THE FIRST CRISIS OF THE NEP

Selected Articles From"Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics" Sakharov V.A.

Svitlana M, Erdogan A

The original version of the NEP proceeded from the fact that the retreat in the economy as a whole would be limited: from the use of methods characteristic of the socialist economy (the plan, the absence of commodity-money relations, etc.), the Soviet government would switch to the widespread use of state capitalism [277]. 

State capitalism in bourgeois society is represented by enterprises belonging to the state, which acts as an aggregate capitalist, and the enterprises themselves are an organic part of the capitalist economy, a sector of its. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the situation changes. State capitalism is represented by enterprises owned by the state but leased to domestic (NEPmen) or foreign (concession) capitalists, cooperation of small commodity producers, as well as those through which the state has to enter into economic relations with the world capitalist market, for example, to exercise a monopoly foreign trade [278]. All other enterprises that remained under the control of the Soviet state, Lenin considered socialist. That is, state capitalism under the dictatorship of the proletariat is a socio-economic structure. 

But this did not end the characterization of state capitalism under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Based on the ideas expressed by K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin developed a view of state capitalism as a "kind of redemption" by the proletariat, which had taken political power into its own hands, of the economy from those capitalists who were ready to cooperate with the dictatorship of the proletariat on the condition of turning them into specialists. This made it possible to "intercept" enterprises from the capitalists on the go without stopping or destroying production [279]. State capitalism was assigned an important role in the social transformation of the petty-bourgeois strata (artisans, merchants, peasants), who, unlike the proletariat, capable of directly passing from capitalism to socialism, pass from capitalism to socialism through state capitalism [280], which acts as a means, a means of curbing the petty-bourgeois elements (grain monopoly, cooperation, controlled private capital) [281].

 Thus, according to Lenin, state capitalism is such a socio-economic structure of a society that has begun socialist transformations, which is capable of transforming the private capitalist, petty-bourgeois and patriarchal structures into a socialist one. Thanks to this ability, state capitalism also acts as a method used by the dictatorship of the proletariat to carry out socialist transformations of the economy and society. 

Forced by the conditions of the civil war, the nationalization of industry, railway and water transport made state capitalism both as a socio-economic structure and as a specific method of socialist construction unnecessary. But with the transition to the NEP, state capitalism again gained relevance. At this time, Lenin was interested, firstly, in his nature, which made it possible to ensure this socio-economic evolution of the non-proletarian strata of the population, and secondly, in the practical issues of the development of state-capitalist enterprises (monopoly of foreign trade, cooperation, concessions, rent, etc. ) and, finally, thirdly, the problem of their transformation into socialist [282]. Lenin's concept of state capitalism made it possible to see the prospects for the growth of the socialist sector under the NEP and to build up the socialist sector of the economy. 

In the autumn of 1921, it became clear that the concession made was insufficient, that the elements of capitalist relations could not be kept within the framework of state capitalism, and that economic life was overflowing beyond the limits set for it. It was necessary to recognize what happened - freedom of trade, the possibility of admitting which was categorically denied in the spring of 1921. 

A choice had to be made: to retreat further or to fight on previously occupied positions. Since Lenin connected the salvation of the revolution with the relations between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry [283], this determined his attitude towards further events: he proposed to retreat further. However, the prospect of new concessions increased the party's skepticism about the possibility of the new economic policy to serve the victory of the socialist revolution. The time has come for a deeper understanding of the entire experience of the revolution, ideas about the ways and methods of building socialism. 

Lenin devoted his most important public speeches of late 1921 and early 1922 to justifying the need for a new retreat, explaining its political meaning, and identifying economic opportunities. In them, he reassessed the entire experience of socialist construction. At the same time, he focused not so much on the forced devastation of the nature of the NEP, but on the fact that it manifested a de facto recognition of the fallacy of previous ideas about the process of development of the socialist revolution. 

