The Ukrainian movement and the Bolsheviks in 1918: from a federal union with Russia to an independent state

Borisenok Elena Yurievna

(Not a Marxist Leninist, definitely not a Stalinist - a Historian, academician)

In Ukraine in 1917-1920. events developed very dynamically. The power changed repeatedly and suddenly. On November 7 (20), 1917, the Central Rada proclaimed the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic in a federal union with Russia. 

Moreover, if the Provisional Government limited the competence of the Central Rada to five provinces - Volyn, Podolsk, Kyiv, Poltava and most of Chernihiv, then the UNR announced its claim also to Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Taurida (without Crimea), the southern parts of Kursk and Voronezh provinces.

Relations between the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks were far from ideal. November 22 (December 5), 1917 at the I All-Russian Congress of the Navy V.I. Lenin, assessing the events taking place in the country, emphasized the priority of the class principle in building Russian-Ukrainian relations. He declared that the Bolsheviks had “nothing to be afraid of” the disintegration of Russia into separate republics: 

“No matter how many independent republics there are, we will not be afraid of this. What is important for us is not where the state frontier lies, but that the alliance between the working people of all nations should be preserved for the struggle against the bourgeoisie of any nation. ...We will say to the Ukrainians: as Ukrainians, you can arrange your life as you want. But we will extend our fraternal hand to the Ukrainian workers and say to them: together with you we will fight against your and our bourgeoisie .. 

In a note on a direct wire, N.V. Krylenko November 24 (December 7), 1917 Lenin emphasized: 

“We believe that ... The Rada has clearly and decisively taken the side of the Kadet-Kornilov and Kaledin counterrevolutions. We are for Soviet power in the independent Ukrainian Republic, but not for counter revolutionary Kaledinsky Rada". 

The Council of People's Commissars, in its manifesto of December 3 (16), 1917, on the one hand, recognized the UNR and its right to secede from Russia or enter into an agreement with the Russian Republic, but on the other hand, accused the Central Rada of an ambiguous bourgeois policy towards the Soviets and the Soviet authorities (refusal to convene a regional congress of Ukrainian Soviets, disorganization of the front, disarmament of Soviet troops in Ukraine, etc.) “We accuse the Rada of the fact,” the document says, “that, hiding behind national phrases, it is pursuing an ambiguous bourgeois policy that has long is already expressed in the non-recognition by the Rada of Soviets and Soviet power in Ukraine ... ". 

It is obvious that the recognition of the Ukrainian people's right to national independence was linked to the Soviet nature of state education. The Council of People's Commissars did not want to recognize the Central Rada, since it was not elected by the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. 

On December 11-12, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was convened in Kharkov, the resolution of which stated: 

“In the conditions of modern bourgeois-capitalist society, based on the existence of classes with opposite interests and with an intensified struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the principle of the right of nations to self-determination becomes contradictory character, depending on who implements this principle: the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. The victory of the workers' and peasants' revolution and the decree of the Council of People's Commissars abolishes all forms of national oppression and inequality in Russia. In the Ukraine, however, the implementation of this principle has fallen into the hands of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois socialists, who, having proclaimed the Ukrainian Republic, are pursuing a petty-bourgeois policy in the interests of the bourgeoisie, not only Ukrainian, but also non-Ukrainian. ... Therefore, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, recognizing the Ukrainian Republic as a federal part of the Russian Republic, declares a decisive struggle against the policy of the Central Rada, which is harmful to the worker and peasant masses, revealing its bourgeois, counter-revolutionary character. The Congress will fight for the self-determination of Ukraine in the interests of the workers and peasants, for their domination, for the elimination of all national restrictions, all national enmity and hatred, for the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, based on the close solidarity of the working masses of Ukraine, based on the close solidarity of the working masses of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, with the working masses of all Russia.

At the congress, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks announced the transfer of power into their hands. Since the Central Rada did not agree with this decision, the confrontation soon took on armed forms. The Bolshevik troops launched an offensive and by mid-January   1918 seized power in almost the entire Right-Bank Ukraine.

However, it was very difficult for the Bolsheviks to retain power in Ukraine. The Central Rada proclaimed on January 11 (24), 1918 the independence of the UNR. Peace talks with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, which began in December 1917, gave the struggle for power in Ukraine a special urgency: the Bolsheviks, trying to prevent the signing of an agreement with the government of the UNR, tried to capture Kyiv. Soviet troops under the command of the Left Social Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov on January 26 (February 8), 1918 entered Kyiv, officially announcing the liquidation of the last centers of resistance and the capture of all government buildings at 10 pm. The Bolsheviks counted on the fact that if the Germans entered into a "fictitious agreement with the dead", then "you can't hide an awl in a bag." However, the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic was nevertheless concluded literally on the night of January 27 (February 9). German troops restored the power of the Central Rada in Ukraine.

