Header Ads

Header ADS

On The article “Their Morals and Ours?: A Marxist-Leninist Critique of Trotskyist Revolutionary Morality” by Bisharat Abbasi

I am publishing this article by Bisharat Abbasi as another case study, as it is dialectically connected to the subjects of my articles: "Ideological warfare tactics of the Bourgeoisie", "The internalization of bourgeois narratives", "The dialectical interrelation between collective and self-imposed illusions", and "Sectarianism and labeling as a weapon of ideological warfare".  E.A

Summary of article

In his article, Bisharat argues that Trotsky’s Their Morals and Ours is powerful and partly materialist: it rightly rejects an eternal, supra-historical morality, insists that moral ideas are class-bound, and refuses to judge revolutionary violence abstractly while ignoring the violence of class society. But its central weakness is that, after destroying the old moral absolutism, Trotsky installs a new supreme tribunal: “the welfare of the revolution.” This becomes a revolutionary moralism rather than a consistently historical-materialist method. It risks allowing whoever claims to speak for “the revolution” to judge their own conduct.

He states that the Marxist-Leninist counter is not bourgeois moralism, pacifism, or liberal abstraction. It is consistent materialist analysis. If Trotsky demands concrete historical contextualization for Bolshevik coercion and civil-war violence, the same method must be applied to the Stalin-era Soviet Union. Stalin must be studied as a historical actor operating under backwardness, imperial hostility, war danger, internal conflict, and rapid transformation—not as the demonic opposite of Trotsky or as a moral category called “Stalinism.” Trotsky’s account of Stalin is evidence, not scripture; his moral indictment is a political document, not a historical verdict.

He concludes that the task is not to construct a “superior” revolutionary morality to Trotsky’s. It is to overcome the moralization of revolutionary history. Marxism-Leninism should reject both the liberal moralist and the Trotskyist moralist, defend revolutionary violence only where historically necessary, defend the Soviet state and Stalin against the black legend without making them infallible, and treat Trotsky himself as a historical actor subject to Marxist criticism. The revolution is not a moral abstraction but a concrete historical process; those who claim to represent it must be judged by material reality and consequences.

Article

The article grants Trotsky’s genuine strengths: rejection of eternal morality, recognition of class morality, refusal to equate slaveholder and slave violence, and insistence that means and ends are not mechanically separable.

Leon Trotsky's Their Morals and Ours is often presented as one of the most sophisticated defences of revolutionary politics against bourgeois moralism. It is certainly a powerful polemical text, and there is much in it that initially appears very close to the materialist conception of history. Trotsky correctly rejects the idea that morality exists as some eternal and universal code standing above history, society, and class struggle. He correctly insists that moral ideas emerge from definite social relations and that the morality of an exploiting class cannot simply be placed on the same plane as the morality of an exploited class struggling for emancipation. He is also right to reject the liberal habit of judging revolutionary violence through abstract formulas while completely ignoring the violence through which existing class society maintains itself. His example of the slaveholder and the slave is deliberately provocative but fundamentally important: the violence of the master who maintains slavery and the violence of the slave who breaks his chains cannot be made morally equivalent merely because both involve physical force. Trotsky's insistence that means and ends cannot be mechanically separated is similarly important, because a revolutionary movement cannot create socialism through methods that systematically destroy the political consciousness, organisation, and initiative upon which socialist society depends. Even in his discussion of the Bolshevik use of hostages during the Civil War, Trotsky's argument begins from the concrete historical circumstances rather than from an abstract prohibition of violence, and he takes personal responsibility for the policy while arguing that its meaning can only be understood within the conditions of the struggle against the counter-revolution.

This prepares the “But…” that follows: precisely because Trotsky starts from materialist premises, his later construction of a revolutionary moral tribunal becomes more significant. His  core critique is that Trotsky replaces the old absolute with “the welfare of the revolution” as the supreme law. The content changes, but the philosophical structure of a supreme tribunal remains.