On October 17, 1921, speaking with a report “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Enlightenment” at the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Enlightenment, Lenin recognized that capitalism had been restored to a large extent, that for the sake of the survival of the Republic, capitalism must be given the opportunity to develop, it would have to be allowed to strengthen, that the limits retreats are not yet known. This puts the revolution before new tasks, for which the communists are not ready, because they do not know how to manage, that this must be learned from the capitalists and, having learned from them, defeat them with their own weapons [284]. Although Lenin expressed complete confidence in the victory of the revolution, in the sufficiency of the state's political and economic levers, the future is by no means painted in bright colors. Under these conditions, Lenin admitted, "teaching cannot but be severe - on pain of death." "We must remember that we must either have the greatest exertion of strength in daily labor, or inevitable death awaits us” [285]. The most difficult war had just ended, in which, it seemed, the question “to be or not to be” had already been removed, during which a policy was found and tested that fully corresponded to Marxist theory. And now, it appears, all it is necessary to begin all over again. Lenin noted that under these conditions "inevitably... some people... fall into a very sour, almost panicky state, and on the occasion of a retreat, these people will begin to indulge in a panic mood"[286]. 

Lenin's speech at the congress of political enlightenment made a painful impression on many members of the party. After all, quite recently at the X All-Russian Party Conference (May 1921), at the III Congress of the Comintern (June-July 1921), he expressed the idea that the NEP was needed only for the period until a new upsurge in the world revolution, which was expected in the coming years [287]. October 27 G.I. Petrovsky, by direct wire from Kharkov, informed Stalin: 

“In Kharkov ... V.I. Lenin caused a feeling of despondency among the workers, like a speech that is losing ground,” and asked for “an explanation from Vl[adimir] Ilyich, otherwise the Central Committee of the Communist Party [of the country] is in a confused state.” 

Sending this text to Lenin, Stalin expressed his opinion:

 

“C. Lenin. I read it and I think that it is necessary to soften the form a little (I mean the future speech at the Moscow conference)” [288]. 

Speaking at the 7th Moscow Provincial Party Conference on October 29, 1921, Lenin admitted:
 

“The exchange of goods has failed: it has failed in the sense that it resulted in purchase and sale ... the private market turned out to be stronger than us, and instead of commodity circulation, ordinary purchase and sale, trade »[289]. 

He proposed to retreat once again, this time from state capitalism to state regulation of buying and selling and money circulation. Lenin considered this path “longer, but more durable, and now the only possible one for us” and, in spite of everything, quite acceptable since it could ensure the possibility of restoring large-scale industry [290]. 

At the same time, Lenin, apparently, took into account the reaction to his previous speech and heeded Stalin's advice. Frank recognition of past and new mistakes Lenin compensated for by a more detailed justification of the possibility of overcoming the difficulties that had arisen. Lenin dwelled in detail on the evolution of views on the process of building socialism, setting up a calm, business-like attitude to new turns in politics, a critical attitude to experience [291]. At the beginning of 1918, 

"we had ... the idea that the development of the revolution ... could take either a relatively short path or a very long and difficult path." 

But then they didn’t think about the worst option:
 

“when assessing possible development, we proceeded ... from the assumptions of a direct transition to socialist construction ... we already opposed the methods of a gradual transition such methods of action as a method of struggle, mainly aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. Then “it was supposed to carry out a direct transition to socialism without a preliminary period adapting the old economy to the socialist economy. We assumed that having created state production and state distribution, we thereby directly entered into another, in comparison with the previous, economic system of production and distribution. We assumed that both systems—the system of state production and distribution and the system of private trade production and distribution—would come into conflict with each other under such conditions that we would build state production and distribution, wresting it step by step from the hostile system. We said that our task now is not so much the expropriation of the expropriators, but accounting, control, increasing labor productivity, and improving discipline. At that time, "we did not at all raise the question of what ratio our economy would be to the market, to trade." The question of state capitalism was then raised not as in the NEP period, when it meant a step backwards, but as a step forward in the establishment of socialist relations. Even then, Lenin admitted, “on a number of points we had to go back", even then we were "must take a step back and recognize the well-known" compromise "". Lenin considered these circumstances important “for understanding what the change in our economic policy consisted of and how this change should be assessed” [292].  

With such ideas about the historical experience of the revolution and the tasks facing the Bolsheviks, Lenin approached the time when the deep meaning of replacing the old economic policy with a new one became fully clear, much better than at the beginning of 1921, when the need to resort to much more difficult and lengthy maneuver for the sake of establishing an economic bond between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry. If at first after the transition to the NEP, Lenin spoke more about retreat, about concessions to the peasantry, etc., although he expressed confidence that the NEP would ensure "the success of our entire socialist construction", now, six months later, he expressed firm confidence not only in success, but in the fact that after the maneuver, “our victorious movement forward will be stronger, faster and wider”[293]. 

