At the Crossroads: Trotsky versus Stalin (1921-1929)
1.2. Discussion of the Principles of Organizing the New Economic Mechanism and the Forms and Methods of Governing Socioeconomic Systems
Valentin Aleksandrovich Sakharov
Aqua-Term Publishing Center, 2012
In the context of the intense
struggle over the NEP, only a leadership of the most important party, state,
and economic bodies that accepted this policy and was prepared to implement
it could guarantee and ensure its implementation. Regarding the highest
positions in the party and the economic management system, these were people
who enjoyed V. I. Lenin's political trust and, in his opinion, were
capable of handling the tasks facing them. V. I. Lenin had his own
candidates for these key positions in the system of power and administration.
Trotsky, speaking out
against Lenin's NEP, insisted on restructuring the existing economic mechanism
in accordance with his vision of the NEP. On August 7, 1921, he
presented the "Theses on the Implementation of the Principles of the New
Economic Policy" to the Central Committee of the RCP(b), proposing to
reorganize the economic mechanism so that the role of "the real economic
political center" would be played not by the Council of Labor and Defense
of the RSFSR, but by Gosplan, whose mission would be to develop the plan and
organize its implementation, "to provide ideological and organizational
guidance for the development, verification, and regulation of the
implementation of the economic plan from day to day, hour to hour."4
Furthermore, he proposed closely linking Gosplan with the Supreme
Council of the National Economy5 to ensure that all problems of the national
economy were resolved "from the perspective of the interests of
large-scale state industry."6
Trotsky proposed transforming
Gosplan and the Supreme Council of the National Economy into an organ
capable of ensuring the subordination of peasant farming to the interests of
restoring large-scale state industry. The transfer of all economic matters
to the specialists assembled within Gosplan inevitably led to the
transformation of the Council of Labor and Defense into a body that supported
Gosplan's work and assumed responsibility for resolving contentious issues. The
Central Committee of the RCP(b) was completely removed from economic matters.
Trotsky, naturally, had his own ideas about candidates suitable for key
positions in the system of power and administration he proposed. In effect,
this amounted to an attempt to leave not only V. I. Lenin but also the Central
Committee of the RCP(b) "outside" the new system of managing the
country's economy, and therefore the state. The personnel issue became a
political, fundamental issue.
The Plenum of the Central
Committee of the RCP(b) rejected L. D. Trotsky's proposals and adopted
the draft "Theses on the Implementation of the Principles of the New
Economic Policy," prepared in June–July 1921 by the Supreme Council of the
National Economy, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, and the
Central Committee of the RCP(b) under the leadership and active participation
of V. I. Lenin. On the same day, these theses were approved by the Council of
People's Commissars of the RSFSR as the “Instruction of the Council of People's
Commissars on the implementation of the principles of the new economic
policy”8.
The struggle over governance intensified
after the initial draft of the NEP had to be revised. In justifying his
proposals, Trotsky expanded on his critique of the existing governance system
and again raised the need to remove party organs, primarily the Politburo of
the Central Committee of the RCP(b), from economic decision-making. The
issue of the participation of leading party organs in resolving the most
important long-term and current economic issues had been the subject of debate,
sometimes fading and sometimes intensifying, throughout the years of Soviet
power.9 But Trotsky's proposals were new. He explained them by the conditions
dictated by the NEP.
On the eve of the XI Congress, on
March 10, 1922, L.D. Trotsky sent a letter to the Central Committee of the
RCP(b), proposing, following the example of the trade unions, to remove
party organs (primarily the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and its Politburo)
from economic management in order to "cleanse the party of bureaucracy
and the economy of laxity." The Central Committee of the RCP(b) was to
delegate the selection and training of economic personnel to the economic
bodies, refrain from interfering in their work, and, at the same time, ensure
their "stable leadership" through ideological work.10 The Party
retained the function of control, which, under these conditions, could do
little to facilitate either the work of the economic bodies or the Party's
own leadership in the political system.
Naturally, V. I. Lenin's
attitude toward L. D. Trotsky's proposals was negative. He sought ways to
delineate the functions of the Party and the state that would allow the Central
Committee of the RCP(b) to retain all the power necessary to implement
the NEP. This search is linked to the history of the reorganization of the
highest bodies that administered the economy (the Supreme Economic Commission,
the institution of deputy chairmen of the Council of Labor and Defense), as
well as the creation of the highest position in the RCP(b) and in the political
system—the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). Both the
establishment of this position and the appointment of I. V. Stalin to it at the
XI Congress of the RCP(b) took place with the active participation of V. I.
Lenin himself11 (see Chapter 2, paragraph 2.1).
