Lavrenty Beria- 1953, Transcript of the July plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other documents.
Download from Academia Edu
https://www.academia.edu/125701984/Beria_Case_Transcripts_of_the_Plenum_of_the_CPSU_CC_1953
https://www.academia.edu/125701984/Beria_Case_Transcripts_of_the_Plenum_of_the_CPSU_CC_1953
or from MarxistLeninists org website
https://marxistleninists.org/Soviet%20Archives/Beria%20Case/Beria%20Case%20Plenum.pdf
https://marxistleninists.org/Soviet%20Archives/Beria%20Case/Beria%20Case%20Plenum.pdf
This is a draft version of the various sections of the Plenum from the Russian Archives translated by and for the Marxist Leninist Discussion Group (MLDG) reorganized and compiled in its full original sequence.
We do not have any intention or time to do any proof reading and editing to publish it as a book.
We have benefited from the documents, we hope that those who are interested in Soviet History and especially in Lavrenty Beria case would benefit from it.
Source: Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Ed. acad. A. N. Yakovleva; comp. V. Naumov, Y. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 - pp. 87-218
Archive: RGANI, f.2, on. 1, d.29, ll. 1-74; d.30, ll. 1-161; d.31, ll. 1-111; d.32, ll. 1-85; d.33, ll. 1-5. Original.
No copyrights
TRANSCRIPT OF the PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
2-7 July 1953
MEETING 2 JULY
Khrushchev: On behalf of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 2, I declare the Plenum open.
The following agenda is recommended:
1. On the criminal anti-party and anti-state actions of Beria.
2. On the convocation of the next Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 3 .
3. Organizational issues.
Will there be any comments on the agenda of the Plenum?
Voices. No.
[Khrushchev] No one raises any other questions?
Voices. No.
[Khrushchev]. Vote or consider it accepted?
Votes. Consider accepted.
[Khrushchev]. The speaker on the first question is Comrade Malenkov; on the second, Comrade Voroshilov; and on the third, organizational questions, Khrushchev.
Are there any comments on the agenda?
Voices. No.
[Khrushchev]. Comrade Malenkov has the floor to make a report. 4
Chairman Comrade Khrushchev. Comrades, there is a proposal to take a 20-minute break after this report so that the comrades can think, and then we will begin discussing Comrade Malenkov's report. Comrades who wish to speak are requested to sign up. Are there any other proposals?
A 20-minute break is announced.
Bulganin: Let's continue, comrades. Comrade Khrushchev has the floor.
Khrushchev 5. Comrades , Comrade Malenkov reported to the Central Committee of the Party how the members of the Presidium organized their work and in this work how they valued the preservation of the unity of the collective of members of the Presidium - not to give a reason not only for a split , but for any unity to be violated, so that this unity would be transmitted through the Presidium of the Central Committee to the entire Central Committee and thus have a united, monolithic whole of our great Party.
a Here and further in the uncorrected transcript, the text that was subject to correction during its editing and preparation for publication in the form of a verbatim report of the plenum, sent in a limited number of copies to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, territorial, and regional party committees, is underlined. - Comp.
And this desire for unity, comrades, was very cleverly used by this adventurer Beria.
Comrades, Comrade Malenkov reported on Beria quite thoroughly. After all, we have known Beria for many years. I have known him for about twenty years and know him well from the Central Committee plenary sessions, then we worked directly with him.
I want to talk about my views on this person even before we began to come to a certain opinion, in connection with which we took such decisive actions.
Beria was a great intriguer during Comrade Stalin's life. He is a clever man, capable , he very, I would say , dug his dirty paws in very tightly and cleverly imposed his opinion on Comrade Stalin at times. He cleverly, skillfully, sometimes with some kind of vague hint, at other times in a more definite way, would sow doubt either in this or that issue, or in one way or another show this or that comrade in some bad light and irritate Comrade Stalin without any reason, achieving for some definite time the restoration of Comrade Stalin against this or that comrade. We have observed this . Cleverness , impudence, and arrogance - these are Beria's main qualities.
Comrades, Comrade Stalin has died . Yes, even when Comrade Stalin was alive, but after an illness that came on suddenly - paralysis, when Comrade Stalin's speech left and we arrived and saw him in such a state, and the doctors said that he was hopeless, we exchanged opinions, though not all , we all then could not exchange opinions about this man.
For example, when Comrade Stalin was alive , when we were on duty with him, two members of the Bureau of the Central Committee 6 at a time, Bulganin and I had to be on duty together. This was probably a day before Comrade Stalin's death. I told Comrade Bulganin then : "Nikolai Aleksandrovich, Stalin is hopelessly ill, he will die, what will happen after Stalin?
This worries everyone. I say, here is my concern : after Stalin's death, Beria will try by all means to become Minister of Internal Affairs. Why does he need this post? He needs this post in order to seize such positions in the state, so that through his intelligence he can spy on members of the Politburo, eavesdrop, monitor, create cases, intrigue, and this will lead to very bad consequences, and maybe even worse , for the party.
Bulganin: There was such a conversation.
[Khrushchev] I say we cannot allow this to happen, everyone will perish.
But you will say, well, okay, then Comrade Stalin died , but still, they say, Beria became a minister and, they say, you also thought and spoke with Bulganin, but both you and Bulganin did not speak out when the formation and distribution of responsibilities took place .
I say, I lay this question bare.
Comrades, why? I will tell you why. It is one thing when you think you are dying but still alive, and another thing is the psychological state when Stalin has already died . We gathered, and this somehow united people even more . Besides, I thought that it was not entirely right to speak out and express this opinion during the discussion. You, dear comrades, keep in mind that Beria achieved his goal while Comrade Stalin was still alive; he achieved disunity between the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee.
Voroshilov: Correct.
[Khrushchev.] I think so, but to think is one thing, and to say is another, perhaps I don't understand it correctly . Comrade Stalin's corpse , which is not yet cold , and to raise this question, they will say: he took advantage of Comrade Stalin's death, immediately brought a split and confusion into the leadership of the party, and, thus, cleverly using this, they will put you up against them, and you will be made a fool, and what a fool! This could have been.
Voices. Quite right, it could have been.
[Khrushchev.] Beria was very keen on this. Beria became Minister of Internal Affairs. You, comrades, each know what the specific weight of this "person" in the party is. Quite large. It would seem that since a person has achieved such specific weight , then, consequently, such a person should be given the most acute area of work.
Comrades, I may encounter some criticism for my conclusions, but I still want to say: is the most pressing issue for us now the Ministry of Internal Affairs? I would say no. This is my personal opinion, and I will tell you why.
Let us now analyze the 10 years of activity that we have gone through. Beria will say that he was not a minister during this time. Let us take a later period. Let us analyze what conspiracies within our country were discovered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security 7 ?
Except for the fake, inflated ones - nothing.
Voroshilov: That's right, none.
