The Political Opposition Of Lenin And Trotsky

Selected Articles From "Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics" Sakharov V.A.

Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Since a significant place in Lenin's "Testament" is occupied by an assessment of the political and personal qualities of Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Pyatakov, it is necessary to consider the question of political and personal relations within the Politburo in 1921 - early 1923.

The widely held opinion in traditional historiography that Lenin strove and knew how to use the abilities of all his political opponents and adversaries for collective work does not quite correspond to reality. It would be more accurate to say that he was forced to work with his opponents and adversaries. Lenin built his working relations with other members of the Central Committee, taking into account not only their work and personal qualities, but also the proximity of political positions. And this is natural for a politician. This determined Lenin's relationship to Trotsky.

The time of their close working contacts dating back to the period of the civil war passed with its end and has never returned. In 1921-1922 the growing confrontation on an ever-wider range of theoretical and fundamental political issues, as well as questions of the organization of current politics, were evident. On this basis, in the summer of 1921, political and personal relations sharply escalated between Lenin and Trotsky, and an open struggle began for the possession of real levers of power.

Lenin defended his right to remain the political leader of the party and the revolution. Trotsky openly challenged him, effectively declaring his rights to this leadership. For an outside observer, this could be presented as a struggle for power (as it is sometimes assessed in the literature), but it was a struggle for the possibility of carrying out that political course, which each of them considered the only true one. The struggle for power served only as a means to achieve this goal. The question of power rested on the question of leadership in the party, which made it possible to decisively influence the formation and implementation of the political course.

This struggle determined Lenin's search for such a political combination that would allow him and his supporters to win. At this time and under these conditions, a certain regrouping of political forces took place in the Politburo (and in the Central Committee of the party). A Leninist core was formed, opposing Trotsky and his few supporters. Relying on this political force, Lenin launched an offensive against Trotsky.

Ideas about Lenin's working relations with other members of the Politburo in 1921-1922. can be compiled on the basis of information contained in the registration books of incoming and outgoing documentation of the secretariat of V.I. Lenin [367].

Lenin's contacts with Stalin, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev

	Total number of contacts	Party-government construction*	Economic policy	Domestic politics	Foreign policy	Comintern	Ideology	Other
Stalin	115 (38.7%)	35 (53.0%)	36 (45.6%)	3 (13.6%)	20 (60.6%)	2 (4.9%)	4 (33.3%)	11 (30.6%)
Trotsky	70 (23.5%)	18 (27.3%)	17 (21.5%)	7 (31.8%)	7 (21.2%)	7 (17.1%)	7 (58.3%)	5 (13.9%)
Kamenev	59 (19.8%)	9 (13.6%)	20 (25.3%)	12 (54.5%)	5 (15.2%)	3 (7.3%)	1 (8.3%)	7 (19.4%)
Zinoviev	53 (18.0%)	4 (6.1%)	6 (7.6%)	0	1 (3.0%)	29 (70.7%)	0	13 (36.1%)
Total	297 (100%)	66 (100%)	79 (100%)	22 (100%)	33 (100%)	41 (100%)	12 (100%)	36 (100%)

 * Including issues of national-state, military construction, and personnel issues.

 It can be clearly seen that Stalin is far ahead of the other members of the Politburo in the total number of registered correspondences, noticeably inferior to Trotsky only in the number of contacts on domestic politics, the Comintern and ideology, Kamenev on domestic policy, and Zinoviev on Comintern matters. Trotsky and Kamenev follow him, Zinoviev closes the list.

The statistics of contacts speak volumes (according to a group of cases containing V.I. Lenin's correspondence for 1922) [368], initiated by Lenin. 

Contacts made on the initiative of Lenin

Correspondent/addressee	Total number of correspondences	Incl. directed by V.I. Lenin
		Qty	%
Stalin	47	33	70.2%
Trotsky	59	10	16.9%
Kamenev	32	20	62.5%
Zinoviev	33	14	42.4%

 Attention is drawn to the fact that the largest volume of correspondence relates to the contacts between Lenin and Trotsky, but Lenin, on his own initiative, turned to Trotsky much less often than to others. These figures will have to be adjusted downwards, given that among these letters there was a large proportion of those sent on the list to all members of the Central Committee or the Politburo.