On March 21, 1922, V. I. Lenin
informed I. V. Stalin and L. B. Kamenev of his intention to write a letter
to the Plenum of the Central Committee and set out in it the plan of his report
at the upcoming XI Congress of the RCP(b). In particular, he also announced his
intention to respond to Trotsky’s proposal. “I will refer to Trotsky’s letter:
basically, they say, I am for it.”12 This “there” is the whole point. It speaks
of V. I. Lenin’s true attitude to Trotsky’s proposal – he agreed only in
order to develop his own system of views and proposals, building on
Trotsky’s proposals. Fulfilling his intention, he wrote to the Central
Committee of the RCP(b): “it is necessary to delineate much more precisely the
functions of the Party (and its Central Committee) and the Soviet government;
"To increase the responsibility and independence of Soviet workers
and Soviet institutions, and to leave the Party in overall control of the work
of all state bodies, without the current, too frequent, irregular, and often
petty interference."13
At the Congress itself, V. I.
Lenin explained that the combination of Party and state functions was being
handled by him, and attributed the existing failures and shortcomings to his
illness, which had torn him away from his daily work, as well as to the
poorly organized work of his deputies and Stalin's workload.14 Lenin addressed
the main point casually, but quite clearly. Acknowledging that issues that
should have been considered by the Council of People's Commissars and the
Council of Labor and Defense were being referred to the Politburo, he
noted that this could not be formally prohibited, since the Party was in
power, and therefore any decision could be appealed to the Central
Committee of the RCP(b). While expressing criticism regarding the functioning
of this system, he, unlike L. D. Trotsky, did not propose dismantling
it. Instead, he proposed improving it by freeing the Politburo and the
Central Committee from minor details and increasing the responsibility of
Soviet officials, especially the People's Commissars.15 The Eleventh Congress
of the RCP(b) supported V. I. Lenin and adopted decisions that strengthened
the Party's position in all spheres of state activity, including economic
management, as well as his proposed principle of the division of labor between
Party and state, without diminishing the Party's leading role.
This defeat did not and could
not stop Trotsky's struggle over the organization of the management system.
In response to Lenin's proposals (April 1922) to redistribute work between the
Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense and his deputies, which, in his
opinion, would improve the work of the Council of Labor and Defense and ensure
that it fulfilled its tasks,16 Trotsky responded with sharp criticism of
Lenin's leadership style, the existing management system, and the measures
he proposed. He believed that neither the institution of deputy chairmen of the
Council of Labor and Defense nor the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection could
solve the problems facing them, since they were incapable of ensuring
day-to-day management of economic work. He demanded the creation of an
"institution on whose wall hangs an economic calendar for the year
ahead... which would foresee and, in the process of foresight,
coordinate." He was referring to the State Planning Committee.17 On May 5,
1922, V. I. Lenin responded with a harsher attack on Trotsky than he had
made against him or any member of the Politburo for a long time. He
characterized Trotsky's comments as partly vague and unresponsive, and partly
as rekindling "our old disagreements." Responding to comments
regarding the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, he wrote that "Comrade
Trotsky is fundamentally wrong," and regarding the State Planning
Committee, that "Comrade Trotsky is not only fundamentally wrong,
but also astonishingly ignorant of what he is judging."18 V. I.
Lenin had no hope of persuading L. D. Trotsky and, apparently, was
unfazed by his objections. He continued to work on his project, as evidenced by
numerous documents from the second half of 1922, as well as the texts of his
last letters and articles.
Discussion of these issues
continued, but now it was stimulated not only by disagreements over
theoretical, political, and organizational issues, but also by the growing
economic crisis. The crisis erupted in the summer of 1923, but its approach had
already been clearly recognized by early 1922. Its threat, causes, and nature
(economic or financial?) were debated extensively, but to no avail. No
consensus was reached regarding the crisis itself or ways to prevent it. By
the end of 1922, despite successes in economic recovery, the economic crisis
had worsened even further. The growing crisis in the management of state
industry was the subject of V. I. Mezhlauk's report, "The
Organizational Crisis of Our Industry and Methods of Overcoming It," sent
to L. B. Kamenev, as deputy chairman of V. I. Lenin's Council of People's
Commissars of the RSFSR. Stalin, in turn, forwarded it to I. V. Stalin on
November 22, 1922, since this issue was to be discussed at the upcoming plenum
of the Central Committee of the RCP(b).
On November 30, 1922, the
Politburo of the Central Committee approved the agenda for the upcoming plenum
of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), which included the item
"organization of industrial management." Disagreements over Gosplan
matters between V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky remained unresolved by this time.
