Stalin to members of the Politburo and Adoratsky July 19, 1934

From; marxistleninists.org
Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 82–86. Script. Typescript.

To members of the Politburo and Comrade Adoratsky.

In sending out Engels's article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism," I consider it necessary to preface it with the following remarks.

Comrade Adoratsky proposes to publish in the next issue of Bolshevik, dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the world imperialist war, Engels' well-known article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism", first published abroad in 1890. I would consider it quite normal if it were proposed to publish this article in the collection of Engels' works or in one of the historical journals. But we are offered to publish it in our military magazine, in Bolshevik, in the issue dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the world imperialist war. Consequently, they believe that this article can be regarded as guiding, or in any case deeply instructive for our Party workers from the point of view of clarifying the problems of imperialism and imperialist wars. But Engels' article, as can be seen from its content, despite its merits, unfortunately does not have these qualities. Moreover, it has a number of such shortcomings, which, if published without criticism, may confuse the reader.

Therefore, I would consider it inexpedient to publish Engels's article in the next issue of Bolshevik.

But what are these disadvantages?

1. Describing the aggressive policy of Russian tsarism and paying tribute to the abominations of this policy, Engels explains it not so much by the “need” of the military-feudal-merchant elite of Russia in access to the seas, seaports, in expanding foreign trade and mastering strategic points, but by the fact that Russia's foreign policy was headed by an allegedly all-powerful and very talented gang of foreign adventurers who, for some reason, were lucky everywhere and in everything, who miraculously managed to overcome any and all obstacles on the way to their adventurous goal, who surprisingly deftly deceived all European rulers and achieved , finally, what made Russia the most powerful militarily state.

Such an interpretation of the question in the mouth of Engels may seem more than incredible, but, unfortunately, it is a fact.

Here are the relevant passages from Engels' article.

“Foreign policy,” says Engels, “is undoubtedly the area in which tsarism is very, very strong. Russian diplomacy is forming a kind of new Jesuit order, powerful enough to overcome, if necessary, even the royal whims and, spreading corruption around them widely, to stop it in their own midst. At first, this order was recruited mainly from foreigners: Corsicans, such as Pozzo di Borgo, Germans, like Nesselrode, East See Germans, like Lieven. Its founder, Catherine II, was also a foreigner.

“Until now, only one full- blooded Russian, Gorchakov, has held the highest post in this order. His successor, von Giere, again bears a foreign surname.

“This secret society, originally recruited from foreign adventurers, raised the Russian state to its present power. With iron perseverance, steadily pursuing the intended goal, not stopping either at treachery, or at betrayal, or at murder from behind a corner, or before cringing, corpses and at least one royal corpse - this gang, as unscrupulous as it is talented, did more than all the Russian armies in order to expand the borders of Russia from the Dnieper and Dvina beyond the Vistula, to the Prut, Danube, to the Black sea, from the Don and the Volga beyond the Caucasus, to the sources of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya. It was she who made Russia great, powerful, fearsome, and opened the way for her to world domination. (Cm.

One might think that in the history of Russia, in its external history, diplomacy was everything, and tsars, feudal lords, merchants and other social groups - nothing, or almost nothing.

One might think that if Russian adventurers like Gorchakov and others, rather than foreign adventurers like Nesselrode or Giers, were at the head of Russia's foreign policy, then Russia's foreign policy would take a different path.

I'm not talking about the fact that the policy of conquest, with all its abominations and filth, did not at all constitute the monopoly of the Russian tsars. Everyone knows that the policy of conquest was also characteristic - no less, if not more, of the kings and diplomats of all European countries, including such an emperor of a bourgeois formation as Napoleon, who, despite his non-royal origin, successfully practiced in its foreign policy and intrigue, and deceit, and treachery, and flattery, and atrocities, and bribery, and murder, and arson.

It is clear that it could not be otherwise.

Evidently, in his pamphlet against Russian tsarism (Engels's article is a good militant pamphlet), Engels got carried away a little and, being carried away, forgot for a minute about some elementary things well known to him.

2. Describing the situation in Europe and revealing the causes and prospects for the impending world war, Engels writes:

“The present situation in Europe is determined by three facts: 1) the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, 2) the desire of tsarist Russia for Constantinople, 3) the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is flaring up more and more hotly in all countries, a struggle whose thermometer is the widespread upsurge of the socialist movement” .

“The first two facts determine the modern division of Europe into two large military camps. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine turned France into an ally of Russia against Germany, the tsarist threat to Constantinople turns Austria and even Italy into an ally of Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive battle - for a war such as the world has never seen before, for a war in which ten to fifteen million armed fighters will face each other. Only two circumstances have hitherto prevented the outbreak of this terrible war: firstly, the unheard of rapid development of military technology, in which each newly invented type of weapon, before it can be introduced in at least onearmy, is overtaken by new inventions, and, secondly, the absolute impossibility of calculating the chances, the complete uncertainty of who will emerge victorious in the end from this gigantic struggle.

