Myth #197: Stalin planned M.A. Suslov as his successor.

 

200 Myths About Stalin

Myth #197: Stalin planned M.A. Suslov as his successor.

Myth #198: Stalin did not prepare a successor for himself.

Both myths have been circulating for a long time, but both are groundless. As, indeed, is virtually any anti-Stalinist myth. Roy Medvedev is the most active in his treatment of Suslov, the "gray cardinal" of the USSR during the stagnation period. He inserts this nonsense in all his books about Stalin. The most recent instance of this was in his expanded work, "Unknown Stalin" (Moscow, 2007). In reality, after the war, shortly before his death, Stalin decided for the second time in his life to wrest power from the party apparatus and, in general, to reduce the party apparatus to a state where it would have no influence whatsoever on state affairs. He saw perfectly well that the party had already fulfilled its historical mission and was now only hindering the rapid development of the country and the state. He saw nothing progressive in it, especially in the party apparatus. It is known, for example, that when A.A. Zhdanov proposed convening a party congress to discuss the problems of development and history, but Stalin, according to A.A. Zhdanov's son, Yu.A. Zhdanov, responded: "The Party... What is the Party... It has turned into a choir of psalm-singers, a detachment of hallelujah-singers... A preliminary, in-depth analysis is necessary."

Over the course of several postwar years, Stalin carried out this profound analysis, the essence of which has been brilliantly summarized by D. Kropotov. This summary is based on the aforementioned book by S. Mironov, "The Riddle of '37: Stalin's Order" (Moscow, 2007).

Only seven years after the war did Stalin decide to attempt to place the party nomenklatura under the people's control (let us immediately note that this was the second time – A.M. ). At the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Stalin undoubtedly attempted to learn from his mistakes (referring to the mistakes of 1937 – AM).

...Stalin decided to begin by changing the party's status. The country's greatest problem, further exacerbated by the end of the Great Patriotic War... was a peculiar "dual power." According to the Constitution, all power belonged to the Soviet organs, but in fact, everything was controlled by the party organs, headed by the Politburo. This had been more or less tolerable during the Civil War and during the threat of foreign intervention, when members of the party leadership had a vested interest in the young Soviet state successfully overcoming all its difficulties and in building a powerful army and industry. Party leaders bore full responsibility for the success of socialist reforms. And this responsibility was not limited to the threat of simple resignation. A victory for the counterrevolution would inevitably have led to the physical elimination of the Bolshevik leaders, and for them, simple execution would have been a fitting outcome. Many of them could have faced not just death, but a painful death—the example of Sergei Lazo, burned in a locomotive firebox, clearly demonstrated this. Under these conditions, "dual power" was justified and effective. Soviet bodies and industrial leaders carried out their duties, while party officials, threatened with death, oversaw and monitored them. They could not indulge in red tape, bureaucracy, and idleness.

However, the situation changed after the USSR's international recognition, its successes in industrialization, the creation of its powerful army, and especially after its victory in the Great Patriotic War. Communism and communists now enjoyed great prestige worldwide as the primary force that had destroyed fascism. At this time, there was no longer the threat of losing their lives, as had been the case during the Civil War, to those party leaders who failed in their assigned tasks. The threat from their superiors, led by Stalin, remained, but this threat was countered by the mutual responsibility and solidarity of the party bureaucrats. Furthermore, the party leaders themselves were only engaged in oversight, not in actual work, like the industrial managers—members of Stalin's "new team."

Stalin, as head of state, could easily control industrial activity, but how could he control the controllers—the party officials? Previously, they had been controlled by fear of a counterrevolutionary victory or the arrival of the Germans, which promised death to all communists. But now, after victory in the Great Patriotic War, being a communist had become profitable and safe. With the elimination of the threat to the well-being of party officials from business, their responsibility for their actions also disappeared. Joining the party, joining the ranks of controllers who had nothing to do themselves but merely manage others, became the cherished dream of a mass of crooks and careerists.

There was only one way to resist them—and Stalin inevitably came to this realization. He had to, as he had previously dreamed, transform the party into an "Order of the Sword," remove the possibility for party members to rest on their laurels, and remove them from the temptations of political power. If there was no "carrot," and only the hard work of propagating communist ideas, there was no need to defend the party from the onslaught of crooks and careerists.

It was precisely this removal of the party from state power, focusing on agitation and propaganda work, work that was not supposed to bring any dividends in the form of glamorous positions or the opportunity to avoid responsibility for any real work, that Stalin's reforms, announced by him at the 19th Congress, were aimed at:

— the party changed its name from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union... Stalin thereby wanted to emphasize the subordinate position of the party in relation to the Soviet state;

— The Politburo was abolished not only in fact (by the early 1950s, it had already served a purely nominal function—Stalin, as head of government, resolved most issues with his deputies) but also in law. Instead of a compact, all-powerful party organ, it was transformed into the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, a body consisting of two dozen people and therefore incapable of providing operational leadership to the party. "And this replacement of the Politburo with the Presidium meant that the party was deprived of the organ directly responsible for governing the entire country, and was being replaced by an organ that would govern only the party, and only during breaks between Central Committee plenary sessions."

Stalin eliminated one-man management in the party—he did what he had wanted to do back in 1927. The position of General Secretary was abolished, and the number of Central Committee Secretaries was reduced to ten. Moreover, together they didn't form any body; all ten simply joined the Presidium, which, again, according to the Charter, had no chairman, no chief. The fact is that one-man management is necessary for good governance of an organization, for it to have responsible leaders, for the entire organization to be strong. But one-man management hinders discussion, the "search for truth." And the search for truth, agitation, and propaganda for communism—that's precisely what Stalin intended to focus the "Order of the Sword"—the Communist Party—on.

"Stalin... also ensured that after his departure as Party Secretary, the Central Committee wouldn't even think of creating a new, informal leader, so to speak. It's well known that at the Central Committee Plenum, immediately after the 19th Congress, Stalin unleashed scathing, often unfair, criticism on his closest supporters—Molotov and Mikoyan. "Researchers" usually attribute this demarche to Stalin's paranoid insanity (which, in reality, never happened— A.M .).

…A much more realistic and logical explanation for Stalin’s behavior is that, having destroyed the principle of one-man command and preparing his departure from the party, Stalin was concerned that the party nomenklatura would not be tempted to reintroduce this principle of one-man command by appointing one of the most senior members of the Politburo as leader.

A brief comment. It's hard to disagree that this is indeed a more realistic and logical explanation. However, that's far from all. During the war and the immediate postwar years, Stalin accumulated a considerable amount of information about the clearly unseemly behavior of Molotov and Mikoyan. This information came from official intelligence services (intelligence and counterintelligence), as well as from Stalin's personal intelligence and counterintelligence. According to information the author has from a high-ranking member of Stalin's personal intelligence, Konstantin Mefodievich, Stalin possessed information about Molotov and Mikoyan's highly confidential personal contacts with certain powerful Western behind-the-scenes forces. He couldn't make this public, but he could easily reprimand his former Politburo comrades. Which is precisely what he did, partly as a warning to others. And they already knew why Stalin was attacking them.

Decades later, in our time, when the brilliant book "The Committee of 300" by former high-ranking British intelligence officer J. Colleman was published in Russian, it turned out that, for example, A. Mikoyan was a member of the Committee of 300. And regarding Molotov, rumors began to circulate, gaining more and more substance over time, about his connections to the Masonic underground in the USSR that remained after 1917. Incidentally, Molotov's own reaction to the Freemason rumors is more than revealing: he mockingly feigned either complete ignorance of the supposed devilry being discussed, or even expressed mockery on the subject, reducing everything to crude jokes. However, such an experienced political and government figure as Molotov, aptly dubbed the "semi-sovereign ruler" by the writer F. Chuev, could not have been unaware of the existence of a Masonic underground in both pre-revolutionary Russia and, especially, in the Soviet Union. Moreover, he could not have known why many of the so-called Leninist guards were put up against the wall in 1937–1938.

— The Presidium was composed of 25 members and 11 candidates (with an advisory vote). Compared to the 9-11 members of the Politburo (especially with Stalin at its head. — L.M.), this turned out to be a very polyphonic collective farm. However, one should not think that Stalin did not understand what he was doing. Most of these 25 people were not party officials, but government officials who… reported to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (that is, at that time, Stalin himself. — A.M.) and, accordingly, to the Supreme Soviet (parliament. — A.M.). Thus, power in the party (even within the party. — L.M.) transferred from the party nomenklatura to Soviet power (strictly speaking, to its nomenklatura).

— Being consistent in eliminating one-man rule in the party, Stalin attempted to resign from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee due to old age and submitted a corresponding application to the Central Committee.

But the party nomenklatura understood that without a leader as the head of the party (even a nominal one, one of the 10 secretaries of the Central Committee - only this was Stalin), the party would immediately be removed from the levers of state power, so they completely obstructed this attempt by Stalin.

Stalin made just one mistake: he failed to insist on his immediate dismissal from the post of Central Committee Secretary, while nevertheless outlining his future plans with complete clarity. After this, "the nomenklatura had only one way out: Stalin was obliged to die as Secretary of the Central Committee, as leader of the party and the entire country. In the event of such a death, his successor as Secretary of the Central Committee would automatically be seen as the leader of the country, and the media, concentrated in the hands of the Central Committee, would quickly try to portray the successor as a genius—cementing him in the public consciousness as the leader of the entire people." And that is precisely what happened. The country was presented with "dear Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev"—who, having usurped power in the country, including through the coup d'état of June 26, 1953, initiated the process of the future collapse of the world's greatest power.

