On The article “Their Morals and Ours?: A Marxist-Leninist Critique of Trotskyist Revolutionary Morality” by Bisharat Abbasi
Summary of article
In his article, Bisharat
argues that Trotsky’s Their Morals and Ours is powerful and partly
materialist: it rightly rejects an eternal, supra-historical morality, insists
that moral ideas are class-bound, and refuses to judge revolutionary
violence abstractly while ignoring the violence of class society. But its
central weakness is that, after destroying the old moral absolutism, Trotsky
installs a new supreme tribunal: “the welfare of the revolution.” This
becomes a revolutionary moralism rather than a consistently
historical-materialist method. It risks allowing whoever claims to speak for
“the revolution” to judge their own conduct.
He states that the
Marxist-Leninist counter is not bourgeois moralism, pacifism, or liberal
abstraction. It is consistent materialist analysis. If Trotsky demands concrete
historical contextualization for Bolshevik coercion and civil-war violence, the
same method must be applied to the Stalin-era Soviet Union. Stalin must be
studied as a historical actor operating under backwardness, imperial hostility,
war danger, internal conflict, and rapid transformation—not as the demonic
opposite of Trotsky or as a moral category called “Stalinism.” Trotsky’s
account of Stalin is evidence, not scripture; his moral indictment is a
political document, not a historical verdict.
He concludes that the task
is not to construct a “superior” revolutionary morality to Trotsky’s. It is to
overcome the moralization of revolutionary history. Marxism-Leninism should
reject both the liberal moralist and the Trotskyist moralist, defend
revolutionary violence only where historically necessary, defend the Soviet
state and Stalin against the black legend without making them infallible, and
treat Trotsky himself as a historical actor subject to Marxist criticism. The
revolution is not a moral abstraction but a concrete historical process; those
who claim to represent it must be judged by material reality and consequences.
Article
The article grants Trotsky’s
genuine strengths: rejection of eternal morality, recognition of class
morality, refusal to equate slaveholder and slave violence, and insistence that
means and ends are not mechanically separable.
Leon Trotsky's
Their Morals and Ours is often presented as one of the most sophisticated
defences of revolutionary politics against bourgeois moralism. It is certainly
a powerful polemical text, and there is much in it that initially appears very
close to the materialist conception of history. Trotsky correctly rejects the
idea that morality exists as some eternal and universal code standing above
history, society, and class struggle. He correctly insists that moral ideas
emerge from definite social relations and that the morality of an exploiting
class cannot simply be placed on the same plane as the morality of an exploited
class struggling for emancipation. He is also right to reject the liberal habit
of judging revolutionary violence through abstract formulas while completely
ignoring the violence through which existing class society maintains itself.
His example of the slaveholder and the slave is deliberately provocative but
fundamentally important: the violence of the master who maintains slavery and
the violence of the slave who breaks his chains cannot be made morally
equivalent merely because both involve physical force. Trotsky's insistence
that means and ends cannot be mechanically separated is similarly important,
because a revolutionary movement cannot create socialism through methods that
systematically destroy the political consciousness, organisation, and
initiative upon which socialist society depends. Even in his discussion of the
Bolshevik use of hostages during the Civil War, Trotsky's argument begins from
the concrete historical circumstances rather than from an abstract prohibition
of violence, and he takes personal responsibility for the policy while arguing
that its meaning can only be understood within the conditions of the struggle
against the counter-revolution.
This prepares the “But…” that
follows: precisely because Trotsky starts from materialist premises, his later
construction of a revolutionary moral tribunal becomes more significant. His core critique is that Trotsky replaces the
old absolute with “the welfare of the revolution” as the supreme law. The
content changes, but the philosophical structure of a supreme tribunal remains.
