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Secret Conversation Between J.V. Stalin And E. Hoxha

Record of a Conversation between J.V. Stalin and E. Hoxha on Albanian-Yugoslav Relations, and Albania’s Foreign and Domestic Policy

City of Moscow

March 23, 1949, 22:00

SECRET

Present: On the Soviet side: A.Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet envoy to Albania D.S. Chuvakhin, and V.I. Erofeyev (interpreter),

On the Albanian side: Chairman of the State Planning Commission of Albania Spiro Koleka and Albanian envoy to the USSR M. Prifti

After exchanging greetings, Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanian delegation had a good journey. Hoxha replies that the Albanian delegation travelled very well.

Hoxha says that he has been instructed, first and foremost, to convey to Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Party and the people of Albania, their deepest feelings of love and gratitude for everything that has been done — and continues to be done — for Albania.

Comrade Stalin thanks him. He then asks whether everything that had been promised was delivered to Albania.

Hoxha confirms that it was.

Comrade Stalin says it was good that the Soviet personnel boarded the Italian battleship and brought it over.[^1] The ship was delivered in full working condition. As for the cruiser, it had been brought by the Italians — they damaged it in the Black Sea just before handing it over to the Soviet Union. Stalin notes that the Italians behaved poorly in that instance.

Hoxha comments that such behaviour is typical of the Italians.

Comrade Stalin asks what questions Hoxha wishes to raise.

Hoxha replies that he would first like to describe the current situation in the country and in the Party, then move on to some economic requests, speak about the Albanian army and its needs, and finally raise several matters on which Albanian comrades would like Comrade Stalin’s clarification. He would also like to briefly describe the situation along Albania’s borders.

Comrade Stalin remarks that Hoxha is not limited in what he can raise and may ask any questions he likes.

Hoxha says that the letters of the Bolshevik Party sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as well as the Cominform resolution, saved Albania from inevitable disaster.

Comrade Stalin asks what kind of disaster that might have been.

Hoxha replies that Yugoslav nationalists were pursuing specific goals — directed against the USSR, against the democratic anti-imperialist camp and against Albania itself.

Comrade Stalin adds: “And against Muslims.” Hoxha agrees. He states that Tito’s group of Yugoslav nationalists had been conducting subversive activities in Albania ever since the country’s liberation. The Albanian communists could not help noticing that economic and other relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were developing unsatisfactorily. However, the Albanian Party’s revolutionary vigilance had not been sharp enough. The main responsibility for this, he says, lies directly with himself — Enver Hoxha. It also played a role that the Albanians, during the war, had become accustomed to trusting in their friendly ties with the Yugoslavs. All of this together led the Albanian leadership to fail to realise that — as the saying goes — “the fish rots from the head.” The Yugoslav Trotskyists had been engaged in all sorts of intrigue within the Albanian Party, seeking to bring about a split. In this subversive activity, they relied on their supporters — notably Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others.[^2]

Comrade Stalin asks whether these individuals are Slavs.

Hoxha replies affirmatively, stating that Koçi Xoxe was originally from Macedonia, and Pandi Kristo from Korça.[^3]

Comrade Stalin asks what religion these individuals follow.

Hoxha replies that they are Orthodox Christians.

Hoxha states that the letters from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) exposed the hostile position of the Yugoslav Trotskyists. If it had not been for those letters, the honest Albanian communists would sooner or later have had to return to the mountains to wage a new struggle. In reviewing its own work, the Albanian Party came to the conclusion that everything stated in the letters from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) applied fully to the Albanian Party — with the sole exception that the Albanian communists had never lost their feelings of love and loyalty towards the Soviet people, the Bolshevik Party and Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin says that not all matters were covered in those letters, because at the time not everything was known. For example, it only later became clear that when the Yugoslavs sought to send a division to Albania, their aim was not the one they claimed — to defend Albania against Greek aggression — but another aim: to overthrow the regime in Albania. That we learned only afterwards. Comrade Stalin remarks that not only were the Albanians insufficiently vigilant — we also didn’t understand everything at the time.

Hoxha says that the Albanians were in close contact with the Yugoslavs and therefore should have been the first to recognise their behaviour. He adds that when he learned of the Yugoslavs’ plan to send a division to Albania, he had assumed the matter had been agreed with the Soviet government.

