A summary by Myanmar Marxist-Leninists; Myanmar ; the fallacy of “Freedom fighters” versus “Junta”
Elections in the midst of the power struggle between Bamar NUG and Bamar Junta and the place of Ethnic Army Organizations (EAOs) in this conflict.
The reality of Myanmar is, especially for the ethnic minorities, Junta and NUG represents the "two sides of the same coin". To start with, externally instigated, promoted and supported "democratic" experiments has historically and repeatedly proven to be failure. Secondly, these imposed “democracies” confirmed to be transformed into war proxies for the distant superpowers at the expense of the local people, and the destruction of the proxy country.
The track record of U.S./Western-backed exiled governments like NUG or opposition coalitions achieving stable, legitimate, and independent power in their home countries is “extremely poor” in the 21st century.
Long before the 2021 coup, Myanmar had a deeply embedded ecosystem of international NGOs, media development programs, and civil society networks funded by Western governments and foundations. US-West organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) have funded Burmese media, labor, and advocacy groups for decades. This built a cadre of individuals and organizations aligned with liberal "democratic" norms and connected to international systems.
Targeted sanctions against the military dating back to the 1990s were designed to cripple the Tatmadaw's economic empire and isolate its leadership. This is not a passive policy; it is an active tool of economic warfare intended to create internal strain and incentivize fragmentation. The civil war in Myanmar didn't "happen in one morning". The “preconditions” for the civil war were set. The coup was the detonator. The explosive material - grievances, organizational networks, and geopolitical alignments -was already in place. The rapid formation of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the NUG within weeks of the coup points to “pre-existing networks and organizational capacity”, not spontaneous generation. The immediate and sophisticated international media campaign favoring the NUG/PDF narrative indicates prepared channels and spokespeople long before the coup. This was confirmed with the swift freezing of Myanmar's assets by the West and the redirecting of financial flows to support the CDM/NUG is a classic tool of financial warfare in support of a political objective.
The coup of February 2021 was a consequence of “intra-elite, intra-Bamar conflict”. The Tatmadaw (a Bamar-dominated institution) removed the NLD (a Bamar-dominated political party). The primary battle for the “political soul and future governance structure of the Bamar state” is between these two factions. The NUG's leadership and the PDF's national-level command are predominantly Bamar, and their fight is to reclaim the central state.
US-Western narrative presents the arm wing of Washington based NUG government, PDF, as the “leading and dominant force” of all the EAO (Ethnic Armed Organization) forces. The anti-junta resistance, in its core, is the rebellion of historically dominant Bamar political/military elite who lost the power to another Bamar dominant political/military elite. In no place within the Ethnic States and armies PDF has control or dominance. Because EAOs, while opposed to the junta, prioritize their own territorial control and political goals. They may allow PDFs to operate nearby, share intelligence, or conduct joint attacks, but avoid a formal merger of command. The Military Leadership (NUG-MOD) while it includes ethnic representatives, the operational and strategic leadership is heavily influenced by former Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) officers who defected (many of whom are Bamar) and Bamar activists-turned-commanders.
The "National Fight" against Junta narrative has been used as a cover to conceal the fight between pro-US Bamar NUG and Nationalist pro-China Bamar Junta. The US-Western Media and NUG constantly use the "Spring Revolution" and "federal democracy" narrative to build legitimacy and international support. It strategically downplays ethnic nationalist goals (like secession) to present a “unified front”. For the NUG, emphasizing a "national" struggle is essential for its political survival. The fact is that the ethnic armies are not fighting “for” the NUG; they are fighting if and when it fits in their interests with a segment of the Bamar elite forces against the “other Bamar elite”. That is why the question of Myanmar is not a simplistic "freedom fighters vs. junta" as Western narrative and NUG portrays. It is, in its core, an intra-Bamar institutional and ideological civil war between the military aristocracy and the ousted political class. It is a continuation of decades long of ethnic revolutionary struggles for” autonomy”, now operating in a more favorable strategic environment.
The Junta is not a revolutionary class power building a new state,” but a faction of decaying oligarchic-military institution fighting to preserve its old one. NUG is the faction of the same decaying oligarchic-military institution with “false narratives” borrowed from the US-West that already have been largely exposed in the world arena.
The “intra-Bamar civil war” in Myanmar cannot be analyzed without seeing its embedment within the US-China “strategic competition”. The NUG seeks and receives political recognition, humanitarian aid, and support from the US, EU, and other Western allies. They frame their fight in the language of “democracy versus dictatorship”, fitting neatly into a Western geopolitical narrative.
In the Bamar heartlands (Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay divisions), the war is indeed primarily between the Junta and local PDFs (with some EAO support/logistics, like from KIA or AA).
