Stalin, Soviets and İsraeli Question - then and now - 13 - Additional Secret Documents
FROM THE NOTE OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA " CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS ON THE REPORT OF THE UN MEDIATOR IN PALESTINE, BERNADOTTA "
October 1, 1948
[...] 111. Conclusions on the proposals contained in the Bernadotte report Bernadotte's latest proposals are basically a reiteration of his proposals submitted on June 27 to Arabs and Jews, which were then rejected by both sides. The difference between the current proposals of Bernadotte lies only in the fact that in them he refused to create a united state of Transjordan and Palestine in the form of an alliance, one of whose members is the Arab state of Transjordan, which includes the entire Arab territory of Palestine and the other member is the Jewish state of Israel. Bernadotte's latest proposals, as well as those of June 27, conflict with the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. This applies in particular to the issue of boundaries. According to the November 29 resolution, the Negev region should be almost entirely part of the Jewish state. Bernadotte proposes to transfer the entire territory of the Negev, which makes up more than 2/3 of the Jewish state, to the Arabs. If we take into account the reservation contained in paragraph 4 "C" (special conclusions) of Bernadotte's report, it turns out that the entire Arab territory of Palestine, including the Negev, should go to Transjordan, and as compensation to the Jews for the loss of the Negev Bernadotte proposes to hand over to them the tiny territory of the Western Galilee. This proposal by Bernadotte is clearly calculated not only to further incite hostility and border clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, but also between the Arab states themselves. This will inevitably lead to the implementation of Bernadotte's recommendation to merge the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, "subject to such corrections of the borders with other Arab states, which may be considered practically possible and desirable."
The proposals in Bernadotte's latest report are fundamentally unacceptable for the following reasons:
1. They provide for the revision of the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 in the most important part - in relation to the border between the Jewish and Arab territories.
2. If the General Assembly resolution of November 29 last year provides for the creation in Palestine of two independent states - a Jewish and an Arab, then Bernadotte's proposals run counter to this resolution and essentially mean the transfer of 4/5 of the Palestinian territory to Transjordan, i.e. under the full control of the British and the refusal, to please the Anglo-Americans, from the creation of an Arab independent state in Palestine within the limits determined by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947.
3. The latest proposals of Bernadotte are not drawn up taking into account the interests of the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine, but in the interests of third countries (Anglo-Americans and the English puppet - Transjordan) and are able to further confuse the issue and cause even greater tension between Jews and Arabs, and between Arab states.
IV. suggestions
1. For the reasons set out in the previous section 111, we consider it appropriate, when discussing Bernadotte's report in the General Assembly, to vote against this report and insist on the implementation of the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947. In putting forward this proposal, we should point out that life has confirmed the correctness of this resolution and that, despite the political play of some states, intrigues and bloody provocations aimed at disrupting the General Assembly's decision on Palestine, this resolution is nevertheless implemented in one of the most significant its parts and the Jewish state on the territory of Palestine has been created and is successfully functioning.
2. Insist that the territory of the Jewish state, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, not be changed without the consent of the State of Israel.
3. To insist on the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 in the part concerning the creation on the territory of Palestine also of an independent Arab state within the limits established by the said resolution.
4. To object categorically to attempts to transfer, as proposed by Bernadotte, the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan.
5. To insist on the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly of November 29 regarding the establishment of a special international statute for Jerusalem.
To invite the Trusteeship Council to submit for consideration by the General Assembly at this session the draft statute of the City of Jerusalem it has developed.
The Israeli government's proposal to include Jerusalem in the Jewish state is unacceptable to us, and not to support it.
6. Support the proposal of the Jews to ensure freedom of communication by land and railways, as well as by air, between Jerusalem and the coastal territories of Israel.
7. Support the proposal in the Bernadotte report to replace the current state of indefinite truce in Palestine with formal peace.
If the proposal by the Interim Government of Israel that peace be concluded through a formal agreement between the disputing parties fails, then it is proposed that a peace agreement be concluded through the United Nations Security Council and its Palestinian Commission.
