Stalin to members of the Politburo and Adoratsky July 19, 1934
Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 82–86. Script. Typescript.
To members of the Politburo and Comrade Adoratsky.
In sending out Engels's article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism," I
consider it necessary to preface it with the following remarks.
Comrade Adoratsky proposes to publish in the next issue of Bolshevik, dedicated
to the twentieth anniversary of the world imperialist war, Engels' well-known
article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism", first published abroad in 1890.
I would consider it quite normal if it were proposed to publish this article in
the collection of Engels' works or in one of the historical journals. But we are
offered to publish it in our military magazine, in Bolshevik, in the issue
dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the world imperialist war.
Consequently, they believe that this article can be regarded as guiding, or in
any case deeply instructive for our Party workers from the point of view of
clarifying the problems of imperialism and imperialist wars. But Engels'
article, as can be seen from its content, despite its merits, unfortunately does not have these qualities. Moreover, it has a number of such shortcomings, which, if
published without criticism, may confuse the reader.
Therefore, I would consider it inexpedient to publish Engels's article in the
next issue of Bolshevik.
But what are these disadvantages?
1. Describing the aggressive policy of Russian tsarism and paying tribute to the
abominations of this policy, Engels explains it not so much by the “need” of the
military-feudal-merchant elite of Russia in access to the seas, seaports, in
expanding foreign trade and mastering strategic points, but by the fact that
Russia's foreign policy was headed by an allegedly all-powerful and very
talented gang of foreign adventurers who, for some reason, were lucky everywhere
and in everything, who miraculously managed to overcome any and all obstacles on
the way to their adventurous goal, who surprisingly deftly deceived all European
rulers and achieved , finally, what made Russia the most powerful militarily
state.
Such an interpretation of the question in the mouth of Engels may seem more than
incredible, but, unfortunately, it is a fact.
Here are the relevant passages from Engels' article.
“Foreign policy,” says Engels, “is undoubtedly the area in which tsarism is
very, very strong. Russian diplomacy is forming a kind of new Jesuit order,
powerful enough to overcome, if necessary, even the royal whims and, spreading
corruption around them widely, to stop it in their own midst. At first, this
order was recruited mainly from foreigners: Corsicans, such as Pozzo di Borgo,
Germans, like Nesselrode, East See Germans, like Lieven. Its founder, Catherine
II, was also a foreigner.
“Until now, only one full- blooded Russian, Gorchakov, has held the highest post
in this order. His successor, von Giere, again bears a foreign surname.
“This secret society, originally recruited from foreign adventurers, raised the
Russian state to its present power. With iron perseverance, steadily pursuing
the intended goal, not stopping either at treachery, or at betrayal, or at
murder from behind a corner, or before cringing, corpses and at least one royal
corpse - this gang, as unscrupulous as it is talented, did more than all the
Russian armies in order to expand the borders of Russia from the Dnieper and
Dvina beyond the Vistula, to the Prut, Danube, to the Black sea, from the Don
and the Volga beyond the Caucasus, to the sources of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya.
It was she who made Russia great, powerful, fearsome, and opened the way for her
to world domination. (Cm.
One might think that in the history of Russia, in its external history,
diplomacy was everything, and tsars, feudal lords, merchants and other social
groups - nothing, or almost nothing.
One might think that if Russian adventurers like Gorchakov and others, rather
than foreign adventurers like Nesselrode or Giers, were at the head of Russia's
foreign policy, then Russia's foreign policy would take a different path.
I'm not talking about the fact that the policy of conquest, with all its
abominations and filth, did not at all constitute the monopoly of the Russian
tsars. Everyone knows that the policy of conquest was also characteristic - no
less, if not more, of the kings and diplomats of all European countries,
including such an emperor of a bourgeois formation as Napoleon, who, despite his
non-royal origin, successfully practiced in its foreign policy and intrigue, and
deceit, and treachery, and flattery, and atrocities, and bribery, and murder,
and arson.
It is clear that it could not be otherwise.
Evidently, in his pamphlet against Russian tsarism (Engels's article is a good
militant pamphlet), Engels got carried away a little and, being carried away,
forgot for a minute about some elementary things well known to him.
2. Describing the situation in Europe and revealing the causes and prospects for
the impending world war, Engels writes:
“The present situation in Europe is determined by three facts: 1) the annexation
of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, 2) the desire of tsarist Russia for
Constantinople, 3) the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie,
which is flaring up more and more hotly in all countries, a struggle whose
thermometer is the widespread upsurge of the socialist movement” .
“The first two facts determine the modern division of Europe into two large
military camps. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine turned France into an ally of
Russia against Germany, the tsarist threat to Constantinople turns Austria and
even Italy into an ally of Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive
battle - for a war such as the world has never seen before, for a war in which
ten to fifteen million armed fighters will face each other. Only two
circumstances have hitherto prevented the outbreak of this terrible war:
firstly, the unheard of rapid development of military technology, in which each
newly invented type of weapon, before it can be introduced in at least onearmy,
is overtaken by new inventions, and, secondly, the absolute impossibility of
calculating the chances, the complete uncertainty of who will emerge victorious
in the end from this gigantic struggle.
