At the Crossroads: A Discussion on the Prospects and Paths of Development of Soviet Society (1921–1929)
Aqua-Term Publishing Center, 2012
This monograph is devoted to key
issues in the debate about the development of Soviet society, during which the
fundamental principles of the Soviet government's economic and social policies
were developed. It focuses on the alternative programs for socioeconomic
transformation of the country proposed by V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotsky, N. I.
Bukharin, and I. V. Stalin, which reflected their inherent theoretical
understanding of the formation of socialist society, their interpretation of
the revolutionary experience, their ability to develop a theory of socialist
revolution based on this experience, and the application of new knowledge to
solving the practical problems of socialist construction in the 1920s. This
book is intended for historians, as well as a wide range of readers interested
in the history of Soviet society.
At the Crossroads: A
Discussion on the Prospects and Paths of Development of Soviet Society
(1921–1929)
The entire
"choice" offered by L. D. Trotsky, in reality, boiled down to
accepting the need to enter the global capitalist market on its terms. And
then? Then—as God wills! So what's the choice? Go right—the socialist
revolution will perish! Go left—it will perish again! Go straight
ahead—consider the prospects of movement to the right and to the left!
"Leader of the Revolution"! A true "leader"... Compared to him, a blind "guide" is not a bad option at all. "And the order 'go there, I don't know where, bring that, I don't know what' is perhaps even more definitive, since it doesn't render the choice of where to go and what to bring completely meaningless."
Introduction
This monograph is devoted to a
problem of significant scientific, historical, political, and theoretical
importance. Its scholarly relevance stems from the need to assimilate
documentary material that has become available to historians in recent decades and
to appropriately adjust or revise previous understandings of the process of
formulating and implementing policies aimed at radically and rapidly changing
the life of society in the interests of the vast majority of the people—that
is, to more accurately account for the monumental experience of the 1920s and
1930s.
The political significance of the
topic is determined by the importance of the intellectual process underway at
the time, reflecting on the socioeconomic, political, and spiritual experience
of the Russian Revolution and seeking innovative solutions to the crisis-ridden
development of society and the state. Its theoretical significance is
determined, above all, by the possibility of establishing a connection between
the theoretical ideas of the main participants in the discussion and their
proposed concepts for the development of the socialist revolution, as well as
plans for the socialist transformation of Soviet society.
This topic has been the subject
of a vast number of specialized studies, and the number of works examining its
individual aspects is difficult to account for. It is impossible to cover even
the main trends in historiography, the stages of its development, or to present
and evaluate the contributions of individual works and authors within the
confines of this monograph. These issues will be partially addressed in the
text.
Here we will simply note that
both the policy and practice of socialist transformations in the early years of
Soviet power were largely determined by V. I. Lenin, whose ideas, assessments,
and proposals formed the basis of the emerging plan for building socialism in
the USSR. His participation and contribution to resolving these problems have
been studied quite thoroughly. The contributions of his supporters and
opponents have been studied incomparably less, and often in a highly
opportunistic manner. The source base upon which this problem was studied
changed significantly over the years, and the assessments and conclusions
depended heavily not only on the source and the results of its exploration, but
also on the authors' ideological and worldview precepts, as well as the
political climate. All this led to a number of issues in this topic remaining
under-researched or completely unexplored.
The author sees his task as not
only offering a new version of the history of the development of ideas about
the methods of socialist reorganization of society, but also drawing attention
to those aspects of the process of developing a plan for building socialism in
the USSR that, for various reasons, fell outside the field of view of
historians or, in the author’s opinion, received an insufficiently accurate
assessment in historiography.
This study used the materials and
results of the author’s research into the relevant aspects of the theoretical
and political activities of V. I. Lenin, primarily his so-called “Political
Testament”, as well as L. D. Trotsky, N. I. Bukharin, I. V. Stalin, the history
of industrialization and individual aspects of the uniqueness of the historical
path of development of Russia 1 .
The novelty of the author's
approach to this topic is determined, firstly, by the consistent application of
the results obtained during the study of the so-called "Political
Testament" of V. I. Lenin. It is precisely in the clear distinction between
Lenin's texts of the "Testament," which contain his opinions and
proposals for resolving a number of important practical issues related to the
optimization of the political machine of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and socio-economic transformations, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
texts falsified "to look like Lenin's," which serve to exploit V. I.
Lenin's authority to achieve victory over his supporters during the intra-party
struggle .
Secondly, in taking into account
how exactly the various political currents, which claimed to determine the
paths of development of the country in accordance with their political views,
ideas, assessments, concepts and plans, in the course of political discussions
and struggle related to various parts of Lenin's "Political
Testament"; how they used them in discussions and political struggle with
their opponents and adversaries.
Thirdly, in correlating the views
and programs of the main forces fighting within the Bolshevik Party not only
with the views, assessments and plans of V. I. Lenin, to which the main
attention is traditionally paid, but also with the views of K. Marx on the
prospects of the socialist revolution in Russia, his ideas that the socialist
revolution can rely not only on the proletariat and its inherent collectivism,
but also on the collectivism of the Russian peasantry, preserved and developed
thanks to the rural commune and providing it with a certain socialist
potential, the realization of which depends on the historical and political
conditions of its existence.
Fourthly, the results of the
analysis from the indicated angle of the positions of the main participants in
the discussion and the plans they proposed for the development of Soviet
society.
This approach, in the author's
opinion, allows us to overcome a number of persistent stereotypes that have
developed in historiography regarding the history of the development of the
plan for building socialism in the USSR, and to more accurately assess the
contribution of individual political forces and figures to it, which
objectively creates better preconditions for a more adequate assessment of both
the process of implementing this plan and its results.
The purpose of this monograph is
to identify the key issues of the discussion, as well as the process of
formation of various options for socio-economic policy, which, in the opinion
of their authors, ensure the successful development of the socialist revolution
in the USSR.
The chronological framework of
the study covers the period from the end of the Civil War and the transition to
the New Economic Policy (beginning of 1921), the discussion of which largely
predetermined the subsequent discussion of the ways and means of socialist
reconstruction of Soviet society, until 1929, when the discussion on these
issues ended, the plan for building socialism was adopted and consolidated by a
number of decisions of the highest party and state authorities, when the work
on its implementation entered a decisive stage.
The process of formulating plans
for building socialism in the USSR and carrying out the preparatory work had
concluded. The historic "season" of building socialism had begun in
the USSR. In this sense, 1929 was truly a year of great change, in the
full sense of the word, used without quotation marks. Therefore, it marks the
end of the period of interest to us and serves as the natural upper limit of
our study.
The exceptionally rich and
valuable experience gained during this work was constantly reflected upon and
led to adjustments to the adopted plan. This experience and the conclusions
drawn from it led to refinements, concretization, and development of the initial
plan for building socialism, refinements of theoretical and general political
approaches to this problem, as well as previously made economic and social
forecasts. Practice adjusted both theoretical concepts and the plans developed
on their basis.
The structure of the monograph
corresponds to the purpose and objectives of the study and consists of an
introduction, four chapters, a conclusion, appendices and a bibliography.
Notes
1 See the list of the author's
works on the research topic.
2 The study of the
"Political Testament" of V. I. Lenin led the author to the following
conclusion: the authorship of V. I. Lenin is fully established with respect to
the letter of December 23, 1923, notes on the reorganization of the Central Committee
of the RCP(b) and the People's Commissariat of the RCI (December 26, 29, 1922),
"On Granting Legislative Functions to the State Planning Committee"
(December 27-29, 1922), "On Cooperation" (January 4, 6, 1923),
"On Our Revolution" (January 10, 1923), the articles "Pages from
a Diary", "How We Can Reorganize the Workers' and Peasants'
Inspection" (and preparatory materials for it), "Better Less, But
Better".