Under these conditions, some regional organizations of the Bolsheviks attempted to create separate state entities on the territory claimed by the UNR. Already the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kharkov showed that there was no consensus on the organization of Soviet power in Ukraine. As the active Bolshevik E.B. Bosch, said; "the mood of the assembled comrades was extremely excited, nervous, talking, interrupting and not listening to each other, in a hurry to make a decision, and at the same time no one made definite proposals." Some delegates proposed to recognize the Central Rada, others believed that the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog region should join Russia, the Mensheviks called for the creation of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Autonomous region, independent of both Russia and the Ukrainian central government. Skrypnik proposed to include the Donetsk and Krivoy Rog regions into the South Russian Ukrainian Republic - part of the Russian Federation of Soviet Republics.

While the leaders of the UNR were signing an agreement with the Quadruple Union, at the IV Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which took place on January 27-30 (February 9-12), 1918 in Kharkov, the creation of the Donetsk Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was announced. Artem (F.A. Sergeev) became the head of the Council of People's Commissars of this republic.

Sharp debates flared up at the congress: what principle - economic or national - should be put in the basis of the organization of the republic. Supporters of the economic principle were Artem, S.F. Vasilchenko, V.G. Filov, M.N. Zhakov and others. They considered the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin to be economically self-sufficient, and therefore quite capable of becoming a separate republic. Skrypnik, a member of the Soviet government, opposed the creation of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic and its separation from Ukraine, believed that this meant undermining Soviet power and proposed declaring the Donetsk Basin an autonomous part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which is part of the Russian Federation. However, the majority of votes adopted a resolution submitted by Vasilchenko, which stated:

 “The Donetsk and Krivoy Rog basin, as an area that already at the moment has its own definite economic and economic physiognomy, should have its own bodies of economic and political self-government, the only authorities which organize the political, economic and cultural legal order of the Soviet Republic in the basin"

This decision testified to the desire to dissociate itself from the "nationalist Central Rada", to prevent the expansion of its influence on the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin after the signing of an agreement between the UNR and the countries of the Quadruple Union. However, such hopes did not come true, and the Austro-German troops began the occupation of the eastern territories of the UNR. In April 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic held a meeting of party, Soviet and military organizations, which identified measures for further strengthening the defense of the Donets Basin.

But despite the resistance, during the second half of April, an occupation regime was established on the territory of Donbass. The leader of the Bolsheviks paid great attention to the events in the Donbass: at the end of February, V.I. Lenin met with V.I. Mezhlaukom, in early March - with Artem. In a telegram to V.A. On February 28, Lenin pointed out to Antonov-Ovseenko:

 “I have nothing against the autonomy of the Don region. The geographic boundaries of this autonomy must be determined by agreement with the population of the adjacent Donets Basin strip and the autonomous republic." 

And on March 3, 1918, the secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) welcomed the emergence of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic with a special telegram. However, the fate of the revolution in this region in the face of the advance of the German and Austrian troops was in jeopardy, and the question arose of the need to ensure a united front against an external enemy. 

On March 14, Lenin, in his telegram to Ordzhonikidze, clearly expressed his attitude towards the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic: 

“As for the Donetsk Republic, tell comrades Vasilchenko, Zhakov and others that, no matter how they manage to separate their region from Ukraine, judging by the geography of Vinnichenko,  it will still be included in Ukraine and the Germans will conquer it. In view of this, it is absolutely absurd on the part of the Donetsk Republic to refuse a single defense front with the rest of Ukraine. Mezhlauk was in St. Petersburg, and he agreed to recognize the Donets Basin as an autonomous part of Ukraine; Artem also agrees with this; therefore, the stubbornness of a few comrades from the Donets Basin resembles an inexplicable and harmful whim, completely unacceptable in our party milieu. Push it all in, comrade Sergo, to the Crimean-Donetsk comrades and achieve the creation of a united defense front".

On March 15, under the leadership of Lenin, a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was held with the participation of members of the People's Secretariat V. Zatonsky and V. Shakhrai, as well as the head of the Council of People's Commissars of the DKR Artem. The question of the relationship between the Ukrainian Soviet government and the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic was discussed. 

The Central Committee decided: “The Donets Basin should be considered as part of Ukraine” and ordered all party workers to “work together to create a united front of defense”, to ensure the participation of soviets from all over Ukraine, including from the Donetsk Basin, in the II All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, at which it is necessary create one government for all Ukraine. Indeed, the Congress of Soviets, held March 17-19, 1918, in Yekaterinoslav, created a single government of Ukraine.

It should be recognized that for that time the formation of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic was not a unique phenomenon. Immediately after the establishment of Soviet power in Odessa, on January 17 (30), 1918, the Odessa Soviet Republic was proclaimed (mainly covering the Kherson province), which lasted until March 13. Odessa Council of People's Commissars headed by V.G. Yudovsky. In March-April 1918, there was the Soviet Socialist Republic of Taurida, which also declared its entry into the RSFSR. The emergence of such republics was the result of the federal construction course proclaimed by the Bolsheviks. Various state formations appeared on the ground, formed not only according to the national, but also according to territorial attribute. For example, there was Kaluga soviet republic. In the spring of 1918, the Terek Soviet Republic, the Tauride Socialist Republic, the Don Soviet Republic, the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic, and others were proclaimed. Such republics did not have a clear legal status, most of them ceased to exist either under the pressure of the White Guards, or as a result of intervention.