“All this danger of a world war will disappear on the day when things in Russia
will take such a turn that the Russian people will be able to put an end to the
traditional policy of conquest of their tsars and, instead of fantasies of world
domination, take up their own vital interests within the country, interests that
are threatened by extreme danger".
"... The Russian National Assembly, which wants to cope with at least the most
urgent internal tasks, will have to decisively put an end to all aspirations for
new conquests."
“With increasing speed, as if on an inclined plane, Europe is rolling into the
abyss of a world war of unheard-of scope and force. Only one thing can stop her:
a change in the order in Russia. That this should happen in the coming years is
beyond any doubt.
"... On the day when tsarist power falls, this last stronghold of all-European
reaction, on that day a completely different wind will blow in Europe" (see
ibid.).
It is impossible not to notice that in this characterization of the situation in
Europe and in the list of causes leading to a world war, one important moment
was omitted, which later played a decisive role, namely, the moment of the
imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, for sources of raw materials,
which already then had a very serious importance, the role of England as a
factor in the coming world war, the moment of contradictions between Germany and
England, contradictions that were already of serious importance at that time and
later played an almost decisive role in the emergence and development of the
world war, are missed.
I think that this omission is the main shortcoming of Engels' article.
From this shortcoming follow other shortcomings, of which it would not hurt to
note the following:
a) Reassessment of the role of the desire of tsarist Russia for Constantinople
in the brewing of a world war. True, initially Engels puts in first place, as a
factor of war, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but then he pushes
this moment into the background and brings to the fore the conquest aspirations
of Russian tsarism, arguing that "all this danger of a world war will disappear
at that the day when things in Russia will take such a turn that the Russian
people will be able to put an end to the traditional aggressive policy of their
tsars.
This, of course, is an exaggeration.
b) Revaluationthe role of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, the role of the
"Russian National Assembly" (bourgeois parliament) in preventing an impending
world war. Engels argues that the fall of Russian tsarism is the only way to
prevent a world war. This is a clear exaggeration. The new, bourgeois system in
Russia with its "National Assembly" could not have prevented war, if only
because the mainsprings of the war lay in the plane of the imperialist struggle
between the principal imperialist powers. The fact is that since the Crimean
defeat of Russia (the fifties of the last century), the independent role of
tsarism in the field of European foreign policy began to decline significantly,
and by the time before the world imperialist war, tsarist Russia played in
essence the role of an auxiliary reserve for the main powers of Europe.
c) Reassessment of the role of tsarist power as "the last stronghold of
pan-European reaction" (the words of Engels). That tsarist power in Russia was a
mighty stronghold of all-European (and also Asian) reaction—of this there can be
no doubt. But that it should be the last stronghold of this reaction—this can be
doubted.
It should be noted that these shortcomings in Engels' article are not only of
"historical value". They have or should have had still more important practical
significance. Indeed: if the imperialist struggle for colonies and spheres of
influence is overlooked as a factor in the impending world war, if the
imperialist contradictions between England and Germany are also overlooked, if
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, as a factor in the war, is
relegated to the background before the desire of Russian tsarism for
Constantinople, as a more important and even determining factor in the war,
ifFinally, Russian tsarism represents the last stronghold of pan-European
reaction—is it not clear that a war, say, between bourgeois Germany and tsarist
Russia is not an imperialist, predatory, anti-people war, but a war of
liberation, or almost a war of liberation?
It can hardly be doubted that such a train of thought should have facilitated
the fall of the German Social Democracy on August 4, 1914, when it decided to
vote for war credits and proclaimed the slogan of defending the bourgeois
fatherland from Tsarist Russia, from "Russian barbarism", etc.
It is characteristic that in his letters addressed to Bebel, written in 1891 (a
year after the publication of Engels's article), where he discusses the
prospects for an impending war, Engels directly says that "the victory of
Germany is, therefore, the victory of the revolution", that "if Russia will
start a war - forward to the Russians and their allies, whoever they are!
It is clear that with such a train of thought there is no room for revolutionary
defeatism, for the Leninist policy of turning the imperialist war into a civil
war.
Such is the case with the shortcomings of Engels' article.
Apparently, Engels, alarmed at that time (1890–1891) by the Franco-Russian
alliance, which was directed with its tip against the Austro-German coalition,
set out to attack the foreign policy of Russian tsarism in his article and
deprive it of any confidence in the eyes of public opinion in Europe before all
of England, but in realizing this goal, he lost sight of a number of other
important and even defining points, which resulted in the one-sidedness of the
article.
After all that has been said, is it worth publishing Engels's article in our
militant organ, Bolshevik, as a guiding article, or in any case deeply
instructive, for it is clear that publishing it in Bolshevik means giving it
tacitly such a recommendation?
I don't think it's worth it.
I. Stalin.
19.VII.34
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