Stalin, Soviets and İsraeli Question - then and now -14 - Position of Jews
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN D. LIFSHITS
October 14, 1948
Secret
Today at 4 o'clock I met with Shertok and Lifshitz to clarify the position of the Jews regarding the Bernadotte plan in view of the upcoming discussion of this plan by the General Assembly.
Shertok first outlined the position of the Jewish state.
Bernadotte's plan, he said, is unacceptable to Jews. It is not completely unacceptable, since its points such as the recognition of the existence of Israel and some others are acceptable. The main thing that the Jews cannot agree with is the proposal to deprive the Jewish state of the Negev region. This point in Bernadotte's plan is an attempt to destroy all the original plans of the General Assembly. Shertok said that at the meetings of the General Assembly they will state detailed reasons why they cannot agree to the concession of the Negev to the Arabs (economic reasons, access to the Dead and Red Seas, etc.).
On the issue of Jerusalem, Shertok said that the Jews would be ready to accept an international statute, but bitter experience has shown the impracticability of this statute. The fact is that in order to ensure its international statute, there must be troops in Jerusalem, which could at any time protect the city and its population. However, in the current conditions, one cannot count on the creation of an international army for Jerusalem. In any case, now it will be practically impossible to implement it. But even if such an army had been created, the Jews are now unlikely to agree to rely on it, as well as on any foreign army in general. The Jews think to declare at the Assembly that they themselves will defend themselves, as they rely more on their own strength. Jews cannot rely on an international army, if one would have been created, also because at the current tense moment in the event of any international crisis, which is quite possible, the Arabs can easily take advantage of this and take Jerusalem into their own hands, since the international army in Jerusalem would then be powerless and hardly capable or willing to defend the Jewish population of Jerusalem. Therefore, Jews cannot rely on an international statute. In addition, the Jews are against the international statute for Jerusalem for other reasons. Previously, they agreed with the establishment of an international statute in Jerusalem, because in the resolution contained in the resolution of 29.XI. 48, the plan for the partition of Palestine, all the elements of this plan were organically linked, namely: the plan provided for - a) the creation of an independent Arab state, 6) the creation of an independent Jewish state and c) the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem. All three elements of Palestine were united into a single economic whole through the establishment of an economic union of Palestine, which includes the Arab state, the Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem. But since now the Economic Union is not feasible and this issue has disappeared, this circumstance undermines the entire financial basis for the international regime of the city of Jerusalem, because, as you know, in the decision on the economic union, it was envisaged that from 5 to 10% of the net income of the Arab and Jewish states had to go to the needs of the city of Jerusalem. Without additional funds, the City of Jerusalem is unable to maintain its municipal services and urban development. Now that the idea of an economic union has disappeared, it is not clear who will bear these costs. “We believe,” Shertok said, “that it is necessary to review this plan of the international regime for Jerusalem and adapt it to suit the given situation.”
Shertok went on to outline his revised plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem. He said that it would be possible to limit the international regime to the tricks of the Old City, that is, that part of the city that is surrounded by walls, and this border could even be slightly expanded to include, for example, the Garden of Gethsemane, and the New City would be included in territory of Israel. There would be an Israeli garrison in the Jewish part of the city. The Old City could be further delimited by granting autonomy to the Arab, Jewish and Christian communities. International control over the Old City is considered by the Jews to be obligatory and, in the opinion of the Jews, even handing over part of the New City to the Arabs would be a lesser evil than handing over the entire Old City to them. Shertok went on to say that they still have not responded to the American proposal for the establishment of an Arab-Jewish guardianship over Jerusalem. They are still studying the American proposal. This proposal, according to Shertok, preserves the framework of the international regime in Jerusalem, since the supreme body of supervision and control over the entire city would be the Trusteeship Council, and in fact, both communities - Arab and Jewish - would be masters - each over its own part of the city. Shertok said that the Americans did not fully clarify their plan, but Eban understood them so that not only the Arab part of the New City, but also the Old City should be included as a trust territory of the Arabs. This would be completely unacceptable for Jews. “However,” Shertok said, “in the worst case scenario, they will be ready to consider this proposal, but they themselves will not put forward it. As for the Americans, they may put forward this proposal in the Assembly.
Referring to the Jewish plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem, Lifshits noted that in this plan the main idea of establishing international control over Jerusalem remains and in this part their plan does not contradict the UN decision, but the Jews now only propose to limit the boundaries of the Jerusalem zone to a narrower territory, that is, only to the Old City and its Holy Places.