The formation of the Soviet federation had just begun. Despite the fact that the Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which was adopted in January 1918 by the third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, stated that "the Soviet Russian Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics", the question of principles of federation remained very relevant. The work of the Constitutional Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which began in April 1918, showed that there was no unity in determining the principles of the federation. Some defended the national a sign of building the RSFSR, others - economic. Thus, the legal scholar M.A. Reisner considered the defining feature to be economics, i.e. members of the federation must be economic units, and I.V. Stalin insisted that the regions, which have a special way of life and the national composition of the population, are at the same time integral economic territories and defended the national sign of building the RSFSR. 

Under these conditions, the emergence of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic reflected the desire of the local Bolsheviks to distance themselves from the “bourgeois” UNR, which entered into an alliance with the countries of the Quadruple Union, especially since the question of the principles for building the Soviet federation remained not fully resolved. Nevertheless, in difficult domestic and foreign political conditions, the Bolshevik leadership continued to support the slogan of the freedom of nations, their right to self-determination, based on the need to create a large Soviet Ukrainian republic, which included industrial areas in the east and south. It was the industrial regions with a proletarian population, which were the potential social base of the RSDLP (b), that were to become a support in Ukraine in a difficult international situation.

Soviet Russia was forced to sign a peace treaty with the allies (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey) on March 3 in Brest-Litovsk. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks recognized the independence of the UNR, although they considered this a forced measure, and the existence of an independent Ukraine was only the result of foreign policy circumstances, devoid of any internal justifications. Ukraine was occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian troops. At the end of April 1918, former lieutenant general of the Russian army P.P. came to power in Ukraine. Skoropadsky, proclaimed Hetman of the Ukrainian State.

In such a difficult socio-political situation, the policy of introducing the Ukrainian language into social and cultural life, the support of Ukrainian culture in the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian state, carried out by its various governments and being a symbol of the sovereignization process, attracted close attention from various public and political forces. Such a policy was called "Ukrainization", thus perceiving the term first introduced into circulation by M.S. Grushevsky .

The governments of the UNR and the Ukrainian State attached special importance to the status of the Ukrainian language, which was to become the language of legislation, administration, and the army. The main efforts of the "independent" authorities were aimed at introducing the Ukrainian language into the education system (at all levels - from elementary to higher), into the publishing process (publishing newspapers, magazines, books, especially educational literature, etc.), the development of Ukrainian theatrical and musical art, museum work, etc.

So, soon after the February Revolution, on March 18, 1917, the first Ukrainian gymnasium was opened. T.G. Shevchenko in Kyiv, which was funded by Ukrainian figures and societies. While the participants in the all-Ukrainian teachers' congresses, which took place in April and August 1917, made decisions on the Ukrainization of school education, the teachers' congresses at the provincial and district level were far from being so categorical, and the supporters of Ukrainization often found themselves in the minority. The Ministry of Public Education of the UNR in March 1918 came to the conclusion that "broad intentions regarding Ukrainization did not materialize".

Much attention was also paid to the language issue in the Hetman's Ukraine. On May 7, 1918, the Council of Ministers, considering the issue of the language of legal proceedings, decided to recognize that the Ukrainian language is the state language, and all institutions must switch to this language. The Ministry of Military Affairs decided to translate all official communication into the state (i.e. Ukrainian) language, and courses in Ukrainian studies were to be organized in institutions and units. The Ministry of Internal Affairs obliged employees of the post, telegraph, and telephone stations to use only the state language during the performance of their official duties. The Ministry of Railways also announced the need to remember that in the Ukrainian State the state language is Ukrainian.

The personnel problem was very acute. Skoropadsky recalled that a few days after the coup, representatives of Ukrainian parties came to him and declared their readiness to support the hetman if he agreed to the role of president of the republic. Skoropadsky considered this disastrous since the country could be saved only by dictatorial power. As a result, after the party coup socialist and national orientations became in opposition to the Hetman's regime, and Skoropadsky faced an acute personnel problem: 

“Ukrainians all say that I used Russian forces to create Ukraine,” the hetman wrote. - Yes, because it was impossible to create anything serious by Ukrainian forces alone. The truly cultured class of Ukrainians is very small. This is the misfortune of the Ukrainian people”.

The personal convictions of Skoropadsky and his entourage, on the one hand, and the "personnel shortage", on the other, determined the peculiarities of the Ukrainization during the period of the hetmanate. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education N.P. Vasilenko, a well-known scientist, a member of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party, emphasized that “no forcible Ukrainization can be out of the question”: “In my convictions, I am absolutely far from violent methods in the sphere of culture". Later, Skoropadsky wrote in his memoirs: the state language in Ukraine should be Ukrainian, but he had nothing against “that over time both languages, i.e. Russian and Ukrainian were equal." The fear of some Ukrainians that the Russian language will “overwrite” Ukrainian, the hetman argued, “shows a lack of faith in Ukraine.” Nevertheless, while "the situation with languages ​​is so acute", "the Ukrainian language will be alone".

