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Conversation Between V.M. Molotov And E. Hoxha On Albanian-Yugoslav Relations

From the diary of V.M. Molotov.

Record of a Conversation with E. Hoxha on Albanian-Yugoslav Relations

City of Warsaw[^1]

June 24, 1948

16:00

SECRET

After exchanging greetings, Hoxha thanked Molotov for receiving him, saying he was aware of how busy Molotov was at that time.

Molotov asked Hoxha whether he considered the convening of the conference of eight countries to be timely.

Hoxha replied affirmatively.

Molotov then asked Hoxha for his opinion on the draft statement by the foreign ministers of the eight countries.

Hoxha said that he had not had the opportunity to read the document straight away, as it had not been translated into French.

Molotov asked whether he now had a translation.

Hoxha replied that he had received it and that the draft statement was very good.

Molotov remarked that the conference had been called in haste, but action had needed to be swift. There had been no time for preparatory work. Nevertheless, he hoped no serious mistakes would be made.

Hoxha said he wanted to inform Molotov about the situation in Albania.

The letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) had saved Albania from great danger.[^2] Albania and the Communist Party of Albania had been placed in serious jeopardy as a result of the actions of the Yugoslav leadership.

Molotov noted that this was indeed the case. Hoxha said the leadership of the Communist Party of Albania had placed complete trust in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and especially in Tito. They had been convinced that this position aligned with the directives of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). The Albanian leadership had informed the CPSU(B) of their stance. Hoxha recalled that during his first meeting with Molotov in Paris, he had spoken about Albanian-Yugoslav relations. This issue had also been discussed during his stay in Moscow.

Hoxha stated that the letter from the CPSU(B) had allowed the Albanian leadership to understand the true nature of the CPY Central Committee’s line. In order to facilitate the implementation of this line, the CPY Central Committee sought, first and foremost, to undermine unity within the leadership of the Communist Party of Albania and to damage the authority of certain Albanian leaders. Hoxha acknowledged that the Communist Party of Albania was still very young. Its leadership lacked sufficient Marxist-Leninist training. The country essentially had no working class. However, the party had considerable experience in struggle. During the war, it had fought for Albania’s liberation with great courage and boundless faith in the Soviet Union. Mistakes had been made, but in Hoxha’s opinion, there had been no fundamental or principled errors.

During the war, there had been no connection between the leadership of the Communist Party of Albania and the CPY Central Committee. It was true that Popović had been in Albania — he had been freed from the Germans by the Albanians. Popović had rendered assistance to the Albanian communists, but he had not been an official representative of the CPY Central Committee. On the eve of Albania’s liberation, the CPY Central Committee sent an official representative. At that time, the Yugoslavs claimed that this representative’s task was to help the Albanians organise a government. In fact, his aim was to remove the party’s former leadership and replace them with individuals loyal to the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs gave the impression that the Albanian leadership had made a series of errors. In particular, they accused the leadership of attempting to act independently of the CPY Central Committee. In connection with the Kosovo question, the Yugoslavs accused the Albanian leaders of chauvinism.

Hoxha went on to say that, in his view, the Yugoslavs had achieved their objective: on the eve of Albania’s liberation, the composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania was shaped in accordance with Yugoslav intentions. The Yugoslavs had succeeded in sowing division within the party leadership. They tried to ensure that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania followed only the directives of the CPY Central Committee. The Albanians, for their part, entered into close cooperation with the Yugoslavs.

The turning point in Albanian-Yugoslav relations was the visit by the Albanian leadership to Moscow. Hoxha said that when he returned from Moscow, a tense situation had arisen in Albania. The Yugoslavs began accusing the Albanians of changing their political line. They accused the Albanian leadership of pursuing an anti-Yugoslav policy and resorted to blackmail. They claimed that portraits of Tito had allegedly been removed from a number of Albanian institutions. In a conversation with the Yugoslav chargé d’affaires, Hoxha stated at the time that these accusations were completely unfounded.

The Yugoslavs also began attacking Albania’s economic policy. Even before Hoxha’s trip to Moscow, the Albanians had handed over their five-year plan to the Yugoslavs. For a long time, there had been no response. Eventually a reply was received — it was a harsh criticism of the plan. The Yugoslavs accused Albania of striving for autarky. They also said that Yugoslavia’s relations with other people’s democracies — especially with Bulgaria — were much better than its relations with Albania.

The Yugoslavs openly expressed dissatisfaction with Nako Spiru. They even implied that, in their view, the hand of the enemy could be felt in the activities of the Albanian party leadership.

The situation became very difficult. The Yugoslavs’ criticism of the Communist Party of Albania was clearly unfriendly. The Communist Party of Albania was not treated as an independent party. The situation within the Albanian party leadership itself also became very strained. At that moment, a tragic event occurred — the suicide of Nako Spiru.

Molotov said: “We had the impression that, in the person of Nako Spiru, Albania lost a good worker and a friend of the USSR.”

Hoxha replied that Nako Spiru had evidently fallen victim to Yugoslav intrigue. However, he, Hoxha, believed that Spiru was an ambitious man.

Molotov remarked that this was possible.

Hoxha continued, saying that Spiru’s ambition could be excused when considered in the context of Yugoslav machinations. Hoxha said that at the time he had made a mistake by allowing himself to be influenced by the Yugoslavs. He believed their criticism. All the circumstances — including the stance taken by Koçi Xoxe — led to his own hostile attitude towards Spiru. Spiru’s suicide, in a sense, seemed to justify that attitude.

Molotov remarked that Spiru’s suicide was worthy of condemnation. Such an act was unworthy of a communist. Molotov noted that at the time the Yugoslavs had put great pressure on Hoxha.

Hoxha agreed. He said that the Yugoslavs had deliberately escalated tensions with Albania. The accusations of striving for autarky were absurd.

Molotov stated that if Albania wished to move forward, it must develop relations with other countries — including economic relations.

Hoxha responded that the Yugoslavs did not want this. Their policy towards Albania was a colonial policy.

Molotov said this view was absolutely correct. The Yugoslavs were indeed pursuing a colonial policy towards Albania.

To support his point, Hoxha related the following incident. The Yugoslavs had promised to supply Albania with the necessary equipment to increase oil production. However, they failed to fulfil this commitment. When the Albanians raised the issue, the Yugoslavs replied that the Albanians needn’t worry, as lower oil output would only harm Yugoslavia. Thus, said Hoxha, the Yugoslavs were thinking only of Yugoslavia’s interests. They refused to recognise that Albania was itself interested in boosting oil production and, more broadly, in developing its own economy.

Molotov apologized to Hoxha for not being able to continue the conversation, as he had to attend a meeting of the Editorial Commission.

In parting, Molotov said that Albania was on the right path, having freed itself from the influence of the bad Yugoslavs. He added that there were good people among the Yugoslavs too.

The conversation lasted 30 minutes. Recorded by VIDYASOV.

 

AVP RF. F. 06. Op. 10. P. 27. D. 334. L. 1–4.

Original.

 

Footnotes

 

[^1]: The conversation took place in Warsaw during the conference of foreign ministers of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania on the German question.

 

[^2]: This refers to the letter from the CPSU(B) Central Committee to the CPY Central Committee dated March 28, 1948, which was circulated for information to the communist parties belonging to the Cominform.

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