cohabitation that sometimes more ties are obtained after free secession!! The right to self-determination is an exception to our common general premise of centralism".
The Bolsheviks constantly reminded of the need to join forces in the struggle against capitalism. In the article “Against Federalism” published in Pravda on March 28, 1917, Stalin sharply criticized the idea of creating a federal state from Russia (meaning the article “Russia is a union of regions”, published in No. 5 of the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper “Dela Naroda”). Stalin emphasized that
“in America, as in Canada and Switzerland, development went from independent regions through their federation to a unitary state, that the trend of development is not in favor of the federation, but against it. Federation is a transitional form.
In his opinion,
"the development of capitalism in its highest forms and the expansion of the boundaries of the economic territory associated with it with its centralizing tendencies require not a federal, but a unitary form of state life."
Stalin listed the territories that “it is customary in Russia to call regions in need of, say, autonomy”: Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Siberia, Turkestan, etc. and proposed to grant “the right to secession to those nations inhabiting certain regions of Russia that cannot, do not want to remain within the framework of the whole", and at the same time - political autonomy "within the framework of a single (merged) state with uniform norms of the constitution for areas that differ in a certain national composition and remain within the framework of the whole".
Such a contradiction between the desired and the possible, i.e. between the ideal - a centralized state - and the right to self-determination up to secession, is very characteristic of Bolshevik thought, including during the revolutionary period. It is noteworthy that at about the same time that Stalin's article came out, Lenin wrote the pamphlet The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution (April 1917). Bolshevik leader advocated
"the proclamation and immediate implementation of complete freedom to secede from Russia of all nations and nationalities oppressed by tsarism", while emphasizing at the same time that "the proletarian party strives to create the largest possible state", and this goal must be achieved by "a free, fraternal union of workers and working masses of all nations.
Great attention was also paid to the national question at the April 1917 conference of the RSDLP. Stalin, in his report on the national question, emphasized his adherence to the right of nations to self-determination, but separated the right to secession from the obligation to secession. G.L. Pyatakov made a co-report in which he regarded the right of nations to self-determination only as "just a phrase, without any real content." He proposed considering the national question on the basis that the victory of the socialist revolution is possible only simultaneously throughout the world or in most countries; therefore, from the economic point of view, the independence of nations is an obsolete, obsolete phenomenon. In this regard, Pyatakov proposed to fight for socialism under the slogan "Away with the borders!". “We must, first of all, establish the principle that we are against separatist movements, against the slogan of nation-states and are fighting against such movements,” Pyatakov said. - If this is so, then the “right of nations to self-determination” loses its real ground under its feet. ... All Social Democrats are waging a definite struggle against the forcible retention of nations within the boundaries of the Russian state, but this does not mean that if we are waging such a struggle, then we see in the right of nations to self-determination is a positive slogan".
Pyatakov's position was shared by other participants in the conference. Lenin had to sharply oppose this project:
“We stand for the necessity of the state,” said the leader of the Bolsheviks, “and the state presupposes borders ... What does “away with borders” mean? Anarchy begins here...”.
Lenin criticized the "revolutionary impatience" of his party comrades, pointing out the need to reckon with the difficult internal political situation in the country. He explained his position as follows:
“Why should we, the Great Russians, who oppress more nations than any other people, refuse to recognize the right to secession of Poland, Ukraine, Finland?”. He declared: “We want a fraternal union of all peoples. If there is a Ukrainian Republic and a Russian Republic, there will be more ties between them, more trust. If the Ukrainians see that we have a Soviet republic, they will not secede, but if we have a Milyukov republic, they will secede.
In the adopted resolution, all the nations that are part of Russia recognized "the right to free secession and to education independent state". However, the question of the right of nations to free secession "must not be confused with the question of the expediency of secession of this or that nation at one time or another", such questions had to be decided in each individual case and taking into account the interests of "social development and the interests of the class struggle, the interests of the class struggle proletariat for socialism. At the same time, “cultural-national autonomy” was rejected, but the idea of “broad regional autonomy, the abolition of supervision from above, the abolition of the mandatory state language and the determination of the boundaries of self-governing and autonomous regions on the basis of the consideration by the local population of economic and living conditions, national composition of the population, etc.”.