However, much attention was paid to Ukrainization in the educational and cultural spheres. On July 22, 1918, the Hetman's Ministry of Education drew the attention of local authorities to the mandatory introduction of education in elementary school for the Ukrainian population in the Ukrainian language, and on August 29, the study of the Ukrainian language was introduced in schools where instruction was not in Ukrainian, i.e. for schools of national minorities. Finally, on August 1, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian State, Hetman Skoropadsky, established the compulsory study of the Ukrainian language and literature, history and geography of Ukraine in all secondary general education and vocational schools, theological and teacher's seminaries and institutes. On August 3 Hetman approved this law.

In September 1918, the Council of Ministers adopted a law declaring the former Russian higher schools on the territory of the hetmanate as Ukrainian state universities. These are the universities of St. Vladimir in Kyiv, Kharkov, Novorossiysk (Odessa), as well as technical universities - Katerinoslav Mining Institute, Kharkov Technological and Veterinary Institute, Kyiv Polytechnic Institute. The document did not contain any warnings regarding the language of instruction. Subsequently, a law was adopted declaring the Nizhyn Historical and Philological Institute of Prince Bezborodk Ukrainian state higher education institution. At Kharkiv, Novorossiysk universities and the Nizhyn Institute, a number of departments of Ukrainian studies were opened.

Despite the difficult conditions, the Ukrainian governments managed to achieve some success (especially the Central Rada and the Hetman's government). Ukrainian schools were created (only in 1917, 215 so-called higher primary schools were opened, and by the end of 1918 the number of Ukrainian gymnasiums reached 150). The number of periodicals in the Ukrainian language reached 106 titles in 1917 and 212 in 1918. As for books, in 1917 747 items, in 1918 - 1084, 1919 - 665.

 In 1918 Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Departments of Ukrainian studies were opened at Russian higher educational institutions, in addition, a university was opened in Kamenetz-Podolsk, a historical and philological faculty in Poltava, the People's University in Kyiv was transformed into the Ukrainian State University, the National Library was opened, and several national theaters were operating.

The essence of the Ukrainianization activity of the Central Rada was expressed by the deputy chairman of the well-known writer V.K. Vinnichenko: “We, Ukrainians, wanted to live and express ourselves in all spheres and areas of life. We believed that all public, political, and social institutions should be for the people, and not the people for them. In Ukraine - the Ukrainian people, Therefore, for him, as the Ukrainian people should be all institutions: government, administration, school, court. And also, the army."

Ukrainization, according to its initiators, was supposed to cover all aspects of society. However, the conditions of the civil war did not allow us to carry out all the plans in full. In addition, the majority of the Ukrainian population was preoccupied with other, primarily socio-economic, problems. Compared with the food and agrarian problems, the emergence of Ukrainian schools, books in the Ukrainian language and departments of Ukrainian studies seemed to be a secondary phenomenon. Due to their pronounced politicized nature, the measures for Ukrainization drew attention primarily to representatives of the intelligentsia. The mood of Russian society is very figuratively recorded in the "White Guard" by M.A. Bulgakov. Naturally, much attention was paid to the new status of the Ukrainian language: “... Who terrorized the Russian population with this vile language, which does not exist in the world? Hetman,” says Alexey Vasilyevich Turbin. And further: “He (hetman. - E.B.) is a bastard, because he himself does not speak this accursed language!”.

Leonid Yuryevich Shervinsky objects to Turbin: “I must speak in defense of the hetman. True, mistakes were made, but Hetman's plan was correct. Oh, he's a diplomat. The land is Ukrainian, there are elements here who want to babble on this move of theirs - so be it! But Turbin did not agree with this: “Five percent, and ninety-five are Russians!” 

Kyiv barrister and public figure A.A. Goldenweiser in his "Kyiv Memoirs" mentioned the resonance that this phenomenon caused in society. He noted that Ukrainization “confused all non-Ukrainians involved in school, science, advocacy. The Ukrainian language, with which they later became somewhat accustomed, evoked affected ridicule; no one was going to learn this language.” But if the memoirist considered the actions of the Central Rada for Ukrainization (“the fight against the Russian language”) simply “uncivilized and harmful”, then the policy of Hetman Skoropadsky was perceived by him in a completely different way. If Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, Goldenweiser wrote, fought for "the realization of the dream of their whole life," then the hetman's policy "from the very beginning was completely unprincipled." “The only constant element in the government program was pleasing the Germans,” says Kyiv Memoirs. - The Germans, apparently, wanted the formation of an independent Ukraine; so, guards' officer Skoropadsky became Ukrainian nationalist and independentist. [...] It was hypocritical, feigned nationalism. Skoropadsky's Ukrainization measures were perceived by Goldenweiser so negatively, firstly, because of the cooperation of the hetman with the enemy of the Russian Empire - Germany. In addition, the author of the memoirs did not believe in the sincerity of the "Ukrainian feelings" of the former tsarist general, a representative of the military elite of the Russian Empire.

Goldenweiser's observation is also confirmed by the memoirs of other contemporaries. Recalling the events of 1917-1919, T.M. Kardinalovskaya (wife of the Ukrainian Prime Minister V.A. Golubovich) first of all mentioned the negative perception of Ukrainization by the Kyiv intelligentsia: “... some protested because of intolerance towards everything Ukrainian, others because of its forcible planting.” Kardinalovskaya was greatly impressed by the lengthy lists of people who signed under the slogan "I protest against the forced Ukrainization of the South-Western Territory" published in the newspaper Russkaya Mysl. At the same time, according to the memoirist, the surnames were not only Russian, but also Ukrainian.