At this time, Trotsky began to introduce into the system a new form of communication with members of the Central Committee - mailing letters, which naturally increased the total volume of correspondence that Lenin received from him. It should also be taken into account that a significant part of it was devoted to issues on which there was a heated discussion between him and Lenin, so their high number speaks not so much about the closeness of their political views, positions, and relations, but about the problems that existed here. Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee testified:

“Cooperation between comrade Trotsky and the majority of the Politburo have been going on for more than a year, mainly in the form of mailing comrade Trotsky of letters and declarations in which he invariably criticizes almost all the activities of the Central Committee. For the most part, the majority of the Politburo refrained from responding in writing to these documents. Only occasionally, in some cases, comrade. Lenin responded with written explanations to one or another of the particularly incorrect statements of Comrade Trotsky"[369].

With regard to the frequency of contacts at the initiative of Lenin, Stalin stands out.

Also indicative is the frequency of references to Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in separate documents (text, title, addressee) published in the 45th and 54th volumes of the Complete Works of V.I. Lenin: Trotsky is mentioned on page 61, Zinoviev on 62, Kamenev on 112, Stalin on 116. Keeping in mind the well-known conventionality of this calculation, we note that its results are in good agreement with the above data.

Of course, these statistics do not give an absolutely accurate picture of Lenin's actual contacts with other members of the Politburo. Only a small part of them were registered on paper in one form or another. A significantly larger number of contacts took place without registration - in the course of personal conversations, telephone conversations, conversations during meetings of the Politburo, plenums of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), etc., however, if we talk about politically important contacts, then many of them were associated with those problems that are reflected in written contacts. In addition, there is reason to believe that such operational and therefore unrecorded contacts between Stalin and Kamenev and Lenin were more or less the same and much more frequent than with Trotsky.

It is known from other sources that at that time Lenin solved many issues together with them. With Zinoviev, who spent much of his time in Petrograd, contacts were necessarily much more modest than with Stalin and Kamenev. And perhaps even less frequent than Trotsky's. If we take this into account, then there are grounds for believing that the above figures, despite their incompleteness, quite accurately convey the general nature of Lenin's contacts with other members of the Politburo.

The formation of a new alignment of political forces in the Politburo, the lowering of Trotsky's political weight, and the strengthening of Stalin's position in the Central Committee can be evidenced by the practice of sending information reports from the OGPU on the situation in the country. They were sent every other day to 31-33 addresses. There is a clear system in the mailing list that allows you to see "who is who" in the then political leadership of the party and the country and confirms our observations. From May (it is from this time that reports are kept) until September 26, 1921, the names on the list go in this order: 1) Lenin and Stalin, 2) Trotsky and Sklyansky, 3) Molotov and Mikhailov (secretaries of the Central Committee of the RCP (b); to them sometimes a third secretary was added - Em. Yaroslavsky). Neither Kamenev nor Zinoviev are among the first persons on the list. It is also indicative that the same copy was sent to Lenin and Stalin. It's clear, which is not due to saving paper. Reports were sent one copy each to Trotsky and Sklyansky, as well as to Molotov and Mikhailov. Trotsky's position in this sense is overshadowed by his blocking with Sklyansky, indicating that the report was sent to Trotsky not as a member of the party leadership and leader No. 2 in the party, but as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. This position of Trotsky did not change even later (lists are available until mid-July 1922) [370].

The expansion of the front of struggle between Lenin and Trotsky on the fundamental issues of the development of the socialist revolution and the implementation of the NEP was reflected in their work and personal relations. Outside of the meetings of the Politburo and other collegiate bodies, in which they contacted out of necessity, these relations were insignificant, intensified only from time to time and, as a rule, were limited to the issues on which they were discussing, i.e. were mostly negative in nature.

Contacts not marked by controversy are increasingly limited to political fluidity. Lenin only occasionally made positive “nods” to Trotsky [371]. Their correspondence suggests that the range of domestic and foreign policy issues discussed by them was narrowing. Lenin tries to avoid personal contacts with Trotsky, even by telephone, preferring to conduct them through intermediaries [372]. Of course, one cannot conclude from this that Trotsky as a politician was ignored by Lenin. But everything that could be decided without direct contact with Trotsky was decided by Lenin in this way. Yaroslavsky, who in 1921 was secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), recalled that

"Lenin repeatedly expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Trotsky, saying that he was 'mortally tired' of Trotsky's hysteria"[373].