But precisely because Trotsky begins from such apparently materialist premises, the theoretical movement that follows becomes all the more interesting, and, from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, all the more problematic. The fundamental weakness of Their Morals and Ours is not that Trotsky recognises the class character of morality; that part of his argument is largely correct. The deeper problem is that after destroying the idea of an eternal morality existing above history, he proceeds to construct a specifically revolutionary morality whose ultimate tribunal becomes the revolution itself. The famous conclusion that “the welfare of the revolution” is the “supreme law” captures this movement with unusual clarity. Trotsky believes that the proletariat must free itself from religion, democracy understood as bourgeois formalism, and transcendental morality, because only the socialist revolution can overcome the social conditions that reproduce exploitation and domination. But in place of the discarded absolute he installs another supreme criterion: whatever serves the revolution is moral, while whatever obstructs it is immoral. The old moral absolutism is therefore not completely overcome; it is transformed. The bourgeois says, in effect, that his moral principles are universally valid, while Trotsky says that the interests of the revolution provide the highest standard by which political conduct is to be judged. The content is radically different, of course, but the philosophical structure contains an important similarity: there remains a supreme tribunal standing above the particular political act and determining its legitimacy.

This raises the need to distinguish historical materialism from revolutionary moralism because Marxism asks about social relations, class interests, historical conditions, objective possibilities, strategy, and consequences—not simply whether an action “serves the revolution.

This is where we must distinguish between historical materialism and revolutionary moralism. Historical materialism does not require us to discover a new moral law after rejecting the old one. It requires us to understand the concrete social relations that produce human conduct, the class interests embodied in political institutions, the historical contradictions through which social systems develop, and the objective consequences of political action. Marxism does not say that something is correct simply because a revolutionary believes it serves the revolution. It asks what social forces are operating, what historical conditions exist, what class interests are involved, what possibilities are objectively available, what political strategy corresponds to those conditions, and what consequences a particular course of action produces. The difference may seem small when expressed in abstract language, but politically it is enormous. Once “the revolution” becomes the supreme moral subject, whoever claims to speak in its name acquires the possibility of becoming the judge of his own conduct. The revolutionary organisation can say that its actions are necessary because they serve the revolution; its leadership can identify its own policy with the interests of the revolution; and the historical opponent can consequently be transformed from a political opponent into a moral enemy. This is precisely the danger that Trotsky's formula does not sufficiently resolve.

Trotsky’s treatment of revolutionary violence shows both the strength and weakness of his method. Trotsky is right to contextualize revolutionary violence and secret trials under civil-war conditions. But explanation is not automatic justification; necessity must be demonstrated, and explanation, necessity, correctness, and consequence must be distinguished.

Trotsky's treatment of revolutionary violence demonstrates the strength and weakness of his method at the same time. He is entirely right to reject the liberal fiction that revolutionary violence can be evaluated without considering the social violence that preceded it. A colonial power does not become morally neutral simply because its violence is legal. A capitalist state does not cease to exercise coercion because its coercive institutions operate under constitutional forms. A slaveholder's violence cannot be equated with the violence through which the enslaved attempt to destroy slavery. Nor can the violence of fascist counter-revolution be treated as simply another equivalent political force alongside the resistance of those fighting fascism. Trotsky is therefore correct when he mocks the attempt to formulate an abstract moral code for civil war in which revolutionary forces are condemned for taking hostages, imposing restrictions, using artillery, or conducting secret trials while the very existence of the revolutionary state is threatened. In his discussion of secret trials, he argues that stable political conditions permit one kind of judicial procedure while civil war creates an entirely different political environment in which the possibility of impartial justice is drastically reduced. This is a genuinely materialist observation. Political institutions cannot be detached from the conditions in which they operate.

Trotsky’s testimony and the Soviet experience. Trotsky’s account of Stalin and the USSR must be treated as historical evidence produced by a political opponent, not as the neutral voice of the revolution. No faction automatically embodies history’s legitimacy.