As you can see, there's not the slightest basis for even listening to Roy Medvedev's baseless assertions that Stalin allegedly targeted Suslov as his successor as General Secretary. This is utter, pseudo-intellectual nonsense.

However, it is no nonsense that Stalin was indeed grooming a successor... within the government. The renowned Stalinist People's Commissar I.A. Benediktov later recalled: "Stalin... selected a worthy successor, in his view, for at least one of the highest posts. I am referring to Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, who during the war headed the partisan movement headquarters at the Supreme Command Headquarters. Possessing a strong and independent character, Panteleimon Kondratievich was simultaneously a collectivist and a democrat to the core, and knew how to win people over and organize the harmonious work of a wide range of people.

A brief comment. It was to him, Panteleimon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko, that Stalin entrusted in 1938 the most difficult mission—to immediately end the repressions in Belarus—and granted him exclusive powers to do so. Moreover, Stalin personally instructed him on how to conduct himself in the republic to immediately put an end to the atrocities of the "Yezhovshchina." P.K. Ponomarenko carried out this task brilliantly, not only ending the indiscriminate repressions in the republic but also freeing hundreds of thousands of people from prison while simultaneously harshly punishing those responsible for these repressions.

Stalin took into account that Ponomarenko was not part of his inner circle, had his own position, and never sought to shift responsibility onto others' shoulders.

The document appointing P.K. Ponomarenko as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had already been endorsed by several members of the Politburo, and only Stalin’s death prevented the implementation of his will. [12]

Having become First Secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev, who was naturally aware of everything, took the necessary steps to push Ponomarenko aside—first to Kazakhstan, then, in 1955, to diplomatic service, as ambassador to Poland, then to the Netherlands. However, his tenure here, too, was short-lived—the dangerous "competitor" was quickly sent into a very modest pension, without the benefits due to him for his public service. A simple, modest, and unassuming man in his personal life, burdened with the care of his family and friends, he literally eked out a near-beggarly existence when, finally, after Khrushchev's resignation, his friends, appealing to the Central Committee, secured a decent pension for him in his old age.

This is the real truth regarding the above myths.

Myth #199: In the last months of his life, Stalin retired from public life and lived quietly at his dacha.

Myth #200: Stalin died of natural causes (as a result of a stroke).

There are countless myths and conjectures on this topic. Everyone has tried, and continues to try, this! The result is always the same: everything within the reach of the mythmakers, usually acting on orders from the authorities, has been so confused that figuring out what actually happened is extremely difficult. But nevertheless, it is necessary. Very necessary. Because this topic never leaves the forefront of politics. Specifically, politics, not history. This story is twisted this way and that... The last time, for example, this was done was by the half-Moscow, half-London dandy A.K. Pushkov—the well-known "television arts figure" (an ironic expression of Faina Ranevskaya)—on his television program "Postscript" on July 7, 2007. So, in that program, which, under the general direction of A.K. Pushkov was trained by his employees Ramil Gataulin and Artem Shirokov, the following was said:

And now about the mysterious pages of our history. As we told you in the previous episode, the US Central Intelligence Agency recently declassified its archives, covering the period from 1953 to 1973. Among other things, these documents contain a report on the death of Joseph Stalin. Moreover, the CIA experts who prepared the report did not rule out the possibility that the Generalissimo could have died a violent death several days before the official announcement of his death. Incidentally, this same theory has been advanced by some in our country, including members of Stalin's own family. So, did Joseph Stalin die a natural death or was he assisted? Ramil Gataulin and Artem Shirokov explore this in their article.

—  In the declassified CIA materials dedicated to Stalin, there is one intriguing phrase:

"It is not known whether he was killed or died as reported in medical reports."

This once again gives rise to the question: did Stalin die a natural death or was he murdered? And who could have wished for the death of the all-powerful leader? According to the official version, Joseph Stalin died on March 5, 1953, from a massive cerebral hemorrhage. However, even before this announcement was published, people began to speculate that Stalin had not died a natural death, and that the killers should be sought within the leader's inner circle. Even then, several theories about the Generalissimo's death emerged.

Version one. Beria the poisoner

"  The first person suspected of murder was Lavrenty Beria. After all, he had access to a special NKVD toxicology laboratory. It had been created back in the 1930s, incidentally, at Stalin's own initiative. But Beria had more than just poison. He also had reason to want his master dead. In the early 1950s, rumors in Moscow were swirling that he had lost the leader's trust. The joke even spread, "Beria, Beria—he's lost his trust." And from there, he was only one step away from repeating the fate of his predecessors, Yagoda and Yezhov," recalls Stalin's niece, Kira Alliluyeva-Politkovskaya.

"  He became a terror to Beria. He was already disillusioned with Beria, and Beria was probably very frightened. What won't you do when you're afraid? After all, when a person is afraid and has no way out, he'll find any way out."

—  Stalin, apparently, feared an assassination attempt and therefore was extremely cautious. Anastas Mikoyan later recalled: “He would do this: he would put a new bottle down and say to me or Beria: “You, as Caucasians, understand wines more than others; try it, is this wine worth drinking?” I always drank the glass to the end; Beria did too. In this way, he protected himself from the possibility of poisoning: after all, the wine business was subordinated to me, and Beria sent the bottles, receiving them from Georgia. So he was testing us.”

Stalin created an incredibly strict food control system. His water was brought in from Abkhazia, from the glaciers of the Abkhazian Mountains, and he drank no other water. Wine was delivered from Georgian wineries, directly from Georgia, via a special route. Food was meticulously checked, and no poisons could possibly find their way onto Stalin's table. Even when he was ill, Stalin never took the medications they gave him. Instead, he sent his guards to a regular pharmacy for pills, each time to a different one. However, there is a theory that the guards were more obedient to their immediate superior, Lavrentiy Beria, and his men could well have given Stalin the "medicine" he needed.

"  Of course, everything was checked. But the thing is, he was in the NKVD, and everything was checked by his people. Who else could it have been checked by? Beria's people. He was the one in charge there, not Stalin. Stalin was the leader, and he was in the NKVD, so he could have slipped something in there. Svetlana, for example, believed he was poisoned."

"  Practically the only person Stalin trusted back then was Valentina Istomina, his "housekeeper" and part-time state security officer. For the last 18 years, she waited on the leader at table and, it is said, shared his bed. Istomina's whereabouts on the night of Stalin's stroke remain unknown. However, Beria wasn't the only one who could have wanted Stalin dead."

A quick comment. It's astonishing that the aforementioned "television personalities" didn't even realize they were dragging onto the screen, to put it mildly, some relative of Stalin's who was, in terms of age and the number of grievances she harbored against him. However, perhaps that was precisely their point. She spun a yarn in front of the camera, but the journalists didn't even bat an eyelid. But Kira Alliluyeva-Politkovskaya was lying utterly. Beria had no connection whatsoever with the state security organs since the end of 1945! To confirm this, you don't have to listen to some old woman's nonsense—just look at the standard research on Beria. Even the most "democratic" study mentions this fact. The state security organs were led at that time not by Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, but by Semyon Denisovich Ignatiev! Which, by the way, is also perfectly clearly and documented in the history of the state security agencies. And, therefore, there was no need to drag Beria into this at all. Of course, the old lady, with her historical ignorance and fierce hatred of Stalin and Beria, could have blurted out such a thing, but where were those "television artists" looking?!

By the way, as soon as L.P. Beria is dragged into this story, you can be absolutely sure that you are dealing with a blatant lie!

As for the Lubyanka toxicology laboratory, firstly, it was created on the orders of Lenin, not Stalin. It's about time he knew that. Secondly, having left the state security agencies for the atomic project (it was only through this project that Beria came into contact with the state security agencies—primarily, with the illegal intelligence service through which the information needed by Soviet atomic scientists was obtained) Lavrenty Pavlovich had absolutely no connection with this laboratory. During this period, it reported to First Deputy Minister of State Security Ogoltsov, whom Beria could not command. And finally, and most importantly, thirdly. The old woman shouldn't have lied with the help of a twisted ditty, and the "television artists" shouldn't have listened to her. First of all, because the original ditty looked like this:

Our comrade Beria lost our trust.

And comrade Malenkov gave him a good beating.

Moreover, it appeared not before Stalin's death, but after Beria's assassination, that is, after June 26, 1953. Frankly, it wouldn't hurt for television journalists to know at least a little history, so as not to get into yet another embarrassing mess every time.

It's also worth knowing this history because Beria didn't lose Stalin's trust at the time—on the contrary, as someone vested with Stalin's special trust, he oversaw the entire Soviet atomic and hydrogen programs. What, and no one knows, was the nonsense of an elderly woman so incompetent was necessary?! Incidentally, on the eve of Stalin's death, it was at Stalin's insistence that the decision was made to return Lavrenty Pavlovich to the MGB, as the state security agencies, under Ignatiev's leadership, had completely infuriated Stalin. He no longer trusted them, which was particularly evident in the "Doctors' Plot," when he himself commissioned an independent expert examination.

