Myanmar ; the fallacy of “Freedom fighters” versus Junta - Are all ethnic armies in official alliance with the US-Backed PDF?
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| States and Regions |
Elections in the midst of the power struggle between Bamar NUG and Bamar Junta and the place of Ethnic Army Organizations (EAOs) in this conflict.
Are all ethnic armies in official alliance with the US-Backed PDF?
Despite all the US-Western
narratives to draw such a picture, the clearcut answer to this question is
“no”. The relationship is not a widespread, a unified, official
alliance but a complex, evolving
patchwork of “tactical cooperation”.
Considering the fact that most ethnic armies are focused within their
own boundaries, they have no reason to have an alliance with the PDF other
than for the exceptional situations that may arise.
US-Western narrative presents the
arm wing of Washington based NUG government, PDF, as the “leading and
dominant force” of all the EAO (Ethnic Armed Organization) forces. Although
the US-CIA, with its vast experience formed the leadership of National Unity
Government (NUG) with the addition of people from Karen, Kachin and Chin, the majority
is Bamar (Burman). PDF leadership and majority fighters are made up of
Bamar and their fighting region is primarily within the central Myanmar,
Bamar region. As I will try to expose, the “anti-junta war”, in its
core, in fact, is a war
between the two leading (military and civil) groups of Bamar elites.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) is the most powerful and impactful coalition. It includes the “Arakan Army (AA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)’. They have conducted extensive joint operations with local PDFs in northern Shan State and Sagaing, most notably Operation 1027. This is a “military pact”, but the PDF’s involvement have been typically under the command structure of the EAOs.
In no place within the
Ethnic States and armies PDF has control or dominance. Because EAOs, while
opposed to the junta, prioritize their own territorial control and political
goals. They may allow PDFs to operate nearby, share intelligence, or
conduct joint attacks, but avoid a formal merger of command. This
describes the stance of several smaller Shan and Kayah groups.
Several EAOs have ceasefire
agreements (NCA) with the junta; UWSA, NDAA, RCSS/SSA-s, Karen National
Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council -KNU/KNLA-PC, Democratic
Karen Benevolent Army- DKBA, New Mon State Party -NMSP, Arakan Liberation Party-ALP
and do not openly ally with the NUG/PDF. In addition, there are ethnic groups
with Bilateral Ceasefire agreement with Junta; United Wa State Army (UWSA), the
most powerful EAO, with over 30,000 troops, Shan State Progress Party / Shan
State Army -SSPP/SSA, National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). It is clear
that not every ethnic region is fighting against Junta, but in some cases
fighting against each other.
Another factor to consider is
China the most influential external actor in the conflict. Its primary
interests are border stability, security of its investments, and curbing
cross-border crime , engages with EAOs directly, often as a mediator. Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) leadership is ethnically
Chinese and operates in a Chinese-speaking region.
As we can easily see that the “ethnic
armies” against junta “narrative”
does not hold strong ground in a way that US-Western media portray that to be-
a unified all out force. Most are
fractured in their relationship with Junta.
Notably, some EAOs have “clashed
with PDF” over territory, resources, or influence, particularly in areas
where the PDF's Bamar-dominated NUG government is seen as potentially
replicating Bamar-centric policies of the past. This is a general
sentiment within the leadership of most ethnic armies. It is this fact of
EAOs being aware of the PDF’s Bamar ethnicity and the character of NUG
as another Bamar government to be implanted, an “alliance” with them is avoided. That’s why presenting it a formal, all-encompassing
"alliance" is a fallacy of Western Media and of its extension media. What is going on in
Myanmar is a “strategic network of partnerships of varying depth”, often
negotiated locally as an exception.
In this sense, the claim, or the
picture to be drawn with falsified maps that “PDF units are active in every
region and state of the country” is just a propaganda. They are active
in Bamar regions of Sagaing,
Magway, and the Dry Zone where the most intense fighting occurs. As I have
noted earlier the PDF leadership made up of predominantly, (but for a purpose
of “appearance” – to make it appear o be not exclusively Bamar)
Bamar-Burmese origin.
The Political Leadership (NUG)
The National Unity Government, claims authority over the PDF, is led
predominantly by elected (pre-Junta) MPs and figures from the
Bamar-majority areas, including ousted NLD members.
The Military Leadership (NUG-MOD)
while it includes ethnic representatives, the operational and strategic
leadership is heavily influenced by former Myanmar military (Tatmadaw)
officers who defected (many of whom are Bamar) and Bamar
activists-turned-commanders.