Contacts between Lenin and Trotsky at the meetings of the Politburo during this period, especially from the middle of 1921, often took on a conflict character. Molotov recalled that in the first period after the 10th Party Congress, at meetings of the Politburo, “we sat almost next to Trotsky in the Politburo. Or rather, this: I am near Lenin, and Trotsky is opposite, obliquely. Trotsky was the first and constant opponent of Lenin, and during this period he adapted and walked in a common harness, so Lenin appreciated him all the same,” however, in the summer of 1921 the situation changed and “it became impossible to work with Trotsky” [374] .

M.I. Ulyanova recalled:

“At one meeting of the PB, Trotsky called Ilyich a “hooligan”. Lenin turned pale as chalk but restrained himself. "It seems that some people here are playing tricks on their nerves," he said something like this in response to Trotsky's rudeness, according to his comrades, who told me about this case. He did not feel sympathy for Trotsky, and besides that, this man had too many traits that made it extremely difficult to work collectively with him.” [375]

A vivid picture of the relationship between Lenin and Trotsky, which excluded joint not only comradely, but also simply impeding the more or less productive work of the Politburo, is a letter given by of 9 members and candidates of the Politburo dated December 31, 1923. Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rudzutak, Rykov, Stalin and Tomsky wrote:

“Before Comrade fell ill. Lenin, at the time when comrade Lenin directly supervised the work of the Politburo," it "could not work quietly precisely because comrade Trotsky introduced those elements of factionalism and isolation at the same time, which he began to introduce to an even greater extent since then, as comrade Lenin fell ill (our italics. - BC).

Comrade Trotsky, then and now, complains about the absence of a planned element in the work of the Politburo. But if anyone bears the blame for the fact that the work of the Politburo proceeded and to some extent, still proceeded in an extremely tense and nervous atmosphere, it is Comrade Trotsky. For months and months, Comrade Trotsky appears at the meetings of the Politburo (and this was at the time when Comrade Lenin presided over the Politburo) with a thick English dictionary, and during almost the entire meeting defiantly studied English, from time to time being distracted from this lesson only in order to make an acrimonious remark about the poor system of work in the Politburo. More than once things came to sharp clashes and serious conflicts between Comrade Trotsky, on the one hand, and Comrade Lenin, who presided over the Politburo, and other members of the Politburo, on the other. In view of the extreme nervousness of the situation, Comrade Lenin increasingly turned to the undersigned with a proposal to resolve this or that issue by voting by telephone, in order only to avoid unnecessary scenes, conflicts, etc. ” [376].

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on January 1, 1926, during Trotsky’s polemic with Stalin on the organization of the work of the Politburo and Trotsky’s participation in it, Petrovsky stated:

“And by the way, I must say that at one time Vladimir Ilyich complained at meetings of the Politburo that few people work. Here is Comrade Trotsky,” said Ilyich, “sitting and reading English books—he doesn’t work much.” Petrovsky was supported by Yaroslavsky, who in 1921 was secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). None of the Politburo members present protested this statement. Trotsky answered without refuting what was said on the merits [377].

It is not surprising that Lenin began to take measures that could somehow remove or mitigate the problem that had arisen. Molotov talked about the methods that Lenin resorted to during the meetings of the Politburo to conduct a political struggle against Trotsky. In particular, he said that in 1921 he “participated in Lenin’s conspiracy against Trotsky”:

“Lenin suggested that we gather for meetings of the Politburo without Trotsky. We conspired against him."[378]

Interesting documents confirming Molotov's testimony were cited by D.A. Volkogonov [379]. So, for example, when Kamenev made a proposal to finance the army, Lenin wrote in a letter: "I fully join"; Stalin, Zinoviev and Molotov also wrote their consent, while Trotsky abstained. Then Lenin wrote: “I propose to meet today at my place ... together with Stalin (Zinoviev and Molotov) and agree on the convocation of the Politburo,