Khrushchev: Let's recalculate, we both know: before 1937 and after 1937 - more than half are fake.
Voice from the Presidium. More than half is fake, that's right.
[Khrushchev.] And after that, let's sort it out. Let's do it not only here, at the Plenum , we'll take all the documents, the most important reports, all the open conspiracies, group, individual and all sorts. We, comrades, will meet them there. Why am I drawing attention to this? Because of the monolithic nature of our party ranks, the unity of our people around our party is the main strength.
Voices from the floor. Correct.
[Khrushchev.] Comrades, as soon as the war ended, Hitler counted on marching across the Ukrainian steppes in tanks and immediately conquering, and Moscow would be captured, and everything would fall. But now the whole world knows how it began and how it ended. What does this mean? Again, this speaks of the strength of our party, the unity of our people, the boundless trust in our leadership and the leadership of our party.
If we take the later issues - doctors 8 - this is a shameful case for us, it is a sham. If we take the Mingrelian case, the Georgian case 9 - it is a sham. If we take other cases as the most prominent - it is a sham.
The question arises, why Beria, and Beria knows this well, no, after all, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, why does he need this post? He needed the post in order to take control of this uncontrolled organ, comrades, and I would say, difficult to control, comrades. Look, we control any minister, any worker, the fulfillment of the plan, there the party organization will act, there we see something, but in the Ministry of Internal Affairs everything is covered in secrecy. He says: I am going to a safe house to receive some agent, but which agent to receive there, does anyone know? Nobody knows. That is what he needed, comrades. That is why he went to this post, against the party, against the Government.
That's his goal. I noticed an interesting detail. I think the shameful case with the doctors, the Georgian case, is a shame. We, the members of the Presidium, have spoken among ourselves several times, I have spoken to Lavrenty. I received a letter to the Central Committee, of course, from Colonel General Kryukov 10 , and Zhukov received this letter. I showed it to the Presidium of the Central Committee, we need to look into it. There are about twenty and a half generals convicted there 11 , and Kryukov was sentenced to 25 years. Beria is not taking on this case of investigation, but it is indisputable that it is a sham.
Voroshilov. Linden.
[Khrushchev.] Why? I think that Beria did it for those purposes - he wanted to work with these generals and then free them. Because he didn't just free them, he freed them, and these people came out, and he convinced them that it was Beria who gave them back their lives, not the party, not the government, but Beria.
Here Kuzmichev was arrested (12). I think he should have been released, but was it necessary to immediately dress this Kuzmichev in a general's suit and appoint him head of security for the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee when he was released from prison? I don't think it was necessary, but he was appointed. Why? Because Kuzmichev became Beria's shadow, he needed such a person.
That's why the post of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was needed, that's why he took this body into his own hands. For criminal purposes.
This collection of all sorts of information . You know, for example, that Beria put the question this way. I even blamed myself before the Plenum.
He called me once and said: "You know, an employee of your Administrative Department called Kobulov and asked him how things are going. This is impossible. I am a member of the Presidium, and it seems like some kind of shadow is being cast, someone is calling my first deputy, not me." In a word, by this he raises the question that neither the Central Committee nor the regional committees should call for, and this means freeing the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from any party control for arbitrary action.
Voices. Correct.
[Khrushchev.] This is what Beria wanted, and I would say, comrades, that he achieved it. It is a fact. After all, these notes on Ukraine, on Latvia, on Belarus. This is a fact, they were collected not through regional committees, not through central committees, they were collected through employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although these materials are all in the Central Committee. So, he achieved his goal. This must be recognized, so that in the future any possibility of hinting at such actions can be excluded.
Comrades, here's what's interesting . For example, I am deeply convinced that Beria is not a communist, Beria was not a communist, Beria is a careerist, Beria is a provocateur. And not only now. Comrades, I will remind you of the Plenum in 1937 13 . You remember that it was announced from this rostrum that Beria worked in counterintelligence in Baku. Kaminsky said this. At the same time, it was said that Beria worked in counterintelligence on the instructions of the party. Now there is no evidence, he did not present any. And time has passed.
Bagirov. The underground work was then led by Anastas Ivanovich, without him no one could go anywhere.
Khrushchev: Comrades, I will tell you that we have already reached a decent age of Soviet power and many of us have gone grey with Soviet power. Therefore, even if they say that he really had an assignment, who will guarantee that he did not work on another assignment, against us, having the cover that he worked on our assignment . What an adventurer! He is a double, but after a certain time he becomes a single person, working in one direction .
Comrades, I have heard Beria's statements about the party, his views , many times . He made his last statement when we discussed the affairs of the GDR, when the Germans were summoned, and when we discussed the questions of Hungary. At that time, the question arose of separating the work in one person of deciding what the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers combine 14 . Remember, Rakosi said then: I would like to know what is decided in the Council of Ministers and what in the Central Committee, what the division should be. Since it will not be in one person, it is necessary to identify the division of issues more clearly. Beria then said dismissively: what the Central Committee, let the Council of Ministers decide, let the Central Committee deal with personnel and propaganda.
I was then cut off by such a statement. It means that he excludes the leading role of the party, reduces its role at first to personnel, and essentially reduces the party to the position of propaganda. In his understanding - what is the difference between Hitler and Goebbels ? Is this a view of the party? Is this how Lenin taught? Is this how Stalin taught to treat the party?
Why did he say that? He brought in the awareness that the role of the party had faded into the background, and when he became stronger, he would destroy it completely. Of course, not physically, he is not such a fool, he would have done everything for his own purposes. This, comrades, is a great danger, and therefore I conclude that he is not a member of the party, he is a careerist, and maybe a spy, we still need to dig into this.
Voices from the audience. Both.
[Khrushchev.] After all, Beria and I used to go together, and we walked arm in arm , so we could hear a lot from Beria. This is an interesting thing : he himself was outraged by many things that were happening in the Ministry of Internal Affairs or in state security. I wonder what proposals he brought to the Presidium. We hadn’t discussed them yet, we didn’t have time, we decided to put him in jail first and then discuss them. He made a proposal that the Special Conference at the Ministry of Internal Affairs should be liquidated . Indeed, this is a shameful thing . What is the Special Conference ? 15 It means that Beria arrests, interrogates and Beria judges.
I ask, do we really have such a flow of counter-revolutionary uprisings that the Central Committee itself does not have the ability to sort out these issues, do we need special bodies to sort them out and judge them without an investigation, right in the office, without the criminal ? Where are these crimes? How many are there? There aren't any yet.
Why did Beria need this? Because, having the Special Conference in his hands, he had the right to any person. He himself said: I can force any person to say that he has a direct connection with the English king or queen, to sign it himself. And he did it. Consequently, when he obtains such testimony, when there will be a trial later, there will be an investigator who interrogates Beria's orders, Beria will report and Beria himself will judge .