All the more inappropriate are the references to Anastas Mikoyan—what a "witness"! The mere fact that he successfully traveled "from Ilyich to Ilyich without a heart attack or stroke" and was, as rumor claimed, capable of walking dry between torrents of rain, makes any testimony he offers extremely unreliable. Anastas Mikoyan had something to hide from prying eyes, and he had reasons to lie... Unfortunately, an analysis of these reasons is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is clear: he cannot be trusted one bit—he was far too "flexible" when it came to Stalin's death... Especially since he later confessed to Albanian leader Enver Hoxha that he and Khrushchev had been plotting an assassination attempt on Stalin.

Likewise, there's no reason to believe the old woman's ravings about Stalin having his water delivered from the glaciers of Abkhazia. Stalin was known for his particularly ascetic modesty and didn't indulge in luxuries in his personal life. One needn't look far for examples. The longtime head of his personal security, the notorious Vlasik, was removed from his post primarily because he tried to blame Stalin for incredibly large quantities of food and beverages. Stalin, in particular, was extremely outraged by the documents that allegedly showed him eating several dozen tons of some particularly delicacy fish, flown to Moscow from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. And that he, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, who literally trembled over every penny of his national income, would indulge in such culinary extravagances—delivering water from the glaciers of Abkhazia?! Honestly, I wouldn't be a sinner if I knew my limits when it came to mythmaking...

Furthermore, the insane old woman was unaware of how the food and drink supplied to Stalin was inspected. This was handled by a special laboratory within Stalin's personal security system. And based on the inspection results, it would stamp the food and drink with its own mark. There was, is, and never will be anything supernatural about this. Since the creation of the world, the food and drink of the head of state have been subject to particularly thorough inspection. This is a crucial element of the entire security system for the head of state. And this has nothing to do with Stalin's character or the system that existed at that time, as the old woman is hinting at. It is simply the security system for the head of state.

That Stalin was particularly attentive to these issues is even less surprising. World history is literally littered with all manner of stories of poisonings and assassinations of the top officials of various countries—in ancient times, the Middle Ages, the 20th century, and even today. And weren't there plenty of people willing to send him to his forefathers?! Both abroad and at home. If, for example, over 648 assassination attempts were made on the life of Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, then surely Stalin should have had less reason to fear for his life than the famous comandante?! After all, these are completely incomparable political figures, not to mention the unprecedented incomparability of the scale, significance, and role of Cuba and the USSR on the world stage!

Finally, the elderly woman, so incompetent for her age, is so clueless that she couldn't even grasp a simple fact. During the period in question, Stalin's security team reported not to Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, but directly to the Minister of State Security, S.D. Ignatiev, since, as a result of a special plot but based on serious incriminating evidence, Stalin's head of personal security, the notorious Vlasik, was jailed. And the state security agencies themselves, from late 1949 onward, were overseen by none other than "dear" Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. Moreover, it's time to remember that in 1953, the NKVD didn't exist. It was the Ministry of State Security.

So before you start paying attention to some old woman's nonsense, it wouldn't hurt to just skim through at least a couple of standard studies on the subject. Then you'd avoid any embarrassment.

But one thing about the old woman's chatter deserves special attention: Stalin was indeed poisoned. And a little later, we'll prove it with documents.

Version two. Conspiracy of the inner circle

Many of his comrades, tired of the fact that all power, including over them, was in his hands, might have dreamed of the leader's death. A collective conspiracy involving Beria, Malenkov, and Khrushchev may have taken place. The reality of such a conspiracy is plausible if we recall how Stalin spent his final hours. He suffered a stroke on the night of March 1, 1953. However, the head of state did not receive help until the following evening, March 2. For more than 24 hours, approximately 36 hours, not a single doctor came to Stalin, who lay on the floor. For the first 10 hours, this was Stalin's own fault. He lived alone, not allowing anyone to enter his room or disturb his sleep. Security appeared when Stalin called for them. If Stalin didn't call, they didn't appear. When he didn't call for them for a very long time—somewhere around 8-10 hours, I believe— they became concerned, went in themselves, and found him lying unconscious on the floor. But the USSR's top leaders didn't arrive in Kuntsevo until another 20 hours later. The servants were ordered merely to move Stalin from the floor to the sofa. They explained, "Comrade Stalin is simply sleeping." Even though it was clear to everyone that he was, in fact, unconscious.

Perhaps it was then, in those hours when the leader was quietly dying, that a spontaneous conspiracy arose. Most historians are certain that they could not have agreed on anything in advance. The members of the Politburo distrusted and suspected each other too much to risk colluding together against Stalin. There was always a strong possibility that someone would inform on him and strengthen their position at the expense of others. Neither Khrushchev, nor Beria, nor Malenkov, nor Molotov, nor Kaganovich were friends; they were adversaries, political opponents. They never met alone; they could not agree on anything; they feared Stalin's death because they feared that, with Stalin's death, the regime would collapse- mechanisms they did not understand, the only one who understood them. And along with Stalin, their own careers would collapse. However, seeing the leader helpless on the floor, Khrushchev, Beria, and Malenkov realized their chance and sat down at the negotiating table. First, power had to be divided, and then it had to be decided who would treat and bury him. And from approximately 2 or 3 PM on March 2nd until the evening of March 2nd, some completely secret consultations, about which we know nothing, took place between Beria, Malenkov, and Khrushchev. Only that night did they agree on who would take over which part of the state: Khrushchev the party, Malenkov the state, the Council of Ministers, and Beria the punitive organs. And then they summoned doctors to Stalin. In other words, they helped Stalin die by denying him medical care at the right moment.

A brief comment. We won't comment on this version at this time, to avoid having to serve Mass twice. We'll return to it after analyzing the third version.

The third and most important version: Natural death

The "Government Announcement" on Stalin's death stated: "On the night of March 2, while Comrade Stalin was in his apartment in Moscow, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, affecting vital areas of the brain." If we assume this is true and Stalin did indeed suffer a stroke, then the former comrades were left to divide power. They weren't outright assassins. Ultimately, it was the regime he himself had established that killed Stalin. He had condemned himself to this regime: complete solitude, no pharmacy, no doctors guarding the entire sprawling Kuntsevo dacha; among the several hundred guards, there wasn't even a paramedic. What kind of murder is this? That's systemic.

Historian Yuri Zhukov, the author of two studies on Stalin, reveals little-known facts about the leader's final years. Zhukov is convinced that Stalin's assassination was pointless; by the end of 1952, he had already retired, and his death was only a matter of time.

Everyone knew and understood that Stalin was about to die. Three strokes—tell anyone uninitiated in medicine, they'll tell you—that's a lot. And a fourth could strike at any moment. Moreover, Stalin no longer fought for power or demanded it. He had modestly retreated to the sidelines and lived at his dacha as a pensioner. He had completely renounced politics. Therefore, there was neither reason nor justification for killing him. Stalin's comrades closely monitored his health, which was deteriorating.

His memory began to fade. He'd have moments of clarity, remembering things clearly, then forgetting everything—what, where, and when. Furthermore, his handwriting had changed. Previously neat, always written on good paper, clear, and medium-sized, it suddenly became different: angular, with enormous letters. When I showed a photocopy to a psychiatrist friend of mine, without saying who wrote what, why, he said: the man's hands were clearly shaking, and he was holding one hand with the other, struggling to write with both. Hence the enormous, angular, sharp letters. Why was it necessary to remove the gravely ill Stalin at that moment? He no longer played any role in politics. He was taking walks at his nearby dacha, and his only pastime was making his own wine, homemade wine. They sent him grapes from the Caucasus and Georgia, and he, remembering how it was done in his homeland, crushed and made young wine himself.

And yet, questions remain. But the answers to them should likely be sought not in CIA files, but in Soviet archives. However, it appears no one is planning to declassify these historical documents, including Stalin's medical records.

A brief comment. It's hard to believe, but this is precisely the version of Stalin's final months that was presented on July 7, 2007, by that same authoritative researcher, Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Nikolaevich Zhukov—the author of several truly fascinating, brilliantly argued books about Stalin, among which "Another Stalin" and "Stalin: Secrets of Power" stand out. The most unfortunate thing is that this occurred on television, meaning his statement was heard by tens of millions of people.

With all due personal and sincere respect for Yu. N. Zhukov and his scientific achievements, I categorically cannot, and have no right to, agree with such a statement. Because it is fundamentally untrue. As for why it is untrue, I will answer the question with the help of Stalin's Minister of Finance, Arseny Zverev. I would like to point out once again that he was a most fascinating person and a superb financier—no match for modern "Russian" finance ministers. He valued the Soviet kopeck and the Soviet ruble so highly that it was fitting to compare him to the defenders of Stalingrad or Moscow. But at the same time, he was so wise, so flexible in his choice of financial means to strengthen the Soviet economy and improve the well-being of Soviet citizens, so far-sighted, that Stalin considered it a good idea to consult with him constantly. So, we quote from A. G. Zhukov's memoirs. Zverev, “Notes of a Minister” (Moscow, 1973, pp. 242–246; according to the memoirs of A.G. Zverev, the following quote refers to March 1–2, 1953; remember this circumstance, it will be very useful below).

"The reconstruction of the economy for peacetime was largely completed in 1946. In 1948, the country's industrial output exceeded pre-war levels. Thus, it took approximately two and a half years to restore industry. The heroic labor of workers and the tireless work of the Party ensured the fulfillment of the first post-war five-year plan in industry in four years and three months.

wever, these successes did not mean the country's path was easy. Despite the impressive advances in industry, agriculture's lag was particularly noticeable. Recovering it proved more difficult than industry. Difficulties in agriculture were largely due to serious shortcomings in management, and the violation of the principle of collective farms and collective farmers having a material interest in the results of their labor.