In their final letters, exchanged in mid-December 1922, they considered it
their duty to acknowledge these continuing disagreements. The December 1922
Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) discussed the work of industry.24
At the plenum, Trotsky made a new attempt to raise the issue of reorganizing
the system of national economic management based on his proposals for
discussion by the Central Committee. No answer was found, but the gravity of
the situation led to a new round of heated debate within the narrow circle of
the top leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Speaking at the plenum, L.D. Trotsky
again proposed a radical overhaul of the entire system of national economic
management, transforming Gosplan into its central and most important element.25
The Plenum of the Central Committee rejected his proposals, believing that,
given the "extreme instability of our currency," it was impossible to
create a system of balances that would form the basis of any real plan.26 It
instructed the Politburo "to develop measures for the organized
participation of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in the financing
of industry, in particular, the introduction of a representative of the Supreme
Council of the National Economy on the Board of the State Bank," and also
decided "to place the issue of organizing industrial management on the
agenda of the next Plenum of the Central Committee" and prepare for its
discussion. 27
Informed of this decision, V. I.
Lenin dictated a letter to I. V. Stalin on December 23, 1922, titled "To
the Congress," in which, among other things, he expressed the need to
enhance the role of Gosplan within the system of economic bodies by giving its
decisions a legislative character. This proposal signaled a desire to develop
the administrative system in a direction diametrically opposed to that
envisioned by Trotsky: the difference between "legislative" and
"administrative" functions was fundamental. Lenin subtly disguised
his objection to the substance of Trotsky's proposal with a rather vague phrase
about his readiness to "accommodate" him "to a certain extent
and under certain conditions," which, however, he did not define in this
letter, perhaps because they were known to Stalin. This non-committal statement
does not obscure the main point—V. I. Lenin's desire to preserve intact the
organizational principles of the existing administrative system. Therefore,
this proposal cannot be considered a concession to Trotsky on a fundamental
issue.
There is reason to believe that
L. D. Trotsky learned of the contents of Lenin's letter from I. V. Stalin that
same day.29 In any case, on December 24 and 26, he sent two letters to members
of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), in which he reiterated and developed
his proposals expressed at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b),
along with their arguments.30 These letters represented an attempt to present
his proposals for a fundamental restructuring of the entire system of national
economic management for discussion at the Twelfth Party Congress. Thus, L. D.
Trotsky and V. I. Lenin effectively opened a pre-Congress discussion on an
issue that had long diverged them.
In his letters, Trotsky
challenged both the decision of the Central Committee Plenum and V. I. Lenin's
proposal. He asserted that establishing planned management is "the state's
fundamental task in the economic sphere" and criticized the existing state
of affairs, in which "some (institutions and individuals) create a plan or
plans, while others conduct practical economic work (allegedly on the basis of
these plans)." In other words, Trotsky considered the use of the principle
of division of labor and specialization in this sphere to be harmful and
unjustified. He wrote that economic management requires "a proper system
of day-to-day functioning institutions directing the economy," and
proposed creating "an institution that would hold in its hands, day
after day, all the threads of economic activity, which, on the basis of its
practical management work, would create a general economic plan... would
actually direct the implementation of this plan, making the necessary
amendments to it during the process".
In the existing system of
governance, Trotsky wrote, the central role was played by the Council of Labor
and Defense (STO), which was merely an interdepartmental commission of the
Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) of the RSFSR and, as such, lacked
sufficient capacity to effectively coordinate the work of central economic
institutions. Coordination between the work of these bodies and the Central
Committee of the RCP(b) was ensured by Lenin personally until his illness. Now,
this coordination was absent, but the need for it had not disappeared.
In Trotsky's opinion, only
Gosplan could practically combine "the work of finance and industry,
finance and transport, transport and industry, industry and foreign trade, and
so on" in day-to-day work. As a semi-academic advisory body to the STO, it
tended to become an "economic management institution." However, at
the present time, it was "not suited for management work in the
above-mentioned sense" "either in its relationship with the economic
commissariats or in its composition." Trotsky's plan consisted of
adapting Gosplan to fulfill this function. To achieve this, Gosplan was to
be placed in a position where "not a single central economic issue would
escape it," and its activities would be limited to "establishing
practical coordination" between the work of all the main economic bodies.
To ensure the ability to fulfill their assigned tasks, both "in developing
the economic plan" and "in the day-to-day work of practically
coordinating the parts of this plan," Trotsky proposed granting "the
chairmanship of Gosplan" to the head of industry—the chairman of the
Supreme Council of the National Economy. As the author of the reform, Trotsky
could count on being appointed head of both Gosplan and state industry.