Comrades, is this even conceivable? Why is he confusing our heads? He writes that this matter must be regulated, but how can it be regulated? Now a special meeting can make its decision with a punishment of up to 25 years and sentencing to the highest measure - execution. I propose to abolish the highest measure - execution and to give not 25 years, but 10 years. Comrades, 10 years. This means giving 10 years, and in 10 years he can come back and he can be sentenced to 10 years again. This is real terror for you, and it will turn anyone into camp dust.
When I received this proposal, I called Comrade Mikoyan, Comrade Bulganin, Comrade Molotov - did they read this proposal, called Lazar Moiseevich, and told him - read what Beria is proposing. Is it conceivable to do this, and for what purposes? Good. Maybe there is some matter in the country that should not be brought into the public eye. This may be, but so that the Central Committee could not specifically discuss and make a decision, find a form for resolving this issue, I think we will probably not refuse this in the future, but it must be an exception and so that this exception is by decision of the party and the government, but not a law, not a rule, for the Minister of Internal Affairs to do this, having such power, terrorizing the party and the government, that is what we are talking about.
Another decision that he also made, but we have already made this decision . He made a proposal that all convicted or arrested people, convicted people who have served their sentences, and arrested people, if acquitted by the investigation or the court, who are subject to release, should be released only after the prosecutor reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What does this mean, comrades? This man talks about legality. But what kind of legality is this, and then they say that our prosecutors are shit, the prosecutor is commanded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. How can a prosecutor work and enjoy trust when he must report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at a time when the court has already proven that the person is innocent. Is this, comrades, legality, do we need such legality?
Why did Beria grab onto this, why should he hold the souls of not only those who are in prison, but also those who are under investigation, who have already been released from prison? So that they would tremble while Beria is in power. This was done for the sake of terror. This terror was directed against the party, against the government, against our people.
Voice from the floor. Correct.
[Khrushchev.] That's what this scoundrel needed. And so, comrades, as they say, drop by drop creates streams. We had a whole series of our so-called friends - Beria, Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov - all of them are berries of the same field.
Therefore, we must have this organ . The sword of our socialist state must be sharp and honed. We still have many enemies. We have the strongest capitalist countries and their agents inside the country. Therefore, it would be deeply wrong to drag this organ through the mud, to think that it is not needed, since we can pay for it. But this sword must be kept sharp against the enemies and so that it is not directed against our own people.
Kaganovich: So that he would be in the hands of the party.
Khrushchev: And for this we need to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its place. We need to create good intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. Put good, honest Bolsheviks on this job. And we will move this job forward . But the Ministry of Internal Affairs will be controlled by the party, controlled by the government.
Malenkov: We spend 17.5 billion rubles on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not counting what we spend on construction and management, without construction and management.
Khrushchev: Georgy Maximilianovich made a completely correct remark here.
Comrades, I am a man, as they say, of the old regime. (Laughter.)
I saw a gendarme for the first time when I was probably already 24 years old. There were no gendarmes in the mines, we had a policeman - the Cossack Klintsov, who went and drank with the miners. Take the district . There was no one except the policeman under the old regime. Now in each district we have a chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and also an operative. He gets the highest salary, more than the secretary.
S m e s t a . Twice as much as the district committee secretary.
[Khrushchev.] But if they created such a network for him, something needs to be done. If we now look through the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I am convinced that 80% of the population of the Soviet Union has Ministry of Internal Affairs questionnaires, and a file is being developed for each of them. (Laughter.)
Voices. Correct.
Khrushchev: Of course, if they pay you money, then you have to do something. But if there are no offenses , and the boss asks, are you, son of a bitch , working? If not, then you have to do something.
I know from Moscow, last year a man was sentenced to 25 years because the agent himself made up a case against this man, and he was sentenced. That's the case.
We must establish order, comrades, we must give people work according to their abilities . And we must leave as many people as are needed in this post, and those who would understand the party's policy, strictly implement it, and obey it .
Voices. Correct.
[Khrushchev.] Comrades, Beria - you don't know this man, but I do . You'll say now, you went, you're gaping . Beria is not that kind of man; you have to know him well and figure him out well.
Personally, I had different periods of our relationship with Beria , but the best period of my relationship with him, such as - inseparable, not stretched out - was after the death of Comrade Stalin. If I did not call him for a day, then he already calls and asks why you did not call. You say that you do not have time, there are things to do. "And you call."
I, comrades, began to think: what is it, why did such love immediately flare up for me, what is the matter? It seems that nothing has changed, I remained the same as I was.
And he calls me one day and says, what about Malenkov, what about Molotov. He will throw poison at everyone, wants, so to speak, to somehow indicate that you are better. I later told this to comrade Malenkov, comrade Molotov.
Malenkov: He considered us simpletons, that he had us in his hands .
Khrushchev. I say to Comrade Malenkov: listen, you are probably against me, but he is speaking to me against you. He is an intriguer, and the main thing is that he considers everyone to be fools, he thinks that he is a great intelligence officer, he understands everything... He thinks that he is a great intelligence officer, he understands everything, and this, they say, is to use it blindly, but they turned out to be not such simpletons as he thought.
For example, I think this: he did a lot of things for provocative purposes. We could not make decisions on agriculture during Comrade Stalin's life and we could not make decisions after his death. Why? Beria will sow doubts, Beria will raise a question, and the question will be immediately removed. We all respect Comrade Stalin, but the years take their toll, and lately Comrade Stalin did not read papers, did not receive people, 16 his health is poor, although he was brave, because in old age one always becomes brave. And this, comrades, was cleverly used by the scoundrel Beria, very cleverly. And he, as a provocateur, will tell Comrade Stalin that the question is not worked on. Any question, no matter how well it is worked on, can always be proven for further work.
Voices from the floor. Correct.
[Khrushchev.] All the time the issues were left unfinished, and the issue was not resolved. This was during Comrade Stalin's lifetime; he continued this without Comrade Stalin. Comrades, at the last meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers we discussed the issues - it is impossible to earn extra money any longer, these issues were very acute. Why did he do this, comrades? He is a provocateur. He believed - the worse, the better. I will prove why. No, that is exactly it. Why ? Comrades, you know that for several years now Comrade Malenkov has been instructed to oversee rural farming. 17 Beria demonstrates his outward friendship, inseparable, unbreakable with Comrade Malenkov, ruining agriculture, bringing this economy to the utmost degree . We can't stand it any longer: there is no milk, little meat. They declared the transition from socialism to communism, but we are not selling flour. And what kind of communism would it be without hot pancakes, to put it bluntly?
Voice from the Presidium. No potatoes.
[Khrushchev.] No potatoes . This was done in order to overthrow, and then get to power, then declare amnesty, speak out against thieves and repeat offenders . So that they would say: here is Beria saving . He did this in order to bribe the people . Cheap demagogy.
Voice from the Presidium. He speaks absolutely correctly.