Lenin's authorship cannot be
proven using traditional historical methods in relation to the "Letter to
the Congress" (dictations dated December 24-25, 1922 and January 4, 1923),
the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization,'"
letters to Trotsky (March 5, 1923), Stalin (March 5, 1923), Mdivani,
Makharadze, and others (March 6, 1923). Until Lenin's authorship of these texts
of the "Testament" is proven, V. I. Lenin cannot be considered their
author. Consequently, they must be regarded as not belonging to him.
Since a number of documents, both
his and not his, were artificially lumped together under the title "Letter
to the Congress" after Lenin's death, we will refer to only the
pseudo-Leninist texts dated December 24-25, 1922 (the so-called "characteristics")
and January 4, 1923 (the "addendum" to the
"characteristics") under this title. Texts whose authorship is
reliably established by Lenin (dictations of December 26-27 and 29, 1922),
which he did not consider an address to the Congress of the RCP(b), we will not
consider as part of the so-called "Letter to the Congress."
When speaking of Lenin's
"Political Testament" ("Will"), we will mean all the texts
of the last letters, notes, and articles, the author of which, according to
political and historical tradition, is considered to be V. I. Lenin, regardless
of whether he is the author of a particular document or not, since under this
name they entered the political life of the country and, in this capacity,
influenced the position of members of the Communist Party, the public
consciousness of the Soviet people, and world public opinion.
Chapter 1
Understanding the accumulated
experience of the revolution and the formation of plans for the country's
development (1921–1922)
1.1. Two concepts of the new
economic policy of the Soviet government
The end of the Civil War and the
expulsion of foreign interventionists coincided with the onset of a severe
political crisis for Soviet power, caused by years of war, devastation, famine,
political mistakes, popular fatigue, and a lack of social stability. The crisis
did not erupt suddenly; it escalated gradually, forcing the abandonment of
previous plans for combating it and the search for new ones. Initially, its
resolution was conceived within the framework of the previous policy—so-called
"war communism"—and the already adopted tactics of economic recovery,
according to which the first priority was to restore large-scale industry using
funds confiscated from the countryside. The restored industry was to cover this
debt to the countryside by supplying its products, while simultaneously
creating the preconditions for the technical reconstruction of agriculture .
In modern historiography, the
prevailing opinion is that the author of the NEP was not V. I. Lenin, but L. D.
Trotsky. This opinion is based not so much on a comparative analysis of Lenin's
and Trotsky's proposals, but on Trotsky's assertions . 2 For example, at the
11th Congress of the RCP(b), he said that it was he who proposed "in
February 1920, on the eve of the 9th Congress, to move from the surplus tax to
a food tax and to contractual relations in industry." 3 The question of
the authorship of the NEP is interesting in itself, but for our topic, it is
important because the proposals of V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky outlined two
opposing concepts of the NEP. The 10th Congress of the RCP(b) accepted Lenin's
proposal for a new economic policy, which led to a lengthy and heated debate
regarding the essence, character, and content of the NEP, as well as a struggle
within the party leadership to choose between its various options. The adoption
of a new economic policy is not so much a formal act expressing the political
will to replace the previous economic policy with a new one, but rather a long
and difficult political process of understanding what needs to be and can be
done in the economic sphere to ensure the victory of the revolution.
Trotsky proposed a change in
economic policy at a time when a peaceful respite from the Civil War allowed
issues of economic development to come to the fore. His proposals largely
echoed Lenin's later proposals, but were not identical to them, as he claimed.
Speaking at a meeting of the Moscow Committee of the RCP(b) on January 6, 1920,
with a report entitled "The Main Tasks and Difficulties of Economic
Development," L.D. Trotsky declared: "As long as we have a grain
shortage, the peasant will be forced to provide the Soviet economy with a tax
in kind in the form of grain, under penalty of merciless reprisals. Within a
year, the peasant will get used to this and will provide grain. We will
allocate proletarian units, a hundred to two thousand, to create food
bases." And then, having created... the possibility of general labor
service as compulsory, with the enormous importance of the educational factor,
we will be able to improve our economy” (bold italics by the author – BC ) 4 .
In February 1920, Trotsky
submitted to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) the theses "Basic
Questions of Food and Land Policy", in which he developed his proposals:
"The current policy of equalizing requisitions based on food quotas, mutual
responsibility in collecting and equalizing distribution of industrial products
is aimed at degrading agriculture, at dispersing the industrial proletariat and
threatens to completely undermine the economic life of the country."
"Food resources," he continued, "threaten to run out, against
which no improvement of the requisition apparatus can help. It is possible to
combat such tendencies of economic degradation by the following methods: 1. By
replacing the confiscation of surpluses with a certain percentage deduction (a
kind of income-progressive tax in kind) in such a way that a larger arable land
or better cultivation of the land still represents an advantage; 2. By
establishing a greater ratio between the distribution of industrial products to
the peasants and the amount of grain they collected, not only in volosts and
villages, but also in peasant households” (bold italics by the author - BC) 5 .
These proposals by L. D. Trotsky
contained elements of both the future NEP and the previous policy of "war
communism." In terms of the tax in kind, they indeed echoed Lenin's
proposals (February 1921) and thus preceded them, but at the same time, they
opposed them on the question of the system of economic relations in which the
tax in kind was included.
According to Trotsky, "Lenin
spoke decisively against this proposal. It was rejected in the Central
Committee by eleven votes to four. As subsequent events showed, the Central
Committee's decision was erroneous," "the transition to market relations
was rejected," and "the economy remained in a deadlock for a whole
year afterward." 6 Trotsky not only oversimplifies and overestimates the
socioeconomic and political effectiveness of his proposal, but also distorts
its essence. There was no mention of a transition to market relations in his
proposals. The demands for the introduction of "labor service,"
"issuing products to the peasants," and the collection of taxes
"under threat" leave no room for them.
Until the end of 1920, the
stimulation of peasant farming was conceived through the use of "war
communism" policies and the extension of planned economy methods to it . 7
On November 30, 1920, V. I. Lenin proposed replacing the food tax with a food
tax, combining it with product exchange between the city and the countryside,
industry and agriculture. 8 This was a far more important step toward the
future NEP than Trotsky's proposal, as it did not envisage the repressive
measures proposed by Trotsky, and product exchange was then viewed as a
relationship prescribed by the theory of socialist revolution, rather than by
the circumstances of wartime, which explain Trotsky's proposed methods of
stimulating increased agricultural production and tax collection. However,
trade, even within the framework of local trade, was not yet permitted here.
For now, the peasantry was encouraged to "communicate" with the city
in an "economic language" foreign to it (not through the market).
Not surprisingly, the measures
taken failed to produce the expected economic effect. Discontent in the
countryside continued to grow, manifesting itself in a rising wave of peasant
uprisings. The proletarian revolution found itself facing a peasant revolution
turning against it, inevitably transforming into a counterrevolution against
the proletarian socialist revolution. Lenin, assessing the emerging situation,
spoke of a "peasant (petty-bourgeois) counterrevolution": "Such
a counterrevolution is already confronting us." This struggle, waged
according to the principle of "who will win?", would decide the fate
of the socialist revolution in Russia . In order to prevent an undesirable
development of events, on February 8, 1921, V. I. Lenin submitted to the
Politburo a proposal to accommodate the working peasantry, for which purpose to
replace the confiscation of grain by the tax levy with a tax in kind, reduced
in comparison with the tax levy, to introduce incentives for the peasant's work
by reducing the tax percentage and "to expand the freedom of the farmer to
use his surplus above the tax in local economic turnover, on condition of
prompt and full payment of the tax" 10 .
