Early possible implications of the war of aggression against Iran.

Will the small countries be  heading towards to a “neutral” posturing ?

Introduction

It has been proven that having US military base in one’s country will not make it safer, but a high likely primary target.

The false confidence of relying on the US-air bases in their countries and the  support of US  in case of an attack shattered in front of entire world. All the US military bases in the family-states have been destroyed by Iran to a degree that to repair them will cost billions of dollars, and many years. The future of these family-states is bleak. While they were expecting a regime-change in Iran, the possibility of regime changes in those family-states looks more plausible sooner or later.

Being a "high likely primary target" versus protector is the inherent paradox of hosting a foreign military base, especially one belonging to a superpower. These countries cry out against the attacks on the US military bases in their countries, reasoning that they are not the ones who attacked in Iran. They conceal the fact that it is “Guilt by Association”.  In the eyes of an adversary of the superpower, the host nation is not a neutral party because it is providing the logistical, territorial, and political platform for the enemy. The base is a “force multiplier” for the superpower, so attacking it is a direct way to degrade that superpower's capabilities. Military bases are high-value Strategic targets. They contain command centers, intelligence facilities, air squadrons, and stockpiles of weapons. Destroying or damaging them provides a significant strategic victory for an attacker.

The Iranian strikes on US bases in the region serve multiple purposes:1) To retaliate against the superpower for its actions; “Punishment” 2) To show the superpower and the world that its assets are vulnerable; “Demonstration of Power” , 3) To send a message to the host country about the consequences of their alliance; “Signaling:”

In this context, the host country's safety is not just tied to its own conflicts but is now directly linked to every international crisis involving the superpower. A conflict between the US and Iran, for example, immediately becomes a conflict “on” and “against” the soil of countries like Iraq, Qatar, or Kuwait, whether they are willing and  want it or not.

The near-future process seems to be an inclination from “alliance with military bases” to alliance without military bases” in the direction of “non-alignment”- a neutral postering.

Why and How long the Countries will Host Bases?

The question is why do countries like Japan, South Korea, Germany, Qatar, and others to host US bases? Because the intended benefits can, in theory, outweigh the risks.

1. Assumed  “deterrence (the intended benefit):” The primary purpose of a base is to “prevent” an attack in the first place. The logic is that an adversary will think twice before attacking a country that has a direct, immediate military response from a superpower. For countries like South Korea facing North Korea, this supposed to be a tangible and daily reality in narratives. Contrary to the narratives, in reality The US base in South Korea is not just a target; it is the tripwire and the response mechanism.

2.   Actual “economic benefits: “ Bases can be massive economic drivers. They provide local jobs, inject money into the local economy through contracts and spending, and often come with significant aid or military hardware discounts from the superpower.

3.  Assumed “political influence and modernization:”“ Hosting a base provides a small country with a direct line to the world's most powerful capitals. It also facilitates the transfer of technology, training, and military doctrine, modernizing the host nation's own forces.

4. Reality in most cases is “Internal Security:”“ For most regimes, the presence of a superpower can also act as a guarantee against internal uprising, revolution, or coup attempts. It has been a  confidence building practice for the ruling elites in unipolar world order, but as has been proven, we are in the transformation stage of multi polar world order,

The "False Confidence" in alignment with military bases

The attacks of Iran on the Gulf “Family-States” "shattered” this “false confidence".  The false expectation of the "family-states" operate under a security umbrella theory by hosting US bases, they gain a powerful guarantor of last resort. An attack on them is an attack on the US. The Reality, the Iranian strikes, however, has shown a different dynamic. The attack wasn't “on” the host nation ,  it was “on” the US “in” the region. The host nation's territory became the battlefield, and its sovereignty was violated by both sides. The US couldn't prevent the strikes, and they were  powerless to stop either the US action that provoked them or the Iranian retaliation. This shattering self confidence was not only in military sense, but in both economic and political sense.

The economic and political Cost on the Gulf family-states for hosting the US military bases

The financial and temporal cost of repairing the damage is beyond any estimates both for the US and for the hosts in addition to the extensive time required for the repair. However, the greater cost is the loss of sovereignty and the internal political turmoil it will create. The host government is caught between its superpower ally, a powerful neighbor, and its own public opinion, which is often against the foreign military presence. In Gulf countries specific, this is more nuanced due the factors of religion and sects.

That is why hosting a superpower's military base in multipolar world order era  is a “double-edged sword of immense proportions” because It absolutely makes a host country more significant and likely target”“ in the superpower's conflicts, drawing threats that would not otherwise exist. Because the promise of protection becomes a  ““false confidence”“ when the superpower's actions (not of the host) trigger an attack, or when the superpower's interests shift and you are left exposed.  The recent Iranian strikes on US bases in Gulf  are a ““perfect case study”“ validating this point. They demonstrated that the host nations in the Gulf had little control and bore the brunt of the consequences.