Comrade Stalin replies that the Yugoslavs had planned to send their division in secret, without informing the USSR — although they may well have led the Albanians to believe it was done with Soviet approval. The USSR only learned of the Yugoslavs’ intentions by chance — through a report from Hoxha. When the USSR confronted the Yugoslavs, they apologized and called it a “mistake.”

Comrade Stalin asks what percentage of Albania’s population is made up of non-Albanians.

Hoxha replies that Greeks and Jews live in Albania, but they are few. In addition, there are about 5,000 to 6,000 Macedonians, who live near the country’s southern border.

Comrade Stalin asks whether there are many Albanians in Yugoslavia.

Hoxha replies that about 1 million Albanians live in Yugoslavia.

Comrade Stalin asks what religion these Albanians follow.

Hoxha replies that they are mainly Muslims, with some Catholics from northern Albania.

Comrade Stalin asks how many Orthodox Christians and people of other non-Muslim faiths live in Albania.

Hoxha replies that Orthodox Christians make up 30-35% of the population, and Catholics 10-15%. Catholics live mainly in the north, Orthodox Christians in central and some southern regions, and Muslims predominantly in the south.

Comrade Stalin asks what language the Orthodox Christians and Catholics speak in Albania.

Hoxha replies that they all speak Albanian. Hoxha states that after the letters from the Bolshevik Party and the Cominform resolution, the Albanian communists took decisive measures against Yugoslav nationalism — both within the Party and in the economic sphere. At first, it was difficult to carry out a full analysis of the Party and the country’s situation. This was due to the fact that one of the main supporters of the Yugoslav Trotskyists — Koçi Xoxe — put up strong resistance and concealed many things from the Party. It took considerable time to uncover the extent of the sabotage in the national economy and the subversive activity within the Party that was being carried out by the Yugoslav Trotskyists and their agents in Albania. By the time of the Party Congress, the country already had a clear picture of the Yugoslav Trotskyists’ activities in Albania and their intrigues within the Party. Many serious errors had been made in the Party. Intra-party democracy barely existed. The Party’s organisational structure — entirely copied from the Yugoslavs — was flawed. The Party was under the full control of the security services. Laws and economic directives in the country were not being implemented. The Albanian people’s reaction to the betrayal by the Tito clique was very strong. The struggle against the Yugoslav Trotskyists and their supporters went beyond the bounds of the Party — the entire people united around the Party in this fight. Hoxha notes that the Albanian people’s attitude towards the Yugoslav people was not damaged by any of this — the Party took care to ensure that.

The Party Congress demonstrated that in the struggle against the Yugoslav Trotskyists, the Party had been healed and had grown stronger. It also showed that although young, the Party possessed great strength and energy for the fight for the correct line. The sharp criticism of the pro-Yugoslav elements was carried out in full view of the Albanian people. The Party acknowledged its mistakes and pointed out the way to overcome them. The Party did not resort to mass repression — it acted with great caution, recognising that many comrades had followed a mistaken path in good faith, believing the Yugoslav line to be correct. Therefore, those comrades who admitted and criticised their errors were given a chance to correct themselves. Only Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and three others were arrested. Kristo Themelko,[^4] one of those most responsible for promoting the harmful Yugoslav line, and who had repeatedly shown a negative attitude towards the USSR and Soviet specialists working in Albania, was not arrested. Themelko presented all the facts about his activities to the Party bureau and subjected himself to sharp self-criticism, which was deemed sincere and objective.

Comrade Stalin asks what position Kristo Themelko held.

Hoxha replies that he was a general and served as political director of the army.

Comrade Stalin asks where Kristo Themelko is now and what he is doing.

Hoxha replies that Themelko is in Tirana, has been removed from office and is currently not engaged in any official duties.

Comrade Stalin asks what nationality Kristo Themelko is.

Hoxha replies that Kristo Themelko is a Slav. He adds that at one time, the Albanian government requested that the Soviet government permit Themelko to go to Moscow to study at the Lenin Military Academy.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians received a response to their request.

Hoxha replies that at first the response was positive, but then the matter stalled.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians want to get rid of Kristo Themelko by sending him to Moscow.

Hoxha answers that they wanted to send Themelko to study in the USSR in the hope that he might rehabilitate himself.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Party places political trust in Kristo Themelko.

Hoxha replies that the Party still hopes Themelko can correct himself, but cannot grant him full political trust.

Comrade Stalin remarks that, therefore, the Albanians no longer need Kristo Themelko.

Hoxha agrees.