But precisely
because Trotsky begins from such apparently materialist premises, the
theoretical movement that follows becomes all the more interesting, and, from a
Marxist-Leninist standpoint, all the more problematic. The fundamental weakness
of Their Morals and Ours is not that Trotsky recognises the class character of
morality; that part of his argument is largely correct. The deeper problem is
that after destroying the idea of an eternal morality existing above history,
he proceeds to construct a specifically revolutionary morality whose ultimate
tribunal becomes the revolution itself. The famous conclusion that “the welfare
of the revolution” is the “supreme law” captures this movement with unusual
clarity. Trotsky believes that the proletariat must free itself from religion,
democracy understood as bourgeois formalism, and transcendental morality,
because only the socialist revolution can overcome the social conditions that
reproduce exploitation and domination. But in place of the discarded absolute
he installs another supreme criterion: whatever serves the revolution is moral,
while whatever obstructs it is immoral. The old moral absolutism is therefore
not completely overcome; it is transformed. The bourgeois says, in effect, that
his moral principles are universally valid, while Trotsky says that the
interests of the revolution provide the highest standard by which political
conduct is to be judged. The content is radically different, of course, but the
philosophical structure contains an important similarity: there remains a
supreme tribunal standing above the particular political act and determining
its legitimacy.
This raises the need to
distinguish historical materialism from revolutionary moralism because Marxism
asks about social relations, class interests, historical conditions, objective
possibilities, strategy, and consequences—not simply whether an action “serves
the revolution.
This is where we
must distinguish between historical materialism and revolutionary moralism.
Historical materialism does not require us to discover a new moral law after
rejecting the old one. It requires us to understand the concrete social
relations that produce human conduct, the class interests embodied in political
institutions, the historical contradictions through which social systems
develop, and the objective consequences of political action. Marxism does not
say that something is correct simply because a revolutionary believes it serves
the revolution. It asks what social forces are operating, what historical
conditions exist, what class interests are involved, what possibilities are
objectively available, what political strategy corresponds to those conditions,
and what consequences a particular course of action produces. The difference
may seem small when expressed in abstract language, but politically it is
enormous. Once “the revolution” becomes the supreme moral subject, whoever
claims to speak in its name acquires the possibility of becoming the judge of
his own conduct. The revolutionary organisation can say that its actions are
necessary because they serve the revolution; its leadership can identify its
own policy with the interests of the revolution; and the historical opponent
can consequently be transformed from a political opponent into a moral enemy.
This is precisely the danger that Trotsky's formula does not sufficiently
resolve.
Trotsky’s treatment of
revolutionary violence shows both the strength and weakness of his method. Trotsky
is right to contextualize revolutionary violence and secret trials under
civil-war conditions. But explanation is not automatic justification; necessity
must be demonstrated, and explanation, necessity, correctness, and consequence
must be distinguished.
Trotsky's
treatment of revolutionary violence demonstrates the strength and weakness of
his method at the same time. He is entirely right to reject the liberal fiction
that revolutionary violence can be evaluated without considering the social
violence that preceded it. A colonial power does not become morally neutral
simply because its violence is legal. A capitalist state does not cease to
exercise coercion because its coercive institutions operate under
constitutional forms. A slaveholder's violence cannot be equated with the
violence through which the enslaved attempt to destroy slavery. Nor can the
violence of fascist counter-revolution be treated as simply another equivalent
political force alongside the resistance of those fighting fascism. Trotsky is
therefore correct when he mocks the attempt to formulate an abstract moral code
for civil war in which revolutionary forces are condemned for taking hostages,
imposing restrictions, using artillery, or conducting secret trials while the
very existence of the revolutionary state is threatened. In his discussion of
secret trials, he argues that stable political conditions permit one kind of
judicial procedure while civil war creates an entirely different political
environment in which the possibility of impartial justice is drastically
reduced. This is a genuinely materialist observation. Political institutions
cannot be detached from the conditions in which they operate.
Trotsky’s testimony and the
Soviet experience. Trotsky’s account of Stalin and the USSR must be
treated as historical evidence produced by a political opponent, not as the
neutral voice of the revolution. No faction automatically embodies history’s
legitimacy.
But Trotsky then
makes a leap that Marxism-Leninism should resist. To explain an action
historically is not automatically to justify it morally, politically, or
strategically. More importantly, necessity itself has to be demonstrated rather
than simply invoked. An action may be historically explicable without being the
only possible action; it may be unavoidable under one set of conditions while
avoidable under another; it may solve an immediate problem while creating a
more serious long-term problem; it may be undertaken with revolutionary
intentions and yet produce consequences that weaken the revolutionary process.