The political goal of this
maneuver was limited: to stem the tide of counterrevolution, restore conditions
for establishing political understanding with the peasantry, establish economic
cooperation with them, and thereby ensure the continuation of the socialist
revolution. This proposal by V. I. Lenin did not signify an admission that the
policies pursued in the past were fundamentally flawed. It merely called for a
forced change, a change that would not lead to the abandonment of the stated
goals (the reorganization of society on socialist principles), nor to the use
of methods and means for this reorganization, the very thought of which was
forbidden on principle.
In developing the initial version
of the NEP, Lenin assumed that the economic retreat would be limited and
organized: from the use of methods characteristic of a socialist economy
(plans, commodity exchange, etc.), Soviet power would move to the widespread
use of state capitalism. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, he
understood state capitalism to be a sector (structure) of the economy and a
method for the socialist transformation of the country's economy. State
capitalist enterprises were considered, firstly, those owned by the state but
leased to domestic (the so-called NEPmen) or foreign (concession) capitalists;
secondly, cooperatives uniting small producers and closely linked to the state
sector of the economy; and thirdly, those state enterprises in which the state,
as the owner, was forced to enter into economic relations with the capitalist
market (the monopoly of foreign trade) and conduct business itself, using
methods characteristic of a capitalist enterprise .
State capitalism also played a
key role in the social transformation of the petty bourgeoisie and peasants. V.
I. Lenin believed that it would help control market forces and ensure the
growth prospects of the socialist sector of the economy. Furthermore, through
the grain monopoly, cooperatives, and controlled private capital, it weakened
the economic ties between the petty bourgeois strata of the city and village
and the private capitalist sector of the economy, strengthening their ties with
the socialist sector . 12 Thanks to this, state capitalism proved capable of
assisting the socialist system in overcoming private capitalism and
transforming the petty bourgeois and patriarchal systems into a socialist one.
Consequently, state capitalism served not only as a socioeconomic system but
also as a means, a method for transforming the socialist system into the
dominant, prevailing one, and, ultimately, defined the fundamental trend of
economic and social development toward socialism. V. I. Lenin's proposals formed
the basis for the decision adopted by the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) (March
1921) to transition to the New Economic Policy.
The “tax in kind” is commonly
considered a kind of "calling card" of the NEP, but this statement
reflects a somewhat simplified understanding. In the NEP, it wasn't just the
tax that mattered, but also its size, which could either stimulate or depress
the economy more than any food tax. It also influenced how it was integrated
into the economic system. Trotsky "incorporated" the tax into a
system that prohibited trade, while Lenin integrated it into a system that
permitted it. It is this system that determines both the tax's economic content
and the role it can play in the country's socio-political development. This
circumstance is crucial for understanding the variants of the new economic
policy proposed by V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky.
L. D. Trotsky's proposal dealt
with the "distribution" of industrial products to the peasants, and
made no reference to "market relations" or the marketplace.
Consequently, the tax therein does not play the economic and political role it
did in V. I. Lenin's proposals, the essence of which lay precisely in linking
the tax with freedom of trade (on a local scale). In speaking of the tax,
Trotsky was only taking the first step in the direction Lenin proposed on
February 8, 1921. For this reason alone, there is no reason to consider Trotsky
the true author of the new economic policy adopted by the Tenth Congress of the
RCP(b).
These differences lead to other
differences, suggesting two entirely different policy concepts. This primarily
concerns the different socioeconomic and political implications of their
proposals. Trotsky was interested in the tax as a means of stimulating
individual peasant farms to increase grain production and supplies, while Lenin
saw it as a way to prevent peasant counterrevolution. Therefore, the essence of
L.D. Trotsky's proposals lay in the economic and administrative maneuver, while
V.I. Lenin's lay in the political maneuver . 13
Since Trotsky was solely
concerned with obtaining additional grain and other agricultural products, the
inevitable or potential social consequences of his proposed measures receded
into the background. Clearly, this is why his proposals were aimed primarily at
stimulating the wealthy strata of the village and the kulak peasantry, whose
economies were more likely to ensure an increased tax on agricultural products.
Consequently, they were entitled, firstly, to pay a lower tax and, secondly, to
be rewarded by the state with increased supplies of industrial goods. Trotsky's
proposals resulted in strengthening the economic and political positions of
opponents of Soviet power and weakening those of its supporters. Consequently,
they inevitably led to a radical change in the class policy of Soviet power in
the countryside.
V. I. Lenin, however, was
interested in the task of restoring political relations with the peasant masses
and establishing economic relations with them on terms acceptable to them.
Hence the well-known practice of exempting the poor from taxes, moderately
taxing middle-class households, and heavily taxing the wealthy and kulak
peasants. Thus, while Lenin's NEP led to the expansion of the social base of
Soviet power and the socialist revolution, Trotsky's proposals led to its
narrowing.
Trotsky had no interest in the
peasantry as such. His reflections on the NEP a year after its adoption
(January 8, 1922) are revealing. He asserted that the NEP "consists, on
the one hand of restoring the market as the basis of purely capitalist forms of
economy. On the other hand, it involves using market forms of exchange,
calculation, and accounting for the development and self-testing of the
socialist economy." 14 Thus, in discussing the content of the NEP, he
failed to address the problems of the peasantry in the socialist revolution in
any social, political, or economic sense.
V. I. Lenin at the XI Congress
(March 1921), in fact objecting to L. D. Trotsky, gave a different
interpretation of the NEP: “The entire significance of the New Economic Policy,
which in our press they still often continue to look for everywhere, anywhere,
but not where it should be, the entire significance lies in this and only in
this: to find a link between the new economy, which we are creating with
enormous efforts, and the peasant economy ” (bold italics by the author – V.S.
) 15 . As can be seen, there is practically nothing in common between the views
of Lenin and Trotsky on the essence of the NEP.
Different understandings of the
NEP's essence are linked to different understandings of its purpose. For V. I.
Lenin, the NEP's primary political objective was a class maneuver, an attempt
to alter the course of the revolution to take into account new conditions and
accumulated political experience, to better capitalize on real possibilities,
and an attempt to "hook" and draw the peasantry into the mainstream
of socialist revolution . 16 Administration was intended merely to ensure the
achievement of these goals. For Trotsky, the NEP was also a maneuver, but a
completely different one—it was a maneuver aimed at ensuring a more efficient
use of the resources of the petty-bourgeois village in the interests of the
socialist sector. In other words, for Trotsky, the primary focus was
administration; political effect was merely a consequence of proper
administration. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Lenin clearly emphasized
the "peasant" orientation of the NEP, while Trotsky emphasized its
"urban" orientation.
Lenin and Trotsky also differed
in their assessments of the reasons necessitating concessions to the peasantry.
According to V. I. Lenin, the reason was that the dictatorship of the
proletariat had failed to adapt the peasant economy to its demands. Therefore,
it was now the proletarian dictatorship, as the party with the necessary
interests and, secondly, the greater capacity to maneuver, that must take the
initiative and adapt the state sector of the economy to the peasant economy, in
order to later gain the opportunity for the gradual transformation of the
petty-bourgeois peasant economy into a socialist one.