8. With regard to the settlement of the Arab refugee problem, we would consider it appropriate to propose that this issue be settled through direct negotiations between the parties concerned, that is, between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Arab State in Palestine.
9. To propose that the Palestinian Commission, established by resolution 181 (P) of November 29, 1947, and which by General Assembly resolution 186 (S. 2) of May 14, 1948 was relieved of its duties, resume its activities ...
To entrust this Commission with the task of demarcating the borders of the State of Israel in accordance with Part II of General Assembly resolution 181 (P) of November 29, 1947, as well as carrying out, together with the Trusteeship Council, the necessary measures to bring into force the statute of the City of Jerusalem. In carrying out the task of demarcating the border of the State of Israel, the Commission may, with the consent of both parties concerned (Jews and Arabs of Palestine), make some minor changes to the border, taking into account the actual changes that have taken place in Palestine.
With regard to possible other functions and powers of the Palestinian Commission, this issue can be considered further when and if the need arises.
WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39.L. 38, 46-50.
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE ATTORNEY OF THE USSR AFFAIRS IN SYRIA I.A. ISAGULOVA WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA OF SYRIA I. ISTUANI
October 4, 1948
Secret
As it was agreed at a reception at the French envoy, Ibrahim Istuani, director of the political department of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, arrived at our mission today. The initiative for the meeting came from the latter, who repeatedly expressed a desire to pay me a visit, but each time postponed it because of "excessive work,".
From what Istuani said during the conversation with him, the following deserves attention:
1. The trip of Syrian Foreign Minister Mohsen Barazi to Cairo is caused by the position of the Transjordanian King Abdullah towards the Palestinian government. Barazi will consult with the Egyptian prime minister on this matter and will probably take advantage of Iraqi Prime Minister Pachachi's stay in Cairo to find out the point of view of their governments on this issue. Istuani allegedly does not have detailed information about the results of these negotiations, however, he said, it is known that Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq support Syria's point of view towards the Palestinian government.
In this regard, Istuani, as in previous meetings with me, again spread about the position of the great powers and, in particular, the Soviet Union on the Palestinian issue, and in his reasoning came to the conclusion that to hope for the United States or the Soviet Union for a favorable solution the Palestinian question no longer exists and there remains only a small hope on the part of the British. However, he declined to answer what he had in mind.
Note. Syrian Foreign Minister Mohsen Barazi September 26 left for Cairo, and expect his return only today.
Istuani's message that this trip by Barazi was caused by the position of the Transjordanian king towards the newly formed Palestinian government is true. Syria, like no other Arab country, is interested in preserving the integrity of Palestine, since its division and Bernadotte's project on the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan is viewed by it as an immediate threat to the existence of republican Syria. Therefore, it is making every effort to convince Cairo and Baghdad of the danger of the position of the Transjordanian king and to prevent the implementation of such a project of partition of Palestine, which could strengthen Transjordan.
According to official statements, Barazi's mission to Cairo was crowned with success. However, the fact that not a single Arab country, including Syria, has so far officially recognized the Palestinian government indicates that the British are seriously hindering this.
2. Turning to the question of how thorough the reports of a number of Syrian newspapers are about the steps taken by certain circles to create the Eastern Bloc, Istuani - without denying that such negotiations are being held between representatives of the countries of the Middle East - said that Syria voluntarily will not agree to participate in any bloc unless force is used. At the same time, he made a reservation that he does not mean the action of the armed force, but any other possible pressure that may be exerted on Syria.
Note. In recent days, almost all Syrian newspapers have reported new Anglo-American maneuvers to form the Mediterranean or Eastern Bloc. At the same time, they refer to the talks allegedly currently underway in Paris between representatives of the Middle East with representatives of Greece and Turkey on the initiative of the latter.
According to our information, the Anglo-Saxons offered the Arab countries to accept the terms of "aid," according to the Marshall plan, if these countries agree to conclude a regional alliance providing for the conditions of joint defense, the unification of weapons and close political and economic cooperation of the countries of this alliance, but that in particular Egypt, Syria and Lebanon have so far refrained from discussing these proposals.