Not everyone shared the hopes and calculations of Lenin, as indicated by the speeches of some delegates to the 11th Congress of the RCP (b) and the notes submitted to Lenin. Trotsky continued to be Lenin's main opponent. He agreed with Lenin on the use of state capitalism, both in 1918 and under the NEP [294], but "free trade"! For him, this meant a return to capitalism. And he struggled with this prospect as best he could. The front of disagreements between Lenin and Trotsky expanded considerably: in addition to the differences of tactical nature mentioned above, new ones were added - on fundamentally important political and theoretical problems. As a result, the struggle between them on the basis of the NEP became even more acute, and the political distance between them increased. 

Trotsky did not share Lenin's assessments and hopes. His own prediction was different. 

On August 25, 1921, at a meeting of the Politburo [295], Trotsky declared that “the days of Soviet power are numbered”, that “the cuckoo has already crowed” (see Appendices No. 8, 9), that the death of Soviet power is inevitable if the course of economic policy proposed by him, Trotsky, is not adopted and the management of the national economy is restructured in accordance with it [296].  

 The question of why Trotsky decided to give such a forecast at this particular time has not been specially studied. He himself did not give a direct answer to it either. Judging by the material known to us, the reason lies, firstly, in the internal difficulties that the country was experiencing (famine, peasant uprisings, paralysis of industry, etc.), and secondly, in the realization of the fact that in the near future the proletarian revolution Europe does not count. This became clear by the middle of 1921.[297] 

Moreover, Trotsky believed that there was a real threat of a new intervention, about which he never tired of warning the Politburo [298]. In his forecast, the characteristic features of the theory of "permanent revolution" are clearly visible, which meant Trotsky's resurrection of it as a theoretical basis for developing a policy alternative to Lenin's NEP under the new conditions of the development of the revolution. New concessions to the principle of free trade within the framework of the NEP, apparently, further strengthened his faith in the correctness of the theory of "permanent revolution". At the 11th Congress, Trotsky answered all of Lenin’s arguments in the following way: a bond with the peasantry is necessary “until it is possible to rely on the victorious working class of Europe” [299]. Consequently, later it will be possible to abandon the bond, the political and economic union with the peasantry, and build socialism without the participation of the peasantry, ignoring the will of the majority of the country's population and suppressing it? 

At the beginning of 1922, Trotsky began to republish his old works, in which the Russian socialist revolution was analyzed from the standpoint of the theory of "permanent revolution". Thus, disagreements on NEP questions gave birth to a new discussion—on fundamental questions of the theory of socialist revolution. 

The first to appear in March 1922, on the eve of the XII Congress of the RCP(b), was a collection dedicated to the revolution of 1905. Trotsky prefaced it with a preface written in January 1922, in which he confirmed the validity of all its main assessments, which opposed the Leninist theory of the outgrowth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one. Explaining the meaning of the theory of "permanent revolution", he wrote: "The revolution will not be able to solve its immediate bourgeois tasks otherwise than by placing the proletariat in power. And this latter, having taken power into his hands, will not be able to limit himself to the bourgeois framework in the revolution ... in order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard will have to make the deepest intrusions not only into feudal, but also into bourgeois property in the very first stages of its rule. At the same time, he will come into hostile clashes not only with all groups of the bourgeoisie ... but also, with the broad masses of the peasantry, with whose assistance he came to power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country (with an overwhelming majority of the peasant population) can only be resolved on an international scale, in the arena of the world revolution of the proletariat”. Further, Trotsky wrote that “although with a break of 12 years (i.e., not in 1905, but in 1917 - BC), this assessment was fully confirmed” [300]. 

The conclusions suggested themselves: in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, the working class came to power in Russia. The October Revolution is political, proletarian, but not social, not socialist in character, and the power of the working class in peasant Russia can be maintained only if the world proletarian revolution is victorious. 