Trotsky agreed to this concession
to the peasantry in order to optimize the management system and utilize market
methods of management to adapt peasant farming to the needs of large-scale
industry . 17 A letter (February 1921) is indicative of L.D. Trotsky's
position. In it, he saw the way out of the emerging crisis in improving the
functioning of the economic apparatus, but he did not believe the time had come
to change anything in interclass relations. He, as before, saw the solution to
the problem in the reorganization of the management system and the
strengthening of planned principles in the national economy . 18
Both Lenin and Trotsky spoke of
the NEP as a retreat, but they understood this retreat very differently. V. I.
Lenin saw it as a tactical maneuver to strengthen ties with a strategic ally,
with whom the fate of the revolution depended on reaching a political agreement
and establishing economic cooperation. Trotsky interpreted this retreat as a
retreat from economic methods characteristic of socialism to capitalist
methods.
These differences, which were
clearly evident in the very first proposals of Trotsky and Lenin concerning the
New Economic Policy, do not allow us to speak not only of the identity, but
even of the closeness of the views of V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky on the NEP.
True, there is no reason to
overestimate the political significance of these disagreements during the
adoption of the NEP. This is evidenced by the fact that Trotsky accepted
Lenin's proposals and voted for them at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). Why? Presumably
because, on the one hand, he saw Lenin's proposals as a step in the same
direction in which he himself proposed to move, and on the other, he hoped that
he would subsequently be able to adjust the NEP in accordance with his own
ideas about it. This may have been facilitated by the fact that V. I. Lenin
himself at that time clearly drew a connection between the NEP and the policy
of 1918, the fundamental ideas of which he formulated in his pamphlet "The
Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power" and a number of other works and speeches
of that time, in which much attention was devoted to state capitalism . L. D.
Trotsky agreed with that policy; in any case, he was not among its principled
critics.
It can be said that, in the
Trotskyist interpretation, the NEP is, to a large extent, Lenin's program of
the spring of 1918,20 adjusted by his own proposals to ensure the priority
restoration of large-scale industry by ensuring the flow of products from the
countryside through incentives for individual peasant farms to both increase
their production and to contribute a portion of their output to the state as
taxes. The certain similarity of their views on the NEP is evidenced by the
coincidence of some of its assessments, as a political tactic and a set of
economic methods inherent in the transition period from capitalism to
socialism.
However, since these similarities
did not affect the essence of the NEP as a policy aimed at securing an
agreement with the peasantry, they, despite their importance, could not prevent
the growing divergence between V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky as the implementation
of the New Economic Policy shifted from general ideas to the development of
specific economic plans and the creation of an economic mechanism consistent
with its conditions and goals. During this process, Lenin and Trotsky's
disagreements on issues related to the socio-political essence of the NEP began
to acquire increasing significance and predetermined the intensification of the
struggle that unfolded over the tactics of economic restoration and the methods
and system of management necessary to address the immediate and long-term
challenges of economic development and revolution.
Before the transition to the NEP,
it was considered self-evident that large-scale industry, as the foundation of
the socialist economy, had to be restored first, followed by the restoration
and technical reconstruction of agriculture. However, Lenin's very first
proposal (February 8, 1921) effectively acknowledged the inevitability of a
change in tactics: the need to prioritize the restoration of agriculture as an
absolutely urgent task, one in which large-scale industry could not immediately
assist agriculture. Following this, V. I. Lenin began to develop ideas about
the need to abandon the previous plan for restoring the national economy, which
was correct in principle but impracticable under the real conditions of the
early 1920s, and to adopt new tactics for restoring the national economy, in
which the restoration of industry followed the restoration of agriculture,
rather than preceded it . 21 Trotsky, on the contrary, insisted on maintaining
the previous tactics (“Theses on the Implementation of the Principles of the
New Economic Policy.” August 7, 1921): “Under the new course, as under the old,
the main task is the restoration and strengthening of large-scale nationalized
industry (highlighted by the author – VS ) ” 22. The Plenum of the Central
Committee did not support Trotsky.
Consequently, for V. I. Lenin,
the interests of the immediate normalization of relations with the peasantry
determined the meaning and real content of the NEP, were the reason for the
transition to it and its justification, while for L. D. Trotsky, the normalization
of relations with the peasantry, the satisfaction of its economic interests,
should have been the result of a long process of restoring large-scale
industry.
From different understandings of
the essence and purpose of the NEP, from different ideas about the tactics of
restoring the national economy, there arose disagreements between Lenin and
Trotsky on issues concerning the role and place of the plan and the market and
the corresponding restructuring of the economic mechanism.
If agriculture was to be restored
first, then, naturally, planning would lose its former significance, its scope
would shrink, its tasks would change, and the role of market levers in the
economy, on the contrary, would increase to the extent that this was required
to revive agricultural production and establish an economic link between the
city and the village.
Hence, V. I. Lenin's demand that
Gosplan, when planning "the foundations of the general state economic plan
for the next period, a year or two," take "foodstuffs," which
limits the development of other sectors, " as its starting point,"
and pay "special attention" to "industry that produces items
suitable for exchange for bread" (bold italics by the author - BC ) 23 .
Granting economic independence to industrial enterprises limited the role of
operational planning in industry and the national economy. Hence, the
inevitable transformation of Gosplan from an operational planning body into an
expert commission under the Council of Labor and Defense of the RSFSR (STO
RSFSR) 24 .
If, however, the primary
objective is to restore large-scale nationalized industry, then directive
planning methods must not only retain their importance but also be
strengthened, ensuring not only the management of large-scale state industry
but also the subordination of all sectors of the national economy to its
interests. This was precisely the opinion of L. D. Trotsky, 25 who held the
GOELRO plan in very low regard, rejecting it as a plan and, consequently,
denying the existence of a long-term plan.26 He opposed Lenin's proposal to
transform Gosplan, demanding that Gosplan be granted the right "to
ideologically and organizationally direct the development, verification, and
regulation of the implementation of the economic plan from day to day, hour to
hour." Moreover, both planning and planned management were to be carried
out not primarily in the interests of restoring agriculture and the economic
ties between the city and the countryside, but "from the perspective of
large-scale state industry. " 27 It was at this time, and in connection
with these disagreements with V. I. Lenin and his supporters on the NEP issues,
that he uttered his “famous” forecast: the cuckoo, they say, had already crowed
the imminent death of Soviet power 28 .
In the autumn of 1921, it became
clear that the concession made to the peasantry had been insufficient, that the
spontaneity of capitalist relations within the framework of state capitalism
could not be contained, and that economic life was overflowing beyond its
established limits. It was necessary to acknowledge what had been achieved—free
trade, the possibility of which had been categorically denied in the spring of
1921. V. I. Lenin acknowledged: "Commodity exchange had failed: failed in
the sense that it had resulted in buying and selling... the private market
proved stronger than us, and instead of commodity exchange, we had ordinary
buying and selling, trade." 29 This recognition of this fact meant that
Lenin's calculations to restrict trade through the mechanisms of state
capitalism, which formed the basis of the decisions of the Tenth Congress of
the RCP(b), had proven erroneous. At least in this situation.
