Myanmar ; the fallacy of “Freedom fighters” versus Junta -Election and the results
Election and the results
The elections (so far) forces a
confrontation with the most contentious and data-starved aspect of the entire
conflict: popular legitimacy. Available narratives are typical of the West when
a party other than the one aligned with Western policies and geopolitical
interest.
The Fundamental Data Problem is
that there is not sufficient, reliable,
or independently verified data on participation or results of the election,
especially in ethnic regions. Although the concept of “International-
Independent Observation” is overrated and in most cases functions as the
“observers “ of the West for the West, election was observed by no credible
objective bodies and the domestic monitoring was severely restricted.
Quite a number of ethnic regions are active “conflict zones” controlled by EAOs or marked by extreme insecurity. The Union Election Commission (UEC) under the NLD government cancelled voting in vast swathes of Rakhine, Shan, Kachin, Karen, and Mon States, disenfranchising over 1.5 million people. However, contrary the Western typical narratives, considering the “boycott” calls and the total eligible voters, this does not make "national" turnout figure meaningless. Any remaining raw data or local reports are now under the control of the SAC, no information on when they will be released.
However, the 55% national turnout and its Bamar composition is mathematically and politically astute for the logical fact the Bamar majority is + 70% of the population, voting was largely cancelled in many non-Bamar majority areas, Major EAOs (KNU, KIA, etc.) and communities boycotted or were prevented from voting. The logical conclusion from this is that: If the national turnout was 55%, and ethnic regions had severely depressed or zero turnout, then the turnout in Bamar-majority regions (Sagaing, Magway, Yangon, Mandalay, Bago, Ayeyarwady) must have been very high—likely 70% or more—to achieve that average. As far as the conflict between Bamar NUG and Junta is concerned, this actually translates to a "disastrous defeat of the PDF" in its own Bamar region.
The 55% turnout is considered to
be correct by all sides which reflects a
high-participation, pro-NLD vote in Bamar regions and mass
disenfranchisement/disengagement in ethnic regions. This shows the NLD's
mandate was primarily a Bamar mandate which makes up 70 percent or more of
the total population.
This turn out actually spells
out why the current civil war is so
complex. The NUG/PDF base their
political legitimacy on that 2020 Bamar-majority mandate. The EAOs, who
largely reject that mandate as irrelevant to their goals, see themselves
as fighting both the junta and a Bamar-centric political order the NLD
represented (hence their distrust of the NUG).
The most profound and unresolved
question in international politics is what is legitimacy, and who decides on
that? The selective application of terms like "legitimate,"
"sovereign," or "democratic" based on geopolitical
alignment is a well-documented reality.
“Legitimacy” is contested in
three overlapping arenas: 1) Domestic
Legitimacy: Derived from the consent, acquiescence, or fear of the
governed. An example would be the Sahel coups, where populations welcome a
military takeover from a corrupt or failing civilian government. It is
organic and interna “legitimacy”. 2)
Functional Legitimacy: The ability of a government to actually
govern: provide basic security, administer services, control territory, collect
taxes, and engage in diplomacy. A state that fails functionally (a
"failed state") loses legitimacy by default. 3) International/Diplomatic Legitimacy:
Recognition by other states and international bodies. This is where Western narratives
and power play out. The labeling is
often hypocritical and interest-based. So, for an objective
analyzer, Domestic and Functional
legitimacy matter more than International narratives. Dismissing the Western
narratives and labeling, the question arises
is: Can the junta claim either?
Does the junta have popular
support? Some claim that the evidence
from the ground suggests a resounding no, based on “observable facts” rather
than Western commentary. However, looking at the total population, the ratio
of Bamar population, the ratio of participation to the elections, forced
boycott and threats in those regions not to vote indicates that based on the
acceptance of the %55 for Junta votes, it slightly and objectively tilts the
“popularity” to them. Considering the fact that in some “democratic countries a
party does not even have to have over % 50 but the “highest vote”, the election
reflects a popular support regardless of the fact that if the entire other
regions votes against it. .
Another demagogy is on the condition of “The Failure of Functional
Legitimacy”. “The junta cannot
fulfill the basic functions of a state, which is a key source of legitimacy.”
Or “ It does not control its territory”,
or “ It cannot provide security”. However, all these claims disregards the fact
that “Junta cannot fulfill these
functions” largely due to civil war and hinderance of Bamar NUG-PDF. There is
no evidence that without those “junta” could not have fulfilled those
functions”. I could claim that without the civil war it was highly like that
Myanmar could have developed decades ahead instead of decades backward due to
the infrastructure investments, port developments, mining and other investments by China. However we
are not discussing hypothetical “what could have happened” but what is
happening”.