On the eve of the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, another article by Lenin “On the revision of the party program” was published, in which it was still asserted that the party was obliged to recognize the right to secession, and the Bolsheviks would recognize this right “both for Finland, and for Ukraine, and for Armenia". But at the same time, the Bolsheviks and their leader admitted:
“But we, for our part, do not want secession at all. We want the largest possible state, the closest possible union, the largest possible number of nations living in the neighborhood of the Great Russians...”
What exactly the future state will be, the Bolshevik leadership did not have an unambiguous vision. Obviously, when declaring the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin emphasized in every possible way that "secession is not at all our plan." Despite the commitment to a large state, the program documents did not talk about a unitary state, but about a close union of fraternal peoples. Moreover, in The State and Revolution, written in August-September 1917, Lenin again turned to the issue of federation:
“Engels, like Marx, defends from the point of view of the proletariat and the proletarian revolution, democratic centralism, a single and indivisible republic. He considers the federal republic either as an exception and a hindrance to development, or as a transition from a monarchy to a centralist republic, as a "step forward" under certain special conditions.
Thus, despite the unfavorable attitude towards the federal structure of the state, Lenin by no means completely ruled out the possibility of its use under certain conditions and at a certain stage, which was shown by subsequent events.
Immediately after coming to power, the Bolsheviks emphasized the immutability of the principles of their national policy. At the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October 25-27, 1917, it was announced that the Soviet government “will ensure to all the nations inhabiting Russia the true right to self-determination. On January 12 (25), 1918, at the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the “Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People” was adopted, which fixed the principles of free development and equality of peoples: equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia, the right of peoples to free self-determination, up to secession and the formation of an independent state, the abolition of national and national-religious privileges and restrictions. Point two proclaimed:
"The Soviet Russian Republic is being established on the basis of a free union of free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics. "
A somewhat different situation developed on the lands with the East Slavic population, which turned out to be after the divisions of the Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century. within the Austrian monarchy. That part of the population, which will later be called Ukrainian, lived in three provinces in the Austrian part of the monarchy - the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (Galicia), Bukovina - and in Ugric Rus, which was part of the Hungarian part of the monarchy.
Various names were used to designate the local population. During the period of Habsburg rule, the concepts of “Rusyns” (Russen) or “Ruthenians” (Ruthenen) were used at the official level. As a self-name, the names "Rusyns", "Russian people", "Rusnaks" were used. Confessional names were also common (for example, "Greek Catholics"). The leaders of the Ukrainian movement insisted on using the name of the Ukrainian-Russian people, and then - the Ukrainian people. According to experts, “the diversity and inconsistency of ethnonyms suggests that the process of formation of national identity East Slavic population in the region in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries was far from complete. "
Within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the proportion of Rusyns/Ukrainians 65 reached 8.5% on the eve of the First World War (in the Kingdom of Hungary - 2.4%). For comparison: the proportion of the Little Russian population in the Russian Empire by 1917 was 18.1%. Rusyns prevailed in all districts of Eastern Galicia, only in Lvov they amounted to 37.1% by 1910 (actually in Lvov in 1910 - 19.1%). In Bukovina, the share of Rusyns at the beginning of the 20th century was 38.1% of the population; in Transcarpathia, on the lands inhabited by Rusyns, their share in 1910 was 15.7% .
At the same time, it should be taken into account that the composition of the population of these regions was heterogeneous. Not only the East Slavic population lived here, but also Poles, Jews, and others. So, at the end of the 19th century in fifty cities and towns of Eastern Galicia, Poles accounted for 64%, Rusyns - 23.4%. In large cities with a population of over twenty thousand people, Poles made up 72.5% of the population, Rusyns - 13.6%. In rural areas, Poles made up only 26%. The Jewish population was also significant. In Eastern Galicia, Jews accounted for 12.8% of the population (in Western Galicia - 7.7%). In 1900, Jews accounted for over 30% of the population of the cities of Galicia, in Eastern Galicia they accounted for almost 40% of industrial workers, 74% of merchants, 27% of employees, 49.3% intelligentsia.
At the beginning of the 20th century in Bukovina, the Ruthenian population was the majority in the northern provinces. Another large group of the indigenous population of Bukovina were Romanians (34.4%). Jews were the third largest ethnic group, at the turn of the century they accounted for almost 13% of the total population, and in Chernivtsi - up to 20 %. At the same time, the East Slavic population of Galicia and Hungary was predominantly Greek Catholic, Bukovina - Orthodox.