Protests against Ukrainization were fairly widespread. “A whole series of meetings of school councils, school parent committees began, at which, united amicably, the Black Hundreds and Democrats unanimously began to make protest after protest, sending them to the government,” Vinnichenko testified. 

They protested against “forced Ukrainization”!” If the Ukrainization of secondary education raised many questions from parents, then in higher educational institutions it was often negatively perceived by the scientific intelligentsia. For example, professors at St. Volodymyr in Kyiv categorically opposed the aspirations of the Central Rada to rebuild the university way of life in the interests of Ukrainian studies. July 26, 1917, Council of the University of St. Volodymyr sent a protest to the Provisional Government against the forced Ukrainization of Southern Russia. The professors were especially worried about the orientation of the Ukrainian movement towards “political isolation and alienation from the rest of Russia of those areas that they consider Ukrainian” and the desire to make the Ukrainian language a language teaching in Ukraine. And the rector of Odessa University, having received a letter from the Secretary General for Education with a request to send a report on the progress of Ukrainianization of the educational institution, returned it with a demand to translate it into the state Russian language, since he does not know the Ukrainian language.

The rejection of Ukrainianization measures was a very significant factor. The newspaper "Voice of Kyiv" published on June 13, 1918, the appeal of the board of the Union of Government Employees of Vinnitsa to the authorities. The text spoke about the absence of the need to introduce Ukrainian office work in institutions, since “cases of mutual misunderstanding between these institutions, on the one hand, and by the local population, on the other, never happened.

“Moreover,” we read further in the document, “such cases are possible precisely with the introduction of the Ukrainian language because the latter in its literary form has almost nothing in common with the local vernacular”. Employees, on the other hand, fully understand, “and in some cases explain themselves” in “the simple language of the local population.” Ukrainian literary, no one speaks the language.

Ukrainian public figure who ended up in exile after the civil war, N.M. Mogilyansky, in his memoirs about what he experienced in Kiev in 1918, asked himself the question: “Does “Ukrainization” enjoy the sympathy of the broad masses of the Ukrainian population?”  Trying to honestly understand the situation, Mogilyansky admitted that “in the historical stage in which the population of Ukraine lived at that time, it was more than indifferent to any attempts and undertakings of Ukrainization". Confirming the opinion of other contemporaries, the memoirist also noted a negative attitude towards Ukrainization on the part of the general population: “As the sad events and experiences of Kyiv, Kharkov, Odessa showed, the population of cities everywhere has a clear inclination towards Bolshevism, and the villages everywhere yearned for one thing: land! Moreover, Mogilyansky considered the only “allies” of Ukrainization to be the Germans, “who were interested in deepening “Ukrainization” for the success of the dismemberment of Russia”.

To complete the picture, we present one more opinion. In his "Essays on Russian Troubles" General A.I. Denikin spoke very sharply about the events taking place in Ukraine. He called the program of the Hetman's government none other than “national chauvinism and Ukrainization”: “Minister of the Interior Kistyakovsky introduced the law on Ukrainian citizenship and oath; the Minister of Public Education Vasilenko proceeded with the mass closure and forced Ukrainization of educational institutions; Minister of Confessions Zenkovsky was preparing the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church... Together, in absurd and offensive forms, they tore the connection with Russian culture and statehood".

Other examples of negative perception are also characteristic.

Ukrainization by broad sections of the Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia. In contrast to the statesmen of the Ukrainian People's Republic, who considered Ukrainization to be natural process that accompanied the construction of the Ukrainian statehood, the Russian and Russian-speaking public believed that such measures on the part of the government violate the "equality of nationalities." These are the thoughts expressed by V.I. Vernadsky (note that the father of the academician was an ethnic Ukrainian) in April 1918: “Now in Poltava there is a very disturbing feeling in connection with the beginning of forced Ukrainization. In three weeks, shop signs should be in Ukrainian. Everywhere it is prescribed to enter office work in Ukrainian language. Hatred of the language is aroused. Vernadsky called Ukrainization “violent” and considered it “a complete violation of equality nationalities”, repeatedly pointed out the size of the Russian population in Ukraine and the strong influence of Russian culture there. “Under the conditions that exist in the country, Ukraine can hardly be reborn with a purely Ukrainian language and culture,” wrote Vernadsky. “For this, there is not a single layer that would support and be embraced by this idea”.