In the same 1922, Trotsky republished his 1917 pamphlet The Peace Program, prefaced it with a specially written preface, in which, again from the standpoint of 1922, he openly challenged Lenin's conclusion about the possibility of successfully building and building socialism in Russia under conditions capitalist encirclement:
 

“Having defended ourselves in the political and military sense as a state, we have not come to the creation of a socialist society and have not even approached ... As long as the bourgeoisie is in power in other European states, we are forced - in the fight against economic isolation — seek agreements with the capitalist world; at the same time, it can be said with certainty that these agreements, at best, can help us heal certain economic wounds, take one step or another forward, but that a genuine upsurge of the socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe”[301]. Thus, socialist construction as such can begin in Soviet Russia only after the decisive victories of the world proletarian revolution. 

The propositions he formulated pointed to the disagreements he still had with Lenin on the most important proposition for Marxism—the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky countered Lenin's thesis that the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry under the leading role of the proletariat: the dictatorship of the proletariat is the power of the working class directed against all non-proletarian strata of society. It can also be seen that, unlike Lenin, in 1922, as in 1905, and in 1917, Trotsky gave primacy to external factors in the development of the socialist revolution in Russia over internal ones. It is clear that the differences between Lenin and Trotsky on the question of the socialist revolution have intensified over the past years, that they have proposed to the party two completely different concepts of the Russian socialist revolution. 

The return to political use of the theory of "permanent revolution" is a well-known fact. But in historical literature, due attention was not paid to the fact that its political orientation was now completely different than in 1905-1917. The term "revival" of the theory of "permanent revolution" correctly conveys the external side of the matter but does not fix the internal political evolution that this theory underwent during the socialist revolution due to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, therefore it does not convey the political meaning of this "revival". Previously, it contained a call to move the revolution forward, despite the possible danger of its defeat. Now it served to assess the path traveled by the revolution and to substantiation of the forecast about its inevitable death outside the framework of the victorious world proletarian revolution. And along with this, Trotsky from the "absurdly left" (as Lenin defined it) turns into an ordinary social democrat. 

As an appendix to the collection, Trotsky placed his article "Our Differences", containing a polemic with Lenin on the place and role of the peasantry in the socialist revolution, on the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. In comments to it, written from the standpoint of 1922, he wrote:
 

"The anti-revolutionary features of Bolshevism [302] threaten with great danger only in the event of a revolutionary victory." 

Since 1917 brought victory to the Bolsheviks, then, according to Trotsky's logic, the time has come when Lenin and his supporters become dangerous for the revolution. It is impossible to say this directly, but the hint is more than transparent. The facts of the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917, the victory in the civil war and the development of the revolution connected with this had to be "reconciled" with their thesis about the "anti-revolutionary essence of Bolshevism." Trotsky “removes” this contradiction between his forecast and the fact of history with the help of the assertion that “under the leadership of Comrade Lenin, Bolshevism accomplished (not without an internal struggle) its ideological rearmament in the spring of 1917, that is, before the conquest of power” [303]. In other words, he declared that in October 1917 it was not the Bolsheviks themselves who took power, but the newly minted Trotskyists, who had not yet realized themselves in this capacity and, by inertia, retained their former name and loyalty to the former theoretical and political schemes. From here it is not far to the assertion that they took power with the participation of Lenin, but under the ideological (and organizational) leadership of Trotsky, who allegedly was the real leader of the October Revolution. This has not yet been directly stated here (it will be said later - in the article "The Lessons of October", in October 1924),

These speeches marked the beginning of Trotsky's political attack on the historical front. He had to show that he, Trotsky, as a theoretician and politician was superior to Lenin, that he was the true leader of the "de-Bolshevik" Bolshevism - the party that took power in October 1917, therefore it is to him that the revolution owes all its best achievements and victories. The political subtext of this attack is this: Bolshevism came to power in 1917 only because it had “become Bolshevikized”, and therefore there was no point in clinging to it in 1922. The attack directed against Lenin personally was lightly covered by the thesis that Lenin led the process of "de-Bolshevikization". 

Trotsky placed the "history" of the struggle against Lenin at the service of the interests of his contemporary struggle against him. The reader was moving towards a relevant political conclusion: although Trotsky came to the Bolshevik Party, in fact, Lenin, in the main questions of the socialist revolution in Russia, went over to Trotsky's position. If the Bolshevik Party won thanks to the fact that they went over to the positions of Trotsky, then he, Trotsky, is its true inspirer and organizer of this victory. 