From meetings with Stalin, from conversations with him, from his statements, I formed a very clear idea that he was not confident in the correctness of all the methods of managing agriculture that we were using...

…My area is finance. I will touch on this aspect of the problem, specifically its most pressing issue of those years: agricultural taxes.

Taxes are also used to encourage collective forms of development. They are inherently repayable: the proceeds are reused for the benefit of workers.

I'll tell you, in particular, about the agricultural tax. Its history dates back to the pre-war years. When the law on this tax was being drafted, Stalin was extremely wary of the People's Commissariat of Finance's proposal to increase it (we cited the grave international situation and the urgent need to provide large sums of money to industry). But he ultimately agreed to increase the tax on collective farmers by 1.8 times.

When discussing the issue at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), I asked for some leeway in tax fluctuations. Noting that our statistics were in order, I suggested setting an upper limit 1.9 times higher than the previous one. Having received approval, I set about refining the data. Only after thorough preparation did the financial authorities begin work, and they did a good job.

The Great Patriotic War interrupted further development of this problem. With the transition to peace, the issue of reducing wartime taxes had to be addressed. The agricultural tax issue once again became pressing. Once again, extensive research was required to prove the need for its revision. There were people in the central administration who were convinced the Ministry of Finance was mistaken. Stalin even accused me of being insufficiently informed about the financial situation of collective farmers. He once told me, half-jokingly, half-seriously:

— It’s enough for a collective farmer to sell a chicken to console the Ministry of Finance.

- Unfortunately, Comrade Stalin, this is far from true - for some collective farmers, even a cow would not be enough to pay the tax.

After that, I sent a summary of the actual data to the Party Central Committee. The figures spoke for themselves. The government had decided to reduce the agricultural tax by one-third. (Note how openly and assertively Arseny Zverev spoke when defending the interests of the collective farmers. And note that each time he relied on the results of serious research, and wasn't just making up his mind. Note also A. Zverev's tenacity in pursuing the agricultural tax reduction. You'd think the head of the finance department, by definition the stingiest in any country, inclined only to fleece the population and businesses, would zealously advocate for a rapid reduction in the agricultural tax! With figures in hand, he breaks the government's bias and gets his way! Now that's a Stalinist minister! Have you heard or seen anything like it in our time? — AM)

In early March 1953, a specially created commission reviewed a report on the income tax rates for citizens engaged in agriculture, as well as certain local taxes. Some commission members proposed introducing a separate turnover tax and a labor tax. I objected, as the turnover tax already existed: it was formed primarily from the difference between procurement and retail prices for agricultural products, taking into account the cost of processing, as well as the profits earned by processing enterprises.

In this way, a portion of the national income generated by collective farms and their workers was transferred to the state. I was then tasked with compiling a report on the turnover tax rates for individual types of agricultural products. It stated that the turnover tax on grain was 85 percent, on meat—75 percent, and so on.

These figures raised doubts. The report was shown to Stalin. In a telephone conversation with me, Stalin, without addressing the origin of the figures, asked how I interpreted the nature of the turnover tax. I replied that the tax was related to profit, one of the forms of surplus product. I heard: "Correct." Another question: "And do you remember how, before the war, one member of the Central Committee at a Central Committee meeting called the turnover tax an excise tax?" I remembered that incident. Stalin then replied that the excise tax had a different economic nature.

Stalin then asked: What explains such a high turnover tax on the main types of agricultural products? I replied that it stems from the difference between the procurement and retail prices set by the government for agricultural products.

The next question: why do we separate profit and turnover tax, and wouldn't it be better to combine these payments? I say that if we combine them, even if only as profit deductions, then the light and food industries will see profits of 150-200 percent per year. The incentive to reduce costs, which is planned at 1-3 percent per year, will disappear, since the profits will already be high, but not as a result of the work. Again, I hear the remark: "Right!" Thus, many fundamental problems of financial activity were touched upon, without even mentioning the agricultural tax. At the end of the conversation, Stalin said, "Goodbye." (A very rare occurrence: usually he simply hung up.)

However, the meeting never took place – a few days later, I.V. Stalin died.”

So, who could explain clearly how Stalin, supposedly with a weakened memory, retired from public affairs in the final months of his life, when, on the eve of his (violent) death, he was meticulously engaged in such subtle and complex issues of managing the state's economy through taxes (remember what was said on pages 155-156, citing K.N. Brutents)? Not to mention that in October 1952, he chaired the 19th Party Congress, and then the Central Committee Plenum. It seems he retired and quietly made wine at his dacha?

Incidentally, immediately after Stalin's death, the Soviet government made significant changes to agricultural legislation, including a reduction in agricultural taxes, which spurred accelerated development in the agricultural sector. Could this really have been the work of Khrushchev or Malenkov?

It's also astonishing that A.G. Zverev used the date March 1-2 in his memoirs. This is astonishing because he was extremely accustomed to absolute mathematical precision, and in this case, it follows that Stalin's misfortune occurred not on the night of March 1, but later. Unfortunately, today there is no way to verify A.G. Zverev's data. However, since he was a very honest and precise man—otherwise, Stalin would not have kept him as a financial backer—there is no reason to distrust his memoirs. Obviously, only time will tell what lies behind the date Zverev used in describing his conversation with Stalin.

However, modern data allows us to dismiss as completely unfounded Yu. N. Zhukov's assertions that there was no motive for Stalin's assassination, that he had withdrawn from politics and was living quietly at his dacha. As for "living quietly at his dacha," we've just shown that this is not true. While living at his dacha (incidentally, a very long time ago), Stalin did not withdraw from politics; on the contrary, he was clearly preparing for very serious, large-scale changes in politics and the state, as evidenced by the memoirs of A. G. Zverev, K. N. Brutents, D. Shepilov, and others.

The renowned contemporary researcher Yuri I. Mukhin, in his celebrated book, "The Assassination of Stalin and Beria" (Moscow, new edition 2007), brilliantly demonstrated that shortly before his death, Stalin made a new attempt to sever the party bureaucracy from power, from the leadership of the state. The first attempt, in 1937, ended in failure and a frenzy of repression provoked by the party bureaucracy in response to Stalin's attempt, democratic in nature and essence, to effect a desperately needed rotation of the ruling elite through direct, secret elections on an alternative basis. The second attempt, undertaken by Stalin after the war, led to his assassination as a result of a conspiracy by the party bureaucracy. This is the primary (internal) motive for the assassination.

And what's most terrifying is that this happened in strict accordance with the fundamental tenets of the "classics of scientifically grounded" banditry on a global scale. They have a saying, seemingly purely political-economic: "The ability to hold a commodity as exchange value, or exchange value as a commodity, awakens greed, or auri sacra fames, 'the accursed thirst for gold,' as the ancient Roman poet Virgil put it."

Meanwhile, in the political sphere, along with the opportunity to hold power (a commodity) as an exchange value (that is, the ability to "rule" the state without being held accountable, but enjoying unprecedented privileges) or exchange value (that is, the ability to "rule" the state without being held accountable, but enjoying unprecedented privileges) as a commodity (that is, power), identical to the "damned thirst for gold," greed awakens in the form of "LIBIDO DOMINANTI," that is, in the form of "PASSION FOR POWER ." When the party bureaucracy realized that Stalin had once again decided to wrest it from power within the state, recalling 1937, it literally went berserk. After that, Stalin didn't have much time left to live.

And although this is the main motive for the murder, it is only one of four motives.

Incidentally, another motive is closely related to this—if not the primary one, then very close to being so. The fact is that after the war, Stalin resumed an intensive investigation into the causes of the incredible tragedy of June 22, 1941, with the goal of establishing both the nature of the tragedy and, especially, the specific perpetrators. Many are likely well aware of Stalin's words that "victors can and should be judged, can and should be criticized and examined... there will be less arrogance, more modesty." These words of Stalin are often linked to the case of Marshal Zhukov, especially since they were also uttered in 1946, when the commander was roughly "flogged" for his desperate immodesty and taking credit for nearly all the combat achievements of the Soviet Army. This is indeed partly true, but only partly. In reality, Stalin had in mind a thorough investigation into the causes of the tragedy of June 22, 1941, which he had begun in deep secrecy at the outset of the war and which, in principle, never ceased—it was simply that the investigation was temporarily scaled back. However, by the end of 1952, Stalin had practically completed this investigation—the interviews with the surviving generals who had commanded units in the western border districts on the eve of the war had already been completed. And this greatly alarmed the senior generals and the marshals, especially Zhukov himself. It was no coincidence that they so quickly defected to Khrushchev's side and, a little later, helped him carry out the coup d'état of June 26, 1953. The deadly impact of this investigation's findings on our generals and marshals was extremely high. Even in 1989, when the Military History Journal began publishing some of the materials from this investigation, in particular the results of Stalin's survey of generals about when they received warning of the German attack (incidentally, everyone indicated June 18-19, and only the Western Special Military District generals wrote in black and white that they had received no instructions to that effect, and some even learned of the war from Molotov's speech), the editors of the Military History Journal were immediately slapped. And publication of the materials was immediately stopped! It turns out that even then, these materials were dangerous for the generals and the marshals. They have not been published in full to this day. Consequently, they remain dangerous for the generals today. However, for the authorities too, because the publication of these materials in full will cause a thermonuclear explosion in the entire historical science, since it will turn literally everything upside down and will force us to kneel and beg forgiveness before Stalin's grave for all the slander and dirt that was heaped on him after March 5, 1953.