Shertok further dwelt on the need to establish a territorial connection between Jerusalem and the territory of Israel, stating that the ongoing war fully proved this necessity. If the Jews did not defend the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem route with all their might, the city would be doomed to death or would have to submit to the Arabs, the Jews would not be able to send reinforcements to their units that fought in Jerusalem, and the city's Jewish population would be completely cut off. Regarding the width of the corridor or zone leading to Jerusalem, Shertok said that this zone should include in its western part the strategic heights for which the fighting took place and which ensure the safety of the path and water supply. Closer to Jerusalem, this zone can be narrowed down to 2-3 kilometers. Shertok said that on the route of this corridor of 4 water pumping stations - 3 are in the hands of Jews and only the station in Latrun is still controlled by the Arabs, since the Arab position dominates over Latrun, strongly fortified by British sappers. The length of the proposed corridor will be approximately 40-45 km.
When I told Shertok about a message from Berne about negotiations allegedly taking place between Jews and Egypt regarding the division of the Negev into the northern (Jewish part) and the southern, which would be under the Jewish-Egyptian condominium (published in Fran-Tirer, from 12 .X. 48), Shertok denied these rumors, but confirmed that Egypt is one of the opponents of the transfer of the Negev to Transjordan, since. this transfer is tantamount to handing over the Negev to the British and would negate all their efforts to bring about the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt.
On the issue of Haifa and Lydda, Shertok reaffirmed Israel's already well-known position that Israel will not limit its sovereignty. Haifa is an Israeli port and should remain so, although Israel can declare its readiness to negotiate with the Arab states on granting them port privileges (free zone) in Haifa on a reciprocal basis. “This reciprocity,” Shertok said, “must be understood in a broad sense, that is, Jews may ask in exchange not necessarily for port privileges in Arab ports, but for any other privileges,>. Shertok categorically stated that there could be no question of imposing restrictions on their sovereignty over Haifa and Lydda on them, even on behalf of the UN or some other international body. Regarding the Lydda airfield, which is in the hands of the Jews (the city of Lydda among the Arabs), Shertok noted that they could grant, for example, Iraq the right to free air traffic through the Lydda airfield, if Iraq, in turn, gives the Jews the same right in relation to their territory. The issue of Haifa and Lydda may thus be the subject of a mutual agreement between Israel and other Arab states, but a solution to this issue cannot be imposed on Israel.
When I asked about Jaffa, Shertok said that this city was almost completely abandoned by the Arabs and was in the hands of the Jews, and the Arab enclave, which was planned according to the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, actually does not exist.
“The question of Galileo,” Shertok continued, “they do not intend to put forward, since the Jews already have it in their hands,>. Section plan dated 29.XI. 47 is, as Shertok said, their starting point, but they want to make some adjustments to it. Shertok recalled that even then, in November 1947, he declared at the Assembly that this plan was the minimum for Jews. If then the Arabs expressed their readiness to peacefully cooperate with the Jews, the Jews would not have proposed any changes, but the Arabs declared war on this plan, and thereby destroyed one of the prerequisites of the entire plan. The whole plan was based on its mandatory peaceful implementation. But as in the given conditions, after the invasion of Arab troops, one can agree on the boundaries that are provided for in this plan, when the Jewish territory cuts into the Arab, and the Arab into the Jewish. If the Jews now accepted these boundaries, they would be impossible to defend. Since, instead of peaceful coexistence with the Arabs, Israel had to defend its borders, there is a need for some changes to the border lines, which is provided for in the resolution of November 29.
From the words of Shertok it was clear that the Jews with all their might will defend the preservation of the Western Galilee. He gave a number of other arguments in defense of this position. He said that the Negev cannot be cut off from the territory of Israel, since the Jewish state was created and exists within the boundaries determined for it by the decision of November 29. “As for the Western Galilee,” Shertok said, “the Jews do not take this territory away from the Arab state in Palestine, as it does not yet exist,”. The Arabs, in accordance with the resolution of November 29, 1947, should have shown their readiness to create their own state, but this did not happen.
I noticed that this does not mean that an Arab state will not be created in Palestine either, and if it is created, then, apparently, the borders of this state should be secured in the form they were outlined in the resolution of the General Assembly. Shertok replied that if an Arab state arises tomorrow, they will be ready to enter into negotiations with him on this issue. However, Shertok immediately added that Western Galilee, as the experience of the war showed, is necessary for the Jews in order for their state to be viable and able to defend itself. In addition, the Arabs, in his opinion, must pay some price for their attempt to thwart the UN decision to partition Palestine. He reiterated that since the economic union was non-existent, maintaining the old borders is simply unthinkable. “If the Arabs agree to negotiate with the Jews,” Shertok said, “then they, the Jews, will be able to concede something to them. Now, - said Shertok, - the Jews are actually conducting a discussion in conditions of war. For Jews, there are three possible outcomes:
1. If the war continues, everything will have to be decided by the war. Then the Jews may be able to conquer all of Palestine (up to Jordan).
2. If a new UN decision is adopted, Israel will defend its right to Galilee as the position it needs for defense.
3. If full agreement is reached with the Arabs, the Jews will be ready to make concessions to the Arabs in order to get a real lasting peace.