Vernadsky believed that in Ukraine “Russian culture is surprisingly strong.” And it is clear that Ukrainization can hardly pass. Therefore, for the scientist, "the struggle for the Russian language as an equal in social and cultural life" was, of course, a struggle "for the rights of minorities." But at the same time, he emphasized “the importance of the Russian language as a world language for raising the education of the people and the intelligentsia”: “It cannot be replaced by an alien and difficult to understand English or German or French language” . This remark appeared in the diaries not by accident. The question of language acquired particular importance in the process of formation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and Vernadsky's opinion on the significance of the Russian language was not shared by many. On June 8, 1918, Vernadsky recorded his meeting with M.S. Hrushevsky and conveyed his opinion about the language of the work of the future Academy of Sciences: “Ukrainian with the right of French or German ac[paniment] (Russian language) excluded)". Numerous debates over the issue of the language of works and publications did not subside. Initially, the charter fixed the printing of works in the Ukrainian language and in whatever language the author wishes. However, in December 1918, changes were made, according to which the works were to be published in Ukrainian, and, if desired, simultaneously in French, or German, English, Italian, Latin.

At the same time, Vernadsky was by no means an ardent opponent of the Ukrainian language and culture, on the contrary, he considered "the revival of the Ukrainian language a very positive phenomenon". For Vernadsky, it was important to prevent a gap between Ukrainian and Russian culture: “I pointed out the strength of Russian culture and the need for peaceful creative cohabitation with Ukrainian. Avoid pulling to the side, and this is possible”. According to him, it was necessary to unite the Ukrainians, “working in the Ukrainian revival, but loving Russian culture, for them, too, native”, and “to maintain the connection of all scientists and scientific and educational institutions with Russian culture and a similar Russian organization, and not German". It is necessary in every possible way to "preserve scientific and cultural connection with Russia," Vernadsky believed. At the same time, the scientist noted with bitterness that many Russians cannot realize that "separation from Russia is a fait accompli", and the only way out, from his point of view, is "the growth of Russian culture", which remains the connecting link "between the torn off parts of the state." “You are amazed at the low consciousness of what has happened among Russian society,” Vernadsky wrote on June 1, 1918, on the way from Poltava to Kiev.

However, in his opinion, the representatives of the Ukrainian movement are also to blame: Vernadsky noted “the low moral level of Ukrainian leaders”, “the narrow and petty chauvinism of this movement”, “an unfair attitude towards Russian culture”. Vernadsky strongly condemned the "zoological Ukrainian and Great Russian moods", emphasizing that he finds support in life "only in the very to himself", "in the depths of his personality".

The aggravation of national contradictions in the UNR, emphasized by the famous scientist, was not just a consequence of the Ukrainization efforts of the Central Rada, the Hetmanate and the Directory, but also reflected the situation characteristic of the collapse of imperial structures. Public opinion was divided not only along party-political lines, but also along national lines: the policy of the Ukrainian governments changed the existing cultural and linguistic situation, the Ukrainian language penetrated into previously inaccessible areas, which created additional social tension. The Russian intelligentsia was alarmed and concerned about the new role of the Ukrainian language in the cultural space of Ukraine proposed by the national governments. 

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks offered their recipes for solving the Ukrainian issue. Speaking at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on January 18 (31), 1918, with his closing speech, Lenin expressed his firm confidence in the voluntary unification of the working people of all nations around Russia. 

“We see now that our ideas have won in Finland, in the Ukraine and are winning on the Don, awakening the class consciousness of the working people and organizing them into a firm alliance,” said the Bolshevik leader. - We acted without diplomats, without the old methods used by the imperialists, but the greatest result is obvious - the victory of the revolution and the uniting with us of the victorious ones into one mighty revolutionary federation. We rule not by dividing according to the cruel law of ancient Rome, but by uniting all working people with inseparable chains of living interests, of class consciousness. ... This is the basis of our federation, and I am deeply convinced that around revolutionary Russia increasingly individual federations of free nations will be grouped. Quite voluntarily, without lies and iron, this federation will grow, and it is indestructible. The voluntariness of the association was prompted by the specific conditions of 1917 to settle relations with already with established national entities".

Stalin, speaking at the same congress on January 15 with a report on the national question, actually made the national question dependent on the class question, interpreting the principle of self-determination as the right exclusively of "the working masses of a given nation." Analyzing a number of conflicts "between the Council of People's Commissars and the outskirts", the People's Commissariat of National Affairs concluded that "these conflicts, however, were not created around issues of a national character, but, precisely, around the issue of power." On the example of the Central Rada, the speaker argued "how the principle of self-determination was used by the bourgeois chauvinist circles of Ukraine for their class imperialist purposes." “All this points to the need to interpret the principle of self-determination as the right to self-determination not of the bourgeoisie, but of the working masses of a given nation,” the speaker said. As the controversy over the national question at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 showed, many Bolsheviks shared the Stalinist approach.

Indeed, the development of the official course of national policy took place in heated discussions. Although many communists, relying on the coming world revolution, rejected the importance of national culture and considered nations to belong to an irrevocable historical past, in their real politics they had to take into account the peculiarities of the mentality of the "backward" population, subject to "national survivals". It was impossible to continue the Russification policy in this situation. The preservation of Ukraine as one of the "bridgeheads of socialism" in Europe urgently required the neutralization of the "bourgeois influence" on the peasantry as the majority of the population of Ukraine.