The result was supposed to be a
system that L.D. Trotsky envisioned as follows: "The Council for Labor
and Defense remains above Gosplan with its current functions. Dissatisfied
departments can continue to refer issues to the Council for Labor and
Defense... only those Gosplan decisions achieved through coordination and
agreement among departmental work will be implemented." True, Gosplan's
work would be effective "if the Council for Labor and Defense does not
reject complaints from dissatisfied departments in nine, if not ten, cases out
of ten." The latter would only be possible if Gosplan's personnel were
improved by concentrating within it "the most qualified administrators and
business managers." This condition made both the Council for Labor and
Defense and all departments completely dependent on Gosplan. Gosplan was
transformed into an organ of economic dictatorship, and its director—an
"economic dictator," that is, effectively the master of the state.
Thus, by making a concession to Lenin regarding the Council for Labor and
Defense's place in the administrative system, Trotsky effectively proposed
turning it into a simple "registrar" of Gosplan's decisions and
actions.
While L. D. Trotsky's views on
the concentration of economic power in the country in the hands of the head of
Gosplan and the Supreme Council of the National Economy were quite clear and
precise, the same cannot be said regarding Gosplan's work in drafting the state
plan and coordinating departmental activities based on it. In these matters,
which required specific proposals and advice, he limited himself to
generalities that offered no insight to those tasked with developing and
implementing the plans. Trotsky envisioned "planned economic
management" as follows: the proper distribution of "resources among
various sectors and parts of the economy, the establishment of proper
relationships, connections, and proportions, the redistribution of forces as
circumstances change, the anticipation of the needs of tomorrow and the day
after tomorrow, and timely preparation for these needs through various
departments and various sectors of the economy." The plan itself
"must adapt to the market, not mechanically oppose itself to it," and
therefore be flexible, largely "conditional," have several options,
and be drawn up for "six months, a year," which Trotsky considered a
"more or less lengthy" and entirely justifiable period.
The planning proposed by L.D.
Trotsky is nothing more than an attempt to minimize the negative consequences
of market fluctuations for state industry by redistributing resources between
sectors and industries as circumstances change, establishing more appropriate
relationships, connections, and proportions between them, anticipating the
needs of tomorrow and the day after, and promptly preparing for these needs. It
is certainly possible that in this case, the situation in industry could be
somewhat improved, but only at the expense of complicating the situation in
other sectors, primarily agriculture. In order to increase the degree of
exploitation of various branches of the economy in the interests of state
industry, such a plan could prove useful, if, of course, following Trotsky, one
recognizes the liquidation of the NEP in its implemented Leninist version as an
acceptable price for the “dictatorship of industry” and as the only politically
correct and desirable thing.
Trotsky's letter reached V. I.
Lenin's secretariat, and it appears he read it.31 A reaction to Trotsky's
proposal can be found in his notes, "On Granting Legislative Functions to
Gosplan,"32 which he dictated between December 27 and 29, 1922. In them,
Lenin developed and concretized his thoughts against Trotsky's plan. Repeating
his proposal to grant Gosplan legislative functions, Lenin unequivocally
opposed the concentration of the leadership of the Supreme Council of the
National Economy and Gosplan in the same hands, including in the hands of any
"political leaders." He argued for the advisability of combining
highly qualified specialists and administrators in Gosplan's leadership, and
expressed confidence in the existing Gosplan leadership and satisfaction with
its work. The idea that neither Trotsky's proposed reorganization of the
administrative system could be accepted, nor that Trotsky himself was
unsuitable to lead Gosplan, runs through Lenin's text like a red thread.
Having dictated these notes, V.
I. Lenin, according to available information, shared them with I. V. Stalin,
and through him, with other members of the Politburo. 33 He may have asked
Stalin to confront Trotsky. Stalin was highly critical of the
then-existing system of national economic management,34 but accepted it as
fundamentally consistent with Lenin's concept of the NEP, which he fully
shared. Be that as it may, it was I. V. Stalin who took on the task of
continuing the polemic with L. D. Trotsky. A correspondence ensued between
them (letters addressed to the Central Committee of the RCP(b)), a correspondence
that is very interesting and important for understanding the development of the
Soviet system of national economic management, as well as the combination
of market and planned economic methods. At its center initially were
issues related to the assessment of the existing system of national economic
management, with the clarification of the nature of the necessary changes, the
principles on which it should be built in the future, the organizational
expression and provision of vital priorities and balances of interests of the
main sectors of the national economy, the place of the State Planning Committee
and the purpose of the plan in a market economy, as well as ways to
overcome the departmental approach in solving national issues.
Behind all these questions lay
the problem of choosing between two concepts of the NEP: Lenin's, which pursued
the goal of establishing an economic link between city and countryside and
fostering political interaction between them, and Trotsky's, which focused on
the accelerated development of industry as the primary condition for achieving
the fundamental social and political objectives of Soviet power.