So, how is all this not a motive for murder, especially one that objectively consolidates the selfish interests of both parts of the military-party complex?

After all, both the party bureaucracy and the high-ranking generals and marshals understood in principle that Stalin was planning a two-pronged attack: on the party bureaucracy, which he intended to permanently cut off from governing the state, and, as a warning to future commanders, on the high-ranking generals and marshals, because they would have to answer for the incredible sacrifices made by the Soviet people. Stalin openly admitted his guilt, as is well known. Moreover, he intended to openly repent to the people for the mistakes he had made, especially before the war (incidentally, this also greatly frightened the party bureaucracy, for it knew its bloody guilt before the people, oh how it knew it, just as it knew that under Stalin it would have to answer for all its crimes against the people). Stalin saw and understood perfectly well that during the war years, the party bureaucracy and the top generals had become so entrenched in the USSR's misery that, as a military-party complex, they posed a colossal threat to the very existence of the USSR—Stalin's life's work. This, in fact, was confirmed in 1991.

So, the top generals and marshals also had a stake in Stalin's death—not all of them, of course, but a significant portion, led by Zhukov. I emphasize this again, as this group immediately defected to Khrushchev's side and, under his overall leadership, staged a coup d'état on June 26, 1953, during which Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was assassinated (shot in his own home) without trial or investigation. Meanwhile, Beria, apparently, was the only person in the then-top brass who, after Stalin's death, consolidated the materials of this eloquent investigation into the causes of the June 22 tragedy. Not to mention the fact that he essentially investigated the entire Stalin assassination case as well. The arrest of the main culprits responsible for Joseph Vissarionovich's murder—former Minister of State Security Ignatiev and Khrushchev, who oversaw the state security agencies—came to the forefront. On June 25, 1953, Beria officially requested the Central Committee and Politburo's approval for Ignatiev's arrest, and by lunchtime on June 26, he was shot dead by soldiers in his own home. Incidentally, the military, led by Zhukov, staged not just a coup d'état using armed forces, but precisely according to Tukhachevsky's scenario—that is, according to his tank-based coup scenario...

But here's what's interesting next. We can now confidently speak of a quartet of real motives for Stalin's assassination. It's astonishing, but true, that three of them are linked to the West's most secret anti-Soviet and Russophobic designs. Accordingly, only one conclusion suggests itself: an objective consolidation of the interests of the party bureaucracy (including as an integral component of the military-party complex) with the global interests of the West occurred. [13] Moreover, it's possible that this consolidation of interests was discussed beforehand. Judge for yourself.

On March 1, 1950, Soviet newspapers published the following decree from the USSR Government: "In Western countries, a depreciation of currencies has occurred and continues, which has already led to the devaluation of European currencies. As for the United States, the ongoing rise in prices for consumer goods and the resulting inflation, as repeatedly stated by senior US government officials, have also led to a significant decline in the purchasing power of the dollar."

Due to the above circumstances, the purchasing power of the ruble became higher than its official exchange rate.

In view of this, the Soviet government recognized the need to raise the official exchange rate of the ruble, and to calculate the ruble exchange rate not on the basis of the dollar, as was established in July 1937, but on a more stable gold basis, in accordance with the gold content of the ruble.

Based on this, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided:

1. To cease, as of March 1, 1950, the determination of the ruble exchange rate against foreign currencies on the basis of the dollar and to transfer it to a more stable gold basis, in accordance with the gold content of the ruble.

2. Set the gold content of the ruble at 0.222168 grams of pure gold.

3. To establish, from March 1, 1950, the State Bank’s purchase price for gold at 4 rubles 45 kopecks per 1 gram of pure gold.

4. To determine, from March 1, 1950, the exchange rate for foreign currencies based on the gold content of the ruble established in paragraph 2:

4 rubles for one US dollar instead of the existing 5 rubles 30 kopecks.

11 rubles 20 kopecks per pound sterling instead of the existing 14 rubles 84 kopecks.

Instruct the State Bank of the USSR to change the ruble exchange rate in relation to other foreign currencies accordingly.

In the event of further changes in the gold content of foreign currencies or changes in their exchange rates, the State Bank of the USSR shall set the exchange rate of the ruble in relation to foreign currencies taking these changes into account."

"Just think about what Stalin encroached upon," emphasizes Yu. I. Mukhin, "the US's holy of holies, its base of parasitism, the dollar! After all, thanks to the dollar being (at that time becoming – AM) the universal currency in international trade , the US has the opportunity to foist off on the world trumpeted paper with portraits of its presidents instead of real assets. But Stalin not only refused to use the dollar in the USSR's ever-expanding international trade; he even stopped pricing goods in dollars. Can there be any doubt that he became the most hated person in the US (and Great Britain, too – AM ) ?" Stalin simply undermined the gold standard established after the war, which relied on the principle of $34.50 per troy ounce of gold (31.103477 g), under which the Yankees were madly issuing greenbacks.

A little-known episode from the final years of French President de Gaulle's reign captures the essence of the matter more vividly. In 1964, the French Minister of Finance told French President General de Gaulle a story about the development of the pre-war and then post-war international financial system. He gave the following example: "Imagine a Raphael painting is being auctioned off, and a battle ensues between Friedrich the German, Abdullah the Arab, Ivan the Russian, and John the Yankee. Each bids for the painting in their own way: the Arab offers oil, the German technology, Ivan gold, and John the Yankee, with a cheerful smile, bids double the price, pulls out his wallet containing a wad of brand-new hundred-dollar bills, counts them out, takes the painting, and leaves."

"Where's the trick?" asked de Gaulle.

"The trick is," his Treasury Secretary responded, "that the Yankees laid out a hundred hundred-dollar bills, but actually paid three dollars, because the paper cost of one hundred-dollar bill is three cents..." In other words, all the world's wealth, all its gold, flowed in exchange for greenbacks! Previously, before the war, the British pound sterling had played a similar role.

De Gaulle was furious, collected 750 million paper dollars from all over France, and in 1967, during an official visit to the United States, he caused a furious scandal, but exchanged the paper money for gold, fortunately the US was still on the gold standard at the time. De Gaulle returned to Paris with nearly 66.5 tons of gold on board his plane (in 1967, the average price of one troy ounce of gold was $35.23). He lived only two years after this, and the following year, in May 1968, he was subjected to what are now called the famous student unrest, which forced him to resign. And by 1969, France was bidding a tearful farewell to the great Frenchman of the 20th century. Stalin, meanwhile, after essentially the same action—except that he didn't directly exchange dollars for gold—lived exactly three years.

So, how could this not be a motive for murder—the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of March 1, 1950 ?! When gold is involved, the West stops at no crime. Incidentally, note that all studies of Stalin's death clearly state that Joseph Vissarionovich's misfortune occurred on the night of March 1. Meanwhile, since the death of Ivan the Terrible, there has been an Anglo-Saxon "tradition" of being directly or indirectly implicated in the deaths of great Russian rulers at precisely this time—at the very beginning of March...

The question of introducing a gold standard for the ruble and calculating the ruble's exchange rate on this basis is closely related to a detective story. According to the now, regrettably late Professor V.G. Sirotkin, after the war, "Stalin refused to seek 'tsarist gold' with the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition, and did not send his representatives to the International Financial Conference in Bretton Woods in July 1944, where the IMF and the World Bank were established (and all 'orphaned gold'—Nazi, Jewish, Tsarist, etc.—was transferred to their authorized capital). The dollar subsequently became the most secure post-war international payment unit.

...Stalin began searching for the "tsar's gold," including that of the last tsar's family, independently. For this purpose, he developed the "Cross" plan (incidentally, a similar operation had been carried out before the war. — A.M.)... The Americans were not satisfied with this action. Therefore, in 1946, the "false Anastasia" reappears—the same Anderson. In response, Stalin, also in 1946, orders the construction of a "Tomb" for the executed royal family near Yekaterinburg, closing the question of Anastasia. Incidentally, Operation "Tomb" was so serious that V.M. Molotov personally oversaw its construction [(God knows what bones were buried in it) — note by Professor V.G. Sirotkin. ] After Stalin's death, Operation "Cross" was for some reason stopped. Its materials are still kept under seal in the FSB archives."

So, the whole point is that the United States, as well as Great Britain, stole a colossal amount of gold from Russia. Under the Tsar, under a far-fetched pretext imposed by Witte himself, approximately 23 ships laden with gold sailed to the United States. At least a thousand tons. V.I. Lenin also shipped an equal amount of gold to the United States (for more on this issue, see my book "Who Brought War to the USSR?", Moscow, 2007, as well as the fourth book of the five-volume set). The personal gold and jewelry of the last Russian Tsar, which he carelessly shipped to England, were brazenly appropriated by the British royal family and have not returned them to this day. Worse still, Great Britain and France also appropriated the collateral gold that the Tsarist government had held in Western banks on the eve of World War I. With the stroke of a pen, on August 1, 1914, a banking moratorium on transactions with Russian gold was imposed. After the two "revolutions" in Russia, it became impossible to demand the gold back. Gold held in German banks, including that which Lenin had taken under the Second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, was particularly subject to theft. In total, the gold stolen in this manner amounts to over 610 tons. Therefore, the furious reluctance to return the stolen gold, especially in such quantities, is a more than serious motive for Stalin's assassination. Especially after it became known that he had begun operations "Cross" and "Tomb."