The political conflict that was brewing between Lenin and Trotsky has already in the summer of 1921 become so aggravated that Lenin made an attempt to send Trotsky to work somewhere in Moscow. Various options were discussed, and they settled on Ukraine, where work on the procurement of grain was difficult and needed organizational strengthening. A formal reason was found. The real reason was different: Lenin wanted to remove Trotsky from Moscow in order to free his hands to carry out the chosen course, get rid of the importunate critic and get rid of the disruptor of the work of the Politburo. In addition, the absence of Trotsky in Moscow for a long time would eventually raise the question of the need to replace him as head of the military department, since it would be difficult to combine the hard work of preparing food for the People's Commissariat of Food of Ukraine and the leadership of the army outside Moscow. Molotov told about the presence of such an intention in Lenin:

“Lenin understood that from the point of view of complicating matters in the party and the state, Trotsky acted very corruptly. Dangerous figure. It was felt that Lenin would be glad to get rid of him, but he could not. And Trotsky had enough strong, direct supporters, there were also neither this nor that, but they recognized his great authority ... Lenin, no less than Stalin, understood what Trotsky was, and believed that the time would come to remove Trotsky, Lenin decided to get rid of him: "Let's go to Zinoviev to come to an agreement, what should we do?" Three of us - Lenin, Kamenev, and I ... went to Zinoviev to negotiate what to do with Trotsky. He should have been removed from the post of People's Commissar of the Navy"[381].

Trying to soften the negative impression of this story, Trotsky, in a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated October 23, 1923, tried to create the impression that it was an ordinary business trip, which he and other members of the Politburo had a lot of and which “had nothing to do with to internal disagreements in the Politburo, but were caused by urgent business needs. Trotsky described this story as a “ten-degree episode” [382].

Many of his explanations were accepted willingly. Volkogonov supported this version by ignoring archival materials to which he had access and could not have been unaware of this story. Calling Trotsky Lenin's "magic wand" who was sitting in the Kremlin all the time, he assured the reader that this time Trotsky refused to travel because of his overburdened business and managed to convince Lenin "of the correctness of his position" [383].

This version is also supported by the publishers of Trotsky’s letter to members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the RCP(b) dated October 23, 1923, who made an attempt to smooth out the conflict between Lenin and Trotsky and present this story, if not for the benefit of Trotsky’s political authority, then at least without prejudice for him. This is achieved by referring to the Politburo's agreement "not to enforce this decision until the convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)"[384].

In the Bio-chronicle of Lenin, the fact of the conflict is not hidden, but its history is presented in a distorted form, hiding the severity of the conflict varnishes the true relationship between Lenin and Trotsky and thus supports the legend of Lenin's desire to rally all his political opponents and adversaries around him[385]

What actually happened? Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in a letter dated October 19, 1923 said:

“No one else but Comrade. Lenin, by the end of 1921 (the date is indicated erroneously. - BC) passed a decision in the Politburo on the appointment of comrade Trotsky to Ukraine as authorized by the People's Commissariat of Food"; this decision, later canceled, “was caused precisely by the intolerable situation that was created by the constant declarations of comrade Trotsky against the majority of the Central Committee"[386].

In solving this problem, Lenin personally did not connect any special hopes with Trotsky. The so-called “Pomgol”, which included Trotsky, was directly involved in the fight against hunger. All work was under the control of the Politburo, in which these questions went mainly through Lenin and Kamenev. A good harvest was expected in Ukraine, and great hopes were placed on it in the fight against hunger. Questions were discussed about how to organize the harvest and tax in kind, the size of the possible seizure of grain [387].

On July 16, 1921, Lenin submitted a proposal to the Politburo “on the appointment of comrade. Trotsky NKProdom of Ukraine. Trotsky protested. How he argued his refusal, we do not know; the protest, apparently, was energetic enough, but unconvincing for the Politburo, because the decision made read:

“a) Appoint Comrade Trotsky to the NKProdom of Ukraine.

b) In view of Comrade Trotsky's protest, this decision should not be carried out until the convening of the Plenum.

Instruct the Organizing Bureau to convene the Plenum as soon as possible” [388].

It is no coincidence that Trotsky and the historiography following him are trying to mitigate the acuteness of the problem that has arisen. There is a “state of emergency”: a member of the Politburo refuses to comply with the decision of the Politburo, and in order to solve the problem that has arisen, it is decided to speed up the convocation of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party. This is not an ordinary case. No matter how he argued his act (he was not sick), this refusal of Trotsky to obey meant a gross violation of party discipline. It is clear from the resolution that Trotsky did not convince the Politburo that he was right. Measures were even taken to quickly bring the issue to the discussion of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party and resolve it there in a positive way. This decision shows, therefore, that Lenin also did not abandon his intention to "send" Trotsky to the Ukraine.