Historical materialism therefore requires distinctions between explanation,
necessity, correctness, and consequence. Trotsky's language of revolutionary
morality tends to compress these distinctions into the single category of what
“serves the revolution”. This makes his framework rhetorically powerful but
theoretically less precise than the scientific method he claims to defend.
And here the
argument becomes particularly important when we turn to Trotsky's treatment of
the Soviet experience. We should not accept Trotsky's historical interpretation
simply because he was himself a Bolshevik revolutionary. His account of Stalin
and the Soviet Union was produced by a political opponent who was deeply
involved in the struggles that he later interpreted. That does not make
everything Trotsky wrote false; neither does it make it true. It means that his
testimony has to be treated as historical evidence rather than as the neutral
voice of the revolution itself. This distinction is often forgotten because
Trotsky's literary brilliance gives his historical judgments an extraordinary
appearance of certainty. His political enemies become bureaucrats,
reactionaries, usurpers, or traitors, while his own political tendency appears
as the authentic continuation of Bolshevism. But historical materialism gives
us no basis for granting one political faction the right to define itself as
history's legitimate representative.
This is especially important
because the later historiography of Stalin has been dominated by moral
simplification. Domenico Losurdo’s work challenges the inherited
“black legend” of Stalin. The article does not demand blind acceptance of
Losurdo; it demands that materialists investigate conditions rather than
replace history with the moral proposition that Stalin was simply a tyrant.
This is
especially important because the later history of Stalin and the Soviet Union
has been subjected to an enormous process of moral simplification. Trotsky was
an important early contributor to the narrative that Stalin had somehow
transformed the Bolshevik revolution into its opposite, and later
anti-communist historiography expanded this interpretation into the much
broader mythology of “Stalinism” as a uniquely monstrous political phenomenon.
Domenico Losurdo's Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend is important
precisely because it challenges this inherited framework. Losurdo does not
simply ask whether Stalin was “good” or “bad”; he investigates how the
historical image of Stalin itself was constructed, how the comparison between
Stalin and Hitler became normalized, and how the Soviet experience was
increasingly interpreted through categories that abstracted particular episodes
from the wider historical context. The authorized English edition describes the
project explicitly as an attempt to subject the widespread caricatures of
Stalin to critical examination rather than simply accepting received
representations.
This does not
mean that every proposition in Losurdo's book must simply be accepted. It means
that the burden of historical proof cannot be placed exclusively upon those who
challenge the anti-Stalin narrative. If we claim to be materialists, then we
must investigate the material conditions ourselves. We have to ask what kind of
society the Soviet Union inherited, what devastation followed the First World
War and Civil War, what the international position of the Soviet state was,
what the problems of industrialisation and agricultural transformation actually
involved, what internal political conflicts existed, what the Soviet leadership
knew at particular moments, what alternatives were available, how state
institutions functioned, and how external threats affected internal political
decisions. We cannot replace this investigation with the moral proposition that
Stalin was simply a tyrant who possessed unlimited freedom to choose between
good and evil. That is precisely the kind of idealist history that Marxism was
developed to overcome.
The next step is to apply
Trotsky’s own contextualizing principle consistently. If
civil war and foreign intervention contextualize Bolshevik coercion, the same
method must contextualize the Stalin period: hostile capitalist powers,
military threats, internal conflict, and rapid economic transformation. The
article also notes historiographical contestation over 1937–38 and Grover
Furr’s challenge to the standard narrative.
This is where
Trotsky's own principle becomes useful against Trotsky. He insists that
historical circumstances determine the meaning of political action. Fine. Then
let us apply the principle consistently. If civil war, foreign intervention,
economic collapse, and counter-revolutionary activity must be taken into
account when evaluating the Bolshevik use of coercion, then the same material
method must be applied to the Soviet state in the Stalin period. If the
revolutionary government cannot be judged as though it were operating under
peaceful parliamentary conditions, neither can the Soviet Union be judged as
though it existed in a world without hostile capitalist powers, military
threats, internal political conflict, and the enormous pressures of rapid
economic transformation. Trotsky cannot demand historical contextualization for
the actions he regards as revolutionary while simultaneously allowing his own
political narrative to become the framework through which the actions of his
opponents are interpreted.