[Khrushchev.] Well, dear comrades, that's why he was a provocateur, and a big one. Big, don't say goodbye - he was a big provocateur. Comrades, we listened and criticized, just like you criticized . Novgorod and Pskov listened recently, then Smolensk listened. We made the right decisions, comrades. Comrades, no matter what smart resolution you write, no matter what decisions you make, if we pay three kopecks per kilogram, no smart resolution will help agriculture.
Voices. Correct.
Mikoyan: We need to count.
[Khrushchev.] We need to calculate everything, comrades . This has been reduced to absurdity. I spoke with comrade Zverev . We have 3.5 million fewer cows than before the war. Fewer cows means less meat, less butter, less leather. He said that they talked about abolishing cows for individual use and supplying them through the collective farm. He is throwing a pebble into the garden that this cannot be done. There will be a time when the collective farmer will do this. If we do not believe in this matter, then we are not communists. Will a peasant collective farmer always hold her own cow by the tail? But to suggest this now is stupid. This cannot be done. We need to create conditions, we need to raise the collective farm peasantry , we need to raise the marketability of the collective farm peasantry.
They say that the party organs do not pay attention to this issue. What attention, when a cow must give a certain amount of milk, comrade Zverev takes a tax from this cow. When you calculate everything, it turns out that the owner is left with only manure. He then decides to get rid of this cow.
Comrades, I would ask you to understand this matter correctly . This is a very sensitive issue. Now, on the instructions of the government, this issue is being worked on, but we must have a measure of feeling. They have brought it to the point of absurdity, and this must be cleared up now .
But Beria stubbornly tore it up. We have been discussing the issue of potatoes and vegetables for three months, and we cannot make a decision for three months. As soon as we put it in, there will be another revision . We have reduced the prices of potatoes and cabbage, but there are no potatoes or cabbage in the stores. Cabbage has become more expensive or is the same price as bananas. What is this? Have our collective farmers forgotten how to grow cabbage?
No, comrades, we need to look deeper and we need to resolve this issue, and everything will be fine. But he is a provocateur. I even think that he thought that if there were a rebellion somewhere , it would be better. Wow, what a scoundrel he is.
Comrades, the decisions we have taken on Western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia - Comrade Malenkov spoke on this issue, and I fully agree with this - we need to recall these notes. The central committees and regional committees need to look at this more closely. Perhaps we will even have to make adjustments to our decisions.
After all, letters are sent to the Central Committee. We received a letter from a teacher from the Stanislav region. She wrote to me: “You said that now there are no two Ukraines – Western and Eastern. But there is one Ukraine. I am a teacher, I have been working in Stanislav for 13 years, and now after the decision I am being kicked out of Ukraine.” Where, why? It is by our decision. That is how it happens, comrades. That is what it means now. And they write such letters from Lithuania.
Here is a letter one writes:
"I go into a store, ask the clerk to sell me groceries, but he doesn't answer because I'm speaking Russian. And he, knowing Russian, doesn't answer." What does this mean? This decision is directed against Russians, it is a desire to set Russians against other nationalities.
Voices from the floor. Correct!
[Khrushchev.] What cleverness! He acts under the guise of implementing Stalin's national policy, but in reality he is creating a split between nations and wants to achieve his own. What a provocateur !
Now all of Beria's speeches must be viewed in a different light. Let's take his speech when he patted the Russian people on the head, saying that the Russian people are great 18 . After all, this is vile! It is not Beria's definitions that make the Russian people great, it is not his will that the great Russian people rose up and created greatness. He needed to pat the Russian people on the head because he already considered himself Stalin's successor. Stalin declared a toast to the great Russian people 19 , and Beria already had his intentions then. He took a big swing, but he fell and crashed, his spirit was lost.
We need to fix these things.
The last session was instructive . He showed himself most clearly as a provocateur, as not a communist, on the German question, when he raised the question of abandoning [the] construction of socialism, of making concessions to the West. Then they told him: what does this mean ? It means that 18 million Germans will be given over to the protection of the Americans. And he answered: yes, we must create a neutral democratic Germany.
How can neutral democratic bourgeois Germany be between us and America ? Is it possible ? We must not hide the fact that the capitalist bourgeois states have a certain friendship with us . We ate King Michael 20 , with whom our general hunted in Romania.
Beria says that we will sign a treaty. And what is this treaty worth? We know the value of treaties. A treaty has its force if it is backed up by guns. If the treaty is not backed up, it is worth nothing. If we talk about this treaty, they will laugh at us, they will consider us naive. But Beria is not naive, stupid, not a fool. He is smart, cunning, but treacherous. That is why he did it, or maybe he did it on instructions, the devil knows, maybe he received other instructions through his residents. I will not vouch for this. Therefore, I repeat once again that he is not a communist, he is a provocateur and he behaved provocatively.
Comrades, besides , his impudence was simply unbearable. When we discussed the Germans 21 , these people made a mistake, we had to correct them, not bully them. And you should have seen this man when he was yelling at Ulbricht and others, it was simply embarrassing to sit there. And we were silent, and one might have thought that we agreed with him . And you, dear ministers, present here, you are accustomed to this, and therefore you accepted all sorts of insults without question and sometimes smiled (animation in the hall), thinking that this was a friendly pill, that it was not bitter . Now I think that you, on the contrary, have a different taste for this impudent fellow.
In general, it worked out well, another time he even joked . He believed that he had the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he had everything, and even if they wanted to, they would be incapable of arresting him due to their weak character . And even if they did want to, how, who would arrest him? They would turn to Kobulov to arrest Beria, and we would arrest them along with Kobulov, he was convinced of this. But when we saw that we were dealing with a provocateur and the disunity that he believed ensured his success in his provocative actions, this disunity immediately fell . When we were talking to each other - listen, you like this man - then some looked at him in surprise and thought: why is he asking this question, for what purpose? (Laughter.)
Then we continued and said - listen, why are you looking at him like that, he is a provocateur, look and you will see for yourself that he is a provocateur , that he is a scoundrel. And after that people said - perhaps this is the right way to pose the question, a matter of principle. When we came to an agreement with each other , it turned out that we were all of the same opinion. Then we organized a meeting. We organized a meeting of the Council of Ministers, and invited the members of the Central Committee who were not part of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers 22 to this meeting, and then we turned to the Presidium meeting and laid it all out there, told him straight to his face - you are a provocateur, you are not a communist and were not a communist, we will not tolerate this any longer . And you should have looked at this hero who was running around, how he immediately went limp, and maybe even more (laughter), and what a hero he looked like.
Comrades, we did this and were deeply convinced that the Central Committee would understand us correctly and approve our decision. (Prolonged applause.)
The unanimous decision of the Presidium about Beria - this, comrades , was necessary to achieve. I will say it straight out, so that they do not whisper later. Some said - how is it possible, Malenkov always walks arm in arm with Beria, probably the two of them - they tell me this, and others, probably, they tell that Khrushchev also walks with him. (Laughter.) And this is correct. They walked, and I walked. He would walk in the middle, sometimes, and Malenkov would walk on the right side, and I would walk on the left. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich once even said - the devil knows, you walk and discuss something all the time. I say - nothing worthwhile, all sorts of vile things, it is disgusting even to listen to, but we walk on.