Comrade Stalin states that if the Albanians don’t need Kristo Themelko, then the Soviets don’t need him either. He then asks whether the Albanians want to send him to the USSR for reasons of internal security.

Hoxha replies that Themelko himself has long wanted to study at a Soviet military academy.

Comrade Stalin says that if the Albanian comrades wish, the USSR will accept Themelko.

Hoxha continues, saying that after the Party Congress, measures were taken to purge the Party. A number of comrades compromised by their ties to Yugoslav Trotskyists were removed from leadership positions in the Party and army. Steps were taken to strengthen inner-Party democracy, all directives issued under Yugoslav influence were cancelled and so on. At the Congress, a new Central Committee was elected, composed of young and loyal comrades. Measures were also taken regarding the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where abuses and misconduct had taken place. That ministry has now been reinforced with fresh personnel. Currently, elections are underway in primary Party organisations in the cities and across the country, as well as for district Party committees. As a result, trusted and tested comrades are now coming to lead local Party bodies. Soviet comrades working in Albania have been of great help in correcting the mistakes made in the country’s economy.

Hoxha notes that the recent events have also had some negative effects within the Party. In a number of Party organisations, discipline has declined. Among weaker elements, anarchistic tendencies have appeared. In the current moment, with the intensification of class struggle, opportunist moods have become more noticeable among some Party members. Hoxha explains that while the Party was focusing on fighting Yugoslav nationalism and its supporters within the Party, it backed off somewhat in the fight against kulak elements in the countryside. This step was taken to avoid further complicating the situation in the country. However, this resulted in the state not being able to collect enough wheat and maize from the villages due to kulak activity. This has created serious economic difficulties. Another reason for the crisis was that during the Yugoslavs’ preparations for their betrayal of Albania, they withheld aid for eight months. This led to economic chaos in Albanian markets. Peasants stopped bringing their goods to market and prices rose sharply. Only Soviet aid allowed for beginning to ease this situation. Hoxha declares that despite all these difficulties, the Albanian people fully trust their leadership. The Albanian people have always suffered and endured misfortunes, and they are not afraid of hardship.

Comrade Stalin remarks that it seems the Albanians are forming collective farms (kolkhozes).

Hoxha replies that the Congress adopted a decision to begin forming kolkhozes, but not to rush the process.

Comrade Stalin says that Albanian comrades should not rush to create kolkhozes. Albania is an underdeveloped, mountainous country. Even in the Soviet Union, there are no kolkhozes in the mountains. So in Albania, kolkhozes should not be created for now. If the peasants lack fertilizer, livestock, and machinery, the state can help them. The state should have machine-tractor stations so that, if the peasants ask for help, the state can plough their land with machines and assist during the harvest by threshing their grain. The state can charge peasants in kind for this assistance. How the peasants divide their grain and maize among themselves is not the concern of the state. The state simply receives its share in kind. The state should have its own farms with tractors, threshers, and other machinery to provide assistance if peasants request it. This is not collectivisation, but it gives the peasants a chance to see and appreciate the usefulness of machines. In the Soviet Union, these were once called machine-rental points. The machines were rented to peasants, then returned to the state. The same approach should be used in Albania. As for dividing the harvest, peasants with more land will receive more, and those with less land will receive less. This is not a struggle against the kulaks, but it will teach the poor peasants to cooperate with each other.

Comrade Stalin asks if there is a national trading bourgeoisie within Albania.

Hoxha replies that there is a trading bourgeoisie, but it has no factories, shops, or houses — all of that has been confiscated.[^5]

Comrade Stalin says that this is not a good thing. The national bourgeoisie could help by producing some goods and engaging in some trade until the state grows stronger, especially if elements of the bourgeoisie value Albania’s freedom and independence. Such patriotic elements among the bourgeoisie should be used, not pushed away. Comrade Stalin continues, saying he can offer an example from practice in northern China. Among the Chinese national bourgeoisie, among small and medium manufacturers and merchants, there are some who support the communists. The Soviet Union advised the Chinese comrades not to alienate these elements. This national-patriotic part of the bourgeoisie believes that only the communists can defend China’s independence and freedom, and that all other parties have failed. So they have established contact with the communists. This part of the bourgeoisie abandoned Chiang Kai-shek because they saw that his party could not preserve a unified and independent China, and they realised that only the communists were fighting for that goal. This bourgeoisie is truly helping the communists. As is known, China is divided into north and south. Some trade associations in the north are supplying goods to the Chinese communists from the south — even American goods. When asked why they do this and why they sacrifice their money, they reply: “We see no one but the communists who can defend China’s independence from Japan and America.”