A choice had to be made: fight on
from previously occupied positions, i.e., hinder as much as possible the
development of free trade and the free market, or retreat further. In the first
case, it was necessary to use operational planning to bring the emerging market
under control, subordinating peasant farming and trade turnover to the
interests of restoring large-scale industry. This, in effect, would have meant
abandoning the adopted version of the NEP and a definite step back—to the
policy of "war communism," to the options for replacing the food tax
with a tax in kind that V. I. Lenin proposed in November 1920, or even to
Trotsky's proposals of early 1920. In the second case, it was necessary not
only to acknowledge the establishment of free trade but also to align its
actions with it. This also effectively meant abandoning the initially adopted
version of the NEP and taking a step away from it, but a step in a different
direction—toward developing the general idea underlying it, rather than abandoning
it.
For V. I. Lenin, the choice was
predetermined by the fact that he linked the salvation of the revolution with
the establishment of relations between the proletariat and the peasantry . 30
Therefore, he proposed a further retreat, hoping that by establishing economic
relations with the peasantry, he would preserve state power and gain the
opportunity to search for, develop, and implement more complex plans for the
development of the socialist revolution.
The rejection of the initial
adopted version of the NEP did not mean abandoning the very idea of searching for forms of economic
agreement between the state industrial sector and peasant farming. But since
state capitalism, under those conditions, could not become an obstacle to the
development of free trade, additional points of support for limiting and
controlling it had to be sought in the deeper layers of capitalist relations.
This retreat from state capitalism meant a step into theoretical and political
uncertainty: how to ensure the beginning of building the foundations of a
socialist economy through free trade? The time had come for a deeper
understanding of the entire experience of the revolution, and of the paths and
methods of transition from capitalism to socialism. For Lenin, the main
question of the NEP now shifted to the plane of defining the limits of new
concessions and the search for new points of support – both in resisting the
onslaught of capitalism and in ensuring the victory of socialism over it.
Obviously, the adoption of such a
decision in the area of domestic
policy was facilitated for V. I. Lenin by the new ideas about the prospects for
the development of the Russian socialist revolution that he arrived at in late
1920 – about its significant autonomy from the
pace and success of the development of the world socialist revolution, which he
began to view as a condition for the lasting victory of the Russian revolution,
and not as a condition for its victory in general 31 . This was a new word for
Russian Marxists. From now on, V. I. Lenin associated the prospects of the
socialist revolution in Russia mainly with the solution of the country's
internal problems and the state of the Bolshevik Party 32 . The transition to
the NEP not only did not change these assessments 33 , but further strengthened
them in V. I. Lenin's views. He linked victory on the domestic front with the
fulfillment of the plan for the electrification of the country and the
possibility of ensuring, within 10-20 years, "correct relations with the
peasantry," built on the basis of the NEP 34 . During this time, Lenin
hoped, even if a proletarian revolution did not occur in other countries, the
Soviet republics would prepare to move from trade to commodity exchange, from
which, as was believed, only one step remained to socialism (product exchange).
35 The success of electrification made it possible to block the dangers
emanating from the individualism of the small farmer and free trade . 36
Therefore, the implementation of the electrification program and the
implementation of the NEP, in Lenin's opinion, ensured the victory of the
Russian socialist revolution not only within the country, but also on a
"worldwide scale (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing,
are delayed) ." 37
All this allowed V. I. Lenin to
take a more relaxed attitude toward the prospect of a slowdown in the pace of
the revolution, and the possibility of more complex and profound socio-economic
and political maneuvers that would allow him to gain time, retain power, and
focus on resolving internal problems that would require "entire
decades." 38 Success in resolving these problems was expected to lead to
an even greater weakening of the dependence of the Soviet socialist republics
on the success of the world revolution, which Lenin began to view as a factor
in shortening the timeframe for fulfilling plans for Russia's socio-economic
development, rather than as a decisive factor for survival . 39 Trotsky was far
removed from such views on the relationship between the Russian and world
socialist revolutions.
The basic outlines of the new
concept of the NEP were developed by V. I. Lenin in a series of speeches in the
autumn of 1921. In his report "The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of
Political Educational Organizations" at the Second All-Russian Congress of
Political Educational Organizations (October 17, 1921), he substantiated the
need for further retreat, explained its political significance, and identified
the possibilities for moving toward socialism under the new conditions. At the
same time, he rethought and reassessed the economic policies of the Civil War
era. Now, Lenin no longer emphasized the forced (devastating) nature of the
NEP, but rather its de facto recognition of the fallacy of previous ideas about
the development of the socialist revolution. He also acknowledged that the
limits of this new retreat were still unknown.
The picture Lenin painted was
depressing: the brutal Civil War had recently ended, in which the bourgeoisie
was thought to have been decisively defeated, and a policy fully consistent
with Marxist theory had been discovered and tested. However, it turned out that
the fate of the socialist revolution still had to be decided in the struggle
against and for peasantry. The 10th Congress of the RCP(B) adopted the New
Economic Policy, which seemed to ensure a positive resolution of these issues.
And suddenly it turned out that everything must start from scratch, that the
question of "who will rule whom" will be resolved in favor of
socialism only if the Bolsheviks can learn how to manage the economy from the
capitalists, and for this learning, a partial revival of capitalism would have
to be allowed. 41 V. I. Lenin recognized that under these conditions, panic was
inevitable. 42
In his speech at the Second
All-Russian Congress of Political Educational Workers, he posed the problem in
all its complexity, but he had not yet answered the main question—the basis for
the formation of the new version of the NEP. V. I. Lenin apparently reached a
decision on this between October 17 and 29, 1921, when he delivered his speech
at the Seventh Moscow Provincial Party Conference. In preparing for it, he
apparently took into account the negative reaction within party circles to his
previous speech and heeded the advice of I. V. Stalin, who recommended
"slightly softening the form" of his speech at the Moscow Conference.
43 His frank admission of past and new mistakes was offset by a more detailed
justification than before for the possibility of overcoming them. Lenin dwelt
in detail on the evolution of views on the process of building socialism,
encouraging a calm, businesslike approach to new political developments and a
critical approach to accumulated experience. But, most importantly, it was here
that he first clearly formulated a new basis for the NEP, proposing a shift
away from state capitalism toward state regulation of purchase and sale and
monetary circulation. 44 Thus, he identified a new fulcrum, located in a
system of capitalist, rather than state capitalist, relations.
V. I. Lenin considered the new
version of the NEP "the only possible one for us," since it was
capable of ensuring a "more durable" forward movement and the
restoration of large-scale industry.45 This allowed him to conclude that the
limit of retreat had already been reached, that the concessions made to the
principle of private property did not threaten the revolution with inevitable
degeneration and destruction. Only now, he believed, was the New Economic
Policy "sufficiently and clearly established."46 This was followed
by his announcement of an end to the retreat.47
Many members of the RCP(b)
perceived the need for a new retreat as a de facto admission of the collapse of
the socialist revolution. They were not prepared to accept it.
L. D. Trotsky perceived the
failure of Lenin's version of the NEP adopted by the Tenth Congress of the
RCP(b) as confirmation of the correctness of his version of the New Economic
Policy. He considered such a retreat in the face of the economic onslaught of
capitalism mortally dangerous for the revolution, unacceptable for
revolutionaries. All this significantly exacerbated their political
confrontation. From the autumn of 1921, Trotsky intensified his attempts to
ensure an adjustment to the NEP in accordance with his proposals. V. I. Lenin
continued to substantiate and develop his version of changes to the NEP. His
new views and proposals were reflected in the decisions of the Eleventh
Conference of the RCP(b) and the Ninth Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. At the
11th Congress of the RCP(b), V. I. Lenin raised the question of the place and
role of the peasantry in the socialist revolution in a new way, thereby taking
another important step in the development of a new version of the NEP.