But Trotsky then makes a leap that Marxism-Leninism should resist. To explain an action historically is not automatically to justify it morally, politically, or strategically. More importantly, necessity itself has to be demonstrated rather than simply invoked. An action may be historically explicable without being the only possible action; it may be unavoidable under one set of conditions while avoidable under another; it may solve an immediate problem while creating a more serious long-term problem; it may be undertaken with revolutionary intentions and yet produce consequences that weaken the revolutionary process. Historical materialism therefore requires distinctions between explanation, necessity, correctness, and consequence. Trotsky's language of revolutionary morality tends to compress these distinctions into the single category of what “serves the revolution”. This makes his framework rhetorically powerful but theoretically less precise than the scientific method he claims to defend.

And here the argument becomes particularly important when we turn to Trotsky's treatment of the Soviet experience. We should not accept Trotsky's historical interpretation simply because he was himself a Bolshevik revolutionary. His account of Stalin and the Soviet Union was produced by a political opponent who was deeply involved in the struggles that he later interpreted. That does not make everything Trotsky wrote false; neither does it make it true. It means that his testimony has to be treated as historical evidence rather than as the neutral voice of the revolution itself. This distinction is often forgotten because Trotsky's literary brilliance gives his historical judgments an extraordinary appearance of certainty. His political enemies become bureaucrats, reactionaries, usurpers, or traitors, while his own political tendency appears as the authentic continuation of Bolshevism. But historical materialism gives us no basis for granting one political faction the right to define itself as history's legitimate representative.

This is especially important because the later historiography of Stalin has been dominated by moral simplification. Domenico Losurdo’s work challenges the inherited “black legend” of Stalin. The article does not demand blind acceptance of Losurdo; it demands that materialists investigate conditions rather than replace history with the moral proposition that Stalin was simply a tyrant.

This is especially important because the later history of Stalin and the Soviet Union has been subjected to an enormous process of moral simplification. Trotsky was an important early contributor to the narrative that Stalin had somehow transformed the Bolshevik revolution into its opposite, and later anti-communist historiography expanded this interpretation into the much broader mythology of “Stalinism” as a uniquely monstrous political phenomenon. Domenico Losurdo's Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend is important precisely because it challenges this inherited framework. Losurdo does not simply ask whether Stalin was “good” or “bad”; he investigates how the historical image of Stalin itself was constructed, how the comparison between Stalin and Hitler became normalized, and how the Soviet experience was increasingly interpreted through categories that abstracted particular episodes from the wider historical context. The authorized English edition describes the project explicitly as an attempt to subject the widespread caricatures of Stalin to critical examination rather than simply accepting received representations.

This does not mean that every proposition in Losurdo's book must simply be accepted. It means that the burden of historical proof cannot be placed exclusively upon those who challenge the anti-Stalin narrative. If we claim to be materialists, then we must investigate the material conditions ourselves. We have to ask what kind of society the Soviet Union inherited, what devastation followed the First World War and Civil War, what the international position of the Soviet state was, what the problems of industrialisation and agricultural transformation actually involved, what internal political conflicts existed, what the Soviet leadership knew at particular moments, what alternatives were available, how state institutions functioned, and how external threats affected internal political decisions. We cannot replace this investigation with the moral proposition that Stalin was simply a tyrant who possessed unlimited freedom to choose between good and evil. That is precisely the kind of idealist history that Marxism was developed to overcome.

The next step is to apply Trotsky’s own contextualizing principle consistently. If civil war and foreign intervention contextualize Bolshevik coercion, the same method must contextualize the Stalin period: hostile capitalist powers, military threats, internal conflict, and rapid economic transformation. The article also notes historiographical contestation over 1937–38 and Grover Furr’s challenge to the standard narrative.

This is where Trotsky's own principle becomes useful against Trotsky. He insists that historical circumstances determine the meaning of political action. Fine. Then let us apply the principle consistently. If civil war, foreign intervention, economic collapse, and counter-revolutionary activity must be taken into account when evaluating the Bolshevik use of coercion, then the same material method must be applied to the Soviet state in the Stalin period. If the revolutionary government cannot be judged as though it were operating under peaceful parliamentary conditions, neither can the Soviet Union be judged as though it existed in a world without hostile capitalist powers, military threats, internal political conflict, and the enormous pressures of rapid economic transformation. Trotsky cannot demand historical contextualization for the actions he regards as revolutionary while simultaneously allowing his own political narrative to become the framework through which the actions of his opponents are interpreted.