I think that for the time being this walking was useful to us, a necessary walking. On Thursday, the 23rd we - Malenkov, me, and Beria - were riding in the same car, and you know how we said goodbye. He is an intriguer, he intrigues me against Malenkov and against others, but he considered Malenkov the main one, that it was necessary against him . He says goodbye, he shakes my hand, only I hear it, I also answer him with a "hot" handshake: well, I think, scoundrel, the last handshake, tomorrow at 2 o'clock we will squeeze you. (Laughter.) We will not shake your hand, but we will tuck our tail between our legs.
Comrades, this is how we should have dealt with a treacherous man . If we had told him when we saw that he was a scoundrel, I am convinced that he would have dealt with us. Don't think that he knows how. I have already told some comrades, and they told me that I was exaggerating: look, don't be a weirdo, he will bury you, make a speech and hang a plaque - here lies a figure of the party and government, and then he will say - "fool". And rest there. He is capable of this. He is capable of adding poison, he is capable of all kinds of vileness. We were not dealing with a party member, with whom we must fight using party methods, but we were dealing with a conspirator, a provocateur, and therefore there was no need to expose ourselves. Agents, as they say. This means: agents - the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Central Committee. This is what we have come to do. Such a situation has arisen.
I think we have a forced, so to speak, friendship . Now you see what kind of friendship it is and how it ended. I think that the party members will understand correctly and will express their attitude correctly. We thought about it: we will come to the meeting, and he will stir up people; the devil knows, after all, we are dealing with a provocateur. Therefore, it was necessary to think through all these issues well, and now we need to organize the work so that this does not happen at all. Firstly, the honesty of people, and secondly, to reduce their role, you can’t do that .
In this matter, comrade Malenkov, comrade Molotov, comrade Bulganin, comrade Kaganovich and all other comrades were unanimous. And this, I believe, comrades, operation, if one can put it that way, will not weaken, but strengthen the leadership of the Central Committee. (Applause.)
Voices. Correct.
[Khrushchev.] And we must not be afraid. There were some voices : how will this be assessed in the party; will it not be understood as weakness.
Comrades, but when we do not solve the problems of agriculture, when there is a shortage of meat in the country, a shortage of milk, a shortage of even potatoes, a shortage of cabbage, how is this strength? Does this determine the strength of the Soviet state or its weakness?
This, comrades, is a disgrace. After all, they will come to us and say: listen, dear comrades, you teach us how to build socialism, but you don’t know how to grow potatoes to provide for your people, you don’t have cabbage in your capital. And why? We can’t decide, the provocateur is interrupting.
I am sure that some will say: he served us honestly for so long, but still the Bolsheviks dug up and hid him. I am sure that this will happen. Therefore, comrades, I believe that this strengthens our leadership, strengthens our party . And what about this act in international relations ? Of course, they will find out, then, no matter how we publish it, no matter how we publish it, they will still know. I am convinced that in international, bourgeois enemy circles they evaluate it correctly: and if they did not stop (and Beria was famous) and hid Beria, it means that they have character. (Applause.) Therefore, comrades, this was done correctly, again correctly.
I will not speak about the incorrect speech of comrade Stalin, about which comrade Malenkov spoke, addressed to comrade Molotov, addressed to comrade Mikoyan. You know that this is without any evidence, it is the fruit of a certain age and physical condition of a person , in life there was nothing that he thought.
Comrades, I am finishing my speech and I think that no one will be able to turn us away from the true path that the party is following, the path indicated by Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)
We will move forward at our own pace now, after the cleansing and removal of this enemy. This pace will be confident and accelerated. (Applause.) I, comrades, believe that we have become even stronger.
Comrades, I would like to cite one detail. When Comrade Malenkov said to Comrade Voroshilov, Comrade Voroshilov, the oldest member of the Party, known to all of us , and by age, he rushed to embrace Comrade Malenkov before the meeting. When Comrade Malenkov said to Comrade Voroshilov, he answered: listen, be quiet, he is listening. And then they said that if he overheard, he would not have time to decipher it, since we had already deciphered it. Can we assume what kind of atmosphere he created inside the Presidium? I saw that another time he spoke correctly, Lavrenty Pavlovich, and spat quietly. Loudly - right, but quietly - I will spit . Is it possible to create such an atmosphere in the Party? Now this will not happen. There will be a collective leadership, a real Bolshevik leadership, and this must be not only in the Central Committee, but lower, to the primary Party organizations, this collectivity . It is necessary that there be Plenums of the Central Committee, there should be meetings, the agenda and sessions should be organized without pomp, without pompous empty chatter. All this should be rebuilt. The strength is in us. And the better and deeper we develop inner-party democracy, the better we organize and involve the people in active discussion of our policy, economic and all our work, the stronger we will be, because, comrades, our people stand like a wall behind the party, our people confidently follow the party, and we all, comrades, understand this .
Therefore, comrades, I conclude with confidence that the cleansing of this vile traitor and provocateur will contribute to the further strengthening of the ranks of our party, the strengthening of our Leninist-Stalinist leadership. (Applause.)
Bulganin: Comrade Molotov has the floor.
Molotov: Comrades, we are discussing a question in relation to which we must take into account both the special situation in which we lived during the last period, the last months, and the special position in which Beria found himself as the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and one of the members of the leading core. The peculiarity of the situation, as comrades here have said, is that after Stalin's death we had to demonstrate unity. This was necessary both from the point of view of the internal situation and from the point of view of the international situation.
The peculiarity of the situation in which Beria found himself, the position he took after Stalin's death, all this clearly shows that he was making his way to the post of Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and he recommended precisely this path. What was done at the beginning, during the March days, was, of course, only a transitional stage for him.
But the essence of the matter is that we now have before us as a result of 3.5 months that a traitor in the leading core of our party and government has been exposed.
Before talking about some larger issues, I will tell the comrades about my personal observations. Here is one small fact. You, members of the Plenum of the Central Committee, know who recommended the Prime Minister at the Plenum of the Central Committee. It was Beria. The Supreme Soviet was convening. Who appointed Beria to recommend the Prime Minister? He appointed himself. None of us objected. When the Supreme Soviet was convening on March 9, I called Beria in a comradely manner. We were still comrades then. Before that, there was a conversation in our leadership group that he again wanted to speak as the one recommending the Prime Minister at the session of the Supreme Soviet. I called to say that we had agreed on this. But is this good, why, strictly speaking, is the Prime Minister at the session of the Supreme Soviet on March 24 , proposed by the party, recommended not by the Secretary of the Central Committee Khrushchev. Three of us spoke at the Mausoleum - Malenkov, Beria, and me. The session was scheduled. The Plenum decided to recommend the Prime Minister. Why shouldn't Khrushchev speak? - "No, I did . "
The unity of the party, the unity of the core leadership - they fell silent. That's one thing.