Lenin always believed that if a revolution is anti-imperialist, aimed at defending a country’s independence under threat, then communists can cooperate with the national bourgeoisie. This cooperation is acceptable at a certain stage, particularly in the initial period. The Albanian comrades should remember this lesson from Lenin.

In the people’s democracies, the national bourgeoisie discredited itself through its ties with the German and Italian occupiers. Therefore, when Russian troops entered these countries, the bourgeoisie left with the Germans. On Albanian territory, there were neither Yugoslav nor Soviet troops. For that reason, some members of the national bourgeoisie remained — if the Albanian comrades didn’t kill them all. Such a bourgeoisie, which supports the national independence of the country and can offer assistance, should not be cast aside. The same applies to certain elements among the intelligentsia, who may not sympathise with the communists, but who recognise that only the communists are capable of defending the independence of the country. Therefore, although these intellectuals may not be sympathetic to communism, they can still be of some help. They, too, should not be alienated.

The Russian Bolsheviks did not follow such a policy. At the time of the revolution, Russia was not occupied, nor was it under immediate threat — except for the war with Germany. The Russian revolution was therefore not anti-imperialist in character. It was directed inward, against internal forces. For this reason, the Russian national bourgeoisie became an irreconcilable enemy of the revolution. The struggle against it dragged on for several years. The Russian bourgeoisie was not patriotic — it appealed to the French and British for help, and invited foreign intervention. The Albanian comrades should not copy what happened in Russia or in other countries. They must take into account their own local conditions.

If there are small capitalists in Albania who open small factories, shops, or workshops, they should be issued licenses, taxed, but also allowed to engage in trade and industry until such time as Albania’s economy is strong enough. Once that happens, a different situation will arise, and the question of the bourgeoisie can be revisited.

Comrade Stalin asks how many people are in the Albanian delegation.

Hoxha replies that there are eight in the Albanian delegation.

Comrade Stalin requests a list of the members and their positions.

Hoxha replies that the Albanian government delegation includes: himself; Spiro Koleka, Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Koço Theodhosi, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Vasil Kati, Deputy Minister of Trade; Xhafer Spahiu, Deputy Minister of Industry; Shinazi Dragoti, Deputy Minister of Public Works; Colonel Nexhip Vinçani, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In addition, Theohar Fundo, Albania’s trade representative in Moscow, is also part of the delegation. Hoxha adds that the Albanian government intends to appoint Koço Theodhosi as its representative to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).

Comrade Stalin asks who is the commander of the Albanian army.

Hoxha replies that he himself is the commander. Comrade Stalin says that Soviet people, Bolsheviks, follow this principle in the formation of government leadership: if the majority of the population are Muslims, then the majority in the government should also be Muslims. The religion of the people must not be violated. The people will not understand why non-Muslims head the government if Muslims are the majority in the country. This is a basic point — something Yugoslavia failed to grasp. Of course, this does not mean only Muslims should be in government. Capable individuals from national minorities should also be included to maintain national unity. Having representatives of ethnic and religious minorities in government ensures stability.

Comrade Stalin says that he wanted to ask whether the Albanians had received the army uniforms from the USSR, which the Albanian Chief of the General Staff had previously requested.

Hoxha replies that they have not yet received them, but he has heard that the shipment is on its way.

Comrade Stalin confirms that it was decided to send the uniforms.

Hoxha asks to move on to economic matters, stating that Albania has drawn up a two-year plan for the recovery of the national economy. This plan provides, first, for the creation of new industrial enterprises for the production and processing of textiles, cotton, sugar, construction timber, and other goods needed in Albania. Second, the plan focuses on enhancing geological exploration and expanding the extraction of mineral resources. It also proposes the construction of a Patos-Valona[^6] oil pipeline and a refinery with a capacity of 150,000 tons per year. The plan includes the development and exploration of copper, chrome, and bitumen deposits. A power plant is to be built to provide energy to the textile complex.

In terms of transport, the plan provides for the expansion of road transport and the continuation of construction on the Durazzo-Elbasan railway. As for agriculture, the plan aims to expand irrigated land through the use of modern agricultural techniques. The plan does not foresee an increase in agricultural machinery production, since the tractors received from the Soviet Union are considered sufficient for the country’s needs.

Comrade Stalin asks which railway is being built.