And what better motive for Stalin's assassination than the one discovered by Alexei Chichkin, a researcher of the Stalin era who published his findings in his work "A Forgotten Idea with No Statute of Limitations?" According to him, in April 1952, an international economic conference was held in Moscow, at which the USSR, Eastern European countries, and China proposed creating a trade zone alternative to the dollar. Moreover, Iran, Ethiopia, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Iceland also expressed enormous interest in this plan. At the conference, Stalin proposed creating his own "common market." Moreover, the idea of ​​introducing an interstate currency was also voiced at the conference. Considering that the initiator of the idea of ​​creating an alternative to the dollar trade zone, a transcontinental “common market,” was the Soviet Union, then the Soviet ruble, whose exchange rate had been converted to a gold basis two years earlier, had every chance of becoming the interstate settlement currency in such a “common market.”

To make things clearer for today's readers, let me remind you how the US reacts to even the hypothetical idea of ​​creating a gas analogue of OPEC, led by Russia. At the mere hint of this idea, the Yankees go ballistic and unequivocally threaten very harsh sanctions, not even hesitating to hint at the use of force. Can you imagine how the Yankees (and the Anglo-Saxon core of the West in general) freaked out when news of this meeting and the ideas voiced there reached Washington?! After all, the situation back then was in many ways more favorable for the Soviet Union than it is today for modern Russia. The mere name of Stalin immediately cooled even the hottest heads in the West—jokes and tricks were useless with the Generalissimo. Moreover, it could have ended very badly for anyone who dared to "joke" with the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership!

So, let's look at a simple chronology of events. In April 1952, an international economic conference was held, the ideas expressed at which resonated so broadly on virtually every continent. Less than a year later, Stalin was assassinated...

Finally, the fourth motive. No one in the world expected that after such an extremely destructive war, the Soviet Union would rebuild its economy so quickly. In fact, by early 1948, the recovery phase was complete, which, incidentally, made it possible not only to implement monetary reform but also to simultaneously abolish the rationing system.

By comparison, Great Britain, which suffered disproportionately less in the war, could not afford to abandon the food rationing system even in the early 1950s.

In fact, it should be noted that the first post-war five-year plan, despite all the difficulties of the period, broke all records literally. If in the first Soviet five-year plan, a new enterprise was commissioned every twenty-nine hours, in the second, every ten hours, and in the third, which was not completed due to the outbreak of war, every seven hours, then in the post-war plan, it was every six hours!

The West didn't miss the Soviet economy's explosive growth rate. Already in the early 1950s, the West was becoming alarmed about it. While the British, for example, mostly limited themselves to the alarming statement that "Russia is experiencing extremely rapid economic growth," the Yankees, with their characteristic bluntness, concluded: "The Soviet economic challenge is real and dangerous." Also in 1953, the American magazine National Business, in an article titled "The Russians Are Catching Up...," noted that the USSR was outpacing any other country in terms of economic growth. Moreover, the growth rate in the USSR was two to three times higher than in the United States. And US presidential candidate Stevenson publicly declared that if the rate of production growth in Stalin's Russia continued, by 1970 Russian production would exceed American output by three to four times. If this happened, the consequences for Western countries, especially the United States, would be dire.

In this regard, I would like to recall one of the main reasons for Hitler's rise to power and the outbreak of World War II. The fact is that Hitler's rise to power was determined not only, and perhaps not even so much, by geopolitical, political, and ideological factors, but by economic ones of colossal importance. Up until 1932, there were four major industrial regions in the world: Pennsylvania in the USA, Birmingham in the UK, the Ruhr in Germany, and Donetsk (then part of the RSFSR) in the Soviet Union. At the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the Dnieper (in Ukraine) and Ural-Kuznetsk (in the RSFSR) were added. Now there were not simply six industrial regions in the world. The West somehow tolerated six. It became intolerable for another reason. Before 1932, three-quarters of the world's industrial regions were located in the West. By the end of 1932, exactly half of the world's industrial regions were already located on the territory of the USSR!

The true rulers of the West had (and still have) an excellent command of the basic principles of economics.

They understood perfectly well that the quantitative indicators achieved so quickly would quickly transform into such fantastic quality that the West would be forced to surrender to the mercy of creative socialism. This is why the West curtailed the global crisis it had created, dubbed the Great Depression. Prolonging it further would have been dangerous for the West itself. At the same time, Hitler was brought to power at the end of the first and beginning of the second five-year plan. It was Hitler, as a factor in the war, who was supposed to interrupt the progressive development of Russia, then called the Soviet Union, which the West hated. At that time, the West could not have come up with anything more clever.

After the war, a situation emerged that greatly alarmed the West. A system of people's democracies emerged, including China, the global demographic giant. This meant that countries that had chosen socialist development paths now possessed enormous resources, which, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, could have been harnessed for economic activity, leading to an almost complete collapse of the West's economic and, consequently, political significance. Naturally, the West began to consider how to eliminate this threat to its very existence. Simply put, the West's aggressive nature had once again prevailed. However, after the war, the military solution was no longer viable. The Soviet Union had convincingly demonstrated its advantages and achieved a victory unprecedented in history. Moreover, even on the peacetime front, the USSR demonstrated an incredible rate of development, achieving pre-war levels in just two or three years. Consequently, resorting to war again to interrupt the USSR's development was no longer an option. Moreover, unlike the pre-war situation, the USSR now had allies both in the West and in the East.

Of course, the West, especially the United States, concocted a myriad of plans to attack the USSR after the war. But they simply couldn't carry them out. Initially, because no one in the world would have understood the West if it had dared to raise a hand against the main victor of World War II. Today, some pretend that America and England made the decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazism. But back then, people all over the world knew perfectly well that without the Red Army and Stalin, everyone would have been enslaved, including the Anglo-Saxons, whom the Nazis even planned to expel, particularly the British, from the British Isles. A little later, the West couldn't do this for the simple reason that the USSR had mastered the secrets of atomic weapons, and speaking to them through force would have been futile, as the war on the Korean Peninsula clearly demonstrated. Such tricks didn't work with Stalin. The Generalissimo could easily have responded in a way that would have turned the West upside down.

And here I would return to some of K. Alliluyeva-Politkovskaya's words. Remember how she pontificated on screen about how Beria, out of fear, could have done such things that... Well, Beria, of course, had nothing to do with it. We must look for the West's hand here. Because, clearly aware that it was better not to speak the language of Mars (the god of war) to Stalin, especially after 1949, when the USSR became a nuclear power, the West became genuinely frightened by the prospect of the USSR's imminent economic and political dominance (especially at the head of an entire system of people's democracies). After all, the growth rate was two to three times higher than in the United States. Combined with the motives mentioned above, this served as the basis for the decision to eliminate Stalin in the most vile, most insidious, but so characteristically Western way: murder!

One can only guess how the West managed not so much to establish contact with Khrushchev and Co. as to reach an understanding, much less an agreement, with them. However, even here, there won't be any particular difficulty if one analyzes everything carefully and thoroughly, but this, unfortunately, goes far beyond the scope of this paper. This is a subject for a separate study.

So, speaking seriously, the respected Yu. N. Zhukov has no compelling reason to claim that there was neither sense nor reason to kill Stalin.

Regarding the poisoning, allow me to introduce you to some interesting materials by contemporary historian Nikolai Dobryukha. "Naturally," as befits a "democratically minded historian," he attributed the poisoning to L.P. Beria. These "democratic historians" simply cannot grasp the simple truth that Beria did not command Stalin's security during the final months of the leader's life. It was personally commanded by the Minister of State Security, S.D. Ignatiev. They also cannot grasp another fact: that the Lubyanka toxicology laboratory at that time reported to the First Deputy Minister of State Security, Ogoltsov, whom, incidentally, Lavrenty Pavlovich almost immediately arrested upon his return to the Lubyanka. And as soon as Khrushchev orchestrated Beria's assassination, Ogoltsov was immediately released on the orders of "dear Nikita Sergeyevich"...

So, if we ignore these quirks, more than typical of "democratic historians"—they're simply beyond the bounds of "democratic thinking" (emphasis on Gorbachev)—and delve into the essence of the materials he uncovered, we'll see that the poisoning did indeed take place. Here are excerpts from N. Dobryukha's article , "How Stalin Was Killed. Part II," published in Argumenty i Fakty (AiF) issue No. 52 in 2005.

Scary tests

The documents I (that is, N. Dobryukha – A.M. ) discovered testify to the undeniable presence of poison in Stalin's body. However, these documents do not reveal its exact composition or origin. Apparently, during those terrifying days and nights when blood tests were performed on the horribly dying Master of the Kremlin, the doctors received no permission, much less instructions, to do so.

So, the first blood and urine test results, which shocked the doctors, arrived at their disposal around the beginning of March 5, 1953. That is, when it was already too late to do anything, as the toxic substances that had entered Stalin's body had caused irreversible damage to his heart and entire circulatory system. This included his brain. [Incidentally, the brain was immediately removed from the deceased Stalin's skull as soon as doctors officially confirmed that Joseph Vissarionovich was dead. However, no one had ever conducted any studies on his brain, much less biochemical ones. – A.M.]. But first, about the tests themselves.