But Trotsky is not so simple either. Well, if he does not want to get grain in Ukraine for the starving Russia (he has other plans!), Then he will find the necessary arguments. What exactly happened is not entirely clear. Trotsky later described what happened as follows:

“I got in touch by phone with Comrade Rakovsky, who stated that all the necessary measures to provide the workers' centers with grain had already been taken [389]. Vladimir Ilyich at first insisted on my trip, but then abandoned this idea. [390]

This is such a good picture. However, later he offered another version of events:

“Comrade Lenin was afraid in the autumn (an error in determining the time. - V.S.) that the Ukrainians would not show sufficient energy in collecting the tax in kind (and during this period this issue was very important) and offered to send me (not from the People's Commissariat for Food, but from the Central Committee (this is a direct lie. - BC)) for the appropriate "pressure"... since I got the impression from my previous visit to Ukraine that the Ukrainian comrades would do what they needed themselves, I considered my trip unnecessary. The disagreement was purely practical. Comrade Lenin's proposal was accepted. Then, in order to avoid confusion in relations, I proposed to appoint me temporarily (it was about 4-6 weeks) as People's Commissariat for Food of Ukraine. This was accepted (without exemption, of course, from other duties) [391].

The next day, Lenin himself, having received more reassuring information from Kharkov, came to me at the military commissariat and offered to cancel yesterday's decision, which I met, of course, with sympathy, since I considered the decision made inexpedient. [392]

Trotsky got confused in his versions. In his place, either Lenin himself proposed to appoint him a People's Commissariat for Food, or Trotsky suggested this idea to him. Either Lenin made this proposal, or he himself recognized it as inexpedient. Now Trotsky agrees to go as a People's Commissariat for Food, then he expresses a strong protest.

Now Trotsky agrees to go as a People's Commissariat for Food, then he expresses a strong protest. Either he contacts Rakovsky after the decision of the Politburo is made and receives assurances from him that they will manage without him, or it turns out that in his objections he relied on his own impressions from a previous trip to Ukraine. Understand who can ... The same can be said about Trotsky's statement that Lenin visited him in the military department, this fact does not find confirmation in other documents, Lenin's Biochronicle is silent about him. It records Lenin’s conversation with Trotsky on July 27, 1921, about sending him to Ukraine and about the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), but nothing is said about the fact that Lenin went to Trotsky for this [393].

The only constant element in Trotsky's stories is that Lenin admits his ignorance, the incorrectness of his assessments, the irrationality of his proposals, and Trotsky's superiority over himself. Moreover, he considers it necessary to record this not only orally before Trotsky, but also in writing before the Politburo, and to testify his respect for Trotsky by a personal visit to him in the military department.

Impressive picture! But Trotsky cannot be trusted! The documents that these days came to Lenin from Ukraine indicated that the problem of collecting the food tax remained very complex and acute, requiring full effort. The available documents show that Lenin himself communicated with the leaders of Ukraine, was aware of all the affairs and did not need Trotsky's mediation [394]. On August 2, Lenin's appeal to the international proletariat with a request to help Soviet Russia [395] suggests that he assessed the complexity of the situation in a completely different way than Trotsky.

Trotsky found some other arguments to get Lenin to abandon his original plan. It is possible that Lenin could be persuaded to make a concession to Trotsky by a threat to present his departure to the Ukraine as a manifestation of political struggle, a manifestation of factionalism, etc., and on this basis to begin a new round of intra-party struggle. Lenin believed that the time for an open battle had not yet come, the conditions for it had not yet ripened. There are grounds for such an assumption. It is known that the matter was decided in the course of a private conversation between Lenin and Trotsky between July 16 and 23. Lenin wrote about this on July 23, 1921, in a note to Molotov:

 "I already told you about my conversation with him."