This point becomes even more important in relation to the highly contested history of the 1930s. There is a substantial historiographical debate over the causes, character, and responsibility for the mass repressions of 1937–38, and it would be intellectually irresponsible simply to insert the conventional phrase “Stalin's Terror” into an essay as though that settles every question. Grover Furr's archival research, whatever disagreements one may have with his conclusions, explicitly challenges the standard anti-Stalin interpretation, and argues that primary-source evidence supports a more complicated account involving political opposition, military figures, and conflicts within the Party-state apparatus. We do not need to turn Furr into an infallible authority to recognise the significance of the challenge. The point is methodological: the historical agency behind these events cannot simply be presumed from the moral vocabulary inherited from Trotskyist, liberal or Cold War historiography. If the evidence is contested, then the historical question remains open to investigation. And once that is recognised, Trotsky's moral indictment loses the privileged status it has too often been granted.

Indeed, there is something deeply revealing in the way Trotsky's own moral framework functions here. He repeatedly tells us that revolutionary violence must be judged according to the concrete historical struggle, but when the Soviet leadership adopts policies that Trotsky opposes, the political struggle increasingly becomes a struggle between revolutionary morality and bureaucratic degeneration. The concrete institutional and social questions remain, but they are increasingly absorbed into a moral narrative. Trotsky is not merely arguing that a particular policy was mistaken; he is constructing an entire theory of political legitimacy in which his own conception of the revolution represents the authentic revolutionary tradition while the Stalin leadership represents its betrayal. Once that framework is established, subsequent historical evidence can easily be interpreted through it. If Stalin strengthens the Soviet state, this becomes bureaucratic consolidation; if the Soviet economy is transformed, it becomes forced industrialisation; if opponents are removed, it becomes terror; if the state survives enormous external pressures, the explanation becomes authoritarianism rather than the objective requirements of state survival. This is precisely what we should reject.

Stalin as a historical actor, not a moral monster or saint. The question is not “Was Stalin good or a monster?” but what concrete formation the USSR was, what contradictions it faced, and what it achieved—including industrial transformation and the defeat of Nazi Germany.

A Marxist-Leninist analysis of Stalin cannot begin with the question, “Was Stalin a good man?” Nor should it begin with the opposite question, “Was Stalin a monster?” Both questions are politically seductive and scientifically inadequate. We must begin with the Soviet Union as a concrete historical formation. We must examine the contradictions of a socialist state attempting to transform an overwhelmingly agrarian and economically backward society while facing a hostile international environment. We must examine the relationship between the peasantry and the state, the development of industry, the creation of a modern working class, the transformation of education and science, the development of Soviet state institutions, the national question, the struggle against internal political opposition, the changing international situation, and finally the gigantic confrontation with fascism. Only then can we begin to understand Stalin as a historical actor. And once we do so, the picture is necessarily more complicated than either the hagiographic Stalin of crude apologetics or the demonic Stalin of Trotskyist and liberal mythology.

What is particularly striking is that even hostile historical traditions have had difficulty completely erasing the magnitude of the transformation that occurred under Stalin's leadership. The Soviet Union entered the Stalin period as a predominantly agrarian and economically backward country and emerged as an industrial power capable of producing the military and economic capacity necessary to survive the Nazi invasion and ultimately defeat Nazi Germany. The Soviet victory over fascism cannot be reduced to a footnote in Stalin's biography. It was a world-historical event, and Stalin's role in the organisation and direction of the Soviet war effort cannot simply be dissolved into the word “dictator”. Losurdo's work insists upon precisely this historical dimension and challenges the tendency to isolate the most controversial aspects of Stalin's rule from the immense transformation of Soviet society and the geopolitical struggle in which it occurred. To acknowledge this does not require us to claim that every Soviet policy was flawless; it requires only that we stop pretending that historical judgement can be produced by selecting the darkest episodes and treating the rest of history as background noise.