This point
becomes even more important in relation to the highly contested history of the
1930s. There is a substantial historiographical debate over the causes, character,
and responsibility for the mass repressions of 1937–38, and it would be
intellectually irresponsible simply to insert the conventional phrase “Stalin's
Terror” into an essay as though that settles every question. Grover Furr's
archival research, whatever disagreements one may have with his conclusions,
explicitly challenges the standard anti-Stalin interpretation, and argues that
primary-source evidence supports a more complicated account involving political
opposition, military figures, and conflicts within the Party-state apparatus.
We do not need to turn Furr into an infallible authority to recognise the
significance of the challenge. The point is methodological: the historical
agency behind these events cannot simply be presumed from the moral vocabulary
inherited from Trotskyist, liberal or Cold War historiography. If the evidence
is contested, then the historical question remains open to investigation. And
once that is recognised, Trotsky's moral indictment loses the privileged status
it has too often been granted.
Indeed, there is
something deeply revealing in the way Trotsky's own moral framework functions
here. He repeatedly tells us that revolutionary violence must be judged
according to the concrete historical struggle, but when the Soviet leadership
adopts policies that Trotsky opposes, the political struggle increasingly
becomes a struggle between revolutionary morality and bureaucratic
degeneration. The concrete institutional and social questions remain, but they
are increasingly absorbed into a moral narrative. Trotsky is not merely arguing
that a particular policy was mistaken; he is constructing an entire theory of
political legitimacy in which his own conception of the revolution represents
the authentic revolutionary tradition while the Stalin leadership represents
its betrayal. Once that framework is established, subsequent historical
evidence can easily be interpreted through it. If Stalin strengthens the Soviet
state, this becomes bureaucratic consolidation; if the Soviet economy is
transformed, it becomes forced industrialisation; if opponents are removed, it
becomes terror; if the state survives enormous external pressures, the
explanation becomes authoritarianism rather than the objective requirements of
state survival. This is precisely what we should reject.
Stalin as a historical actor,
not a moral monster or saint. The question is not “Was Stalin good or a
monster?” but what concrete formation the USSR was, what contradictions it
faced, and what it achieved—including industrial transformation and the defeat
of Nazi Germany.
A
Marxist-Leninist analysis of Stalin cannot begin with the question, “Was Stalin
a good man?” Nor should it begin with the opposite question, “Was Stalin a
monster?” Both questions are politically seductive and scientifically
inadequate. We must begin with the Soviet Union as a concrete historical
formation. We must examine the contradictions of a socialist state attempting
to transform an overwhelmingly agrarian and economically backward society while
facing a hostile international environment. We must examine the relationship
between the peasantry and the state, the development of industry, the creation
of a modern working class, the transformation of education and science, the
development of Soviet state institutions, the national question, the struggle
against internal political opposition, the changing international situation,
and finally the gigantic confrontation with fascism. Only then can we begin to
understand Stalin as a historical actor. And once we do so, the picture is
necessarily more complicated than either the hagiographic Stalin of crude
apologetics or the demonic Stalin of Trotskyist and liberal mythology.
What is
particularly striking is that even hostile historical traditions have had
difficulty completely erasing the magnitude of the transformation that occurred
under Stalin's leadership. The Soviet Union entered the Stalin period as a
predominantly agrarian and economically backward country and emerged as an
industrial power capable of producing the military and economic capacity
necessary to survive the Nazi invasion and ultimately defeat Nazi Germany. The
Soviet victory over fascism cannot be reduced to a footnote in Stalin's
biography. It was a world-historical event, and Stalin's role in the
organisation and direction of the Soviet war effort cannot simply be dissolved
into the word “dictator”. Losurdo's work insists upon precisely this historical
dimension and challenges the tendency to isolate the most controversial aspects
of Stalin's rule from the immense transformation of Soviet society and the
geopolitical struggle in which it occurred. To acknowledge this does not
require us to claim that every Soviet policy was flawless; it requires only
that we stop pretending that historical judgement can be produced by selecting
the darkest episodes and treating the rest of history as background noise.
Beyond “their morals” and “our
morals”: party, legitimacy, and moral drama. The issue is not whose morality is
better but whose historical understanding is more scientifically adequate. The
article critiques Trotsky’s tendency to turn political defeat into evidence of
moral degeneration and to make his faction the true embodiment of the
revolution.