Regime Change Possibilities

As I have noted earlier, during the unipolar world era in most cases US military bases functioned as a “road block” for any political uprising, revolution, or coup. A potential "regime change" in multipolar world order is not speculative but plausible. A foreign military presence can become a deeply unpopular symbol of a government's subservience, fueling nationalist or religious opposition that can destabilize the government from within. The "bleak" future I mentioned about the “family-states” in Gulf  is one where the host nation has the worst of both worlds: it is a target for external enemies and a source of internal contention. The conditions and situations transform from "bleak" to "structurally unsustainable". For the family-states, the alliance model becomes  not just a strategic risk but  an existential one that interacts directly with every internal vulnerability they have.

In this light, the possibility of regime change within these states seems not just plausible, but almost an inevitable consequence of a major war, regardless of who "wins" that war. The host nations pay the price for the conflict without any prospect of gain, making neutrality is the safest path an undeniable piece of strategic logic.

If we think dialectically as a  real-world case study,  the risk of hosting a superpower base is not uniform; it is magnified or mitigated by the internal structure and economic reality of the host nation.

Integrating the points made, they transform the "double-edged sword" into something far more dangerous for these specific states. It becomes an "all-around sword" for the Family-States and other vulnerable nation-states. When these states are uniquely vulnerable , especially with internal security problems, the "protector" dynamic “ for them, becomes a nearly total liability in a multi-polar conflict. Because a conflict would simultaneously trigger an external attack (on the US base), collapse the economic foundation (loss of oil revenue and non-oil sectors),create a humanitarian crisis (lack of food and goods), and ignite internal political tinderboxes (majority populations vs. ruling minority).

In case of Gulf family-States, they are not as nation-states in the commonly described  sense, but they are  family fiefdoms. It is a ruling small minority such as a Sunni minority ruling over a Shiite majority (as in Bahrain) or a collection of tribal groups over a large expatriate population all of which create a permanent internal security problem.

In this context, the US base in this region and other similar cases is not just an external target but also it's an internal accelerant. It becomes the ultimate symbol of the ruling family's reliance on a foreign power to maintain its position against its own people. An external conflict that leads to economic collapse provides a spark. The uprising is no longer just a political protest but  it can be framed as a nationalist or religious movement against a regime that has mortgaged the country's safety to a foreign superpower and brought down economic ruin upon them. The military base becomes the physical manifestation of everything the opposition resents.

Economic factor

The entire system in Gulf family-states is built on single economic resource (Oil Dependency). If and when the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the revenue stream doesn't just dip, but it comes to a full stop  devastating the economy .

Single economic resourced countries “lack the  self-sufficiency in all other sources. Strait of Hurmuz is not just for oil exports. They are exporters of oil, and  they are importers of “everything else”—food, medicine, manufactured goods. A closure of Hormuz means no money coming in “and” no food coming in. The state's ability to function, to provide for its citizens, and to pay its expatriate workforce collapses almost instantly. This isn't a recession; it's a systemic failure.

The Gulf family-states have the mirage of being  “The "Safe Haven" for ” tourism and financial corporations. The entire branding of places like Dubai or Doha is built on stability, luxury, and being an oasis of calm in a turbulent region. A war, especially one that directly threatens them via the US bases, shatters that image instantly. Capital flight would be immediate and catastrophic, crippling the non-oil sectors they've so carefully cultivated. They have no military power to project stability, and their economic power is entirely dependent on the very peace that war destroys.

The Multi-Polar Context and the Case for Neutrality

In a unipolar world, aligning with the sole superpower was a more calculated risk. The superpower's word carried more weight, and its ability to project power was unmatched.

In a multi-polar world, with a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and regional powers like Iran, the calculation changes entirely.  These family-states are no longer just hosting a US base; they are placing themselves on one side of multiple, overlapping global and regional power struggles. They become a potential frontline in a US-China conflict, a US-Russia conflict, and a US/Iran-Israel conflict simultaneously. As the world is transferred from the unipolar to multipolar world, they transfer  to becoming  “a proxy battlefield.”

Multipolar world order shatters the monopoly on protection. The US can no longer guarantee absolute protection against all comers, as the Iranian strikes demonstrated. The cost of defending them against a near-peer competitor or a determined regional power with its own superpower backers becomes astronomically high and uncertain.

“The risk and benefit”, both sides of this equation are now collapsing simultaneously.

As the Iran strikes show, the danger of being a target is real and immediate. U.S. bases in Japan, like Kadena Air Base and Yokosuka Naval Base, are not just defensive installations; they are key nodes in the U.S. strategy to project power against China, making them priority targets in any conflict . The risk (the target) remains. “

The U.S. is now signaling that it will pull its most critical defensive assets (like Patriot and THAAD missiles) from these very countries to fight elsewhere. The 2026 NDS explicitly states that South Korea must handle its own primary defense, and that U.S. support will be "limited”. The protective umbrella is being folded up and taken away, while the host nation is left standing alone yet still as a target. The benefit (the protection) is withdrawn.

This forces a brutal strategic calculus for leaders in Tokyo and Seoul. They are being asked to host forward bases for U.S. power projection against China, but are being told they cannot rely on U.S. assets for their own defense against North Korea or a conventional attack. They bear all the risk of being a frontline state with none of the guaranteed protection.