In Transcarpathia, on the lands inhabited by Rusyns, their share in 1910 amounted to 15.7% of the population. At the same time, the Ukrainian population by occupation was distributed among comitats as follows: in Uzh (Unga) farmers reached 88.7% of the Ukrainian population, artisans - 4.5%, merchants - 0.2%; in Bereg - respectively 88.8%, 3.9%, 0.3%; in Maramorosh - 89.2%, 4.7%, 0.9%. Thus, in general, it must be emphasized that the East Slavic population on the territory of the Austrian Hungary lived in the least industrialized areas; the main occupation of the population was agriculture.
Exploring the ethnic processes among the Ukrainian population, the well-known domestic specialist V.M. Kabuzan singled out the territories of the absolute predominance of Ukrainians (“which can be considered Ukrainian ethnic territory”) - Right-Bank Ukraine, the eastern part of Galicia, the territory of the Hetmanate, without the northern part Chernihiv region.
According to the famous Canadian scientist P.R. Magochs, the Habsburg rulers, did not identify themselves with any nationality of the empire, and Ukrainians could exist among the accepted structure of the hierarchy of various loyalties without giving up their own national identity: a Galician or Bukovinian could be both a Ukrainian national patriot and a loyal subject of the Austrian Empire. Therefore, the absolute majority of Ukrainian leaders remained loyal to the idea of the Habsburg Empire until last months of the First World War.
Among the East Slavic population of these regions, national ideas developed in two directions: it was either about defending their commonality with the Russian people (Russophiles) or ascertaining their belonging to an independent Ukrainian people (Ukrainophiles). Russophiles spoke of a single Russian world, a common Russian cultural and historical space, part of which are the Russian lands of Austria-Hungary. The leaders of the Ukrainian movement talked about the Ukrainian lands of Austria-Hungary as part of the conciliar Ukraine
In Austria-Hungary, the Ukrainian movement became more widespread than in the Russian Empire, whose authorities sought to prevent the development of the Ukrainian movement. The border prevented the unification of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian and Austrian empires. In addition, Marxist and socialist ideas were greatly developed, so part of the youth, which under other conditions could be a potential force in the Ukrainian movement, was involved in Russian revolutionary organizations. The perception of the Little Russians as part of the Russian people also played an important role, and the cultural specificity of Little Russia was quite acceptable in the eyes of the supporters of the concept of the “big Russian nation”, while, as A.I. Miller, was not in conflict with this concept.
In Austria-Hungary, the Ukrainian movement developed especially actively in Eastern Galicia, and by the beginning of the First World War and during it, it began to occupy a leading position in social and political life. Ukrainian political parties operated here; the leaders of the Ukrainian movement had experience in parliamentary struggle (in 1913 a single Ukrainian club was created in the Galician Seim). In addition, much attention was paid to science and education: the Scientific Society named after A.I. Shevchenko, the department of Ukrainian history was created at Lviv University (1892) and there was a struggle for the creation of a Ukrainian university. To work with the general population of Eastern Galicia, educational societies (Prosvita and others), youth societies (Sokol and Sich), economic organizations (the Dniester Insurance Company, Regional Credit Union, etc.) . With the outbreak of the First World War, the Ukrainian movement received a new impetus. On August 1, 1914, the Ukrainian parties of Eastern Galicia (national-democratic, radical and social-democratic) founded an inter-party organization in Lviv - the Main Ukrainian Council (Golovna Ukrainian Rada), which was supposed to direct all-Ukrainian political actions during the war. On August 4, the Council approved the decision to start the formation of a legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen.
In other regions of Austria-Hungary, the Ukrainian national movement reached a much smaller scale than in Eastern Galicia. However, the national movement of the East Slavic population also developed there. So, in Bukovina, a cultural partnership "Russian conversation" ("Ruska Besida") was created, the "Russian School" ("Ruska School") and the "Russian People's House" were also actively working, the political partnership "Russian Rada (Ruska Rada); youth student organizations were created (for example, "Union", "Young Ukraine", etc.), sports organizations ("Ukrainian Sokol in Chernivtsi", etc.), Ukrainian departments existed at the university in Chernivtsi, and at the beginning of the 20th century in Bukovina the first Ukrainian political parties were born.