A blood test on March 5, 1953, yielded startling results. Red blood cells (erythrocytes) were normal, but white blood cells (leukocytes) were elevated to 21,000 (normal 5,000–8,000). It is these cells that absorb bacteria harmful to the human body and foreign substances. The white blood cell count was also altered: "Lymphocytes - 4.5% [with a normal range of 22–30 % . Such a sharp decrease signifies a serious struggle by the body to maintain its viability and, at the same time, a dangerous decline in its protective functions. It may also indicate that they have detected toxins in the body, that is, poisonous substances of natural origin, and have begun to actively transform into monocytes and macrophages, capable of absorbing and digesting toxins. This is reflected in the following blood counts. Note by N. Dobryukha.]

Monocytes - 10.5% [The norm is 4-8 %. This is additional confirmation of the presence of toxins in the body. Note by N. Dobryukha.]

Neutrophils : 85% [Normal range: 55-68 %. This figure is boldly underlined in blue pencil on the form. An increase in neutrophil count  is perhaps the main indicator of the presence of toxic poisons in the body. Note by N. Dobryukha.]

Band neutrophils—18%. [The norm is 2–5 % . This indicator is also underlined in blue pencil. Note by N. Dobryukha.]

Special notes: Some neutrophils have toxic granularity."

Photocopies of the test results were taken from the newspaper "Evening Moscow", March 9-15 , 2006, No. 39

These "special remarks" probably shocked the doctors. They knew (unlike mere mortals) that the blood cells in which "toxic granularity" was detected protect the human body from bacteria and toxic substances. This requires further comment from the specialists to whom I (that is, N. Dobryukha – A.M.) showed the test results, concealing their identity. Here's what they said: "Why didn't the blood tests immediately show the presence of toxins, but only on the third day?" They then offered the following explanation: "For leukocytes to react to foreign toxins and for the accumulation of antitoxic cells to occur, lymphocytes need time to recognize the 'self-or-foe' principle. By the time the doctors discovered this toxicity, it was already too late, as irreversible damage had occurred to the heart and brain…"

"  When and what should have been done to try to save the patient? " I (that is, N. Dobryukha. - A.M.) persisted. " And they answered me (that is, N. Dobryukha. - A.M. ) : "In all cases, gastric lavage should be performed. The usefulness and power of this method lies in the relative speed and completeness of the removal of the poison from the stomach (if the poisoning occurred through the mouth), as well as in the risk of stroke in the elderly, due to the absence of a rise in blood pressure, which occurs due to intense straining during vomiting. Incidentally, in many cases, gastric lavage also helps with other forms of poison entry into the body, and not just through the mouth. Why? It would take a long time to explain... But take my word for it, it's true!"

Carefully rereading the doctors' journal, I (that is, N. Dobryukha. — A.M.) was surprised to discover that everything, or almost everything, the specialists said had also been true of Stalin. Thus, by the time the doctors treating the leader established the fact of poisoning, it was already too late. [At this point, N. Dobryukha adds his own note, reading: "Which is most likely what Beria was counting on!" In this regard, I am compelled to once again draw the readers' attention to the fact that, as of March 1, when Stalin was poisoned, L.P. Beria had no connection with the state security organs, much less with Stalin's personal guard. It was directly supervised by the Minister of State Security, S.D. Ignatiev, whose actions in the Central Committee were overseen by "dear" Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. — L.M.]

After discovering "granular toxicity in leukocytes," the doctors surely realized that the poisoning had been carried out in such a way that the poisoning itself would manifest itself first, not as a result of the poisoning itself, but as a consequence—a hemorrhage in the brain and stomach. The doctors knew: if they told him the leader had been poisoned, and they had been treating a stroke and hypertension all those days, Beria would arrest them on the spot. [In this case, N. Dobryukha is again mistaking wishful thinking for reality. At that time, L.P. Beria did not have the right to make arrests, since he was not yet the head of the state security organs, but, like any member of the Politburo, he had the right to demand their arrest. - A.M. ]. And under torture, they themselves would say anything. Thus, the "Doctors' Plot," organized precisely at that time (no matter by whom!) played a sinister role in Stalin's assassination. [Every elderberry in the garden, every uncle in Kiev! Firstly, a historian studying the history of the Stalin period would do well to know that the "doctors' plot" began earlier, and not "precisely in those days." Secondly, why on earth was it "instigated by someone of no importance"?! Quite the contrary, it's very important, fundamentally important, especially considering that it was inspired, for some reason, in line with the resolution (at the end of 1952) of the NATO Council session on inciting anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and Stalin had nothing to do with instigating it. Moreover, it was Stalin who suspected a serious trick in this case and attempted to organize an independent examination with the help of people who were not MGB employees at the time, as demonstrated above. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that from March 2, 1953, the entire Soviet press unanimously fell silent about the "doctors' plot," and only the Central Committee could have ordered it to do so.  — A.M.].

The Death of Khrustalev

All tests were performed without Stalin's name being mentioned and were written out to the head of his traveling security detail, I.V. Khrustalev. So, Khrustalev knew more than anyone else?! There's an almost officially accepted theory that Khrustalev was the last person to see the leader healthy. This raises questions about the sudden death of the robust Khrustalev shortly after Stalin's funeral, as Yu.S. Solovyov (one of Stalin's closest bodyguards), who died in secret on January 9, 2005, told me (that is, N. Dobryukha. - A.M.) several years ago. Khrustalev was arrested on the day of Stalin's funeral, but released a few days later. It's unlikely Beria would have released him if he wanted to deal with him so quickly. This suggests that Khrustalev committed suicide. He may have taken his own life, realizing he had become an unwitting accomplice in the murder of the man to whom he had been so devoted.

[N. Dobryukha tried to imply that Beria released Khrustalev as practically an accomplice to the crime. I remind you again that Beria did not command Stalin's security. Until the tragedy befell Joseph Vissarionovich, his security was personally commanded by Ignatiev, the Minister of State Security. Khrustalev was arrested because, as head of the traveling security detail, he was responsible for the security of the head of the Soviet government at that time. And if misfortune befell a person under his protection, it is the head of the security detail that was with the person under his protection at the time of the accident who is held responsible. And yet, he was released quickly precisely because Beria almost immediately established that Khrustalev was innocent. But he was released in vain. Because he was immediately dispatched by those who wanted to cover up all traces of their monstrous crime—Khrushchev and his cronies. Had Beria kept Khrustalev in prison and released him a little later, he might have lived to see his retirement. Therefore, N. Dobryukha had no reason to hint at Khrustalev's suicide. Stalin's security detail consisted of very stable individuals who never lost their heads under any circumstances. But Dobryukha is right about one thing: Khrustalev clearly realized that, given the referrals for tests issued in his name, and especially after receiving the results, it was no wonder he had somehow unwittingly become an accomplice to the murder of the man to whom he was so devoted, as he confided to L.P. Beria. That's why he was released very quickly. But then Khrushchev and Co. got their hands on him, along with two other guards. — AM]

To avoid worsening the "embalming conditions," during the autopsy, "the thyroid gland, pituitary gland, sex glands, oral cavity, tongue, tonsils, esophagus, larynx, and trachea were not checked." [That is, they did not check anything that could immediately indicate poisoning. — L.M. ]

Stalin's autopsy was incomplete... but sensational.

However, a sensational discovery was made: the "inflammatory foci in the lungs" that doctors had written about were absent. Apparently, the medical authorities were counting heavily on pneumonia to explain the increased white blood cell count and simultaneously conceal the mysterious bloody vomiting and "toxic granularity in the white blood cells." After all, the medical report on I.V. Stalin's illness and death stated:

"From the first day of his illness, his temperature rose and he began to notice high leukocytosis, which could indicate the development of inflammatory lesions in the lungs." Stalin was even treated with penicillin.

The condition of the gastrointestinal tract, however, indicated poisoning; the mucous membranes of the stomach and intestines appeared to have been pierced by countless pellets. This is how it was described in the "Pathological Examination Report": "The stomach contents consisted of 200 cubic centimeters of black liquid. The gastric mucosa contained numerous small black-red dots, easily removed with a knife. Upon removal, small punctate depressions were found in the gastric mucosa. The gastric mucosa was smoothed. Similar changes were found in the mucosa of the duodenum. Small punctate hemorrhages were found in the mucosa at the apex of the folds of the upper jejunum. Similar hemorrhages were also found here and there throughout the small intestine. A thick, dark-green mass was found in the lumen of the small intestine, which became black throughout the rest of the intestine. The mucous membrane of the small intestine is in places intensely stained black by this semi-liquid mass…”

The Torments of Professor Lukomsky

It's striking that the pathologists don't offer any assessments of what they saw in the stomach. They use generalities, but at the same time describe everything they saw quite conscientiously. One gets the impression that they assumed that their report would definitely be revisited someday and used to draw conclusions about the true cause of Stalin's death... [It appears that this impression is very close to the truth. Because one of the doctors who participated in Stalin's autopsy, Professor Rusakov, died "suddenly." The USSR Minister of Health, A.F. Tretyakov, by virtue of his status as head of both the commission for the leader's treatment and the commission for Stalin's autopsy, was soon—on March 1, 1954 (that is, already under Khrushchev)—removed from his post, arrested, and sent, along with two other members of the latter commission, also doctors, to Vorkuta to "command" the camp hospital... Apparently, so that their memories could be properly cleared, or rather, as N.S. Khrushchev wished, "cleared." Incidentally, along with Tretyakov, the former head of the Kremlin's Medical and Sanitary Directorate, I.I. Kuperin, whose position had been abolished, and he himself had been arrested and exiled, also departed for Vorkuta for "clearing his memories." This is how "dear Nikita Sergeyevich" covered up the traces of his monstrous crime. — L.M.]