Summarizing this issue, Shertok said that if this could be avoided, the Jews will not specifically raise the issue of Galilee now, but will declare that they remain supporters of the General Assembly resolution of November 29 on the partition of Palestine, but with certain amendments, having in view of Galilee, Jaffa, Jerusalem and the corridor to Jerusalem.
He also stated that the Jews would undoubtedly prefer the creation of a separate independent Arab State, rather than annexing the Arab territory of Palestine to Transjordan.
Schertok further referred to Bernadotte's proposal for the creation of a wide demilitarized zone and for demobilization. Israel is opposed to these proposals, because if they were accepted, it would be placed at a disadvantage compared to the Arabs. He said that accepting these proposals would establish "false," equality, since if the Arabs only withdraw the troops, and do not demobilize them, a potential threat to Israel remains. At the same time, if the Jews are required to demobilize, this will deprive them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The same applies to the demilitarized zone. The Arabs, withdrawing their troops, would not lose anything, and the Jews would have to cede their territory.
Shertok said they would insist on the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine and believe it necessary for the Security Council to take action to prevent further incursions and renewed hostilities in Palestine.
Shertok said that he is not against the guarantee of the borders by the United Nations, but only if these borders are acceptable to Israel. If Bernadotte's plan is accepted, the Jews will object to any such assurances. Bernadotte's proposal for a UN guarantee of the boundaries outlined in his plan is absolutely unacceptable to Jews.
Shertok further said that the Jews would not mind the establishment of a commission to help the peace negotiations, but he would be against a commission that would interfere in these negotiations and try to control or interfere in internal affairs. The Commission should play only a supportive role: to contribute to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere, to induce the parties to an agreement, to offer a compromise, etc. This commission would state the facts and report to the UN on the progress and success of the negotiations.
Shertok also expressed his opinion about the uselessness and inexpediency of the further existence of the institution of a mediator.
Shertok concluded by saying that it might be acceptable for them to resume the activities of the Palestinian Commission, created in accordance with the resolution of November 29, 47, which could replace the existing mediator and the armistice commission, but they have not yet thought through this issue properly ...
On October 15, a member of the Jewish delegation, Lifshits, told me that they were discussing among themselves the question of a possible resumption of the activities of the Palestinian Commission. They have not yet come to a definite opinion on this issue, but they are confused by the composition of the Palestinian Commission, in which the Dane held an anti-Jewish position and the terms of reference of the Commission, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947.
They believe that the terms of reference of the Commission are too broad, and they fear that this Commission would not interfere in the affairs of the Jewish state, which they cannot allow. In general, the impression is that although the Jews have not yet defined their attitude to the possibility of resuming the activities of the Palestinian Commission, they clearly do not like this Commission.
S. Tsarapkin
WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39.L. 70-80.
NOTE "PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE POSITION OF JEWS IN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION "
October 16, 1948
Secret
The Jews have not yet finalized their position on the Palestinian issue.
From conversations with Shertok, we found out the following.
1. The Jews declare that they will take the position of the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, but consider it necessary to make some changes to these decisions.
2. The Jews are positive about our proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine and consider it the main condition that can ensure peace in Palestine.
Jews are also in favor of the Security Council taking appropriate measures to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Palestine.
Jews are in favor of conducting peace negotiations directly between the parties concerned.
3. Regarding point "B" of Bernadotte's proposals - the Jews are categorically against the rejection of the Negev region, but for the inclusion of the Western Galilee in the Jewish state.
4. With regard to point “C”, the Jews are evasively claiming that they would certainly prefer an Arab state to be created in the Arab part of Palestine, but it does not exist.
From conversations with Jews who are not part of their delegation at the Assembly session, it turns out that Shertok himself and most of the members of the Israeli government would allegedly prefer to come to an agreement with Abdallah Transjordan and, through their consent to transfer the Arab territories of Palestine to him, not only keep the Jewish state of the Negev , but also to include Western Galilee and Jaffa in Israel, and to achieve a solution in their favor also the issue of Jerusalem and the corridor between Jerusalem and the main part of the Jewish state.
5. On point "d" of Bernadotte's proposals, the position of the Jews basically coincides with our proposal. They are opposed to any guarantees from the UN of the borders of the Jewish state that Bernadotte is proposing; but they are not opposed to such guarantees if a border decision is made that satisfies the Jews.
6. The position of the Jews on the issue of Haifa and Lydda (points "e" and "f" of Bernadotte) basically coincides with our proposal. They will oppose any limitation of Jewish sovereignty, but they will be ready, on the basis of reciprocity, to enter into direct negotiations with the interested parties on these issues.