On January 6, 1923, I. V. Stalin sent a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(b), challenging L. D. Trotsky's assertion that "the Central Committee limits itself to noting chaos in the management of our economic bodies." He believed that the existing management system (the deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars, including the Council of Labor and Defense, and the Finance Committee, which also included the People's Commissar of Finance) ensured progress "from 'chaos' to order." Trotsky's proposal to grant Gosplan a de facto leading role in the national economy, "under the condition that the chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy be appointed chairman of Gosplan and that the current structure of the existing central regulatory bodies be preserved in detail," was deemed "unacceptable" by J. V. Stalin, as it would lead to the disorganization of the entire system of national economic management. If Trotsky's proposal were accepted, either Gosplan would be "transformed into an auxiliary tool of the Supreme Council of the National Economy" and, consequently, would be unable to fulfill its role as a body working in the interests of the entire national economy. Or, if Gosplan were transformed into a truly leading body working in the interests of the national economy, the entire existing system of management, which allows the country's political leadership to implement its own socioeconomic policies, drawing on the experience of economic managers and the knowledge of specialists, rather than delegating this work to them, would be destroyed. Stalin clearly defined the essence of the difference between the implemented Leninist concept of national economic management and Trotsky’s proposals:
“Who should be the head of state
economic bodies, the Council of Labor and Defense or the State Planning
Committee? This, therefore, is the essence of the question, and not in
granting the State Planning Committee certain administrative rights.”
At the same time, I. V. Stalin,
unlike V. I. Lenin, believed it was unthinkable "to seriously improve the
regulation of our economic bodies while completely ignoring the question
of the composition and some changes in the structure of some of our central
regulatory bodies." This last statement also directly contradicted L. D.
Trotsky's assurances that, with his proposed reorganization, a new system could
be created without "radical legislative changes" at the present time.
Stalin proposed granting administrative functions to the Council of Labor and
Defense, and effectively ignored Lenin's proposal to grant
legislative functions to Gosplan.
Stalin's plan included the
following provisions:
first, "to concentrate
the coordination and management of our economic bodies not in Gosplan, but
in the Council of Labor and Defense." Secondly, "to transform the
Council of Labor and Defense from an interdepartmental conciliation commission
into a supra-departmental governing commission, introducing into its
composition exclusively" the deputy chairmen of the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR, the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the
USSR, and the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR, which would make
the existence of the Finance Committee unnecessary (emphasis added - V.S.).
Thirdly, to retain the State Planning Committee as a commission of the
Council of Labor and Defense, issuing its opinions.
Regarding personal appointments,
I. V. Stalin proposed appointing Chief L. Pyatakov as head of the Supreme
Council of the National Economy of the USSR, and appointing L. D.
Trotsky as deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the
USSR, "placing the Supreme Council of the National Economy under his
special care." Apparently, Stalin resolved the main issues within the
framework of the system of national economic management created by Lenin,
but enhancing its capacity for operational management.
Stalin's proposed plan
gave the discussion new impetus and centered on the question of the ability of alternative
options to overcome departmentalism. In a letter dated January 15, L. D.
Trotsky36 criticized it because it left intact the "financial
dictatorship," which ensured the "self-sufficient formulation of
financial issues" and its consequence—the "fluctuating ruble,"
which not only "cannot be a regulator of the economy" but also pushes
financial bodies toward "reckless speculation" "at the
expense of the state economy." Trotsky was also dissatisfied with
the fact that Stalin's plan gave "incorrect relationships between
finance and industry" a "new organizational expression,"
and, as a result, industrial interests remained un-reflected and unprotected,
and the "dictatorship of industry" was unsecured. In his view,
the situation could only be changed if the "interests of a unified state
industry" were put "at the forefront," something that only the
USSR State Planning Committee could ensure by "developing all planning
issues" "primarily from the perspective of industrial
interests." The mistakes it had made could be corrected by
"amendments" coming "from above, from the Council of Labor and
Defense." To ensure that Gosplan supplied "higher institutions"
with high-quality material, well-developed with due regard for the positions
and interests of Soviet power, Gosplan had to be "taken under its wing...
that is, assigned responsible workers for ongoing work, combining them with
specialists in appropriate combinations."37 Concluding his letter, Trotsky
compared the proposed system of national economic management to military
administration: "For the sake of analogy, I will say that Gosplan will
play the role of headquarters, and the Council of Labor and Defense will play
the role of the Revolutionary Military Council."
On January 17, J. V. Stalin,
in response to L. D. Trotsky's proposal, sent a letter to the Central
Committee,38 in which he demonstrated that his proposals were based on
erroneous notions about the existing economic apparatus: "Comrade
Trotsky writes about an 'independent Collegium of Deputies' as one of the
leading and unifying bodies at the center. I assert that there is and never
has been any independent Collegium of Deputies, supposedly leading, etc. There
is the Finance Committee, as one of the unifying bodies at the center, but
in both its composition and the nature of its work, it has nothing in common
with what Comrade Trotsky presents as the Collegium of Deputies." J.