And that's all. Lenin is silent about its content. Molotov did not mention it either. Lenin's intentions are indicated by his other note to Molotov, in which he reported on the same conversation:

"I think that on this attempt at "Peace and Concessions" (at least for a while - peace is still better than a quarrel, publicity at the Plenum, etc.) - we could all come together. "Let's try," Lenin concluded. He also informed Molotov that Kamenev and Zinoviev agreed, Trotsky "also, as I understand it, agrees"[396].

On July 28, 1921, Lenin wrote a draft resolution of the Politburo, which he sent to Trotsky and other members of the Politburo. Lenin proposed an interesting and unprecedented document in the history of the party: "The draft unanimous resolution of the Pburo" (emphasis added. - V.S.). It read: "

1. The decision of the Pburo to appoint Comrade Trotsky to party work in Ukraine is cancelled.

2. It is decided that Comrade Trotsky, in connection with the aggravation of the international situation (signs of the aggressive policy of France; something like the “experience” of intervention in Murmansk, etc.), devotes more energy to military work (strengthening the combat training of the army) [397].

3. It is decided that Comrade Trotsky has the right to take (at a distance not too far from Moscow, so as not to break away from work in the center) one or more state farms under the jurisdiction of the military department; to these state farms, in the form of an experiment, the law on the expansion of the financial and material independence of large enterprises is applied; these state farms lease neighboring industrial enterprises in order to combine agriculture with industry and create an economic whole with the special task of checking from below the correctness and expediency of our decrees, analyzing the conditions for hiring and employing non-military labor, etc. This experiment must be carried out under conditions which, for the sake of the pure conduct of this experiment, exclude any privileged position for these enterprises and state farms. Not excluding the leasing of state farms of other departments for the same purposes,

By special decree:

It is recognized that it is necessary to put on the agenda the question of a more intensive transfer of the army to economic work, and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic [of the Republic] is instructed to specifically discuss and put this in a series of meetings” [398].

Let's think about the title, it deserves special attention: the draft unanimous resolution. What can this be more than strange name coined by Lenin speak about? The fact that the "unanimous decision" of the Politburo on August 9, 1921, to which Trotsky refers, was not the result of a discussion and recognition by the members of the Politburo as erroneous of their own decision to send Trotsky to the Ukraine by the People's Commissariat for Food (July 16, 1921), but the result of some agreement reached by Lenin and Trotsky, a compromise between them. The demand for unanimity was addressed by Lenin both to his supporters and to Trotsky. The former had to be pushed to change their minds, and Trotsky to compromise.

In order to understand the real reasons that prompt Lenin and his supporters to send Trotsky to work in Ukraine (or rather, to remove him from Moscow), two letters from Molotov to Lenin are invaluable, from which it becomes clear that the real reason for the question about Trotsky's work was the desire to remove him from Moscow. Anywhere! Under any acceptable pretext! And this whole story appears in its true light as a manifestation of one of the most acute phases of Lenin's political struggle against Trotsky.

On July 30, 1921, Molotov informed Lenin of Trotsky's reply to Lenin's draft "unanimous resolution" which was being discussed in the Politburo. It is clear from Molotov's letter that Trotsky had objections. He considered that “the third point is worded ... incorrectly. What does it mean:

"Trotsky has the right to take one or more state farms under the jurisdiction of the military department." Since the state farms are in the military department, there is no need for any resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee. We are talking about state farms and enterprises that are not in the hands of the military department. I believe that the third point should have been worded as follows: the Politburo proposes that the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat for Food (or their Moscow bodies) come to an agreement with the military department represented by Comrade Trotsky on the transfer of several state farms and industrial enterprises to the military department on one or another contractual basis. [expected] x enterprises within the Moscow province, which in their totality could create a combined enterprise, on the basis of which it would be possible to study and apply new decrees, the correctness and expediency of various economic methods, etc., etc., when establishing contractual relations, be guided by the decrees that exist on this account and are to be followed on leasing, etc., and at the same time provide all possible assistance to the specified economic experience”[399].

On the same day, Molotov wrote another letter to Lenin:

 “I will give my opinion:

I believe that your proposal ("draft unanimous] resolution]") did not provide any desirable way out of the situation that had arisen, and most importantly, could create an aura of "persecuted" comrade Trotsky. "Experiments" such as those proposed by you and Comrade Trotsky, in addition to their dubious value, are unlikely to be intelligible to the majority of party members [400].