Now I ask you , you read the minutes of the Presidium. Why is there no signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee? There is an anonymous signature - Presidium of the Central Committee. This has never happened. This happened when there were too many signatures of Comrade Stalin on all the documents . This is an old rule, which existed under Lenin and Stalin: the Chairman of the Council of Ministers presides, and the Secretary of the Central Committee takes the minutes, is responsible for the minutes. So we needed the signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee . I called Comrade Khrushchev at the end of May, because I see that this is not right, I understand that this is not an accident. I ask Comrade Khrushchev: why is there no signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee under the minutes of the Presidium because this is not normal, there is no such party order? Yes, - he says, - this is not normal, there needs to be order as it should be. I call Comrade Malenkov, he agrees. I call Beria - why don't we have a signature under the Presidium minutes? He answers: if we decide this issue, then we need to decide other issues. But what issues - he keeps silent. Again, it's unclear. It turns out that he called Khrushchev and says, “Why is there no signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee under the Secretariat minutes , put your signature. Since then, a signature has appeared under the Secretariat minutes .
I did not understand his statement that when deciding the question of signing the Presidium minutes, other fundamental questions had to be decided. When on June 26 the entire Presidium sat and accused Beria for two and a half hours of all his sins (and there were many ), we asked him to explain what other fundamental questions he had in mind that had to be decided when deciding the question of the Secretary of the Central Committee signing the Presidium minutes. To this he replied: maybe we should draw up a summons . So is this a fundamental question? He lied like the last scoundrel, and could not answer anything .
Our abnormality has gone further . We have an old, ancient tradition that all questions of international politics, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others are decided in the Politburo . Now they have transferred it to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers 25 , and included Comrades Voroshilov, Saburov, Pervukhin - a closer circle - in the discussion.
At that time they didn't want to argue with him, I say it myself, and then I retreat, I think that time is needed to clarify. This could not continue for long. If we value the party and understand what our Bolshevik party is, the Leninist party, whose leaders were Lenin and Stalin and will remain its spiritual leaders, then we could not go down this path for long.
For the sake of completeness, I must touch upon a question which, it seems to me, has finally revealed Beria's face. This is the discussion of the German question. Over half a million people fled from East Germany to West Germany in two and a quarter years , that is, from socialist to capitalist . It is clear that this was an indicator of major disorders in East Germany. These disorders are completely obvious, they were revealed thanks to our help . They took an excessively rapid course of industrialization, an excessively large construction plan. In addition, they have occupation expenses for our army, they pay reparations... And there are 18 million Germans in all. Next to them is the decaying capitalist environment in West Germany , and Hitler's upbringing has a significant effect.
And you yourselves must understand that the question of correcting this obviously leftist course was necessary, it was urgent and pressing. We corrected it. But I must say that when we corrected this matter, we discussed the question of Germany as a whole. Here for the first time Beria spoke - what kind of socialism do we need in Germany, what kind of socialism, it would be a bourgeois Germany, as long as it is peace-loving. We widened our eyes - what kind of peace-loving bourgeois Germany can there be, what kind of bourgeois Germany can there be in the eyes of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of our party, which imposed one world war, bourgeois Germany, which imposed a second world war, what kind of bourgeois peace-loving Germany can there be in our conditions of further development of imperialism, who among Marxists can judge soberly in general, who stands on positions close to socialism or to Soviet power, who can think of some kind of bourgeois Germany, which will be peace-loving and under the control of four powers. Well, we argued, talked a little, we had to formulate. It seemed to me that maybe it was a slip of the tongue, maybe an inaccuracy of expression, a polemical passion, or the person miscalculated what he said in the heat of the moment. After some time, I received a draft resolution on this issue as a result of the discussion. This draft resolution was then drawn up as protocol No. 27 of May 27, 1953. It was drawn up correctly. But here is what was written there, the main directive. I wrote how Beria's decision was made on this issue. When developing a proposal, we had to develop a detailed resolution on the German question based on a short proposal. The main instructions when developing proposals had to proceed from the fact that the main reason for the unfavorable situation in the GDR is the course of building socialism, which is erroneous in the current conditions, pursued in the German Democratic Republic. I called Beria: how is this possible - if the course of building socialism is erroneous, then what is our course? He says: it says there - in the current conditions. What does it mean in the present conditions — in the present conditions, first a course toward capitalism, and then toward socialism. I said that I propose to correct this entire phrase, but to say — the course toward accelerating the construction of socialism is erroneous in the present conditions. I agree. That is how it is written down now. That course toward the construction of socialism was incorrect, erroneous, now the course toward accelerating the construction of socialism turned out to be erroneous, incorrect. This amendment was accepted after some discussions.
So, those conversations that took place at the meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. - what kind of socialist Germany is there, what does socialism have to do with Germany, let it be bourgeois, but peace-loving, that's what we need to hit. It was not a simple conversation. It was a conversation of a person who has nothing in common with our party, this person is from the bourgeois camp, this person is anti-Soviet. That's the meaning of it, of everything that Beria is.
A Soviet person cannot speak against pursuing a course of building socialism in the GDR. This means that we must give up these 18 million Germans, won with our blood, give them to the bourgeoisie, to capitalism. But who will give them up? Where can we find such a person, a traitor in our ranks, who our party or any honest communists or honest workers can follow? This was an attempt to impose a new course, but it failed.
Then, this was already on May 27, there was a preliminary skirmish on a fundamental, deep issue. He approached this issue, but this is a fact, this is not some trifle, not some nitpicking on our part.
That is why, when we talk about Beria’s political image, let’s say: we didn’t understand this matter well, we didn’t understand who Beria was, and he was an outsider, he was not from our camp, he was from the anti-Soviet camp.
Voices. Correct.
[Molotov.] And so I say: how did it happen then, after all, that this man was sitting here. You see, 3 1/2 months have passed , I think it is to the credit of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party that in these three months, when he was unbridled , when he showed himself more openly, when he crawled out with his guts ... we exposed him, arrested him, and put him in prison. I think we should approve such a decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee. (Stormy applause.)
Voices. Correct.
[Molotov.] Comrades, we are now finding out, getting acquainted with the biography of this man, and we see that we will have to scrub a lot of dirt from our hands and from our bodies. This is such a dirty type, a morally decomposed, alien, and rotten person. You will learn these facts yet .
And this man set himself the task of placing the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Government and the Party. All his tricks through his apparatus were aimed at creating a situation where he had real power in his hands, he controlled the Central Committee and the Government , he monitored our every step, he eavesdropped on us. These were the tools he was counting on.