V. Stalin confirmed that the proposal "to abolish the Finance Committee
and transform the Council of Labor and Defense from an interdepartmental
conciliation commission into a supra-departmental leading economic commission
of the Council of People's Commissars" was "fundamental" in
his plan.
Gosplan was to issue
"conclusions" to the Council of Labor and Defense or "develop
assignments" on its behalf. The Council of Labor and Defense, not
Gosplan, was to become the "sole guiding and unifying body for the
planned economy." At the same time, he agreed with L. D. Trotsky on
the need to take industrial interests into greater account when addressing
all issues facing the national economy, but, like V. I. Lenin, he proposed
options that ran counter to Trotsky's intentions and furthered his own
plan: to include in the Council of Labor and Defense "in addition to the
Deputies, the Chairman of Gosplan, and the People's Commissariat of
Finance," also a "representative of the Supreme Council of the
National Economy." He simultaneously reiterated his objection "to
combining the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the
Chairman of Gosplan in one person." Moreover, contrary to Trotsky's
views, Stalin believed that "the number of Deputies would have to
be increased, not reduced... by appointing two more Deputies: Comrade
Trotsky and one from Ukraine." In view of Trotsky's refusal to accept
the duties of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars with the
task of overseeing the Supreme Council of the National Economy, Stalin
proposed another option: to appoint Trotsky "simultaneously"
"either Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman
of the Supreme Council of the National Economy," or "Deputy Chairman
of the Council of People's Commissars and Chairman of the State Planning
Committee."
On January 20, L. D. Trotsky
responded to I. V. Stalin's letter with his own,39 in which he again
highlighted criticism of the work of the deputy chairmen of the Council
of People's Commissars, as well as Stalin's proposal to increase their
number, on the grounds that each was overburdened with numerous
responsibilities. He proposed increasing their effectiveness in the
Council of Labor and Defense by selecting suitable candidates for the positions
of deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars who met the
requirements: "To think that an institution can be made non-departmental
or supra-departmental by relieving its members of certain duties and giving
them the title of deputy is fundamentally wrong. If the current members
of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense are
too narrowly departmentalized, we must place the most responsible and competent
workers at the head of the departments, at least the most important ones,
i.e., those that are part of the Council of Labor and Defense. There is no
other way."
By addressing the issue of the
ability of Stalin's proposed system of national economic management to overcome
a narrow, departmental approach to addressing national issues, Trotsky
shifted the focus of the discussion to a new area. The debate over reform
proposals naturally shifted from critique of the existing management system
to the depths of management issues, where Trotsky, as a manager, was
weak, and as a politician, he was highly vulnerable to criticism, since he
himself, while lobbying for the interests of state industry, advocated the
most extreme departmentalization, threatening social and political
catastrophe.
I. V. Stalin accepted the
challenge. On January 24, he responded to Trotsky with a letter 40 in which
he demonstrated the futility of Trotsky's hopes of overcoming the narrow
departmental approach to economic management through personnel selection, and
he advanced his argument for solving this problem through corresponding changes
in the system of economic bodies. In Stalin's opinion, the main reason
for the inability of the "current Council of Labor and Defense" to
overcome its narrow departmental approach and cope with the task of regulating
the national economy lay in its composition, which consisted
"mostly of representatives from departments." The Council of
Labor and Defense failed to cope with the task of regulation because
departmental representatives "naturally pull in different directions,
and this circumstance precludes the possibility of regulation from a national
perspective." Under these conditions, the regulatory function effectively
passed into the hands of "the Financial Committee, which was not envisaged
by Soviet decrees." It was precisely this practical experience that led
Stalin to the idea that the solution to the problem should be sought
through changes in the management system, not through personnel
selection. Hence his proposal: "either legalize the Financial
Committee and abolish the Council of Labor and Defense, or abolish the
Financial Committee and make the Council of Labor and Defense the sole
governing body for the planned economy, transforming it from an
interdepartmental conciliation commission of the Council of People's Commissars
into a supra-departmental governing (emphasis added - V.S.)
commission." He considered this "last option" to be "the
only expedient option at the present time."