It seems to me that one of the following solutions would be the best way out:

First (best). Trotsky is chairman of the Petrograd Soviet with a directive to pay attention to economic work. Or Trotsky, [formally deputy chairman of the Petro[grad] Soviet (temporarily, for 1/2 year, in view of the need for Comrade Zinoviev to take up the Comintern after the congress, and therefore temporarily stay in Moscow). Or another combination of this kind (for example, Trotsky, chairman of the economic] meeting] of the Northern [northern] region, while remaining in the RVSR).

Second. Trotsky deals with both the army and the people's commissariat of labor in view of the connection of the armies with economic work and special assignments in the field of preserving the proletariat, protecting the main cadre from being dissipated, and so on. There are two (main) inconveniences here: 1) associated with his participation in the SRT in his current mood, 2) the possibility of sharp conflicts in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Third. Tr[otsky] chairman of the economic conference] in the Urals or the Ukraine. But it is again possible that it will be accepted as expulsion, etc.

All such combinations would, it seems to me, be more durable than others. [401]

During the preparation of the Plenum of the Central Committee, Lenin himself supplemented the agenda with a paragraph on Trotsky:

“15. Decision [Pb about comrade. Trotsky[om]” [402].

This means that he wanted to bring the decision about Trotsky to the end. On August 9, 1921, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) canceled the decision of the Politburo to send Trotsky to Ukraine by the People's Commissariat for Food and adopted the draft "unanimous resolution" prepared by Lenin (July 28, 1921).

The attempt to remove Trotsky failed. It was necessary not only to continue to work with him in Moscow, but also to take measures to counteract his attempts to get to the levers of economic management, which, combined with his position in the army, would turn him into an economic and, therefore, political dictator.

By allowing Trotsky to start the "economic experiment", Lenin, apparently, pursued political goals. Molotov recalled Lenin's reaction to the decision of the Plenum:

“Lenin shook hands! He said: “Try to do something in agriculture in one year! Nothing is impossible!” [403].

Some of today's critics of Lenin may say: behold, he has given a man a hopeless cause and rejoices at the inevitable failure. It's not friendly. Answer: do not rush! Lenin had reason to put the question in this way. Trotsky believed that Lenin was procrastinating, organizing things poorly, so the revolution was losing momentum, and so on. Lenin, on the other hand, believed that in matters of economics it was impossible to go so fast and get such quick results as Trotsky spoke about.

Members of the Politburo spoke about this: “Already at the very beginning of the “economic” speeches of Comrade. Trotsky against the majority of the Central Committee, two or three years ago, none other than Comrade Lenin explained Comrade Trotsky dozens of times that economic questions are among those where quick successes are impossible, where years and years of patient and persistent work are required in order to achieve serious results. More than once, Comrade Lenin explained that in the field of raising our economy, nothing serious can be achieved by impudent, swooping, strong words, and even more so by panicky exaggerations. [404]. Taking into account these discussions, the meaning of Lenin's words, transmitted by Molotov, will be as follows: try to show yourself in practice how to do it. The experience will do you good, maybe.

In the second half of 1921 - 1922 the process of exclusion of Trotsky from party and state work took place quietly, but steadily. Step by step, Lenin advanced in this direction. This was also noted by D.A. Volkogonov, who provided extensive material characterizing this process. His attempts to impose his scheme of reorganization of management were rejected, Trotsky's desire to obtain key levers of power in the economy (to become an "economic dictator") was blocked.

Outside the framework of the Politburo and the military department (where his independence began to be severely limited), "leader No.2” working along the lines of Pomgol and ARA, took part in the discussion of certain issues of industrial development [405].

Over time, in his correspondence with Lenin, the flow of regarding secondary and even minor issues relating to the Comintern, issues of foreign and domestic policy, individual issues of personnel appointments, which he either raised before Lenin or participated in their solution increased [406]. The sphere where he continued to maintain more or less regular contact with Lenin was ideology and propaganda, the Comintern, foreign policy, in particular the organization and holding of the Genoa Conference [407].

Lenin's desire to sideline Trotsky from managing the economy, to load him with political fluidity, is especially pronounced if we consider that at the same time the process of expanding authority upon Stalin and Kamenev was underway.