Trotsky's tactic in the fight against Lenin and Bolshevism—publishing his old articles with appropriate comments—was superior to publishing a new article outlining old differences. This made it possible to show the origins and depth of disagreements more fully, to give a detailed argumentation of the anti-Leninist position, to criticize Lenin and at the same time does not provoke criticism of their previous views. You can't rewrite history! What is written is written. This tactic allowed him to combine criticism of the New Economic Policy, Lenin, and Bolshevism, point out their previous mistakes as the cause of the current mistakes and substantiate the thesis about the danger to the fate of the revolution of the Leninist course and Bolshevism as a whole. Trotsky got the opportunity to unobtrusively lead the party to the idea that he was always right in the struggle against Lenin, and Lenin, accordingly, was always wrong. Thus, Trotsky asserted himself as the main theorist of the party and a natural but underestimated leader of the party. 

Although at this time Trotsky avoided openly opposing his views to Lenin's as an integral system, he publicly declared his commitment to his former theoretical and political views. Together with them, Trotskyism was “resurrected” as a political trend openly opposed to Lenin and Bolshevism. Trotsky later claimed that the term "Trotskyism" was coined later, in 1924.[304] This is not true. The term "Trotskyism" was in use among the Bolsheviks even before L.D. Trotsky joined the Bolshevik Party, and after joining it [305]. At the XI Congress of the RCP (b), the representative of the "workers' opposition" Kutuzov directly said that after the X Party Congress and at the XI Congress there were, and are fighting "both the workers' opposition, and Trotskyists, and Leninists, and dozens, and anything else" [306]. And no one was surprised - what is Trotskyism and what is the Trotskyists they did not ask, L.D. Trotsky did not object. Lenin was well aware Trotskyism as a system of political and theoretical views and a political trend in the party. He perceived Trotskyism as an existing political trend. So, outlining the speech of V.V. Kosior at the XI Congress of the RCP (b), who complained that former supporters of Trotsky were bypassed during personnel appointments, “overwritten”, Lenin wrote for himself:

“the elite in the Urals was Trotskyist” [307].

Already at this phase of disagreement, Lenin and Trotsky were separated by an assessment of the nature of the Great October Socialist Revolution. For Lenin, it was socialist. Trotsky assessed it differently. 

At the 11th Congress, he declared that the NEP is a maneuver of the "class (of the proletariat. - BC), which is moving towards socialist revolution” [308]. According to Trotsky, it turns out that four years after the start of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks do not make a socialist revolution (i.e., they do not carry out their program), but only go to the point from which the construction of a socialist society will begin. 

Of course, one can find many statements about the socialist revolution in Trotsky. But this statement is not accidental. Perhaps, against his will, he said here what he had previously preferred to keep quiet. This assessment of the October Revolution echoes his longstanding position on the question of the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a workers' government under the bourgeois system:
 

"The social revolution (meaning socialist. - BC) presupposes such a state of capitalist society when the proletariat is in power" (1916)[309]. 

 This thesis is only a development of Trotsky's long-standing ideas that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be established in the course of a bourgeois-democratic revolution ("without a tsar, but a workers' government")[310]. Consequently, at that time, the contradictions between Lenin and Trotsky on the issue of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the main thing in Marxism [311], became politically actual. No coincidence of views, assessments, positions on other issues could cover these differences, which determined both the state and the dynamics of their relations. 

These public speeches by Trotsky not only sharpened the discussion between him and Lenin, but also gave it the character of a principled struggle of Trotskyism against Bolshevism (Leninism). Trotsky later claimed that Lenin did not oppose his book 1905 and therefore agreed with him [312]. This is not true. Speeches by V.I. Lenin at the 11th Party Congress, at the 4th Congress of the Comintern, at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet, as well as a number of texts of his "Testament" contained criticism of these views and assessments of Trotsky. Lenin gave it the place it deserved - it was carried out in parallel with Lenin's substantiation of the new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia. 