And this brings
us back to the title of Trotsky's essay: Their Morals and Ours. The title
itself reveals the fundamental problem. Trotsky presents the question as a
conflict between two moralities: theirs, the morality of the bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois critics of revolution, and ours, the morality of the
revolutionaries. But from a more developed Marxist-Leninist standpoint, the
opposition should be formulated differently. The question is not simply whether
our morality is better than theirs. The question is whether our understanding
of history is more scientifically adequate than theirs. The bourgeois moralist
sees isolated individuals and isolated actions and judges them according to
abstract principles. The Trotskyist revolutionary moralist rejects bourgeois
principles but can fall into the opposite danger of judging history through the
standpoint of a particular revolutionary tendency. Marxism-Leninism must go
beyond both.
This is why the
phrase “the welfare of the revolution is the supreme law” is insufficient as a
scientific principle. What revolution? Whose conception of the revolution? At
what stage? Under what conditions? What class forces are actually capable of
carrying it forward? What institutions are necessary to preserve the gains
already achieved? What compromises are temporary necessities and what
compromises transform the character of the state? What forms of coercion defend
socialist construction and what forms undermine it? What political conflicts
represent genuine class antagonisms and what conflicts represent factional, personal,
or organisational struggles? These questions cannot be answered by repeating
“the revolution”. They require concrete analysis.
This is also why
the Marxist-Leninist conception of the party is fundamentally different from
the Trotskyist tendency to turn political legitimacy into a moral question. The
Communist Party is not sacred because it calls itself revolutionary. It is an
instrument of the working class, and its correctness must be demonstrated
through its ability to analyse reality, organise the masses, defend the
revolutionary state, correct its errors, and advance the socialist
transformation. Democratic centralism, properly understood, is not the worship
of leadership; it is the combination of collective discussion, political unity,
discipline, and the capacity to act. The leadership can make mistakes, and
those mistakes must be investigated. But the answer to mistakes is not to
construct an alternative moral tribunal from which an expelled or defeated
faction declares itself the true embodiment of the revolution. The answer is to
examine the concrete conditions, the political line, the class forces, and the
consequences of policy.
Trotsky's
conception has difficulty here because his own political history becomes
inseparable from his theory of revolutionary morality. The question of who is
the legitimate representative of Bolshevism becomes a moral question, and the
political defeat of Trotsky's faction becomes evidence of the supposed moral
degeneration of the victorious leadership. But political defeat does not prove
historical illegitimacy, just as political victory does not prove theoretical
correctness. History is not a court in which the faction that loses
automatically becomes the martyr and the faction that wins automatically
becomes the criminal. Such a conception belongs more naturally to political
mythology than to historical materialism.
The irony of Trotsky’s moral
drama and the need for sympathetic contextualization. Trotsky’s history can
become a moral drama of purity, betrayal, and fidelity. Being sympathetic to
Stalin means refusing the black legend as the default framework—not closing
one’s eyes to errors or abuses.
There is
therefore a profound irony in Their Morals and Ours. Trotsky attacks the
moralists for judging revolutionaries according to standards detached from
historical reality, yet his own historical interpretation of the Soviet Union
can become precisely such a moral drama. The revolutionary state becomes a
protagonist that has betrayed its original purity; Stalin becomes the
embodiment of bureaucratic degeneration; Trotsky becomes the custodian of
authentic revolutionary morality. The complexity of history is thereby
organised around a dramatic opposition between betrayal and fidelity. This is
powerful literature, but Marxist analysis must demand more.
And this is
where the sympathetic attitude towards Stalin that we should adopt is not
merely a matter of personal political preference. It follows from our refusal
to accept the black legend as the default historical framework. To be
sympathetic towards Stalin does not mean that we have to close our eyes to
contradictions, errors, or abuses. It means that we recognise that Stalin was a
communist leader operating within an extraordinarily difficult historical
conjuncture and that his political record has been subjected to an exceptional
degree of moralization and decontextualization. Losurdo's work is valuable
precisely because it challenges the assumption that the standard image of
Stalin is simply the neutral result of historical research. The English edition
itself describes the project as an effort to challenge the widespread
caricature of Stalin and to return the question to historical and philosophical
examination.