In the Ethnic Borderlands, the war is a multi-sided contest. The primary fight is often between a powerful EAO and the Junta. The local PDF here is usually a junior partner or an allied auxiliary force to the EAO, not the other way around.
Myanmar is simultaneously a theater of intense internal dominant class and ethnic conflict and a critical piece on the chessboard of US-China systemic competition. China, as a producer economy needs stability for trade and infrastructure. China seeks “manageability” within the Myanmar instability”, not necessarily a “democratic victory” for there is no serious power fighting for “democracy”.
The US & Allies' Interest lies in their policy of weakening a Chinese partner, denying strategic gains, and promoting a pro-Western alignment. Support for the NUG, PDFs, and some EAOs is a tool of “geopolitical denial”. Sanctions aim to cripple the junta's economy, making it a liability for Beijing. Therefore, the conflict in Myanmar is objectively a proxy battlefield. The resistance seeks recognition and support from the West. The EAOs navigate between these poles to maximize their autonomy.
From a materialist perspective, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) does not represent a revolutionary vanguard seizing power from a feudal or bourgeois class. It is, and has been for decades, the “central institution of the existing Bamar-dominated ruling class and its political economy. A serious number of EAOs, however, are challenging the very class character and structure of that state.
For the elections, the ultimate judgment will not come from the Western Media and its local proxies or from the UN. It will come from the people of Myanmar. If this new civil government can actually end the war, improve livelihoods, and gain tacit acceptance from a majority weary of fighting, it will, over time, generate its own form of legitimacy—the legitimacy of delivering a peace that the revolution could not achieve. If it cannot, and the war grinds on, it will be seen as a hollow facade, regardless of how many voted .
The Western double standard narrative is that the more accurate framing of an election is not about the quality of the election day, but about the nature of the regime. However, the “nature of regime”, its “legitimacy” is determined by the people of that country, not by the “Western (double) standard”.
US-West has another problem in Myanmar. The EAOs are not "pro-West proxies." They are historically autonomous, often ethno-nationalist, even Marxist-Leninist entities with their own goals (federalism, self-determination). Their cooperation with the NUG is pragmatic. This makes the coalition inherently fragile, as their post-victory visions (a Bamar-led federal democracy vs. various forms of ethnic autonomy) may clash violently. Based on this reality, the NUG fits the pattern of a government-in-exile formed with Western diplomatic, financial, and possibly clandestine support, awaiting a "day of implantation" that may never come, or if it does, would result in a fragile, client state, vulnerable not only the internal but external devastating war. The undeniable fact is that China cannot afford to have a US-Proxy state at its border especially with US military men and machines on its ground. Similarly, most ethnic armies cannot afford having a US-Proxy government in Myanmar.
Another objective reality- based on the stated facts in the article-is that without the US-Western lifeline, the NUG is irrelevant, and thus makes it a classic proxy. Because the NUG exhibits the classic dependencies of a US-Western-recognized exiled entity. Its "alliance" with EAOs is fraught with future conflict. Under current conditions and situation, the ultimate goal of powerful states is not democracy in Myanmar, but a “pliable government” aligned with their strategic interests—pro-West in the NUG's case, pro-China in the SAC's case.
The question is about “agency and sovereignty.” If the NUG/PDF/EAO coalition wins primarily through its own sacrifice and strategy, EAOs may retain some autonomy. If its victory is contingent on decisive external intervention (which currently is a fantasy proven in Ukraine case), then Myanmar's future would indeed be that of a “client state”, merely switching entirely to Washington.
Who, in the end, will control the political and military structures of a post-SAC Myanmar? The answer will determine whether this is a genuine revolution or a violent regime change operation with a new set of masters.
In conclusion, the civil war in Myanmar is, at its root, a schism within the Bamar national project. It is a fight over who gets to define and control the state. This internal rupture has two identical major reasons and consequences:1) It has created a massive vulnerability that external powers (US/West vs. China/Russia) are exploiting for strategic influence, 2) It has unleashed the agency of non-Bamar national projects (Rakhine, Shan, Kachin, etc.), who are using this Bamar crisis to advance their own historical goals with a speed and success previously was impossible.
Therefore, it is not a "national revolution" but a Bamar civil war occurring simultaneously with—and creating space for—a resurgence of long-standing non-Bamar national revolutions. The two are now militarily intertwined but remain politically and motivationally distinct. Therefore, the post-conflict scenario is highly problematic: the provisional tactical “alliance” formed against the junta obscures the fundamentally different and often contradictory ultimate goals of the Bamar democratic resistance and the ethnic national liberation movements. The fundamental character of the core conflict is Bamar. The end result of this “power struggle” between Bamar Elites, either way, will in no way be in the interests of the EAOs in the long run.
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