Beyond “their morals” and “our morals”: party, legitimacy, and moral drama. The issue is not whose morality is better but whose historical understanding is more scientifically adequate. The article critiques Trotsky’s tendency to turn political defeat into evidence of moral degeneration and to make his faction the true embodiment of the revolution.

And this brings us back to the title of Trotsky's essay: Their Morals and Ours. The title itself reveals the fundamental problem. Trotsky presents the question as a conflict between two moralities: theirs, the morality of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois critics of revolution, and ours, the morality of the revolutionaries. But from a more developed Marxist-Leninist standpoint, the opposition should be formulated differently. The question is not simply whether our morality is better than theirs. The question is whether our understanding of history is more scientifically adequate than theirs. The bourgeois moralist sees isolated individuals and isolated actions and judges them according to abstract principles. The Trotskyist revolutionary moralist rejects bourgeois principles but can fall into the opposite danger of judging history through the standpoint of a particular revolutionary tendency. Marxism-Leninism must go beyond both.

This is why the phrase “the welfare of the revolution is the supreme law” is insufficient as a scientific principle. What revolution? Whose conception of the revolution? At what stage? Under what conditions? What class forces are actually capable of carrying it forward? What institutions are necessary to preserve the gains already achieved? What compromises are temporary necessities and what compromises transform the character of the state? What forms of coercion defend socialist construction and what forms undermine it? What political conflicts represent genuine class antagonisms and what conflicts represent factional, personal, or organisational struggles? These questions cannot be answered by repeating “the revolution”. They require concrete analysis.

This is also why the Marxist-Leninist conception of the party is fundamentally different from the Trotskyist tendency to turn political legitimacy into a moral question. The Communist Party is not sacred because it calls itself revolutionary. It is an instrument of the working class, and its correctness must be demonstrated through its ability to analyse reality, organise the masses, defend the revolutionary state, correct its errors, and advance the socialist transformation. Democratic centralism, properly understood, is not the worship of leadership; it is the combination of collective discussion, political unity, discipline, and the capacity to act. The leadership can make mistakes, and those mistakes must be investigated. But the answer to mistakes is not to construct an alternative moral tribunal from which an expelled or defeated faction declares itself the true embodiment of the revolution. The answer is to examine the concrete conditions, the political line, the class forces, and the consequences of policy.

Trotsky's conception has difficulty here because his own political history becomes inseparable from his theory of revolutionary morality. The question of who is the legitimate representative of Bolshevism becomes a moral question, and the political defeat of Trotsky's faction becomes evidence of the supposed moral degeneration of the victorious leadership. But political defeat does not prove historical illegitimacy, just as political victory does not prove theoretical correctness. History is not a court in which the faction that loses automatically becomes the martyr and the faction that wins automatically becomes the criminal. Such a conception belongs more naturally to political mythology than to historical materialism.

The irony of Trotsky’s moral drama and the need for sympathetic contextualization. Trotsky’s history can become a moral drama of purity, betrayal, and fidelity. Being sympathetic to Stalin means refusing the black legend as the default framework—not closing one’s eyes to errors or abuses.

There is therefore a profound irony in Their Morals and Ours. Trotsky attacks the moralists for judging revolutionaries according to standards detached from historical reality, yet his own historical interpretation of the Soviet Union can become precisely such a moral drama. The revolutionary state becomes a protagonist that has betrayed its original purity; Stalin becomes the embodiment of bureaucratic degeneration; Trotsky becomes the custodian of authentic revolutionary morality. The complexity of history is thereby organised around a dramatic opposition between betrayal and fidelity. This is powerful literature, but Marxist analysis must demand more.

And this is where the sympathetic attitude towards Stalin that we should adopt is not merely a matter of personal political preference. It follows from our refusal to accept the black legend as the default historical framework. To be sympathetic towards Stalin does not mean that we have to close our eyes to contradictions, errors, or abuses. It means that we recognise that Stalin was a communist leader operating within an extraordinarily difficult historical conjuncture and that his political record has been subjected to an exceptional degree of moralization and decontextualization. Losurdo's work is valuable precisely because it challenges the assumption that the standard image of Stalin is simply the neutral result of historical research. The English edition itself describes the project as an effort to challenge the widespread caricature of Stalin and to return the question to historical and philosophical examination.