I.V. Stalin hoped that if
the Council of Labor and Defense were reorganized according to his plan (five
deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars, the People's
Commissariat of Finance, and the chairmen of the Supreme Council of the
National Economy and the State Planning Committee), its composition "would
be dominated by deputies who, by their position (and not by their
qualities), are non-departmental, and non-departmental status is the first
condition necessary for aligning the work of individual commissariats from a non-departmental,
national perspective." Each deputy chairperson of the Council of
People's Commissars, overseeing the work of a specific group of commissariats,
will be well acquainted with their activities, "and such familiarity,
on the part of people outside the department, is the first condition
necessary for proper leadership from the center in terms of a planned
economy." As for Gosplan, which is a "commission of the Council of
People's Commissars," which in turn is a "commission of the Council
of People's Commissars," since it "has not developed beyond being
an auxiliary body of the Council of People's Commissars, preparing
materials" for it and "developing the latter's assignments,"
there is no reason to transform it into a body "practically managing"
the economic commissariats and "issuing its conclusions without the
mandatory sanction of the Council of People's Commissars."
All the fundamental issues that
arose during the correspondence were discussed. The main arguments were
presented. I. V. Stalin believed that after the "exchange of opinions
by correspondence between Comrade Trotsky and myself," certain
conclusions could be reached that could facilitate the work of the Central
Committee members in resolving the issue of our regulatory bodies, and
therefore proposed "moving from words to action and submitting the
issues raised in the correspondence for discussion by the Politburo in
the coming days."
On January 25, in another letter,
L. D. Trotsky agreed with Stalin that their correspondence should be
considered "as exhausted." At the same time, he reiterated his
previously expressed criticisms of the existing management system and I. V.
Stalin's plan, as well as his proposal for the reorganization of
Gosplan, and declined the offer to become one of the deputy chairmen of
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The correspondence between
Stalin and Trotsky ended. The issue was referred to the Central Committee of
the RCP(b) for decision.
I. V. Stalin's proposed plan
for reforming the national economic management system represented an
important step toward adapting it to the conditions and goals of the NEP.
This was manifested, firstly, in the affirmation of the concept of state
planning as a means for the state, in a market economy, to address a range
of critical economic, social, and political development issues; secondly, in
the restructuring of the national economic management system with the goal of enhancing
its ability to serve the benefit of the entire economy. thirdly, in
expanding the state's ability to subordinate the interests of individual
social strata to the interests of all workers in the city and village, who
constituted the social base of Soviet society, by balancing their interests,
correlated with the possibilities of satisfying them in the given conditions of
the country's development.
During the pre-congress
discussion, the issues raised in Trotsky and Stalin's correspondence outgrew
their initial framework, which was limited to the problem of effective
management. The logic of their discussion brought to the forefront a
fundamentally more important question: the role of the ruling party in
implementing economic policy. Under the circumstances, only the upcoming XII
Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1923 could resolve this issue. Trotsky,
who advocated the de facto removal of the state's political leadership
from the day-to-day management of the national economy and its transfer from
the hands of the country's political leadership to that of economic
managers and specialists, suffered defeat at the congress. Soon
after the congress, the question of the system of national economic management
was resolved on the basis of Stalin's proposals. On July 4, 1923, the
Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) resolved to reorganize it
"in the direction of merging the Council of Labor and Defense and the
Finance Committee and forming from the Council of Labor and Defense a single
governing body consisting of deputies and representatives of the necessary
departments, or personally."42 Trotsky's attempts to remake the
administrative system in his own image were finally abandoned. Following
this (on July 5, 12, and August 2, 1923), the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the RCP(b) adopted decisions on the reorganization and personnel
of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Council of Labor and
Defense of the USSR, the "top three" of the USSR State Planning
Committee, and the Council of People's Commissars and the State Planning
Committee of the RSFSR. 43 Trotsky did not receive the power he desired in
the new system, nor the opportunity to exercise decisive influence on the country's
economy and state policy. He was also not appointed deputy chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. 44 Trotsky was included in the
Council of Labor and Defense, but not in the capacity he desired—not as a
leader and "economic dictator," not as one of the political leaders,
not even as one of the deputy chairmen. He found himself in the Council of
Labor and Defense only as a rank-and-file member—as the head of the
military department and the Revolutionary Military Council. 45 Lenin's
demand not to allow Trotsky into the State Planning Committee was also
taken into account and fulfilled—he was not included in the "top
three" of the State Planning Committee Presidium.46 L.D. Trotsky
suffered a complete defeat, and the line outlined by V.I. Lenin and developed
by I.V. Stalin prevailed.
The reorganization of the
national economic management system, carried out based on I. V. Stalin's
proposals, gave a powerful impetus to its development toward strengthening
the role of the state in the country's economy.47 This was entirely
consistent with the vision of creating a system of "commanding
heights" that would ensure "state regulation" of the
market.48 Without this, it would have been impossible to transform NEP
Russia into socialist Russia.