The oddest claim is that “Its
economy is in collapse”, it is not a functioning national economy for its
people.” The reality is that entire EU countries’ economy is in collapse, the
economy of US is heading that way speedily, most every “democratic” countries’
economy is facing a collapse. With that logic, most governments
in those countries are not “legitimate” (a conclusion which I concur
with).
Here is a statistical overview of
the 2025-2026 Myanmar general election based on the latest official reports.
However, it is important to note that detailed state-by-state voting
data is not publicly available in the search results, and the
information provided primarily comes from the military administration's
official statements.
National Election Statistics
The following table summarizes
the key national-level data released by Major General Zaw Min Tun, head of the
military administration's information team.
Total Eligible Voters ;
Over 24.22 million
Total Participation; Over
13.4million
Overall Voter Turnout;
Approximately 55%
Parties & Candidates;
57 political parties, 4,863 candidates. Only six parties were registered to
contest at the national (Union) level, rest registered for local.
Vote distribution of Parties
nation wide
The National and local-Level
Parties
The Union Election Commission
registered six political parties to contest at the national (Union)
level.
Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP) - Bamar
(Nationwide, military-backed)
Mon National Party - Mon
people (Mon State and surrounding regions)
Shan Nationalities Democratic
Party - Shan people (Shan State)
Pa-O National Organization -
Pa-O people (primarily southern Shan State)
Kachin State People's Party -
Kachin people (Kachin State)
Kayin People's Party -
Karen (Kayin) people (Kayin State and adjacent areas)
Distribution of Votes Among Parties (Nationwide)
Union Solidarity and
Development Party ; 5.8+ million
votes, 44.19 percent of votes
The National Unity Party ; 1.7+
million votes (13.28 percent)
The National Unity Party is the direct successor
to the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) of the Ne Win era. The BSPP ruled
Myanmar from 1962 to 1988 under an ideology of "The Burmese Way to
Socialism," which was a unique blend of socialism, nationalism, and
autarky. It was fiercely anti-communist and fought a bloody war against the
CPB.
U Ko Ko Gyi’s People’s Party;
1.1+ million votes (8.80 percent).
The People’s Pioneer Party; 1 million votes (7.62 percent)
Shan and Nationalities
Democratic Party ; 800,000 votes
(6.11 percent)
Arakan Front Party; 20,000
votes (0.17 percent)
State-by-State Data and Areas
Without Elections
The available information is
focused on national aggregates and which specific administrative areas
were excluded from voting.
Union Election Commission stated
that voting took place in only 263 out of the country's 330 townships.
Specific Excluded Townships:
A list confirms elections could not be held in at least 65 townships nationwide.
These include: Chin State: Falam, Tonzang, Thantlang, Rakhine State:
Ann, Taungup, Thandwe, Gwa, Sagaing Region: Banmauk, Kawlin , many other
wards and village tracts within townships that did hold voting were also
excluded.
States/Regions Where Elections
Were Not Held
As previously indicated,
elections could not be held in at least 65 townships across
the country due to instability. This includes townships in the following states
and regions: Chin State: Falam, Tonzang, Thantlang, Rakhine State:
Ann, Taungup, Thandwe, Gwa, Sagaing Region: Banmauk, Kawlin, Kachin
State, Karen State, Mon State, and Shan
State: Multiple other townships were also excluded.
Ultimately, the question of “legitimacy’
in Myanmar cannot be resolved through
the competing moral claims of warring parties, all of whom wield
violence as their fundamental currency of power. For the vast majority of the
population, politics has been reduced to a grim calculus of survival under
shifting regimes of coercion. Whether under the junta's artillery barrages
or an ethnic army's localized reprisals, the civilian experience is often one
of fear and adaptation, not ideological allegiance. The future of the
state will therefore be determined not by which group is most 'legitimate' in
the abstract, but by which nexus of armed force and external patronage can
finally establish a durable, if harsh, monopoly over territory and
people—and in doing so, offer the war-weary a simple, terrible bargain: an
end to the chaos, in exchange for their silent acquiescence. The choice of Myanmar
people in general is not ideological choice, but exhausted pragmatism which
judges the competing powers not on their stated virtues but on their capacity
to enact a brutal, concrete form of order.
The tragedy of Myanmar is acute:
Myanmar is a country of immense potential, rich in resources, now being
destroyed.
Next; Conclusion
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