My  argument rests on three pillars, all of which are confirmed by recent events and official documents. 1) The Depletion of U.S. Military Stocks: the concurrent wars in Ukraine and now Iran have created a severe munitions crisis. This is not just a logistical problem; it is a strategic one. 2) Iran's strategy of using cheap drones has exposed the staggering cost of modern defense. The U.S. and its allies are forced to use interceptor missiles that can cost 10 to 70 times more than the drones they are shooting down . This is an unsustainable economic and industrial equation. 3) The war in Iran is rapidly depleting stocks of key systems like “Patriot air defense missiles”, “Tomahawk land-attack missiles”, and ““SM-3 interceptors” . These are not just any weapons, they are the very systems needed to protect both forward-deployed U.S. forces and the allied nations that host them. The US is drawing down its critical reserves.

The most significant consequence of this war  is not about the ability to fight the current war, but about the inability to deter the next one. A depleted stockpile of systems like ““THAAD”“ (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) raises serious questions about U.S. credibility in a future conflict with China in the Pacific. That makes up “the day after" problem“.

It is crucial to study the newly released 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) which formalizes the shift  I  anticipated. It is a radical document that prioritizes homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere above all else, effectively telling allies they are on their own.

The new doctrine states that the U.S. will provide only "critical but limited" support to its allies. European nations are explicitly told to take "primary responsibility" for their own conventional defense . Limited Support.

For East Asian allies, the message is the same. The NDS suggests that “South Korea is now capable of taking "primary responsibility" for deterring North Korea“, hinting at a major reduction of the U.S. role . The U.S. forces that remain are to be reoriented not to defend their host, but to support a "denial defense" strategy focused on the First Island Chain and China. Shifting the Burden.

The U.S. now views allies as "customers" who should buy American weapons, not as strategic partners whose defense is a shared priority . A transactional Relationship.

Conclusion

The war in Iran has provided a terrifying live-fire demonstration of what it means to host a U.S. base. Gulf states who host US bases that declared their neutrality while hosting US military base offers no protection from being drawn into conflict.

The attacks went beyond military bases to hit international airports, hotels, and residential buildings that contained US personnel, shattered the region's image as a safe haven and causing immediate economic chaos. U.S. military bases have been transformed from a "protective umbrella" into a "magnet for attack" for the host nations .

For countries like Japan and South Korea, this is a devastating double blow. The logic of their alliance was always a trade-off: accept the risk of becoming a target in exchange for the ultimate protection of the U.S. military. Now no more.

Using the  "boomerang effect"  metaphor, the US and Israel's strategy to contain or confront Iran, which was designed to destabilize  Tehran, its primary impact turned out to be  destabilizing Iran's neighbors, economically, socially, and politically, which potentially may lead to their internal collapse. The weapon (attack on Iran for regime change) seems to be  curved through the air and may strike the one who threw it's own allies.

The  generalization of this particular identifies a potential historical turning point. The confluence of events; depleted arsenals, a new major war, and a shift in U.S. strategic doctrine, is creating a perfect storm that is fundamentally devaluing the "security guarantee" that U.S. bases are supposed to provide.

The U.S. is indeed facing critical weapons shortages, its new defense strategy is explicitly deprioritizing the defense of allies in favor of homeland and hemispheric defense, and this combination is forcing allies from Europe to East Asia to confront a terrifying new reality: the bases that were meant to be their "protective umbrella" may now leave them as exposed and undefended.

Will it be the  end of the "vassal" model? Theoretically, historically, and practically that is impossible. This will force countries to consider a neutral stand. The traditional "vassal" model, where a nation trades sovereignty for security by hosting a superpower's bases, is predicated on that security being credible and guaranteed. Hosting a U.S. base provided a “credible guarantee of protection” in a unipolar world.  The military base was a symbol of the alliance's “shared security”. The alliance was an unequal partnership and   “transactional”.  The U.S. always  acted in its own interest, and the host nation's security was a secondary consideration.

The U.S. is now a “depleted superpower” fighting multiple wars, with a doctrine of "limited support." The credibility and guarantee  for safety has disappeared. The U.S. is effectively dismantling the very foundation of its alliance system. By withdrawing the protective assets while leaving the vulnerable bases in place, Washington is demonstrating that its allies are now just forward-deployed platforms expendable in strategy and deniable in defense. For the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and others, the rational response is indeed to begin decoupling their national security from a partner that has so clearly signaled its unreliability.

U.S. assets are being ““withdrawn to fight other wars”“, leaving the host exposed. The U.S. military's mission is being reoriented away from defending the host. The military base has become  a ““primary target”“ for the superpower's adversaries, drawing fire to the host nation.
The next  process for the countries seems to be an inclination from “alliance with military bases” to alliance without military bases” in the direction of “non-alignment”- a neutral postering. The path to neutrality, once unthinkable, may soon look like the only prudent option of small countries.

Erdogan A

March 6, 2026

South East Asia Time