This requires careful language and concrete historical questions.

Labels versus investigation. Phrases like “Stalin’s terror” or “Stalin’s purges” cannot do the work of analysis. The article insists on asking who initiated what, which institutions acted, what evidence exists, and how the international situation mattered. Trotsky’s accusations are political documents, not historical verdicts.

We should therefore be careful with the language we use. We should not casually repeat expressions such as “Stalin's repression”, “Stalin's terror” or “Stalin's purges” as though these formulations themselves constitute explanations. Sometimes they may be useful shorthand after the underlying historical question has been established, but they cannot be allowed to do the work of historical analysis. Who initiated what? Who opposed what? Which institutions were involved? What were the stated objectives? What evidence survives? What evidence has been suppressed, distorted, or interpreted selectively? What was Stalin's actual position in each episode? What did other members of the leadership do? What did the security apparatus do? What did local authorities do? What did the opposition do? What did foreign intelligence services do? What did the international situation look like? These are the questions that must be answered before we attach a simple personal label to a complex historical process.

The same principle applies to the famine question, collectivisation, the Moscow trials, the Gulag, the national question, and the various political struggles of the 1930s. We do not have to settle every one of these enormous historical debates inside an essay on Trotsky's moral philosophy. In fact, doing so would distract from our central purpose. What we must insist upon is that Trotsky does not get to settle them for us. His interpretation is evidence, not scripture. His accusations are political documents, not historical verdicts. His moral language is part of the struggle itself and must therefore be analysed as such.

This prepares the final methodological statement: materialism is proven by method, not by calling one’s morality revolutionary.

Materialist method turned against Trotsky; final conclusion. The real alternative to Trotsky is not bourgeois morality but Marxism-Leninism as concrete historical analysis. The article rejects both liberal moralism and Trotskyist moralism, refuses the “Stalinism” label as a substitute for explanation, and concludes that Trotsky must become an object of Marxist criticism rather than the moral judge of Soviet history.

This is ultimately where Trotsky's conception of revolutionary morality becomes most vulnerable. A genuinely materialist revolutionary does not need to proclaim himself morally superior to the bourgeoisie, nor does he need to construct a sacred category called “the revolution” through which every action can be justified. He needs to understand reality. He needs to understand the objective conditions within which people act. He needs to understand class forces, institutions, productive forces, political consciousness, and the international balance of power. He needs to distinguish between what is possible and what is desirable, between immediate necessity and long-term strategy, between political victory and socialist development. Above all, he needs the intellectual humility to recognise that history is not obliged to confirm the self-image of any revolutionary faction.

And perhaps this is the greatest lesson we can draw from Trotsky's essay. The revolutionary does not become more materialist merely by calling his morality revolutionary. Materialism is demonstrated by the method through which one investigates reality. If Trotsky condemns bourgeois moralists for abstracting individual actions from their historical circumstances, then we must apply the same standard to Trotsky. If he insists that revolutionary violence must be understood in relation to the conditions of civil war, we must apply that principle to the Soviet state as well. If he says that the slave's violence cannot be judged by the same standard as the slaveholder's violence, then we must refuse to judge the Soviet Union as though it existed outside the international system of imperialism, war, and capitalist encirclement. If he tells us that political morality must be connected to the objective historical struggle, then we must ask whether the Soviet leadership's policies strengthened or weakened the material basis of socialism rather than merely asking whether Trotsky approved of them.

In this sense, the real alternative to Trotsky is not bourgeois morality. It is not pacifism, liberalism, or the abstract doctrine that all political violence is equally evil. Nor is it the childish slogan that everything done by a communist government is automatically correct. The real alternative is Marxism-Leninism as a method of concrete historical analysis. It allows us to defend revolutionary violence when it is historically necessary without turning violence into a virtue; to defend the Soviet state without pretending that every decision was perfect; to defend Stalin against the black legend without making him infallible; to recognise political errors without accepting the Trotskyist interpretation of Soviet history; and to understand revolutionary morality itself as a historical product rather than as a sacred code.