I must add to this that all this would be incomprehensible if he were not pursuing a course from socialism to capitalism . Why does he need all this? Who wants to build socialism with us, why are we not his comrades and where will he find better comrades. And if he is not following this course, then he needs to have another support, another apparatus, then he needs to do what he plans to do, but cannot yet say openly. This is how I understand this matter.
I think, comrades, that this fact - comrade Malenkov read the draft letter to "comrade Rankovich ", for "comrade Tito" - with this fact the traitor gave himself away red-handed. It was written by him by hand and he did not want the Presidium of the Central Committee to discuss this issue. What kind of person is he ?
True, we exchanged ambassadors.
Malenkov: And we wanted to normalize relations.
[Molotov.] We want normalization of relations, and we have formulated in writing in the Central Committee how we treat Yugoslavia at the present time. It is clear that if we were unsuccessful in direct action, we decided to take another approach, we decided that we must establish with Yugoslavia the same relations as with other bourgeois states: ambassadors, exchange of telegrams, business meetings, and so on.
And what is this: “ I take this opportunity to convey to you, Comrade Rankovich, a big greeting from Comrade Beria and to inform Comrade Tito that if Comrade Tito shares this point of view, it would be appropriate...”
— etc. etc.
What is this ?
Voice. Without a government decision.
[Molotov .] He did not want the Government's decision. He was fidgeting, but he fell into their hands.
Bulganin: This is the hand of one camp .
Voice from the Presidium. In the hands of one camp .
[Molotov .] This is certainly one camp . The first thing we must say for ourselves is: Beria is an agent, a class enemy.
Voices. Correct.
[Molotov.] He got into our camp and, hiding here, tried to use the situation after the death of Comrade Stalin - as if the party had weakened, lost its head, did not know how to do everything. He got ahead, seized the apparatus, as if it would be useful to him . I will say in all honesty : the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs would not have followed him, there are communists there too.
Voices. Correct.
[Molotov.] There are people there who are devoted to the party . Maybe only scoundrels would have gone. Beria wanted to confuse our internal affairs, confuse our internal policy, and create complications . What was he aiming at? What forces could support the stinking bug - Beria? What internal forces - the class of workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia could support this scum in our Soviet Union ? Who could support? He had no internal forces. He could have found support among foreign capitalists - Tito-Rankovich, he is an agent of the capitalists, he was trained by them. He jumped out of there and made his way to us . We have not studied his biography much, now we will study it better. How could it happen that such a person as Beria could get into our ranks ? From the insufficient vigilance of our Central Committee, including Comrade Stalin. He found some human weaknesses in Comrade Stalin, and who does not have them? Lenin and Stalin and each of us have them . He cleverly adapted to them, cleverly exploited them. This is not my first year of work . Ever since Beria came to Moscow, the atmosphere has deteriorated: plenary sessions stopped being held, the congress dragged on for 13 years. This began after the 18th Congress, just at the time of Beria's arrival in Moscow. He did not carry out a coup, but he did everything that could be done . He poisoned the atmosphere, he was intrigued. Comrade Stalin did not always believe him, especially recently he had little faith in him, but there was weakness on the part of all of us without exception. How could this happen? Because we have only one party in the Soviet Union, because in the Soviet Union we had only one Communist Party, ours . We talk a lot about the fact that this is due to the fact that we do not have antagonistic classes; this is the root of the issue . We must not forget about the international situation. We, in our country, cannot have a second party, that we are in a capitalist encirclement. We could not allow any cracks that could disintegrate our country, our state. The capitalists will give any money, not millions, but billions , in order to start a small camp, an organization that has a leftist face, a rightist face, centrism, pink, whatever you want, only not communist, only that it would differ in some way from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For this they will do anything. In our country, no other party can be anything other than an agent of foreign capital, an agent of the imperialists.
And so, comrades, when they want to create a new organization for us, plan and so on, then these people either dream of the path that Tito and his gang took, or they can dream of creating something like this, because Tito is still considered a communist. Why can't Beria be considered a communist and do things differently from the party? The bourgeoisie, capitalism will shower any such agent with gold, if only he were found.
And the significance of this international moment, which consists in the fact that our struggle is currently reaching a particular acuteness, is that capitalism is worried about its fate and that it is looking for where to find such a rotten place, such a person who can be a provocateur, a traitor, whatever you want, a sellout, but only to carry out this order, to have such a crack in the Soviet Union.
This is the work that the provocateur Beria did - to create a crack and on this basis undermine our Soviet Union.
We talk about merits, we very often judge people by their merits, by their work, etc., or by their so-called pedantic devotion. We very often, instead of a real party approach, instead of real party work, limit ourselves to the fact that if he says hallelujah, if he knows quotes, he is an ideologist who can express the opinion of the party .
We must fight against these traits of dogmatism that exist and create the appearance of party spirit, but are false and do not correspond to real party spirit .
This part, of course. Beria used it well. He wrote a brochure about Comrade Stalin 26 . They say it was not he who wrote it, but his chief assistant in the spirit of Shariy, who is an alien person. Basically, a correct brochure, but a number of such things are allowed in that they are unusually flattering to a certain person, in order to make the attitude to the author as advantageous as possible, from the point of view of attention. Here the dogmatic side is maintained quite cleverly. The imitation of party spirit is quite good, and the quotations are good, and the facts are good. Because what relates to the history of Comrade Stalin's work in Transcaucasia is a brilliant page in the history of our party, this is what not only Transcaucasia, but our entire party was brought up on. But to think that this work reflects real party spirit, that would be naive on our part.
The other side. We often get caught in the fact that a person has merits, works, carries out big tasks. Beoia is one of such people. He did a lot of work, he worked talentedly in organizing a number of economic events, but listen, we also use saboteurs, we make them work when it is necessary, we make people from former saboteurs who bring benefits when they see that it is impossible to go on the old path .
Khrushchev. Ramzin received the Order of Lenin. 27
Molotov. Tupolev sat as a saboteur, and now he makes airplanes for us. When he saw how things were, that he had to work for this government, he started working, and God bless him, let him work.
He is no longer the same person; he is a new person. But a person who is interested not only in a narrow field, but wants to be among the leading government figures, must necessarily be a communist. He must earn trust in some way, rise up. There is no other way out. We have one party, it puts forward, it appoints people, it popularizes, it provides work. This is the path that Beria understood, and he stubbornly followed this path. And now, when we look at him, how he kept everything inside himself and moved forward stubbornly and finally got to the top , we see what kind of person he is. This person does not breathe our spirit, he is alien to our party, he is from a different root, he is an alien . He is an alien and anti-Soviet person. From the facts we have, we must conclude that our party work is weak in many respects, not at the level at which it should be conducted. And it's not just Beria, it's not just that Beria had Sharia as his ideologist. I'll read the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, adopted in 1948, and approved by the Central Committee of the party. Until his last day, Beria's ideological assistant was a certain Sharia. Who is Sharia?