The need for a new concession to the principle of free trade within the framework of the NEP raised a number of difficult not only political but also theoretical questions. It was necessary to find solutions to problems where they had not been looked for before, to take them into account in new theoretical concepts and political conclusions. Thus, the NEP stimulated a new search and led to the creation of a new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia, based on accumulated experience and taking into account the specific conditions of Russia more fully than before. The novelty of the task in this case did not mean its absolute political surprise and theoretical unpreparedness. It is no coincidence that, speaking of the complexity of the situation and the tasks ahead, Lenin was not inclined to dramatize the situation. The political and theoretical surprise of the NEP cannot be overestimated, if only because it actually implemented a fundamental scheme, embedded in the Leninist theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one. It fundamentally allowed for a situation where the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry grew into the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the economy remained for a time the same - capitalist. So, it was at the very beginning of the revolution when Soviet power was established. This was also the case during the transition to the NEP. Therefore, this situation in itself is not evidence of a catastrophe and an insurmountable barrier to a new attempt [313]. 

The surprise of the NEP is the surprise of a partial solution to the problem, while there were hopes for its complete solution. Such an outcome is not planned, but its probability is implied. 

Partial victory is not what was hoped for, but there is no reason to absolutize this failure if the cause of the error is understood and there is a possibility of correcting it [314]. 

Difficult or easier in comparison with 1917-1918 was the cause of the socialist revolution? It was difficult in the sense that it forced the use of detours and methods of a market economy alien to socialism, by necessity allowing the strengthening of the economic and, consequently, political positions of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sections of the city and countryside. But at the same time, it was facilitated, since some of the important and difficult problems were solved completely (taking power, retaining it) or partially (creating mechanisms, developing management methods, forming new managers, etc.). The solution of the problems at hand took place on the basis of incomparably greater experience, knowledge, and in more favorable foreign policy conditions - the military action of the counter-revolution and the interventionists was repulsed, peace was secured for a number of years. For this reason alone, the starting position for a new attempt is better than it was during the first, and the hopes for success based on one's own strength are greater than before. The difficulties are great, but there is no reason to panic. 

In the light of what has been said, the problem of "Thermidor" begins to take shape in a completely different way, which in Trotsky's reasoning regarding the fate of the Russian revolution occupied one of the central places. What Trotsky saw as a manifestation of "Thermidor", in the system of views developed by Lenin, was the normal policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Perhaps that is why Trotsky did not accept the Leninist NEP, because he denied the Leninist theory of the socialist revolution. After all, within its framework, a partial victory was still a step forward and therefore a victory, but for Trotsky, within the framework of his own theory of "permanent revolution", a partial victory was equal to defeat. Obviously, it was no accident that he resurrected this theory after the transition to the NEP and formed on its basis his own concept of the New Economic Policy. 

Lenin's new views and proposals were reflected in the decisions of the XI Conference of the RCP(b)[316] and the IX Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. The retreat made and the understanding of the new situation and politics from the point of view of the prospects for the development of the socialist revolution allowed Lenin to conclude that the limit of the retreat had already been outlined and that it did not threaten the revolution with inevitable death or rebirth. At this time, Lenin expressed the idea that only now the New Economic Policy "is sufficiently and clearly established "[317]. Lenin soon issued an important political statement calling for an end to the retreat. 

The NEP led Lenin to the problem of creating a new concept of the socialist revolution in Russia and confronted the party with tasks that no one had seriously thought about before. Trotsky did not accept this version of the NEP. Trotsky's assessment of the meaning and purpose of the NEP, its place in the socialist revolution was different. He assessed the NEP as a step backward "compared to the idea of ​​an all-plan all-socialist economy." He saw a step forward only in the pacification of the country [318]. It is clear that Lenin and Trotsky viewed the NEP differently. 

Notes:

 

[277] It is no coincidence that Lenin at that time often referred to his pamphlet The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power and other works of this cycle, in which much attention was paid to state capitalism as a form of management with which one could move on to a socialist economy. During the Civil War, he occasionally turned to these works (see: Reference volume to the Complete Works of V.I. Lenin. Part 2. M, 1970. S. 374, 380). 

[278] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 43. S. 223-228. 

[279] Ibid. T. 36. S. 304. 

[280] Ibid. T. 43. S. 228. 

[281] Ibid. T. 36. S. 295–307. 

[282] Ibid. T. 43. S. 223, 228. 

[283] Ibid. T. 44. S. 160–161. 

[284] Ibid. pp. 156-169. 

[285] Ibid. pp. 167, 168. 

[286] Ibid. S. 158. 