This requires careful language
and concrete historical questions.
Labels versus investigation. Phrases
like “Stalin’s terror” or “Stalin’s purges” cannot do the work of analysis. The
article insists on asking who initiated what, which institutions acted, what
evidence exists, and how the international situation mattered. Trotsky’s
accusations are political documents, not historical verdicts.
We should
therefore be careful with the language we use. We should not casually repeat
expressions such as “Stalin's repression”, “Stalin's terror” or “Stalin's
purges” as though these formulations themselves constitute explanations.
Sometimes they may be useful shorthand after the underlying historical question
has been established, but they cannot be allowed to do the work of historical
analysis. Who initiated what? Who opposed what? Which institutions were
involved? What were the stated objectives? What evidence survives? What
evidence has been suppressed, distorted, or interpreted selectively? What was
Stalin's actual position in each episode? What did other members of the
leadership do? What did the security apparatus do? What did local authorities
do? What did the opposition do? What did foreign intelligence services do? What
did the international situation look like? These are the questions that must be
answered before we attach a simple personal label to a complex historical
process.
The same
principle applies to the famine question, collectivisation, the Moscow trials,
the Gulag, the national question, and the various political struggles of the
1930s. We do not have to settle every one of these enormous historical debates
inside an essay on Trotsky's moral philosophy. In fact, doing so would distract
from our central purpose. What we must insist upon is that Trotsky does not get
to settle them for us. His interpretation is evidence, not scripture. His
accusations are political documents, not historical verdicts. His moral
language is part of the struggle itself and must therefore be analysed as such.
This prepares the final
methodological statement: materialism is proven by method, not by calling one’s
morality revolutionary.
Materialist method turned
against Trotsky; final conclusion. The real alternative to Trotsky is
not bourgeois morality but Marxism-Leninism as concrete historical analysis.
The article rejects both liberal moralism and Trotskyist moralism, refuses the
“Stalinism” label as a substitute for explanation, and concludes that Trotsky
must become an object of Marxist criticism rather than the moral judge of
Soviet history.
This is
ultimately where Trotsky's conception of revolutionary morality becomes most
vulnerable. A genuinely materialist revolutionary does not need to proclaim
himself morally superior to the bourgeoisie, nor does he need to construct a
sacred category called “the revolution” through which every action can be
justified. He needs to understand reality. He needs to understand the objective
conditions within which people act. He needs to understand class forces,
institutions, productive forces, political consciousness, and the international
balance of power. He needs to distinguish between what is possible and what is
desirable, between immediate necessity and long-term strategy, between
political victory and socialist development. Above all, he needs the
intellectual humility to recognise that history is not obliged to confirm the
self-image of any revolutionary faction.
And perhaps this
is the greatest lesson we can draw from Trotsky's essay. The revolutionary does
not become more materialist merely by calling his morality revolutionary.
Materialism is demonstrated by the method through which one investigates
reality. If Trotsky condemns bourgeois moralists for abstracting individual
actions from their historical circumstances, then we must apply the same
standard to Trotsky. If he insists that revolutionary violence must be
understood in relation to the conditions of civil war, we must apply that
principle to the Soviet state as well. If he says that the slave's violence
cannot be judged by the same standard as the slaveholder's violence, then we
must refuse to judge the Soviet Union as though it existed outside the international
system of imperialism, war, and capitalist encirclement. If he tells us that
political morality must be connected to the objective historical struggle, then
we must ask whether the Soviet leadership's policies strengthened or weakened
the material basis of socialism rather than merely asking whether Trotsky
approved of them.
In this sense,
the real alternative to Trotsky is not bourgeois morality. It is not pacifism, liberalism,
or the abstract doctrine that all political violence is equally evil. Nor is it
the childish slogan that everything done by a communist government is
automatically correct. The real alternative is Marxism-Leninism as a method of
concrete historical analysis. It allows us to defend revolutionary violence
when it is historically necessary without turning violence into a virtue; to
defend the Soviet state without pretending that every decision was perfect; to
defend Stalin against the black legend without making him infallible; to
recognise political errors without accepting the Trotskyist interpretation of
Soviet history; and to understand revolutionary morality itself as a historical
product rather than as a sacred code.