The anti-junta resistance, in
its core, is the rebellion of historically dominant Bamar
political/military elite who lost the power to another Bamar dominant
political/military elite.
It is true that the Tatmadaw
(Junta) receives support from Russian and Chinese entities for arms, aviation
fuel, and trade. That is actually the core of the issue on how and why
the “Junta “ came to the power. It was a conflict within the military/political
elite; one was trying to turn Myanmar into a war proxy against China and
Russia, other had nationalist ideas to benefit from the world wide conflict and
thus was leaning towards China. Looking at history, no one can deny the fact
that there was a clear “intra-Bamar elite struggle” going on in Myanmar
for decays. The Junta who makes up the core of the State Administration
Council (SAC) is the Bamar-dominated military officer corps, a deeply
entrenched elite with its own economic empire. The NUG Leadership formed
in Washington DC, US, predominantly
comprised of the ousted Bamar-dominated political elite (NLD
politicians, activists, intellectuals) and defected Bamar military officers.
I am not describing the entire civil war as “only”
this elite’s struggle and overlooking the various ethnic armies fights, but
pointing the fact that the elites of the dominant ethnic group,
Bamars, shape the “core
character” of the struggles. Especially, looking at the concrete facts on
the ground where the “ethnic armies” are -with some exceptions- only
focused within their own regions (or on the conflicts between the ethnic armies
for land grabbing) and only fighting when there is a breach of that
border, the “civil war” at large is going on within Bamar regions
between the “elites” of Bamar.
In this sense the narratives that
portray the existence of an
“alliance” between PDF and Ethnic Armies (EAOs) conceal the fact that there
is no such an alliance and there is no all out civil war in
every corner of Myanmar against Junta. Each party has its own political
purpose differs from the other, especially the political aims of NUG-PDF
and EAOs are not only different in their character but contradicts in so
many aspects.
There is a difference between “what
has been” and “what is going on now” . To debunk any critique, I have never claimed that this was “a
purely elite war” between the Bamar Elites, but it was such “in
its core”. The elections and the existing conditions-situations “now”
not only prove my argument but shows the indications that it will be
heading towards becoming as “purely an
elite war”. The concrete conditions and situation in Myanmar at the initial
stage of Junta is different from during
the “1027 joint operation against Junta”, and after the “operation”
until the elections.
That is true that initially the
heaviest clashes have been in Northern Shan State, Chin State, Karenni (Kayah)
State, and Karen State in where local PDFs fought often ethnically integrated
with or under the wing of longstanding EAOs- never under the leadership of
PDF. That has been a pragmatist or opportunist (whatever the case may be)
tactical approach of each ethnic army on the question of their own regions. People do minimize or
even dismiss the fact that NUG-PDF receives millions of dollar funds from the
US. In a poor country where the monthly salary ranges $20 to $100, that money
can buy a lot of soldiers and influence. It is publicly stated numerous times
on their proxy-Media that they pay $ 754 per person to change sides or
participate in the war. Another revealing
news was on the proxy Mizzima- Myanmar news that; “Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Tun,
Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, confirmed that
Myanmar will maintain its voting rights in the UN General Assembly through the
end of 2026. This status was secured after the National Unity Government (NUG)
assumed responsibility for settling the country’s membership dues, totaling
approximately US$1,000,000. That is an incredible sum of money for a
party of Myanmar.
So, the "National Fight" against
Junta narrative has been used as a cover to conceal the fight between
pro-US Bamar NUG and Nationalist
pro-China Bamar Junta.
The US-Western Media and NUG
constantly use the "Spring Revolution" and "federal
democracy" narrative to build legitimacy and international support.
It strategically downplays ethnic nationalist goals (like secession) to present
a “unified front”. For the NUG, emphasizing a "national" struggle
is essential for its political survival.
The fact is that the ethnic
armies are not fighting “for” the NUG; they are fighting if and when it
fits in their interests with a segment of the Bamar elite forces against
the “other Bamar elite”.
That is why the question of
Myanmar is not a simplistic
"freedom fighters vs. junta" as Western narrative and NUG portrays. It is, in its core, an intra-Bamar institutional and
ideological civil war between the military
aristocracy and the ousted political class. It is a continuation of decades
long of ethnic revolutionary
struggles for” autonomy”, now operating
in a more favorable strategic environment. It is a complex network of
temporary, transactional “alliances” between these two forces, fraught with
mutual suspicion. For EAOs, PDF is a useful, temporary ally of
convenience in their fight towards their regional goal. For Bamar NUG,
EAOs is a great way of presenting
and portraying its fight for power against the Bamar Junta.
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