[287] “Of course, if a revolution occurs in Europe, we will, of course, change our policy ... it is difficult to determine the duration of the civil war in other republics, but when it ends in victory, we will change our policy in the sense that, perhaps, we will say: do not take anything with a tax, but everything with an exchange of goods” (V.I.Lenin. Complete collection of works. T. 43. P. 336). 

[288] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5191. L. 1, 2. 

[289] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 207-208, 212. 

[290] Ibid. T. 45. S. 213. 

[291] Ibid. T. 44. S. 197–205, 295. 

[292] Ibid. pp. 197–200. 

[293] Ibid. T. 43. S. 360; T. 44. S. 229. 

[294] Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographer. report. pp. 128-129. 

[295] The date is set on the basis of information about the composition of the participants in the meetings of the Politburo and the circumstances of the discussion of this statement by Trotsky, reported by I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov . _ 10. P. 265; One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. From the diary of F. Chuev. P. 206-207). 

[296] Trotsky's archive. T. 1. S. 13-14. 

[297] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 209-210. 

[298] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 89. L. 1–3. 

[299] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. S. 135. 

[300] Trotsky L.D. On the history of the Russian revolution. pp. 147-148. 

[301] Ibid. S. 145. 

[302] Anti-revolutionary is not just insufficient revolutionaryism, it is “anti-revolutionary”, therefore, a position bordering on counter-revolutionary. And Trotsky repeats this statement without any reservations in 1922. Speaking of Bolshevism, Trotsky aimed first of all and mainly at Lenin - in 1922, as in 1917. 

[303] Ibid. S. 115; see also: Trotsky L. 1905. M., 1922. S. 285. 

[304] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 8. S. 184; Trotsky L.D. On the question of the origin of the legend of "Trotskyism" (Documentary reference) // Stalin's school of falsifications. pp. 108-109; He is . The Stalinists are taking action. To the exclusion of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others // Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. M., 1991. S. 207. 

[305] Lenin spoke about Trotskyism in his concluding remarks on the report “The Tasks of the Day—The Current Moment” at the VII (April) Conference of the RSDLP(b) 1917 (Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP(Bolsheviks) April 1917. Minutes. M , 1958. S. 22). 

[306] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. S. 450. 

[307] Ibid. S. 617. 

[308] Ibid. S. 130. 

[309] Cit. by: Ivanov V.M., Shmelev A.N. Leninism and the ideological and political defeat of Trotskyism. L., 1970. S. 115. 

[310] Ibid. S. 138. 

[311] See: Marx K., Engels F. Selected. op. M., 1986. T. 4. S. 510; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 33. S. 34. 

[312] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 8. S. 185. 

[313] 40 years before the NEP, analyzing the prospects of the Russian revolution, K. Marx (in a letter to V. Zasulich, March 1881) came to similar conclusions, in principle: political power is in the hands of revolutionaries who for a long-time exercise transformation of the economy and the entire life of society on the principles of socialism, using the rural community as a social base, as well as borrowing the achievements of technology and science from developed capitalist countries ( K. pp. 58–80). 

[314] In the article “Notes of a Publicist” (February 1922), Lenin wrote: “There is absolutely nothing “terrible”, nothing that gives a legitimate reason for even the slightest despondency in recognizing this bitter truth ... that joint efforts are needed for the victory of socialist workers of several advanced countries. And we are still alone, and in a backward country, in a country more devastated than others. There is a combat-ready army, the ability to adjust their actions to the requirements of the moment remains. “Those communists did not die (and, most likely, will not die) who will not allow themselves to fall into either illusions or despondency, while maintaining the strength and flexibility of the body for the repeated “starting from the beginning” in the approach to the most difficult task” ( Lenin V.I. 44, p. 418). 

[315] It is interesting that those party leaders who did not fully share Lenin's theory (Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others) tried to interpret Lenin's NEP as a retreat or a retreat par excellence, as a policy that allowed the days of Soviet power to last, but did not allow ensure the victory of the socialist revolution. Those who accepted the Leninist theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution (like, for example, I.V. Stalin) saw in the NEP a way to ensure the victory of the Russian socialist revolution, and not just a way to prolong its existence. 

[316] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 4. S. 239; CPSU in resolutions ... T. 2. S. 448 - 451,452-455, 475. 

 [317] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 356. 

 [318] Trotsky L. How the revolution was armed // Trotsky L. Soch. T. 3, book. 1. S. 284.