The undoubted successes of the Ukrainian movement of the late XIX - early XX centuries. do not cancel the fact that Russophile ideas also found their supporters. Russophilism had a stable position among the Ruthenian intelligentsia in Galicia, and Bukovina, and especially Ugric Rus, among which the ideas that the Rusyns belonged to a single Russian tribe were popular. At the same time, the intensive Magyarization, which intensified after the transformation of the Austrian Empire into Austria-Hungary in 1867, as well as the efforts of the Hungarian authorities to weaken Russophile views, which led to the appearance at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. supporters of the development of a literary language based on local dialects, led to a significant weakening of national movements among the Ruthenian population. This situation continued for the most part until the end of the First World War.
The Ukrainian movement towards the beginning of the First World War was represented by political forces that saw the future of Ukraine in different ways. During World War I and the revolution, the Ukrainian movement radicalized, gradually moving from autonomist and federalist plans to attempts to establish an independent Ukrainian state. It should be recognized that one of the slogans of the Ukrainian movement was the unity of Ukraine, i.e. the creation of a state body that would include all ethnographic lands both in Russia and in Austria-Hungary. At the same time, the Ukrainian issue attracted the attention of various political forces, not only Russian, but also Polish, Czech, Romanian leaders, whose plans for building nation-states usually did not coincide with the plans of Ukrainians.
During the formation of the Polish state, two major political forces stood out, differing in their different approaches to the problem of Polish-Ukrainian relations.
The leader of the National Democrats was Roman Dmovsky (1864-1939). He was not limited to the restoration of Polish statehood within its ethnographic borders. He considered the “Eastern kresy” as an integral part of the Polish state, since they were “a historical field of our national expansion, where Polish culture has reached great heights over several centuries...". Pointing to the civilizational role of the Poles, Dmowski believed that the future Polish state "has the right to go beyond the Polish ethnographic limits to such an extent as to meet the values of historical Poland and realize the civilizational potential of a large nation." In his concept of national policy, Dmovsky proceeded from the fact that the peoples of the “Kreses” are “ethnographic material” that is not capable of independent political existence, and therefore are subject to assimilation.
R. Dmowski did not support the idea of a federal Poland. According to him the division of Poland into autonomous parts is inexpedient, since the federation, in his opinion, is a weakness, not a strength, and the creation of a strong state presupposes its unitary mono-ethnic character. At the same time, he was aware that the idea of the revival Poland within the borders in 1772 was practically impossible and geographic nonsense. The plan of the Endeks was incorporative: Dmovsky's supporters called for the incorporation of such Ukrainian lands as Eastern Galicia, Volhynia and Podolia, and subsequently - to Polonize them, turning Poland into a mono-ethnic state. Other Ukrainian lands, according to the Endeks, were to go to Russia, in which they saw a counterbalance to German hegemonism. The Endeks were supporters of national assimilation: their ideology was based on the recognition of the viability of only ethnically "pure" states. In the political sphere, they advocated the creation of a Polish majority in the Sejm and purely Polish governments.
In contrast to the ideas of Dmowski, the supporters of Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935) intended to create a large and strong Poland in Eastern Europe, reviving it on a federal basis. Piłsudski's plan is often referred to as federalist. Like Dmowski, Piłsudski also hoped to include part of the former territories of the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into the Polish state. Thus, Pilsudski's supporters considered Eastern Galicia to be the original Polish land and advocated its integration into the future Polish state.
In theoretical terms, based on the ideas of his colleague Leon Wasilewski (1870-1936), Pilsudski proclaimed the possibility of creating a kind of Lithuanian-Belarusian state connected with Poland by federal relations until the moment of the real struggle for the borders of the revived Poland. On the Ukrainian lands, formerly part of the Russian Empire, he also theoretically offered to help create a Ukrainian national state allied with Poland and independent of Russia. The federal project was directed against Russia, which Piłsudski considered Poland's mortal enemy. The Polish state, according to Piłsudski, is an obstacle to Russia's great power plans. If, however, Russia is allowed to take possession of the Ukrainian lands, then its next step will be an attack on Poland. Consequently, it was necessary to paralyze the forces of Russia and fence off Ukraine from it.