“All this danger of a world war will disappear on the day when things in Russia will take such a turn that the Russian people will be able to put an end to the traditional policy of conquest of their tsars and, instead of fantasies of world domination, take up their own vital interests within the country, interests that are threatened by extreme danger".

"... The Russian National Assembly, which wants to cope with at least the most urgent internal tasks, will have to decisively put an end to all aspirations for new conquests."

“With increasing speed, as if on an inclined plane, Europe is rolling into the abyss of a world war of unheard-of scope and force. Only one thing can stop her: a change in the order in Russia. That this should happen in the coming years is beyond any doubt.

"... On the day when tsarist power falls, this last stronghold of all-European reaction, on that day a completely different wind will blow in Europe" (see ibid.).

It is impossible not to notice that in this characterization of the situation in Europe and in the list of causes leading to a world war, one important moment was omitted, which later played a decisive role, namely, the moment of the imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, for sources of raw materials, which already then had a very serious importance, the role of England as a factor in the coming world war, the moment of contradictions between Germany and England, contradictions that were already of serious importance at that time and later played an almost decisive role in the emergence and development of the world war, are missed.

I think that this omission is the main shortcoming of Engels' article.

From this shortcoming follow other shortcomings, of which it would not hurt to note the following:

a) Reassessment of the role of the desire of tsarist Russia for Constantinople in the brewing of a world war. True, initially Engels puts in first place, as a factor of war, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but then he pushes this moment into the background and brings to the fore the conquest aspirations of Russian tsarism, arguing that "all this danger of a world war will disappear at that the day when things in Russia will take such a turn that the Russian people will be able to put an end to the traditional aggressive policy of their tsars.

This, of course, is an exaggeration.

b) Revaluationthe role of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, the role of the "Russian National Assembly" (bourgeois parliament) in preventing an impending world war. Engels argues that the fall of Russian tsarism is the only way to prevent a world war. This is a clear exaggeration. The new, bourgeois system in Russia with its "National Assembly" could not have prevented war, if only because the mainsprings of the war lay in the plane of the imperialist struggle between the principal imperialist powers. The fact is that since the Crimean defeat of Russia (the fifties of the last century), the independent role of tsarism in the field of European foreign policy began to decline significantly, and by the time before the world imperialist war, tsarist Russia played in essence the role of an auxiliary reserve for the main powers of Europe.

c) Reassessment of the role of tsarist power as "the last stronghold of pan-European reaction" (the words of Engels). That tsarist power in Russia was a mighty stronghold of all-European (and also Asian) reaction—of this there can be no doubt. But that it should be the last stronghold of this reaction—this can be doubted.

It should be noted that these shortcomings in Engels' article are not only of "historical value". They have or should have had still more important practical significance. Indeed: if the imperialist struggle for colonies and spheres of influence is overlooked as a factor in the impending world war, if the imperialist contradictions between England and Germany are also overlooked, if the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, as a factor in the war, is relegated to the background before the desire of Russian tsarism for Constantinople, as a more important and even determining factor in the war, ifFinally, Russian tsarism represents the last stronghold of pan-European reaction—is it not clear that a war, say, between bourgeois Germany and tsarist Russia is not an imperialist, predatory, anti-people war, but a war of liberation, or almost a war of liberation?

It can hardly be doubted that such a train of thought should have facilitated the fall of the German Social Democracy on August 4, 1914, when it decided to vote for war credits and proclaimed the slogan of defending the bourgeois fatherland from Tsarist Russia, from "Russian barbarism", etc.

It is characteristic that in his letters addressed to Bebel, written in 1891 (a year after the publication of Engels's article), where he discusses the prospects for an impending war, Engels directly says that "the victory of Germany is, therefore, the victory of the revolution", that "if Russia will start a war - forward to the Russians and their allies, whoever they are!

It is clear that with such a train of thought there is no room for revolutionary defeatism, for the Leninist policy of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.

Such is the case with the shortcomings of Engels' article.

Apparently, Engels, alarmed at that time (1890–1891) by the Franco-Russian alliance, which was directed with its tip against the Austro-German coalition, set out to attack the foreign policy of Russian tsarism in his article and deprive it of any confidence in the eyes of public opinion in Europe before all of England, but in realizing this goal, he lost sight of a number of other important and even defining points, which resulted in the one-sidedness of the article.

After all that has been said, is it worth publishing Engels's article in our militant organ, Bolshevik, as a guiding article, or in any case deeply instructive, for it is clear that publishing it in Bolshevik means giving it tacitly such a recommendation?

I don't think it's worth it.

I. Stalin.

19.VII.34