This is why, in
the final analysis, Their Morals and Ours should perhaps be turned around
against its author. Trotsky asks us to choose between “their morals” and
“ours”. But the Marxist-Leninist answer is that history cannot be reduced to
competing moralities. The bourgeoisie has its ideology, the proletariat has its
class consciousness, revolutionary parties have their programmes and political
lines, and different historical forces struggle over the direction of society.
But the correctness of a political line cannot be established merely by
proclaiming its revolutionary morality. It must be tested against reality.
Trotsky's great
weakness is therefore not that he takes the revolution too seriously. He takes
it seriously in the wrong theoretical form. He transforms the revolution from a
historically conditioned process into a supreme moral criterion, and then places
his own political interpretation of that revolution at the centre of judgement.
From this standpoint, Stalin is condemned not merely because of particular
policies but because Stalinism is declared to be a betrayal of the
revolutionary essence that Trotsky claims to represent. Once the premise is
accepted, the conclusion is almost guaranteed. But once the premise itself is
subjected to materialist criticism, the certainty begins to disappear.
Stalin, by
contrast, has to be understood not as the abstract opposite of Trotsky but as a
historical leader operating within the concrete problem of building and
defending a socialist state under extraordinarily difficult conditions. His
significance cannot be separated from the transformation of Soviet society, the
development of industrial capacity, the consolidation of Soviet state power,
the struggle over the direction of socialist construction and, above all, the
defeat of Nazi Germany. This does not make every Soviet policy automatically
correct; it makes Stalin a historical figure whose achievements, errors, contradictions,
and decisions must be understood together. The very fact that Losurdo's
intervention has been necessary to challenge the demonological representation
of Stalin tells us something important about how thoroughly moral categories
have dominated the historiography.
And perhaps that
is the most ironic outcome of our reading of Trotsky. The man who wanted to
liberate revolutionary politics from abstract morality ultimately left behind a
political tradition in which the word “Stalinism” itself became almost a moral
category, requiring no further historical explanation. Once something is
labelled “Stalinist”, the investigation seems finished. The label explains the
crime before the crime has even been examined. It identifies the villain before
the evidence has been considered. It transforms political disagreement into
moral condemnation. It does exactly what historical materialism should teach us
not to do.
We should
therefore reject both the liberal moralist and the Trotskyist moralist. We do
not need to say that Stalin was perfect. We do not need to say that the Soviet
Union was free of contradictions. We do not need to deny difficult historical
questions. What we need to reject is the lazy assumption that these questions
have already been answered by Trotsky's political narrative. We should approach
Stalin with the same materialist seriousness with which Trotsky demands that we
approach the revolutionary violence of 1919. We should ask what the Soviet
leadership faced, what it attempted, what it achieved, what it failed to
achieve, what its enemies attempted, what alternatives existed, and what the
evidence actually tells us.
Then the
question “Their Morals and Ours?” acquires a very different meaning.
Our task is not
to construct a morality superior to Trotsky's. Our task is to overcome
Trotsky's moralization of revolutionary history.
The proletarian
revolution does not need saints, and it certainly does not need Trotskyist
saints. It needs historical understanding. It needs organisation. It needs
discipline and criticism. It needs the ability to distinguish genuine class
enemies from political opponents, temporary necessity from permanent principle,
strategic retreat from capitulation, and historical achievement from political
failure. Above all, it needs the courage to study its own history without
accepting the categories supplied by its enemies.
Trotsky wanted
to tell us that the welfare of the revolution is the supreme law. We should
answer that the revolution itself is not a moral abstraction. It is a
concrete historical process, and those who claim to represent it must
themselves be judged by history, by material reality and by the consequences of
their political practice.
That is why we
do not need Trotsky's “revolutionary morality” to defend the October
Revolution, the Soviet Union or Stalin. We need something much more demanding:
the materialist method of Marxism-Leninism. And once we apply that method
consistently, Trotsky no longer stands above Soviet history as its moral judge.
He becomes one of its historical actors, and therefore, like everyone else, an
object of Marxist criticism.
The article moves from
granting Trotsky’s materialist insights, to exposing his revolutionary
moralism, to applying materialist method consistently to Stalin and the USSR.