Here is the decision of the Central Committee of Georgia from 1948:
"The Bureau of the Central Committee of Georgia considers it established that in 1943, in connection with the death of his son, Sharia wrote an ideologically harmful work in verse, imbued with deep pessimism and religious mystical sentiments. Deviating from the basic principles of the Bolshevik materialistic worldview, Sharia says in this work that he does not see a better world ... His life after the death of his son (he died of tuberculosis) is nothing but torment . And in the end he goes so far as to recognize the immortality of the soul and the reality of the afterlife . "
This man was reinstated in the party by us by mistake: by mistake we supported the wrong decision of the Georgian Central Committee. It turns out that until Beria's arrest, Sharia was his assistant on ideological issues. That's what he breathed in.
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that we wrote decisions in a hurry on Lithuania and Ukraine, which stirred up anti-Russian sentiments among Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalists . We accepted Beria's proposal to remove the secretary of the Central Committee of Belarus, Patolichev, and replace him with another. We also made this decision in a hurry, and corrected it later, on the fly, when Patolichev himself asked not to send him to the Plenum, saying that the Plenum would support him and one could end up in an awkward situation. And indeed, the Plenum, with great unanimity, decided to leave Patolichev as secretary, and we made the one we had designated as first secretary - the former second secretary, a good comrade, comrade Zimyanin - the chairman of the Council of Ministers. This satisfied the general mood of all the comrades at the Plenum of the Central Committee of Belarus.
This "hero" Beria, who decided to replace the first secretary of Ukraine, the first secretary of Belarus, then to make radical changes in the personnel of Lithuania, and so on. - what did he do? Thanks to our hasty decisions, he caused a lot of trouble, he intensified the national enmity in these republics .
[Molotov] ...and we, comrades, must admit - this is another indicator of how weak our party work is. As soon as some new, not quite correct, hasty decision comes to light - even the nationalists are inspired, everyone is already stirring. And where have we gone, our party work? How far behind are we in our party work if it is so easy to spoil our party work with individual decisions.
Malenkov: Correct.
[Molotov] I think that we need to take a good look at what we are doing. Really talk about self-criticism and in practice not forget that we are responsible for some things that need to be corrected carefully, without the haste that we have recently shown on a number of issues. And without this we cannot really correct the matter.
Now - what can this person count on in the Soviet Union? I, comrades, think that from the point of view of our internal forces, our country is in such a prime of life that everyone will envy the fact that we are growing stronger economically from year to year and are growing quickly, rising, strengthening, creating first-class technical things, raising a huge number of new trained qualified people. But, comrades, let us not forget that we have such a number of shortcomings and irregularities in our work that we need to work very hard and seriously on this .
In recent years we have hastily made a number of decisions that need to be corrected. For example, we were forced to decisively correct and cancel the decision to build the Turkmen Canal 28 . It started with the fact that it would cost several billion rubles. It was a useful thing, but it turned out that if we built this canal, it would cost thirty billion rubles, without any immediate benefit in the near future. Is this really the most urgent of all tasks for the Turkmen and for anyone else in the Soviet Union? It had to be corrected. We corrected this matter. And in a number of other construction projects. Take what comrades Malenkov and Khrushchev said about the situation in agriculture. We have an intolerable situation in agriculture, especially in livestock farming, vegetable growing, in the most essential things. Here the comrades were right when they said that not only did a person like Beria not help us in correcting and improving economic work, he interfered, he slowed us down, he did everything he could to prevent this matter from being corrected. Meanwhile, we have every opportunity to quickly provide ourselves with vegetables, potatoes, and cabbage, and raise livestock farming to a truly high level. We just need to get to work on this urgently, and not be afraid to seriously correct some things in our work.
Voice from the floor. Correct.
[Molotov] Because we were not seriously involved in this matter and were too satisfied with the fact that we were making decisions and that everything would be done, we thought, of course, but it didn’t work out .
Now, regarding the international situation, the fact is that now is precisely the period when capitalist states, including the largest ones, are worried about their existence, about their position, and about their tomorrow .
In fact, after the Second World War an unprecedented historical event took place: 800 million people are united in the Soviet Union and around the Soviet Union. Two world markets have been formed, as Comrade Stalin remarkably and extremely scientifically defined in "Economic Problems." 29 This is not simply the market of the Soviet Union and the market of the capitalist states, but two world markets. This means that those states that are united around the Soviet Union in the person of these 800 million people - the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania - these states now constitute such a powerful, unprecedented force that capitalism is now in fear for its tomorrow.
And now more and more adventures against the Soviet Union are being prepared. You see, the armistice in Korea is being delayed; they can do nothing. Our policy has taken this path, they are faced with a fact, they are forced to make peace. The Chinese and Koreans have taken this path to ensure peace in the East. And now they are creating all sorts of obstacles on this path. This is a period when the opportunities that we had in our hands, which we used very poorly in a number of ways, we are now using more actively, we are putting into action the reserves that were lying unused, we are changing tactics and creating a number of new difficulties for them .
We have now created a huge economic base, which consists not only of the Soviet Union and 500 million Chinese and 100 million other nations. This is a colossal economic base of socialism, under which socialism is invincible and moves forward irresistibly. At this time, it is necessary for someone to act as a disorganizer of our work. Here is a class agent of our class enemy sent to our country in order to introduce disorganizing elements into our work at this alarming time.
I think Beria became too brazen, he began to hurry too much, they rushed him too much, and this is how he gave himself away. We are now taking advantage of the fact that what we did not see in Beria for 15 years, we saw in three and a half months, because someone was rushing him and he began to become too brazen, he stuck out his claws too much, and we saw that he was a predator, he was a stranger who needed to be taken by the hand and put in his place.
We have done this, comrades, and I think there can be no talk of any weakening of the leadership of the party and the country, we have cleansed ourselves of the agents of our class enemy, we have strengthened our party. (Stormy applause. )
We are now standing on our feet as never before. In our midst, in the core of leadership, there are now finally honest relations, we are not afraid to talk to each other now, as it was a week and a half ago, and that was it. You may have seen nothing, but maybe you have seen something.
In my opinion, simple conclusions follow from all this: we must be firm, principled and unwavering in our party spirit. We must, moreover, be vigilant in all our work, more vigilant in all our work. (Applause)
Bulganin: There is a proposal, comrades, to stop the work of the Plenum today and to announce a break until tomorrow. No objections? No.
Tomorrow at 12 noon, right here in this hall.
MEETING JULY 3 - Rest is on the website
https://marxistleninists.org/Soviet%20Archives/Beria%20Case/index.htm
Khrushchev: Comrade Kaganovich has the floor. Comrade Bagirov, get ready.
Comrade Bagirov has the floor, comrade Malyshev must prepare.
MEETING JULY 3 Evening meeting
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. July 1953. Verbatim report. July 2-7, 1953.
The chairman is Comrade Bulganin. Comrade Molotov now has the floor.
No comments