The policy of a strong alliance
with the middle peasantry, pursued since March 1919, meant establishing a
military-political alliance with the bulk of the peasantry. There was no
economic alliance with the middle peasantry at that time, and the goal of creating
one was not set. Such an alliance was envisaged for the future, not through
concessions to the peasantry as small property owners, but through its movement
toward the proletariat, based on improvements in its living conditions as the
socialist revolution developed, large-scale industry succeeded, and agriculture
underwent technological reconstruction.
The adoption of the New Economic
Policy by the 10th Congress of the RCP(B) signified a radical change in the
very formulation of the question of economic union—it was achieved through an
initial concession to the peasantry by the proletariat, rather than through its
adaptation to the demands of the proletariat. This signified a definite shift
in views on the position of the working peasantry in the socialist revolution,
recognizing the need to more carefully and fully consider its interests,
desires, and capabilities. At the same time, the question of the extent of
concessions to peasantry was to be decided without regard for their opinions,
in the course of a struggle waged on the principle of "who will win?"
The step toward the peasantry was thus extremely limited and strictly
conditioned.
At the 11th Congress, V. I. Lenin
proposed taking another step toward the peasantry.
He formulated the proposition
that the peasantry would ultimately be the "judge" of the Bolsheviks'
work. "The peasantry as a whole lives by agreeing, 'Well, if you don't
know how, we'll wait, maybe you'll learn.' But this credit cannot be
inexhaustible.
We must be aware of this and,
having received credit, nevertheless hurry." We must know that the moment
is approaching when the peasant country will no longer provide us with credit,
when it will, if one can use a commercial term, ask for cash […] I repeat, we
received a deferment and credit from the people thanks to our correct policy,
and these are, to put it in NEP terms, bills of exchange, but the terms are not
written on these bills, and when they are presented for collection, you will
not know this from a certificate with the text of the bill of exchange”48.
Previously, there could be no
talk of recognizing the peasantry as the force that would ultimately evaluate
and "judge" the Bolsheviks' activities, would pronounce verdict on
the socialist revolution, and the Bolsheviks would be forced to accept it.49
The "bills of exchange" thesis speaks of an understanding of the
need, at any cost, at the cost of any complex and time-consuming maneuver, to
gain a foothold for carrying out socialist reforms in the countryside. It also
speaks of a completely new formulation of the question of class struggle during
the socialist revolution. In connection with the bills of exchange thesis, V.
I. Lenin speaks of the "last and decisive battle" with the domestic
bourgeoisie, emerging from the peasantry, which we are forced to accept in the
near future and which we can win.50 This is not at all the battle he spoke of
at the 10th Congress of the RCP(b): this is no longer a battle against the
peasant counterrevolution, but a battle for the peasantry, for it to recognize
that the promissory notes issued to the Bolsheviks were repaid by improving
their, the peasants', lives during and as a result of socialist reforms. This
battle for the peasantry must be waged against the new bourgeoisie, which also
seeks to find in it support for the struggle against growing socialism.
Accordingly, the forms, methods, and techniques of class struggle with the bourgeoisie had to change. While taking on the outward form of competition with the bourgeoisie in the economic arena, it remained, in essence, a struggle "not to the death, but to the death between capitalism and communism."51 Victory in this struggle meant proving to the peasantry that Soviet power could organize the country's economic life and satisfy the interests and needs of the peasantry no worse, but better, than the bourgeoisie. Victory had to be achieved quickly—within a year, since the peasantry would not wait long.52 The issue here was not the victory of socialism in general, but rather the achievement of tangible results in the restoration of peasant farming thanks to the NEP. This victory, by temporarily weakening the anti-socialist sentiments of the peasantry, would thereby isolate the forces of internal counterrevolution.
Neither at the Eleventh Congress
nor later were Lenin's opponents able to counter the new version (concept) of
the NEP he had developed with anything equivalent in the significance of its
conclusions and the level of its substantiation. Chief among them, Trotsky,
continued to repeat his previous assessments and forecasts.53 New concessions
to the principle of free trade within the framework of the NEP apparently
further strengthened his faith in the correctness of the theory of
"permanent revolution."
For Lenin, allied relations with
the peasantry, not only in the political sphere but also in the economic
sphere, had an independent, rather than opportunistic, value. Trotsky thought
differently. To all of Lenin's arguments about the need to develop and
strengthen economic relations with the peasantry, he responded at the Eleventh
Congress as follows: a link with the peasantry was necessary "as long as
there is no possibility of relying on the victorious working class of
Europe."54 Consequently, he admitted that if the proletarian revolution in
Europe were successful, it would be possible to abandon the political and
economic alliance with the peasantry and build socialism without the
participation of the peasantry, ignoring the will of the majority of the
country's population and suppressing it.
Trotsky believed the time had
come to save the revolution from Lenin. In early 1922, he began republishing
his old works, which analyzed the Russian socialist revolution from the
standpoint of the theory of "permanent revolution." With these works,
Trotsky sought to lay the theoretical foundation for his struggle against Lenin
and his policies at the new stage of the revolution.55 They also showed that
Lenin and Trotsky differed not only in their assessment of the prospects for
the socialist revolution in Russia, but also in their assessment of the
character of the October Revolution. For V. I. Lenin, it was socialist, while
for L. D. Trotsky, it was merely a manifestation of the movement toward it.56
Later, he claimed that Lenin had not opposed his book "1905" and,
therefore, agreed with him.57 This is not true. Lenin's most important public
speeches in 1922 contained criticism of Trotsky's views, but in their context,
it was of a subordinate nature and subordinated to the task of substantiating
his own conception of the development of the socialist revolution in Russia.58
Lenin had no hope of persuading Trotsky and, apparently, was not bothered by
his objections. Trotsky, for his part, continued to develop his own views.
The last exchange of views
between them on the prospects of NEP took place at the end of 1922.
Speaking at the Fifth Congress of the Russian Communist Youth Union (RKSM) (October 1922), L. D. Trotsky declared that if capitalism withstood the threat of revolution for 10 years, this would mean that world capitalism "is strong enough to suppress the proletarian revolution throughout the world once and for all, and, of course, to suppress Soviet Russia as well."59 Consequently, the need to implement the NEP for 10 years made it a hopeless policy from the standpoint of socialist revolution. Apparently, he contrasted his assessments of the NEP with those of V. I. Lenin, who continually asserted that implementing the NEP for 10–20 years would allow Soviet power to achieve the socialist transformation of Russia.60 But that's not all. According to Trotsky, the following prospect emerged: either the world revolution would begin and achieve decisive victories within the next ten years, or the question of it would be "removed from the agenda" of human history.
Either everything at once, or
nothing at all.
V. I. Lenin, for his part, as if
accepting Trotsky's challenge, began to offer even more optimistic assessments.
While at the 11th Congress of the RCP(b) he expressed confidence that the
Bolsheviks
could pass this test, that the
success of the struggle depended solely on them,61 at the end of 1922, in his
greeting to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, he painted a completely
different picture:
"Soviet power... is more
stable than ever... Victory will be ours."62 He essentially devoted his report
to the congress (November 13) to substantiating this assessment. He said, in
particular: "I believe that all of us can, with a clear conscience, answer
this question (about the benefits of a proper retreat – V.S.) in the
affirmative, namely, that the past eighteen months have positively and
absolutely proven that we have passed this test."63 This was a kind of
response to the predictions of the Trotskyist "cuckoo" and an
assessment of the Bolsheviks' ability to demonstrate their economic skills to
the peasantry. V. I. Lenin expressed confidence that the problems facing them
(the accumulation of financial resources, above all) would be resolved, and had
already begun to be resolved.64 "The most important thing," he said,
"is that [...] the peasantry is satisfied with its situation. We can
confidently assert this... Peasantry is the decisive factor for us... We have
no need to fear any movement against us from them. We say this with full
awareness, without exaggeration" (italics added - V.S.)65. Having noted
the successes of Soviet power achieved on the basis of the NEP, and the
mistakes made by the international bourgeoisie, he stated that "the
prospects for world revolution... are favorable," and they could again
become "excellent."66 The essentially anti-Trotskyist direction of
these assessments by Lenin is obvious.