In this situation, the national coloring of Soviet power in Ukraine could play a decisive role: if it was very problematic to stop the collapse of the Russian Empire, then it was possible to fight for the establishment of Soviet power in the independent republics. The People's Commissariat for Nationalities, which was set up among the first people's commissariats and headed by Stalin, was supposed to implement the national policy of the Soviet government. In May 1918, a Ukrainian department was created under the People's Commissariat of Nationalities (later - a Ukrainian representative office). The tasks of this department included the organization of "Ukrainian public opinion in favor of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic". The department was supposed to maintain strict control over those traveling to Ukraine and back, "because a lot of harmful elements with a specific purpose are behind passes."

Cultural, educational and propaganda work was to be carried out both among the “Moscow colony of Ukrainians and Ukrainian Red Army soldiers”, and “Galician prisoners of war”, as well as “between the incoming element”, “which is often very little familiar with the tasks of Soviet power”. It was also envisaged to "send agitators to the places." A separate item was the task of liquidating "all counter-revolutionary organizations".

The ideological orientation of the Bolshevik national policy was especially obvious. The main attention of the Bolsheviks was given to the fight against "bourgeois influence" among the "masses of the working people." So, in early May 1918, the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities considered the fight against "counter-revolution in all its national manifestations" to be one of the main tasks of the commissariat. “Since the Soviets and the central institutions of the Soviet government often have a poor understanding of the physiognomy of various national societies, institutions and circles, the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities is the body that should provide the Soviet government with substantial assistance in this regard” , - was indicated in one of the letters of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, addressed to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. “Ideologically harmful” were considered all public organizations with a national coloring that were not controlled by the Bolsheviks. The latter included the Ukrainian "Enlightenment".

When it became obvious that Ukraine would not be included as an integral part of the RSFSR, the main task of the Ukrainian representation at the People's Commissariat for National Affairs became to work among Ukrainians "living as a national minority outside Ukraine on the territory of the RSFSR". On the ground, it was supposed to deploy a wide network of local subdivisions of the Ukrainian department of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. Such units existed at various times in Yaroslavl, Tambov, Kaluga, Bryansk, Orsha, Kursk, Petrograd, Samara, Voronezh. The struggle for political influence was very tough. Representatives of the People's Commissariat for National Affairs acted in close connection both with local executive committees and with local branches of the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and with the bodies of the Military Administration. Thus, for example, the Ukrainian Voronezh department operated, the head of which, a certain comrade Moskalenko, noted: “October 20 of this year. (1918 - E.B.) the indicated department began to function ... The hitherto open gates were immediately closed to the counter-revolutionaries and the bourgeoisie. Many counter-revolutionaries mistook me for the Ukrainian Consul, which is why the employees of the Soviet Red Army, former officers who wanted to enter the ranks of the Krasnovskaya Army, as well as the ranks of Pan Skoropadsky's Army, did not hesitate to come for passes. Such persons were arrested by me.”

Repressions were carried out not only against individuals, but also entire organizations. In the same Voronezh, on October 27, 1918, the Ukrainian Voronezh Gromada was closed, "the reason for the closure of this community was the counter-revolutionary direction of this organization." "During the search, a lot of literature of the Right SRs was found, as well as portraits of Professor Grushevsky and other enemies of Soviet power." Destructive work turned out to be easier to carry on than constructive work. Thus, they managed to open a library and a reading room, but an attempt to open a school for "younger refugees and evacuated Ukrainians" was defeated: there were simply no people willing to study in the Ukrainian language.

The organization of local Ukrainian departments on the territory of the RSFSR was not always successful, and the Ukrainian representation of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities was forced to admit as a "sad fact" that "in the broad circles of Russian society, not excluding even responsible Soviet and party workers, there is still a complete misunderstanding the importance of the comprehensive development of Ukrainian national culture as the basis for building a socialist society among the Ukrainian people. In fact, this often led - "consciously or unconsciously" - to sad consequences: "... in relation to people of Ukrainian origin and even to entire Ukrainian organizations, measures are taken at best that hinder their activities, and at worst - directly ... reaching contrary to the decision of the leading government and party bodies of the RSFSR".

After the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, in the new foreign policy conditions, the question arose of formalizing the organization of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and of the further tactics of the Bolsheviks on the Ukrainian question. By the beginning of 1918, two independent regional associations of the RSDLP (b) were operating in Ukraine - the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin and the Southwestern Territory, which held different views on the prospects for the development of the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine.

G.L. was at the head of the Kyiv Bolsheviks. Pyatakov. Together with a group of like-minded people, he formed a group called the “leftist”. The “leftists” were convinced that a decisive battle between capitalism and socialism was going on in the world and considered the Ukrainian revolution as an integral part of the world revolution. The Brest peace was assessed negatively, and Ukraine was supposed to serve the cause of continuing the world revolution. One of the Bolshevik party leaders of that time, A.I. Butsenko (in 1917-1919 he worked in Poltava) emphasized this point in particular. According to him, Pyatakov believed that "Ukraine should be a springboard for the deployment of the revolution further to the west without the help of the Russian proletariat for a permanent uprising, and not wait until all party organizations make proper preparations for an organized widespread armed uprising .

It was in the interests of the revolutionary struggle that Pyatakov proposed to unite all the Bolshevik organizations in the Ukraine. In November 1917, on his initiative, a party conference of the Southwestern Territory was held, and the creation of a regional Bolshevik organization "Social Democracy of Ukraine" was proclaimed, although it did not receive the approval of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b).