This is why, in the final analysis, Their Morals and Ours should perhaps be turned around against its author. Trotsky asks us to choose between “their morals” and “ours”. But the Marxist-Leninist answer is that history cannot be reduced to competing moralities. The bourgeoisie has its ideology, the proletariat has its class consciousness, revolutionary parties have their programmes and political lines, and different historical forces struggle over the direction of society. But the correctness of a political line cannot be established merely by proclaiming its revolutionary morality. It must be tested against reality.

Trotsky's great weakness is therefore not that he takes the revolution too seriously. He takes it seriously in the wrong theoretical form. He transforms the revolution from a historically conditioned process into a supreme moral criterion, and then places his own political interpretation of that revolution at the centre of judgement. From this standpoint, Stalin is condemned not merely because of particular policies but because Stalinism is declared to be a betrayal of the revolutionary essence that Trotsky claims to represent. Once the premise is accepted, the conclusion is almost guaranteed. But once the premise itself is subjected to materialist criticism, the certainty begins to disappear.

Stalin, by contrast, has to be understood not as the abstract opposite of Trotsky but as a historical leader operating within the concrete problem of building and defending a socialist state under extraordinarily difficult conditions. His significance cannot be separated from the transformation of Soviet society, the development of industrial capacity, the consolidation of Soviet state power, the struggle over the direction of socialist construction and, above all, the defeat of Nazi Germany. This does not make every Soviet policy automatically correct; it makes Stalin a historical figure whose achievements, errors, contradictions, and decisions must be understood together. The very fact that Losurdo's intervention has been necessary to challenge the demonological representation of Stalin tells us something important about how thoroughly moral categories have dominated the historiography.

And perhaps that is the most ironic outcome of our reading of Trotsky. The man who wanted to liberate revolutionary politics from abstract morality ultimately left behind a political tradition in which the word “Stalinism” itself became almost a moral category, requiring no further historical explanation. Once something is labelled “Stalinist”, the investigation seems finished. The label explains the crime before the crime has even been examined. It identifies the villain before the evidence has been considered. It transforms political disagreement into moral condemnation. It does exactly what historical materialism should teach us not to do.

We should therefore reject both the liberal moralist and the Trotskyist moralist. We do not need to say that Stalin was perfect. We do not need to say that the Soviet Union was free of contradictions. We do not need to deny difficult historical questions. What we need to reject is the lazy assumption that these questions have already been answered by Trotsky's political narrative. We should approach Stalin with the same materialist seriousness with which Trotsky demands that we approach the revolutionary violence of 1919. We should ask what the Soviet leadership faced, what it attempted, what it achieved, what it failed to achieve, what its enemies attempted, what alternatives existed, and what the evidence actually tells us.

Then the question “Their Morals and Ours?” acquires a very different meaning.

Our task is not to construct a morality superior to Trotsky's. Our task is to overcome Trotsky's moralization of revolutionary history.

The proletarian revolution does not need saints, and it certainly does not need Trotskyist saints. It needs historical understanding. It needs organisation. It needs discipline and criticism. It needs the ability to distinguish genuine class enemies from political opponents, temporary necessity from permanent principle, strategic retreat from capitulation, and historical achievement from political failure. Above all, it needs the courage to study its own history without accepting the categories supplied by its enemies.

Trotsky wanted to tell us that the welfare of the revolution is the supreme law. We should answer that the revolution itself is not a moral abstraction. It is a concrete historical process, and those who claim to represent it must themselves be judged by history, by material reality and by the consequences of their political practice.

That is why we do not need Trotsky's “revolutionary morality” to defend the October Revolution, the Soviet Union or Stalin. We need something much more demanding: the materialist method of Marxism-Leninism. And once we apply that method consistently, Trotsky no longer stands above Soviet history as its moral judge. He becomes one of its historical actors, and therefore, like everyone else, an object of Marxist criticism.

The article moves from granting Trotsky’s materialist insights, to exposing his revolutionary moralism, to applying materialist method consistently to Stalin and the USSR.

Powered by Blogger.