Notes: 

[367] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. Case 3. Sheet 4 rev., 9, 10 rev., 11, 32 rev., 35, 41 rev., 43, 45 rev., 49, 49 rev., 51, 53, 55–57, 59, 60, 60v, 67–68v, 74–75, 77v. 78, 80v, 81, 83v, 84, 92v, 93, 94, 94v, 95v ., 97–102, 104, 104v, 106–106v, 107v, 108, 109, 110, 111–111v, 112v, 114–116v, 118; D. 7. L. 4, 4v., 5v., 8, 10v., 11, 14v., 24v., 36v., 38, 40, 45–47, 49, 53v., 57 rev., 61 rev., 62 rev. –65, 68v, 69, 70v, 72v, 73v, 76, 83–84v, 86v, 94v, 114v, 116, 116v, 118, 121v, 123v, 124v , 125, 126 rev, 127, 127 rev, 129, 133, 134 rev-136, 137 rev, 139; D. 8. L. 6, 6 rev, 8, 9 rev, 11, 13, 13 rev, 18-19 rev, 25 rev, 26 rev, 33 rev, 34 rev, 38, 39 rev, 45 rev.- 46 rev, 64 rev - 65 rev, 73 rev, 76 rev, 80, 94 rev, 96, 96 rev, 101, 102 rev, 141, 159 rev; D. 9. L. 2, 4v, 7, 8, 8v, 18-21, 23, 24, 24v, 30v, 31, 

[368] Ibid. D. 26, 28, 30, 32–35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43. 

[369] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 176. 

[370] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2623. L. 146; D. 2624–2636. 

[371] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 6, 7. 

[372] Ibid. T. 54. S. 131. 

[373] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 189. 

[374] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 205. 

[375] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197. 

[376] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. P. 212. Lenin's documents confirm this. Lenin often suggested to Molotov that a decision be made on this or that issue by polling the members of the Politburo, “in a round-robin fashion” (see: V. I. Lenin, Complete collection of works, vol. 54, pp. 57, 58, 70; One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov. From the diary of F. Chuev, p. 200. 

[377] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 209. L. 9-11. 

[378] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. pp. 201-202, 204-208. 

[379] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 23. 

[380] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 305. 

[381] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. pp. 182, 207. 

[382] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 173. 

[383] Cit. by: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. P. 21. 

[384] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 182. 

[385] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 11. S. 127-128. 

[386] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 187. 

[387] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 179. L. 5; D. 184. L. 1; D. 186. L. 1; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44, pp. 67–69.

 [388] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 190. L. 4. 

[389] It turns out that all the emergency measures that Trotsky himself voted for, taken at that time and later by the Politburo, were useless? 

[390] Questions of history. 1989. No. 8. S. 138–139. 

[391] Trotsky also links his appointment with the fate of his other duties, the main of which are: member of the Politburo, People's Commissar of the RSFSR, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. 

[392] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 173. 

[393] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle. T. 11. S. 105, 106; Lenin collection. T. XXXIX. S. 359. 

[394] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 2723. L. 1–1 rev.; Op. 2. D. 42. L. 3, 4, 7v. 

[395] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44, pp. 75–76, 77. 

[396] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 71. L. 5, 24; F. 2. Op. 1. D. 20015. L. 1–1 rev. 

[397] References to the danger of war cannot be taken seriously because Lenin himself did not consider such a danger to be serious. In Lenin's project, this was expressed in a proposal to speed up the transfer of the army to economic work in the context of ongoing demobilization, which Trotsky objected to in the Politburo and which Lenin and Stalin insisted on (see: RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24619. L 1-2, F. 5. Inventory 1. D. 1954. L. 12; Lenin, V. I. Complete collection of works, vol. 44, pp. 3-4, 35-36; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. S. 182). 

[398] Ibid. L. 5, 24–25. 

[399] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24608. L. 1–2 rev. 

[400] From this we can conclude that Molotov took a tougher line with regard to Trotsky than Lenin. Or maybe he showed more impatience in this struggle. 

[401] Ibid. L. 2–3. 

[402] Ibid. D. 24613. L. 1. 

[403] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 207. 

[404] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 7. S. 177. 

[405] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 7a; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 176. 

[406] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 293. L. 1; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 303. L. 1–7. 

[407] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 148; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 297. L. 1; F. 17. Op. 3. D. 247. L. 3.