The Bolsheviks of Yekaterinoslav and Donbass were headed by E.I. Queering. The "right" Donbass believed that without the help of Russia, the revolution in Ukraine was futile and therefore were staunch supporters of a close alliance with Moscow. The “rights” did not want to make contact with the Kyiv organization and initiated the creation of the above-mentioned Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic in January 1918. The initiators of the formation of this republic were inspired by the idea of ​​preserving the entire Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin with Kharkov as part of the Russian Republic as a separate unified region.

The "left" and "right" did not get along with each other, and in order to smooth out the "sharp corners" they sent to Ukraine at the end of 1917 the old Bolshevik (member of the party since 1897) N.A. Skrypnik, and at the beginning of 1919 - another party member, leader of the Bulgarian and international socialist movement H.G. Rakovsky.

At the same time, many Bolsheviks in Ukraine (especially the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Odessa organizations) strongly opposed even the formal Ukrainization of the party. 

However, the people of Kiev also treated the Ukrainian issue differently. For example, the “left communist” Pyatakov was generally a staunch opponent of the right of nations to self-determination and even received from Vinnichenko the nickname “Russian communist centralist, enemy of the Ukrainian national-state revival". However, at that moment, Pyatakov believed that relative independence from Moscow was in the interests of the world revolution since it provided an opportunity to maneuver against the policy of Brest.

It is not surprising that in the process of unification of the Bolshevik organizations in Ukraine there were two points of view. In accordance with this, at the Taganrog Party Conference on April 19-20, 1918, two resolutions were put forward on the organizational issue. The first, written by Quiring, provided for the creation of an autonomous party with its own Central Committee and its own congresses, but subordinate to a single Central Committee and congresses of the RCP(b). Skrypnik was the author of the second resolution. Although he did not share the views of the "left communists", he also considered it expedient to create an independent communist party in Ukraine, with its own Central Committee and its own party congresses and associated with the RCP (b) only through the Third International. At the meeting, Skrypnik's resolution passed by a majority of votes.

However, the central party leadership in Moscow could not allow such a development of events: in the conditions of the civil war, the most important task was to strengthen the party ranks.

On July 5-12, 1918, the 1st Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine was held, which discussed, among others, the issue of "Ukraine and Russia". A report was made by Quiring, who stated that the independence of Ukraine was obtained "not by the force of the national movement of the masses of the Ukrainian people, but by the force of German bayonets", and does not have no serious roots. Moreover, the “independence” of Ukraine, in his opinion, “has no economic grounds”, and for “a long-term separation of these two parts of the previously united Russia, outside help, strength, in the form of the strength of the German imperialism and finance capital". Quiring's conclusion was: 

"Since the desire for secession is contrary to the economic interests of the working masses of Ukraine, we must oppose it and strive to unite with Soviet Russia on the basis of democratic centralism." 

At the same time, he emphasized that such a desire “should not be confused with the desire for reunification among the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in order to restore "Great Russia"". Skrypnik, who spoke in the debate, declared that “the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination, up to secession, had its justification before the October proletarian revolution. As the class struggle unfolds, we may take different positions on this question. And it is precisely for Ukraine that a dialectical change in our attitude towards this slogan is characteristic. Before October, our line was completely correct, but when the proletariat came to power, the situation changed radically.

Already during the Brest negotiations, the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets spoke out against secession, and now we are even more opposed to secession, for now independence is a screen for the counter-revolutionary struggle against Soviet power. As a result of the discussion, a resolution was adopted, which stated: “... the task of our party in Ukraine is, having decisively broken with the mistakes of the past, to fight for the revolutionary unification of Ukraine with Russia on the basis of proletarian centralism within the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, on the way to creating world proletarian commune".

The issue of the status of the CP(b)U was also discussed. Skrypnik believed that “the socialist and political conditions for the activity of our organizations in Russia and Ukraine are not only different, but, in a certain sense, opposite”, therefore “organizational isolation, organizational separation [of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks currently under construction] in Ukraine is necessary ".

Quiring agreed that "in Ukraine, the conditions of struggle are completely different than in Russia, and that our organizations in Ukraine have to resort to completely different tactics and have to carry out completely different organizational principles and work in completely different conditions than in Russia."  However, he did not think that this could serve as a basis for singling out the CP(b)U "as a special party". As a result, it was decided "to unite the party communist organizations of Ukraine into an autonomous, in local matters, Communist Party of Ukraine with its own Central Committee and its own congresses, but part of a single Russian Communist Party with subordination in matters of program to the general congresses of the Russian Communist Party and in matters of general political - Central Committee of the RCP ".

The status of the CP(b)U was clarified by the VIII Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1919, which adopted a special resolution stating: “It is necessary to have a single centralized communist party with a single Central Committee directing all the work of the party in all parts of RSFSR. All decisions of the RCP and its leading institutions are unconditionally binding on all parts of the Party, regardless of their national composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Lettish and Lithuanian Communists enjoy the rights of regional party committees and are entirely subordinate to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.