Characteristic in Istuani's statement in this regard is that he no longer denies, as before, the possibility of such an alliance of Arab countries and Syria's participation in it, but only tries to justify Syria's entry into such an alliance by "action of force."
Charge d'Affaires of the IA. Isagulov
WUA RF. F. 0128. Op. 11.P.8.D. 5.L. 117-119.
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN M. ORENSHTEIN
October 13, 1948
Paris, Palais de Chaillot
Secret
1. Outlining the position of the Jewish delegation on the Bernadotte plan, Orenstein said that he is now preparing the text of their statement, which, as the first paragraph, confirms that Jews are in principle in favor of the General Assembly's decision of November 29 on the Palestinian issue. Such a position, as could be concluded from the words of Orenshtein, if accepted by the Jewish delegation, will be the result of persistent efforts on the part of him personally, Orenstein. Meanwhile, Shertok2, as Orenshtein made it clear, is currently not inclined to adhere to the General Assembly decision of November 29. For example, at a press conference on October 6, Shertok said that they reject Bernadotte's plan as a possible basis for discussion, however, at the same time, Shertok did not say a single word about the General Assembly decision of November 29.
Then Orenshtein said that they considered it necessary for some territorial changes to be made, since in November of this year. The General Assembly defined the boundaries of the Jewish state without considering strategic considerations. At that time, decisions were taken by the General Assembly taking into account the fact that peace will be established in Palestine and that there will be an economic union between the Jewish and Arab states of Palestine, etc. Life over the past period of time has shown the impracticability of an economic union and the illusory premise that the Jewish and Arab states, at least at the present time, can build their relations on the basis of friendship and cooperation. Taking these circumstances into account, in the firm opinion of the Jewish delegation, it is necessary to eliminate the discovered strategic weakness of the borders of the Jewish state, for which it is necessary to make such corrections to the border line of the Jewish state, which would provide to some extent the possibility of a more effective defense of the Jewish state in case of possible the future of military clashes. These corrections, first of all, include the incorporation of the Western Galilee into the Jewish state and the liquidation of the Arab enclave of Jaffa. This last point is especially important for Jews, since recent military events have shown that the Jewish state and, in particular, Tel Aviv would be in a critical situation and, perhaps, they would fall into the hands of the Arabs, if the Jews had even before the invasion of Arab troops Jaffa would not have been completely captured within the Jewish state. According to Orenstein, there are now 5-7 thousand Arabs left in Jaffa out of 35 thousand.
Orenstein also stated that they were opposed to Bernadotte's plan being accepted even as a basis for discussion. However, from inquiries, I found out that Shertok and, one might say, the majority of the Jewish delegation here, as well as in the government in Tel Aviv, are not inclined to support the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29. In particular, Shertok and the majority in the interim government of Israel are inclined to agree to the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan. They do this out of political and practical considerations, arguing that it will be possible to come to an agreement with Abdallah and obtain his consent, and consequently the consent of the British, to include the Western Galilee and the Negev in the Jewish state, meanwhile, with the Mufti of Jerusalem Husseini, for Jews it is almost impossible.
2. The second most important point in which the Jews depart from the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29 is their demand to include the Jewish part of the city of Jerusalem (New City) in the Jewish state. At the same time, they agree that the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem should become part of the Arab state. At the same time, they would agree that in some form international control over the protection of the Holy Places should be established by the UN, but that this control and supervision only concern the Holy Places, in the strict sense of the word.
3. The Jews will also insist on providing them with a corridor to connect the Jewish part of the city of Jerusalem with its 90,000 Jewish population with the main part of the state of Israel (Tel Aviv).
4. Regarding the port of Haifa, Orenstein said that the delegation was in the mood (Shertok et al.), Ultimately, to agree with the proposal to declare Haifa a free port, but not the entire port, but only part of it should be allocated for this purpose , bearing in mind, of course, that such a step on the part of the Jewish state should be based on reciprocity. Orenshtein did not develop what is meant by reciprocity.