The issue of the eastern borders of Poland was the most important point in the political strategy of Pilsudski, who logically assumed that if the western borders of the Commonwealth were determined by the arbitration of the Entente powers, then in the eastern direction everything would be decided by the method of fait accompli for the strongest player.
Despite the fact that history ascribes to him the authorship of the federal concept, Piłsudski never clearly formulated it, approaching it, in essence, very instrumentally. In a letter to Leon Vasilevsky, he wrote: “You know, my views in this regard are that I do not want to be either an imperialist or a federalist until I have the opportunity to speak in these matters with some kind of seriousness - well, a revolver in my pocket. In connection with the fact that in God's world, chatter about the brotherhood of people and peoples and the American doctrine, apparently, are beginning to win, I am inclined to the side federalists".
Thus, the plans of the most influential Polish politicians did not intend to limit the territory of the future Poland to Polish ethnic lands but included in it, part of the former regions of the First Rzeczpospolita. The creation of a large unified (conciliar) Ukrainian state was contrary to the interests of the Polish political elite, since in this case it would include lands with a mixed population, such as Eastern Galicia, where Poles lived along with Ukrainians. On the "kresy" in large cities, the Ukrainian population was in a clear minority, and in the countryside, the large landowners were mostly Poles.
During the formation of the nation state, Czech leaders perceived the Ukrainian problem mainly through the prism of foreign policy strategy or scientific interest in Slavic issues. So, T.G. Masaryk recognized the difference between Little Russians and Great Russians, the national and ethnographic unity of Little Russians and Ruthenians. He perceived the Ukrainian question not only as a language issue, but both political and cultural, linking his decision to the democratic transformations of Russia. Masaryk emphasized that on the question of “whether the Ukrainians are a separate nation or only a Russian tribe, whether the Little Russian (Ukrainian) language is a separate language, or a dialect of Russian,” experts do not give an unambiguous answer. He argued that “Ukrainians, even if their language were only a dialect, can be separated from Russians for economic, social and political reasons. Political independence is not only regulated by language. In the proclamation of the IV Universal by the Ukrainian Rada, he saw a manifestation of the anti-Russian policy of the Germans and Austrians.
The first president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had a negative attitude towards independent Ukraine, since this could weaken Russia - the main barrier to German expansion in Eastern Europe. “We recognized Ukraine when it proclaimed itself a state under the III Universal, but within the framework of federal Russia. We could accept this, based on the Czech and Slavic situation... We recognized Ukraine as part of Russia and thought that Ukraine would still be at war. But the IV Universal says that there will be no war, that there will be peace, and, in particular, with Austria-Hungary... Personally, I cannot recognize an independent Ukraine outside Russia as a legal and political entity. This strongly contradicts my opinion. Breaking Russia, in my opinion, is just working for Prussia,” he believed Masaryk.
After the formation of an independent state, the Czechoslovak leadership had a special relationship with Eastern Galicia. Czechoslovakia did not recognize Poland's claims to Eastern Galicia and even considered a project for the formation of a Western Ukrainian state, however, it never came to fruition.
Czech politicians initially did not have an unambiguous opinion about the inclusion of the territory of the Carpathian Ruthenians into the future state. So, in 1914 T.G. Masaryk wrote: “the inclusion within the Czech kingdom of some Russian minorities in this (near Uzhgorod) region would be desirable, as it would give rise to the proclamation of Russian, of course, literary, the official language along with the Czech, German and Polish languages. At the same time, in 1915, this was not discussed either in the Constitution of the Slavic Empire of K. Kramář, or in Masaryk's memorandums. Presented in March 1915 in Geneva, the map of the future Czechoslovak state included only a small part of the future Subcarpathian Rus. However, plans changed in 1918 against the backdrop of the destabilization of the situation in Russia and the intense activity of diplomats in developing plans for the post-war structure of Europe.
Interest in the Ukrainian problem was shown by Romanian politicians, whose radical part put forward the idea of "Greater Romania", which provided for the annexation of a significant number of adjacent lands through foreign policy maneuvers. This concept was based on state centralism, control over the public, and the fight against any manifestations of separatism. Questions of "Eastern policy" of Romania were developed by I. Nistor. His writings substantiated the "historical right" of Romania to Pokuttya, Bessarabia and all of Bukovina, formulated claims to Transnistria.
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