All these disagreements
over organizational issues were merely a manifestation of the confrontation
between Lenin and Trotsky not only on NEP issues but also on fundamental
questions of the theory of socialist revolution. In his final works, known
as his "political testament," V. I. Lenin translated his confidence
in the victory of the socialist revolution into concrete proposals, as
well as a theoretical and political elaboration of the most important issues
of the socialist transformation of Soviet society, the sum of which is
commonly referred to as Lenin's plan for building socialism. Some of the
most difficult and controversial of these problems will be examined in the next
section.
1 See: Sakharov, V. A., Lenin's
"Political Testament": The Reality of History and the Myths of
Politics. Moscow, 2003, pp. 84–142, 179–192.
2 State Planning Commission under
the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) of the RSFSR.
3 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works. Vol. 42, p. 157; Vol. 43, pp. 260–263.
4 Trotsky's Archive: The Communist Opposition in the USSR: 1923–1927. Moscow, 1990, vol. 1, pp. 16–17.
5 Supreme Council of National
Economy of the RSFSR.
6RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 88. L.
1, 2, 5; see also: Trotsky Archive. – Vol. 1. – Pp. 16–17.
7 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 70. L.
1; Lenin, V. I., Complete Collected Works. – Vol. 44. Pp. 73, 537–538.
8 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works. – Vol. 44. Pp. 538.
9 See: Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit.
– Pp. 95–97.
10 RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 2. D. 50.
Lp. 35–38. "See: Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit., pp. 152–179.
12 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works, Vol. 45, pp. 57, 511.
13 Ibid., p. 61.
14 See: Ibid., pp. 103–104,
113–114, 122, and others.
15 Ibid., pp. 114–116, 121–122.
16 Ibid., pp. 152–159.
17 RGASPI, F. 325, Op. 1, D. 407,
L. 44–45, 47.
18 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works, Vol. 45, pp. 180–182.
19 See: Ibid. – Vol. 45. Pp. 343,
347, 354–355, 383–406, 442–450; Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit. P. 94.
20 See, for example: Eleventh
Congress of the RCP(b). March–April 1922. Stenograph, report. – Moscow, 1961.
Pp. 84, 91–93, 122–124, 302–312, 316–317, 319–320, 325–335, 338, 339–343, 345,
346, 358.
21 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1042.
L. 2.
22 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L.
8.
23 See: Sakharov, V. A., Op.
cit., pp. 207–222.
24 RGASPI, Fund 5, Op. 2. D. 305.
L. 1.
25 Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit., p.
653.
26 RGASPI, Fund 5, Op. 2. D. 305.
L. 1.
27 Ibid. Fund 17, Op. 2. D. 87.
L. 1–2.
28 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works, Vol. 45, p. 343.
29 Izvestia of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. 1990, No. 1, p. 157.
30 For the full text of the
letters, see: Sakharov V. A. Op. cit. pp. 653–658. Original: RGASPI. F. 5. Op.
2. D. 305. L. 1–5; D. 306. L. 1–2.
31 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 10. L.
13 rev.
32 Lenin, V. I. Complete
Collected Works. – Vol. 45. pp. 349–353.
33 On December 27, 1922, the
envelope containing V. I. Lenin's letter to I. V. Stalin was registered in V.
I. Lenin's secretariat. The envelope bears the following notes: "No.
10517" "To Comrade Stalin" "929/l – 27/XII-22." "84
k" "Personally." "Received Nazareth" (See: RGASPI.
Fund 5. On. 4. D. 98. L. 114–145). See also: XIV All-Union Communist Party (b).
December 18–31, 1925. Stenographer, report. Moscow: Leningrad, State Publishing
House, 1926. Pp. 453–454.
34 Izvestia of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. Pp. 198–199.
35 See: Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit.
Pp. 658–660.
36 See: Ibid. Pp. 660–662;
Trotsky Archives. Vol. I, Pp. 9–11.
37 This is how L. D. Trotsky
responded to V.'s proposal. I. Lenin (note “On assigning legislative functions
to the State Planning Committee”) regarding the appointment of a “special
person from among our political leaders” as the head of the State Planning
Committee and the advisability of combining in its leadership different people
with special knowledge and organizational skills (see: Lenin V.I. Complete
Works – Vol. 45. P. 350).
38 See: Sakharov V. A. Op. cit.
pp. 663–665.
39 See: Ibid. pp. 665–669; See
also: Trotsky Archive. – Vol. 1. pp. 12–15.
40 See: Sakharov V. A. Op. cit.
pp. 669–671.
41 See: Ibid. pp. 671–672; See
also: Trotsky Archive. – Vol. 1. pp. 18–19.
42 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 100,
l. 3.
43 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 363. L. 2; D. 364. L. 5; D. 369.
L. 5.
44 ibid. D. 363. L. 2.
45 Ibid. D. 364. L. 5.
46 Ibid. D. 369. L. 5.
47 Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit., p.
477.
48 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works, Vol. 44, p. 212.
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