7. On the issue of Jerusalem (points "g" and "1" of Bernadotte), the Jews will insist on:
a) the incorporation of the New City into the Jewish state,
b) To bring the Old City under international control in order to ensure the protection of the holy places and with the granting of autonomy to the Jewish, Arab and Christian communities of the Old City.
As a second position of the Jews, it is possible that they will agree with the unofficial proposal of the Americans to establish custody of the Jewish and Arab states over Jerusalem under the control of the Trusteeship Council.
8. The Jews will insist on providing them with a corridor to connect Jerusalem with the main part of the Jewish state.
The Jews argue all their demands regarding territorial changes by the fact that the borders established for the Jewish state according to the resolution of November 29, could be acceptable to them only if after the adoption of the resolution everything would go peacefully, the Jewish state was not subjected to attack and an economic union of the Jewish and Arab states and Jerusalem would be established. But there is no peace in Palestine, and the economic union has proved impracticable. Since the border line, as outlined in the November 29 resolution, cannot be defended, it must be corrected for defense reasons.
9. On the issue of Arab refugees (point "i" of Bernadotte's proposals), the Jews believe that this issue should be discussed during peace negotiations with the Arabs. Now, when the Jewish state is in a state of war, the Jews cannot give any guarantees for the settlement of this problem.
10. The Jews would not object to the institution envisaged in paragraph "K" of Bernadotte's proposals to the Palestinian Conciliation Commission, provided that the functions of this Commission would be of a purely advisory nature, without any rights that would allow it to interfere in the affairs of the Jewish state or limit its sovereignty.
With regard to the institution of the Mediator and the Palestinian Armistice Commission, 1 the Jews would consider it expedient to abolish both.
11. The question of the resumption of the activities of the Palestinian Commission, established by the decision of the General Assembly on November 29, is reserved by Jews. They are not satisfied with the composition of this Commission and are confused by its terms of reference. Jews believe that the Commission's terms of reference are too broad. They fear that this Commission might interfere in the affairs of the Jewish state, which they cannot allow.
OFFERS (in addition to the offers already presented)
1. In contrast to both the proposal of Bernadotte, which provides for the possible transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan, and the illegally created in Gaza (an Arab city in the southwestern part of Palestine by the Mediterranean Sea) to the all-Palestinian Arab government2, which declared the creation of a single independent state throughout the territory of Palestine, we it is necessary to insist on the urgent implementation of the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 in the part concerning the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine within the limits determined by the said resolution.
2. Concerning Jerusalem.
Considering that according to the resolution of November 29, Jerusalem should be governed on behalf of the UN by the governor, endowed with full powers, including the right to veto the laws that are passed and the conduct of foreign affairs.
Considering that in order to maintain law and order in the city, the governor is given the right to organize special police units, which will be recruited outside Palestine and in the size that the governor himself determines, and that, thus, through the governor, full control over Jerusalem will actually be in the hands USA and England.
Taking into account also that the question of the Palestine Economic Union disappeared, and therefore the city of Jerusalem, which was to become a part of this Union and, as its member, had to receive in its favor from the Jewish and Arab states from 5 to 10% of net income of these states, has lost its financial base.
It would be advisable to support the demand of the Jews to include the New City, where there are no “holy places,” in the Jewish state, but not the entire New City, as the Jews demand, but only a part populated by Jews. To include the Arab part of the New City into the Arab state of Palestine.
Above the Old City, where the "holy places" of Christians, Jews and Muslims are mainly concentrated, and some other adjacent places (the Garden of Gethsemane, etc.), to establish, in order to protect the "holy places," a special international regime under the supervision of UN. At the same time, provide for the granting of broad autonomy to the Arab, Jewish and Christian communities of the Old City.
3. With the support of the demand of the Jews to provide them with a "corridor" for the connection of Jerusalem with the main part of the Jewish state not to act. Instead, the decision should include a general provision guaranteeing full freedom to enter and live in the city.
4. On the issue of Arab refugees (clause "i" of Bernadotte's proposals), it would be considered possible to support the Jewish proposal that this issue be settled between Jews and Arabs during peace negotiations as part of a peace settlement.
5. We consider it expedient that the issue of guaranteeing the political, economic, social and religious rights of Arabs on the territory of the Jewish state, and Jews on the Arab territory of Palestine (paragraph "F" of Bernadotte's proposals) should also be settled directly between Jews and Arabs during peace negotiations ...
6. With regard to the resumption of the activities of the Palestinian Commission, established by the resolution of November 29, 1947, it would be advisable to make this proposal if the proposal for the immediate creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine, as well as the proposal for withdrawal from Palestinian foreign troops and foreign military personnel. Bearing in mind our proposals set out above in paragraphs 4 and 5, we believe it expedient not to entrust the settlement of the problem of Arab refugees and the problem of the rights of national minorities to the Palestinian Commission.
WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39.L. 81-86.
Translated From Russian; Svitlana M
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