Trotsky, speaking at the congress
session that same day, offered delegates only general arguments that
demonstrated his fidelity to his previous views, as well as assessments that
diverged significantly from Lenin's. "After the conquest of power,"
he said, "the task of building socialism, primarily economic socialism,
arises as the central and at the same time most difficult. The solution to this
problem depends on factors of varying order and depth: first, on the level of
productive forces and, in particular, on the relationship between industry and
peasant farming; second, on the cultural and organizational level of the
working class that has conquered state power; third, on the international and
domestic political situation: whether the bourgeoisie has been finally defeated
or is still resisting; whether there is foreign military intervention; whether
the technical intelligentsia is sabotaging; and so on and so forth."
In terms of relative importance,
these conditions of socialist construction should be arranged in the order in
which we have presented them... But this is a logical sequence. In practice,
the working class, having seized power, first of all, faces political
difficulties... secondly... difficulties arising from the insufficient cultural
development of these working masses... thirdly, its economic construction is
limited by the limits set by the existing level of productive forces."67
Trotsky saw the NEP merely as "a system of measures that would ensure a
gradual rise in the country's productive forces even without the assistance of
socialist Europe,"68 i.e., a policy that, in principle, would allow for
the accumulation of "material" for a future socialist revolution, but
nothing more. It is significant that even in this speech, programmatic in
nature, Trotsky found no room for an analysis of the problem of the peasantry's
participation in the socialist revolution. Obviously, for him this problem was
reduced to the struggle against the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the
peasantry and the effectiveness of the confiscation of the products of their
labor.
Trotsky was most concerned about
the defeat of the revolution in the countries of Europe, which had created
"the most unfavorable conditions for the Soviet Republic and its economic
development" in the "ring of economic blockades."69 "The
main trump cards," he said, "are clearly on our side—with one very
significant exception: behind private capital operating in Russia stands world
capital. We still live in a capitalist encirclement. Therefore, one must ask
whether our nascent socialism, still operating by capitalist means, will not be
destroyed by world capitalism?"70 And he answered:
"If we admit, in fact, that
capitalism will exist in Europe for another century or half a century and that
Soviet Russia will have to adapt to it in its economic policy, then the
question resolves itself, for by this assumption we presuppose in advance the
collapse of the proletarian revolution in Europe and the advent of a new era of
capitalist rebirth."71
In assessing the prospects of the
Russian socialist revolution, Trotsky aligned himself with the Mensheviks
(Social Democrats): if the socialist revolution in Europe were delayed
(according to Trotsky, this was unlikely, but for the Social Democrats, it was
a given), then the NEP would lead to the collapse of the socialist revolution
in Russia. Both sides agreed that this would occur through internal
degeneration (Thermidor). The situation was not helped by Trotsky's long
timeframes—50–100 years. In October 1922, he set this timeframe at 10 years.
This "progress" is obvious, but it does not indicate an evolution in
Trotsky's views, but rather his concealment of odious and unpopular conclusions
within the Bolshevik Party. In his speech at the Fourth Congress of the
Comintern (November 1922), Trotsky, for the first time since 1917, contrasted
Lenin's concept of the socialist revolution in Russia with his own system of
views and assessments, which, admittedly, had not yet been worked out in
detail, but was fully formed in its basic tenets and approaches.72
He spoke at the congress on
November 13, 1922, immediately after Lenin, so Lenin was unable to respond to
him at the congress, but he took advantage of the first opportunity to do so—an
offer to deliver a speech at a meeting of the Moscow City Council on November
20, 1922, which, as is known, became his last public appearance. V. I. Lenin
said that "we had no doubt that we must... achieve success alone."73
"We must calculate, in a capitalist environment, how we will ensure our
existence, how we will benefit from our opponents."74 The chance for
success was provided by competition between capitalist states, which
opened up opportunities for maneuver among them.75 Therefore, the task
is to become a "strong, independent" state in the face of the capitalist
world.76 And then he directly formulates what is perhaps his most important
anti-Trotskyist thesis:
"Socialism is no longer a
question of the distant future... We have dragged socialism into
everyday life, and we must sort this out. This is the task of our day, this
is the task of our era."77
The meaning of the words
"socialism was pushed through every day" can be understood from an
earlier statement by V. I. Lenin about the socialist sector in industry. In a
report on the food tax on April 9, 1921, he said that "we must not forget
what we often observe—the socialist attitude of workers in state-owned
factories, where the workers themselves collect fuel, raw materials, and food,
or when the workers strive to distribute industrial products correctly among
the peasantry, transporting them by means of transport. This is
socialism."78 This is the socialism that has entered into the country's
daily life. Consequently, Lenin sees socialism where Trotsky saw only nascent
socialism, operating by capitalist means.79 This suggests that the disagreements
over the NEP were rooted in profound differences on crucial issues of socialist
theory and socialist revolution.
Concluding his thoughts on the
NEP and socialism, Lenin made the famous statement:
"Let me conclude by
expressing my confidence that, however difficult this task may be, however new
it may be... all of us, not tomorrow, but in a few years, all of us together
will solve this problem at any cost, so that NEP Russia will become socialist
Russia".80
Thus, V. I. Lenin, identifying
new possibilities for the Russian revolution, in 1921–1922, increasingly
departed from old assessments. He moved toward recognizing the greater
potential for the development of the Russian socialist revolution in unfavorable
external conditions, recognizing its greater autonomy, provided it identified
and utilized additional internal resources, primarily from the peasantry, and
skillfully exploited inter-imperialist contradictions. Lenin substantiated a
new vision of the world socialist revolution and the place of the Russian
revolution within it: ahead of the world revolution. The further V. I. Lenin
deviated from previous notions in his views on the path to development of
the socialist revolution in Russia, the more he diverged from Trotsky on all
essential political issues. Thus, V. I. Lenin and L. D. Trotsky, having put
forward two different concepts of the New Economic Policy, began a debate
on a wide range of important political and theoretical issues concerning the
history, prospects, and methods of socialist reconstruction of Soviet society. The
nature of their differences precluded any convergence of positions or
compromise on fundamentally important issues, which ensured the
intensification of this confrontation and debate as the general principles
of the NEP were translated into decisions that would change the country's life
today and predetermine its future.
Notes
1 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works, Vol. 42, pp. 148, 150–151.
2 Izvestia of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. 1990, No. 10, p. 174; Trotsky, L., My Life: An
Autobiographical Essay. Moscow, 1990, Vol. 2, pp. 195–199.
3 See: Eleventh Congress of the
RCP(b): March–April 1922: Stenographer’s Report. Moscow, 1961, p. 270.
4 Trotsky, L. D., The Main Tasks
and Difficulties of Economic Development. From a Report
at a Meeting of the Moscow
Committee of the RCP(b). January 6, 1920 // On the History of the Russian
Revolution. Moscow, 1990, pp. 160–161.