5. Orenstein further advised that the proposals they are currently preparing provide for a commission for the purpose of limiting the ultimate boundaries of the Jewish state, but that they have not yet determined whether it will be a completely new commission, or whether they will propose the reopening of the Palestinian commission envisaged decision of November 29, 1947. Orenshtein promised to give more detailed information on this issue to me at the next meeting.
6. Orenstein stated that they would strongly insist on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine, since peace cannot be achieved until such a proposal is implemented.
7. On the issue of Arab refugees, Orenstein stated that the position of the Jewish delegation is as follows. The bulk of Arab refugees (now no more than 80-100 thousand Arab population remained in the Jewish state, while in November of this year there were over half a million of them) left the territory of the Jewish state even before the invasion of Arab troops into Palestine. This was done under the influence of the propaganda of Arab leaders, who at that time pursued a twofold goal: first, to show that the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs as part of a Jewish state is unthinkable, and secondly, to arouse national, religious and other feelings of the population of Arab states , incite militancy among them and hasten the military intervention of the Arab states by invading Palestine and the Jewish state, using as one of the pretexts the need to return to these Arab refugees their homes, property, land, etc. At the moment, all Jewish leaders and the government are united in their intention to prevent the return of Arab refugees to Israel. The majority in the government is inclined to no longer let them into the territory of the Jewish state, but to use the property and land belonging to these refugees as a fund for the resettlement of Jewish immigrants. However, the united workers' party represented by Orenstein considers it possible, after the end of hostilities and the establishment of peace in Palestine, to allow Arab refugees to return to the territory of the Jewish state, provided that they declare their full loyalty to the Jewish state and will not be the fifth column. In practice, the Jews are thinking of dragging out the refugee issue, not by outright refusal, but by including this issue on the agenda during peace negotiations with the Arabs.
8. Orenstein said (while he made a reservation that these are still rumors that he must check) that there are allegedly direct negotiations between the Jews and the Egyptians, and in these negotiations the representatives of Egypt are trying to ensure that the Jews stop their negotiations with Abdallah of Transjordan ... As compensation for this, the Egyptian representatives propose to the Jews to divide the Negev into two parts: the northern part should become part of the Jewish state, and the southern part should become a Jewish-Arab condominium. Orenshtein promised at the next meeting to inform me of the details of these negotiations and their reliability.
9. Orenshtein drew my attention to yesterday's correspondence (October 12) in the French newspaper "Fran Thierer" from Bern regarding the fact that the USSR representative in Tel Aviv allegedly addressed the head of the Israeli government Ben-Gurion with a demarche, which allegedly contained warning that the Soviet Government will refuse to support the Israeli government if the latter concludes an agreement with Transjordan and agrees to the transfer of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan. When he asked if I knew anything about this demarche, I said that I had not heard anything about it. A translation of this correspondence is attached.
Conclusions:
1. From the conversation with Orenstein it became clear that the Jewish government is inclined to agree with the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan and to refuse the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine envisaged by the decision of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947.
2. The Jews will insist on the incorporation of the Western Galilee into the Jewish state and on the liquidation of the Arab enclave of Jaffa.
3. The Jews are inclined to allocate part of the port in Haifa as a free port for the Arab states, but on terms of reciprocity. What requirements will be put forward by the Jews as these conditions of reciprocity - they have not yet specified.
4. The Jews will insist on the demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine.
5. The Jews do not intend now to give their consent to the return of Arab refugees to the Jewish state.
6. The Jews will insist on the inclusion of the New City of Jerusalem in the Jewish state and on the establishment of a Jewish corridor to connect Jerusalem with the main part of the State of Israel. Thus, the Jews are against part 111 of the General Assembly decision of November 29, which provides for the establishment of a special international statute in Jerusalem.
S. Tsarapkin
WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39.L. 61-67.
Translated From Russian; Svitlana M
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