Hoxha replies that construction is under way on the Durazzo-Elbasan railway. Last year, the first segment — Durazzo to Pekin, 37 km long — was built. The two-year plan includes construction of the Pekin to Elbasan segment, which will be 30 km long.

Comrade Stalin asks whether the Albanians have received rails from the USSR.

Hoxha replies that the rails, wagons, and other materials and equipment have been received by the Albanians. He adds that the two-year plan also includes expanding the school network and increasing the number of hospital beds. To implement the plan, Albania is counting on assistance from the Soviet Union in the form of machines and equipment. On the other hand, Albania has signed trade agreements with the people’s democracies and has received loans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Currently, the Albanian delegation is negotiating with Romania, after which it will travel to Bulgaria.

Comrade Stalin replies that we will provide assistance as much as possible. Jokingly, he adds: “We hope the Albanians themselves will also do the work.”

Hoxha says that the Albanians will make every effort to fulfil the plan.

He states that Albania would also like to request the sending of Soviet specialists, particularly to assist with the construction of textile and sugar plants.

Comrade Stalin replies that we will send people, but Albania must develop its own cadres. Our people will be in Albania temporarily, and then they will return to the Soviet Union. Albania needs to have permanent national specialists. This is the most important thing.

Hoxha says that the Albanian government will do everything to follow this path. He also states that Albania requests the dispatch of a geological exploration group, as well as a group to study Albania’s hydroelectric resources.

Comrade Stalin replies that this can be arranged.

He then asks, is there coal in Albania?

Hoxha replies that there is little coal in Albania; small deposits are located in the Tirana and Korça regions. Additionally, the Italians discovered coal deposits in the far south of Albania.


Comrade Stalin asks whether the railways run on coal or oil.

Hoxha replies that the railways run on coal, but the coal in Albania is poor quality. He says that a major issue for Albania now is organising leadership within the state security services. In this regard, the Albanian government requests permission to send 20 officers to the USSR for special courses. After these officers complete the course, the government would like to send another 20. If that is not possible, the Albanian government requests the dispatch of several Soviet instructors who could organise such courses directly in Albania.

Comrade Stalin replies that officers coming to the USSR for special courses would first need to learn the Russian language, and only then could they begin their training. Therefore, the result would be faster if we send instructors to Albania.

Hoxha says that Albania also needs two instructors for the Ministry of Internal Affairs: one for the police, and one for criminal investigations.

Comrade Stalin says that such instructors can be sent.

Hoxha asks whether the Albanian government could receive written materials in the USSR on the work and organisation of the police.

Comrade Stalin replies that the Albanian government may receive such materials.

Hoxha says he would like to raise another very important issue for Albania. The matter is that Albanian codes were based on the Yugoslav system, and therefore, the Yugoslavs are able to decipher all Albanian telegrams. The Albanian government requests a Soviet instructor to help the Ministry of Internal Affairs develop a new code.

Comrade Stalin asks whether such an instructor is needed for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also asks whether the Albanian MFA uses a cipher.

Hoxha replies that the MFA uses a cipher, but it is stored at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He adds that the Albanian government also requests two radio direction-finding stations, along with the necessary equipment and technicians. The Albanian security services have established that several secret radio transmitters are operating in Albania, one of which is located somewhere near the city of Scutari.

Comrade Stalin replies that radio direction-finding equipment can be sent. He adds that Comrade Vyshinsky will be in charge of preparing responses to the Albanian delegation’s requests, and he will review all the requests. Hoxha may present to Comrade Vyshinsky all issues of concern to the Albanian government. Comrade Stalin reiterates that we will help Albania.

Hoxha says he would like to touch on the Yugoslav issue. Economic and political relations between Albania and Yugoslavia have been severed.

Comrade Stalin asks, who severed these relations?

Hoxha replies that the relations were severed by Albania.

Hoxha says that the Yugoslavs are conducting intense propaganda against Albania, both from Yugoslav territory and within Albania, methodically building up their agent network. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs are conducting propaganda along Albania’s northern borders, trying to incite Albanian citizens to flee to Yugoslavia. This propaganda has had some success, and a fair number of peasants have fled from northern Albania to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs are also trying to take control of bands operating in the mountain regions of Albania. The Yugoslav leaders are trying to unite and organise reactionary elements within Albania in order to overthrow the existing regime. Recently, a band led by the Yugoslav mission was uncovered, and on March 21, the bandits were brought to trial in an Albanian court.