And yet, even in those turbulent times, there was one medical professional who was haunted by this clearly "intentional death." It was he, Professor Lukomsky, who was retroactively commissioned to formalize the "Case History of I.V. Stalin, compiled from the medical records of his illness from March 2 to 5, 1953." Here are the most revealing excerpts from his work, testifying to his attempt to pinpoint the true causes of the leader's death (unfortunately, the other members of the attending physicians did not support this attempt): "On March 2, before each urination, the patient showed some signs of anxiety, which allowed him to be given a 'duck' in a timely manner." [This means his consciousness was still functioning! — Note by N. Dobryukha.]

… All four urine samples contained protein at a level of 2.7 ppm. The sediment contained erythrocytes (that is, blood. – N. Dobryukha's note).

March 5

At 12 noon... the council discussed the cause of the bloody vomiting and came to the conclusion that it was the result of vascular trophic lesions of the gastric mucosa associated with the underlying disease."

The doctors, of course, didn't specify the exact cause of the mucosal damage. Instead, they convolutedly cited a connection "to the underlying condition," which, with such a diagnosis, could have been anything, including hypertension, which hadn't occurred. The doctors had no choice but to reach this conclusion, unconvincing even for Bulganin, who was on duty. And what else could the consultation do if it was forced to pretend that no "toxic granularity" was detected in the blood leukocytes?

The council attributed the rise in temperature to 39°C and white blood cell count to 21,000 to focal pneumonia, which often occurs in patients with hemiplegia (i.e., paralysis of body parts). However, at the autopsy, they "forgot" about it, as if there had been no mention of pneumonia.

On March 5, 1953, the patient again experienced symptoms of acute cardiovascular failure (collapse), which, according to Lukomsky, "were largely due to gastric bleeding." In short, it all started with the stomach. With poison in the stomach. With "toxic granularity in the leukocytes."

Professor Lukomsky repeatedly revised the "Medical History of I.V. Stalin, compiled from the journal entries of the illness from March 2 to 5, 1953." And after him, it was revised many more times...

After all

I (that is, N. Dobryukha – A.M.) asked one of the leading poison experts to comment on all of the above. On condition of anonymity, he noted that he doesn't rule out the use of the drug dicoumarin in this case. Dicoumarin could have been intentionally overdosed, so that its consumption would cause a stroke...

Information about dicoumarin.

Dicoumarin was the first and primary anticoagulant—a medication that reduces blood clotting. However, due to its high toxicity, it was withdrawn from use. The effects of dicoumarin are slow but prolonged, beginning within 2–3 hours and reaching their peak within 12–30 hours. [This, it should be noted, corresponds to the time of Stalin's deepening loss of consciousness during the first 24 hours…—note by N. Dobryukha.]

Increases vascular permeability, which can lead to bleeding. This can include blood in the urine, bleeding from the mouth and nasopharynx, gastric and intestinal bleeding, muscle hemorrhages, and more. It is especially dangerous for the elderly…

And here are a few facts.

1. Issue No. 5 (1998) of the magazine "Health" published an interview with the distinguished Russian surgeon Galina Dmitrievna Chesnokova, who worked at the Second City Hospital in 1953. On the evening of March 2, 1953, security officers summoned her straight from the operating room, put her in a car, and drove her to Stalin's dacha. There, she and her classmate, the renowned Soviet resuscitation specialist Vladimir Negovskii, participated in attempts to resuscitate Stalin. Curiously, she cites the verdict of the doctors' council as of the evening of March 2, 1953: hypertension, generalized atherosclerosis with predominant cerebral vascular disease. Moreover, she explicitly stated in her interview that, after consulting with Negovskii, they concluded that artificial respiration was impossible due to brain damage! Therefore, they chose the path of cardiac massage, which, unfortunately, also did not produce any results.

And at the end of her interview, she dropped a unique bombshell. When everyone was finally convinced that Stalin was truly dead, Stalin's daughter, Svetlana, asked Chesnokova to cover her father's eyes, as they were open. Speaking about how she personally closed the leader's eyes, Chesnokova emphasized that when she closed Stalin's eyelids, they wouldn't respond to her hand movements. And since she didn't have any copper coins with her, she had to (pay attention!) hold her hands on Stalin's eyelids for a very long time.

Based on consultations with several highly experienced doctors and pathologists, each with at least half a century of medical and forensic practice, I feel compelled to report that this is typically the case in cases of poisoning. The muscles stiffen in the exact position they were in when the poisoning occurred. And therefore, they don't respond, at least not immediately, to external influences. That's why she had to hold her hands on Stalin's eyelids for so long to close the leader's eyes!

2. A leading expert on the Stalinist period in Soviet history, Yuriy V. Yemelyanov, in his new and highly engaging book, Stalin Before the Pygmies' Trial (Moscow, 2007), cites a startling fact. One of the stories he learned about the suspicious circumstances of Stalin's death (Yu. V. Yemelyanov explained to the author from whom he heard this story, emphasizing that the person who told him about it never gave the slightest reason to suspect him of spreading false rumors) claimed that the President of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, approached the dying Stalin (that is, while he was still at Stalin's dacha). Seeing traces of blood on Stalin's lips, Gottwald wiped them with his handkerchief. On March 14, 1953, Gottwald died suddenly in Prague from... pneumonia, which was easily treatable even at that time. However, the true cause of his death could only have been his handkerchief, which had traces of Stalin's blood on it. Stalin's real killers couldn't have allowed Gottwald to conduct a thorough blood test. That would have led to the poisoning story being revealed, completely uncontrollably. Because Stalin was killed by poison—as has already been discussed above. And the blood tests clearly showed this. Remember the "toxic granularity"?! That's exactly it, that...

And how they got to Gottwald himself, there is no need to guess – there were plenty of Soviet agents in his circle… [14] 1

This is how an outstanding statesman and political figure of global significance, the creator of the greatest power in the world, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, was killed – poisoned!

AFTERWORD

The keys to the future lie in the past. A historical commandment

So, the long process of analyzing 200 myths has been completed. Of course, not all of them have been included in our analysis. Even the preface to the first volume stated that this was impossible, even for technical reasons, as no amount of space would suffice. The analysis of some of the myths presented in the five-volume set is also incomplete. And this should also be understood correctly: analyzing some myths would require doctoral dissertations. Not to mention that dozens of colleagues are engaged in objective research on various aspects of the life and work of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. And competing with them was not the author's intention.

The author saw his primary goal as, using the accumulated materials, demonstrating the essence of the falsehoods about Stalin and the truth about this great creator. Whether the author succeeded in this will, naturally, be up to the readers to judge.

I'm sure many are wondering why the author took such a step, what was his goal? Remember, at the very beginning of the first volume, Stalin's words were quoted: "I know that when I'm gone, they'll pour buckets of dirt on my head, and heaps of rubbish on my grave. But I'm confident that the winds of history will blow all this away!"

He was right on target. More than half a century ago, his memory—that of a great man—was barbarously insulted. And some time later, his final resting place was completely desecrated. How pagans disturbed his remains! The greatest power in the world he created was derailed, where it has rested since December 25, 1991.

Now, yearning for his former glory and vainly hoping that it will finally return, isn't it time to start small: fully repaying the respect and memory of this great man? That is, removing all the "garbage" that has littered his grave over the past half-century, cleansing the memory of this great man of filthy slander and vile lies!

Yes, he may not have been an angel, but those were not the times of God's grace! However, history itself bears witness to the exceptional sovereignty of Stalin's actions! And how can we not believe it, when Mother Russia still lives on thanks to his labors of that time?

The great Russian scientist and Russian patriot, Academician Pavlov, particularly emphasized that “when we love and are proud of the Fatherland, this means that we are proud of its great people, that is, those who made it strong and respected on the historical stage.”

Stalin was just that. And his fate, including his posthumous one, is inseparable from Russia's. Because those great men of our Fatherland who made it strong and respected on the stage of history, even as they pass into immortality, remain with Russia, to protect it with the formidable grandeur of their illustrious names! And Stalin, to this day, stands guard over Russia's interests! The great Frenchman of the 20th century, Charles de Gaulle, was a thousand times right when he once said that "Stalin did not disappear into the past—he dissolved into the future"! And from there, from the future, with all the strength of his great talent as a statesman and creator, he protects and defends Russia.

Without even a hint of the "wind of history," the author has prepared the five-volume "200 Myths about Stalin" with only one goal in mind: to help the wind of history gain sufficient strength to finally dispel the shroud of barbaric, monstrous lies about the great creator who fought his entire life for the happiness and security of the peoples of Russia and died in this struggle as a soldier!

Whether he was right or not, history has already judged. Right! And so right! After all, the fact that Russia is still alive and has even begun to claw its way out of the abyss that threatened oblivion is thanks to him! Because it was he who created such an unprecedented reserve of resilience for the state that it even withstood the barbarity of the "Western democracy" imposed on Russia.

And this is the highest proof of his rightness!