5 Izvestia of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. – 1990. – No. 10. – P. 174; Trotsky, L. My Life. Vol. 2.
Pp. 198–199;
Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b):
Verbatim Report. Pp. 793–794.
6 Trotsky, L. My Life. – Vol. 2.
Pp. 199.
7 See: Polyakov, Yu. A.,
Dmitrenko, V. P., Shcherban, N. V. New Economic Policy:
Development and Implementation. –
Moscow, 1982. Pp. 18–24.
8 Lenin, V. I. Complete Collected
Works. – Vol. 42. Pp. 51; Vol. 52. Pp. 22–23.
9 Ibid. – Vol. 43. P. 371.
10 Ibid. – Vol. 42. P. 333.
11 Ibid. – Vol. 43. Pp. 223–228.
12 Ibid. – Pp. 228, 295–307.
13 Ibid. – Vol. 43. Pp. 373.
14 Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political History (RGASPI). – F.
5. Op. 2. D. 17. L. 41.
15 Lenin, V. I., Complete Works.
– Vol. 45. P. 75.
16 Ibid. – Vol. 43. Pp. 26–30,
373; Vol. 45. Pp. 77–78.
17 Trotsky's Archive: The
Communist Opposition in the USSR: 1923–1927. Moscow, 1990, Vol. 1, p.
16.
18 RGASPI. F. 5, Op. 2, D. 21, L.
9–12.
19 See: Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works, Vol. 36, pp. 296, 300, 301; Vol. 43, pp. 205–207; Reference
Volume to the Complete Collected Works of V. I. Lenin. Part 2, Moscow, 1970,
pp. 374, 380.
20 Eleventh Congress of the
RCP(b). Stenographer, report. Pp. 128–129.
21 Lenin, V. I. Complete
Collected Works. – Vol. 43. Pp. 146–155, 266, 351–352, 354, 357; Vol. 44. Pp.
222.
22 RGASPI. – F. 325. Op. 1. D.
88. L. 1, 2, 5.
23 Ibid. – Vol. 43. Pp. 263.
24 Lenin, V. I. Complete
Collected Works. – Vol. 42. Pp. 157; Vol. 43. Pp. 260–263.
25 RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 88.
L. 1, 2, 5; see also: Trotsky's Archive. Vol. 1. Pp. 16–17.
26 RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 21. L.
9, 10.
27 Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 88. L.
1, 2, 5; see also: Trotsky's Archive. Vol. 1. Pp. 16–17.
28 Trotsky's Archive. Vol. 1. Pp.
13–14. Trotsky apparently made this statement
at a meeting of the Politburo on
August 25, 1921. I. V. Stalin spoke of it as an eyewitness, meaning he was
present at the meeting. V. M. Molotov recounted that after the meeting,
Lenin, Kamenev, and he, Molotov,
went to see Zinoviev, who was absent from this meeting due to illness (See:
RGASPI. Fund 5. Op. 2. D. 275. Sheet 4; Stalin, I. V. Works. – Vol. 9. P. 75;
Vol. 10. P.
265; One Hundred and Forty
Conversations with Molotov: From the Diary of F. Chuev. – Moscow, 1990. Pp.
206–207). This composition of participants corresponds to only one Politburo
meeting over many months – August 25, 1921 (RGASPI. Fund 17. Op. 3. D. 194).
29 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works. – Vol. 44. Pp. 207–208.
30 Ibid. – Vol. 44. Pp. 160–161.
31 Ibid. – Vol. 41. Pp. 354–355;
Vol. 42. Pp. 1, 3, 21–25.
32 Ibid. – Vol. 42. Pp. 261.
33 Ibid. – Vol. 43. Pp. 19, 341.
34 Ibid. – Pp. 330, 331, 383,
401, 404, 406; Vol. 44. Pp. 60.
35 Ibid. – Vol. 43. Pp. 336.
36 Ibid. – Pp. 382.
37 Ibid. – Pp. 382–383.
38 Ibid. – Pp. 13, 384; Vol. 44.
pp. 326, 327; Vol. 45. pp. 78, etc.
39 Ibid. – Vol. 43. pp. 228–229;
Vol. 44. pp. 407–408; Vol. 45. p. 12.
40 Ibid. – Vol. 44. pp. 159–160.
41 Ibid. – pp. 156–169.
42 Ibid. – p. 158.
43 See: Sakharov, V. A., Lenin’s
“Political Testament”: the Reality of History and the Myths
of Politics. – Moscow, 2003. p.
102.
44 Lenin, V. I., Complete
Collected Works – Vol. 44. pp. 197–208, 212.
45 Ibid. – p. 213, 229.
46 Ibid. – P. 356.
47 Ibid. – Vol. 45. Pp. 8, 11,
13.
48 Ibid. – Pp. 77, 81–82.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. – Pp. 83, 95.
51 Ibid. – P. 95.
52 Ibid. – Pp. 75–81.53 Trotsky,
L. D., “The New Economic Policy of Soviet Russia and the Prospects of World
Revolution,” in Works. Vol. XII: Basic Questions of the Proletarian Revolution.
Moscow, 1925. pp. 312–313, 323, 336.
54 Eleventh Congress of the
RCP(b): Verbatim Report. p. 135.
55 See Trotsky, L. D., “Our
Differences,” in On the History of the Russian Revolution. Moscow, 1990. p.
115; id. “1905,” in On the History of the Russian Revolution. Moscow, 1990. pp.
145, 147–148. See also:
id. 1905. Moscow, 1922. p. 285.
For more detail, see Sakharov, V. A., Op. cit. pp. 105–110.
56 Eleventh Congress of the
RCP(b): Stenographer, report. P. 130. Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the
CPSU. – 1991. No. 8. P. 185
57 Izvestiya of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. – 1991. No. 8. P. 185.
58 See: Lenin V. I. Complete
Collected Works – Vol. 45. Pp. 343, 347, 354–355, 383–406, 442–450;
Sakharov V. A. Ibid. P. 94.
59 Trotsky L. D. Report on the
International and Internal Situation of the Republic // Fifth
All-Russian Congress of the RCYL:
October 11–19, 1922. Stenographer, report. – Moscow; L., 1922. Pp. 31–32.
60 Lenin, V. I., Complete Works,
Vol. 43, Pp. 330, 331, 383, 401, 404, 406; Vol. 44, Pp. 60; Vol.
45, Pp. 277, 283, 285–288, 292,
294, 309.
61 Ibid., Vol. 45, Pp. 79–81,
83–84, 95.
62 Ibid., Vol. 45, Pp. 277.
63 Ibid., Pp. 283.
64 Ibid., Pp. 286–288.
65 Ibid., Pp. 285.
66 Ibid. – P. 292, 294.
67 Trotsky, L. D., The New
Economic Policy of Soviet Russia and the Prospects of World Revolution. P.
305–306.
68 Ibid. – P. 312–313.
69 Ibid. – P. 312.
70 Ibid. – P. 323.
71 Ibid. – P. 336.
72 N. A. Vasetsky evaluates
Trotsky's report on the NEP at the IV Congress of the Comintern as "the
pinnacle of his political career in the post-war period. From the point of view
of theoretical understanding of the NEP, he rose no higher" (See:
Vasetsky, N. A., Trotsky: An Experience of a Political Biography. – Moscow,
1992. P. 171.). It seems that N. A. Vasetsky is right. But to this assessment, it
must be added that his speech also became the culmination of his public polemic
with Lenin on the fundamental issues of the socialist revolution and the
NEP.
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