Comrade Stalin asks whether there is still a Yugoslav ambassador in Albania, and whether diplomatic relations remain.

Hoxha replies affirmatively.

Hoxha says that the Albanians are not sitting idle either. They are carrying out activities directed against the Yugoslav Trotskyists and are maintaining contact with the Albanian minority living in Yugoslavia. In addition, the Albanians have organised the immigration of Yugoslavs, although those Yugoslavs arriving in Albania must be treated with great caution, since some of them turn out to be Ranković’s men.

Comrade Stalin remarks that Ranković is planting his agents.

Hoxha says that in his opinion, the Tito clique will be destroyed as a result of political struggle, which will eventually develop into an armed partisan movement.

Comrade Stalin replies that this is not out of the question.

Hoxha, moving on to the Greek question, says that the Albanian comrades would like to know Comrade Stalin’s opinion on whether Albania is under direct threat from Greece, considering the constant provocations by the monarcho-fascist troops and various rumors about the partition of Albania. The morale of the monarcho-fascist army in Greece is very low, despite ongoing American support for the Greek army. At the same time, the morale of the Democratic Army is high. The Greek Democratic Army is currently well-equipped and well-armed. Hoxha says, however, that some aspects of the behaviour of the Greek comrades raise concerns. In particular, he believes the Democratic Army of Greece is cut off from the people, since the monarcho-fascists evacuate the population from areas threatened by the Democratic Army, and the Democratic Army, in turn, evacuates the population from the areas it occupies into Albania.

Comrade Stalin explains that this happens in the zones where fighting is taking place.

Hoxha agrees with this.

Hoxha says that the form of leadership organisation in the government and army of democratic Greece seems somewhat strange to him. From his conversation with Zachariadis and the Greek comrades, Hoxha got the impression that they somewhat downplay the leading role of the party. There are no political commissars in the army. Zachariadis, due to what seems to Hoxha to be an unclear modesty, still does not serve as head of government. Hoxha believes that all of this stems from the mistakes of the Marcos period, and that the lack of political commissars reflects past errors of EAM and ELAS.

Comrade Stalin says that the Greek comrades do not emphasise the role of the Communist Party because they are appealing to the democratic masses and want to show that the war is being fought by the entire people. They are doing the right thing. As for political commissars, they no longer exist in the Soviet Army either. Political commissars are unnecessary when the army is, in fact, led by the communists themselves.

Comrade Stalin points out that all the talk about dividing Albania is made up to frighten the Albanians. As is known, Albania’s independence is guaranteed by the declaration of the three powers — America, Britain, and the USSR. Of course, this declaration can be violated, but it’s not that easy. As for the Tsaldaris Greeks, they are on too weak a footing to seriously talk about partitioning Albania. If the Albanians behave correctly, do not curse the imperialists too much, do not provoke them, and act more modestly, no one will touch Albania. America and Britain do not want Albania to belong to Italy, because that would strengthen Italy; they do not want it to belong to Greece, because that would strengthen Greece; and they do not want Albania to belong to Yugoslavia. More than that, America does not even want Albania to belong to Britain. Because of this, they support the preservation of Albania’s independence.

The conversation lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes.

Recorded by V. EROFEEV

AP RF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 249. L. 55–74.

Certified copy.


Footnotes

[^1]: This refers to the battleship Giulio Cesare (“Julius Caesar”), received by the Soviet Union as part of reparations from Italy. In the USSR, it was renamed Novorossiysk. It exploded in Yeysk Bay (near Sevastopol) on October 29, 1955.

[^2]: For more details, see: Vol. I, docs. No. 302, 305.

[^3]: In Enver Hoxha’s book With Stalin: Memoirs (Tirana 1984), only Kristo Themelko — mentioned later — is referred to as a Macedonian, i.e., a Slav. In the Soviet transcript of the conversation, all Orthodox Albanians are classified as Slavs.

[^4]: Kristo Themelko was one of Enver Hoxha’s closest comrades during the national liberation struggle, a participant in the founding meeting of the Communist Party of Albania in November 1941, and a member of the first Central Committee of the CPA.

[^5]: A series of decrees issued by the Provisional Democratic Government in January 1945 practically eliminated the private sector in industry and trade.

[^6]: Throughout the text, the Italian spelling of Albanian cities has been retained: “Valona” instead of “Vlora,” “Durazzo” instead of “Durrës,” “Scutari” instead of “Shkodra.”


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