Myanmar ; the fallacy of “Freedom fighters” versus Junta - The Bamar- Myanmar Civil War - in particular and in general
The Bamar- Myanmar Civil War - in particular
The coup of February 2021 was a
consequence of “intra-elite,
intra-Bamar conflict”. The Tatmadaw (a Bamar-dominated institution)
removed the NLD (a Bamar-dominated political party). The resulting
resistance was born first in “Yangon and Mandalay”, led by Bamar youth, civil
servants, and professionals. The primary battle for the “political soul and
future governance structure of the Bamar state” is between these two
factions. The NUG's leadership and the PDF's national-level command are
predominantly Bamar, and their fight is to reclaim the central state.
The Junta is not a revolutionary
class power building a new state,” but a faction of decaying
oligarchic-military institution fighting to preserve its old one. NUG is
the faction of the same decaying oligarchic-military institution with
“false narratives” borrowed from the US-West that already have been largely
exposed in the world arena.
Operation 1027 wasn't a NUG/PDF plan. It was conceived and executed by the MNDAA, TNLA, and AA. Their objective wasn't to install the NUG in Naypyidaw, but to secure control of border trade routes (especially to China) and entire swaths of Shan State. They have succeeded, creating facts on the ground that neither the junta nor the NUG can ignore. This was not a localized fight; it was a strategic campaign that has reshaped the national battlefield.
The main trigger (the coup) is
the primary political conflict (control of the central state in Naypyidaw),
and the original fault line are undeniably within the Bamar power structure.
The Tatmadaw and the NUG/PDF core are competing for the mantle of
the Burmese state.
The 2017 military campaign occurred under the
NLD (now NGU)-led "civilian" government, and Aung San Suu Kyi's
defense at The Hague was a stark demonstration of how Bamar nationalist
consensus—across military and democratic elite lines—has historically unified
against certain ethnic others. This fact severely undermines the NUG's
"federal democracy" narrative for many in Rakhine and beyond. It
shows the Bamar elite struggle is, in part, a fight over which Bamar
vision governs the state's relationship with minorities, not a fundamental
rejection of a centralized, Bamar-dominated state model. The EAOs are strategic
actors within this frame. EAOs are not
fighting the NUG's war. They are pursuing their decades-long objectives
for autonomy within the chaos of the Bamar civil war. The junta's weakness,
created by the PDF's uprising in the heartland, presents a historic opportunity
for them. Their expansion (like the AA into Sagaing) is a tactical move to
cripple their shared enemy (the Tatmadaw) and improve their position for the
post-conflict negotiations, regardless of which Bamar faction (Junta or
NUG) survives.
One sided narratives on using
excessive force
“The Universality of Armed Group
Logic” is that any armed organization seeking to control territory, resources,
and populations—be it a state military, an ethnic army (EAO), or a local
People's Defense Force (PDF)—must establish a monopoly on violence within
its area of operation. This inherently involves “deterrence, punishment,
and the enforcement of compliance.” The methods may differ in style,
systematization, or ideological justification, but the fundamental logic of
coercion is often present.
“There are ample reporting and
documented evidence of abuses by non-state actors from NGOs, journalists, and
human rights groups of serious abuses by various EAOs and PDFs. These
include “Forced recruitment and portering,” “Extortion and "taxation" under
threat,” “Extrajudicial killings” of
alleged informants, rivals, or those who defy their authority, “Internal purges” and violence against subgroups
within their own ethnic or political communities, “restrictions on
movement, speech, and assembly” in controlled territories.
The distortion of
"legitimacy" in a war zone reality completely upends any romanticized
view of "popular support”. In many contested areas, a civilian's
"allegiance" is not a choice between good and evil, but a
“calculated decision about which armed patron offers the least-bad survival
odds” at a given moment. Shifting alliances or silent suffering under any group
that holds the gun are not signs of ideological commitment, but of
pragmatic adaptation to terror.
Junta's Coercion is
typically a systemic, top-down, and ideologically framed as
"counter-terrorism" or "national unity." It utilizes a
formal, hierarchical command structure, air power, and artillery. Its violence
is often large-scale and indiscriminate.
EAO/PDF Coercion, in most cases
are more “localized, variable, and
personalized.” It may be framed as "revolutionary justice,"
"community defense," or "traitor punishment." It can also be
driven by local commanders' prerogatives, inter-factional rivalry, or
the simple need for resources (food, money, recruits) to sustain the fight. The
fear of civilians is omnidirectional. A
villager may fear the junta's raid, but also fear being accused of
collaboration by the local PDF, or being caught in the crossfire between two
EAOs. “"Reprisal" is a risk from all sides.” This creates a state
of profound political paralysis and survival-focused neutrality
for millions.
The question of whether the
system in any locality provide enough predictable security and
basic administration for civilians to resume some form of life, even if
under duress or not, becomes a measure
of its established authority and “legitimacy”.
In order to see the nature of
conflict clearly, we must see fear as universal, not partisan. This doesn't create moral equivalence, but it
does force us to abandon comforting narratives and confront the grim,
complex, and deep human tragedy of life amidst competing instruments of
violence.
Geopolitical aspect of civil
war in general; US-China
Competition.
A critical minded person has to
look beyond the surface-level narrative to identify the core engines
of the conflict. The “intra-Bamar civil war” in Myanmar cannot be
analyzed without seeing its embedment within the US-China “strategic
competition”.
The conflict between the elites
in Myanmar that brought about the Junta
was a final proxy friction point. The Junta is reliant on China
for diplomatic cover, border stability, and a vast array of trade (including
dual-use items). It is also now fundamentally dependent on Russia for arms,
jets, and fuel. China and Russia's support is what keeps the junta financially
and militarily afloat.
The NUG seeks and receives
political recognition, humanitarian aid, and support from the US, EU, and other
Western allies. They frame their fight in the language of “democracy
versus dictatorship”, fitting neatly into a Western geopolitical
narrative. While the scale is not comparable to Ukraine, the alignment of
interests is clear. A Beijing/Moscow-backed military junta versus a
Washington/Brussels-backed political opposition-in-exile, fighting for
control of a strategic country at the crossroads of South and Southeast
Asia.
It is a two-tiered War with converging
battlefield; 1) The
Political/Geopolitical War. It is a struggle for control of the Burmese
state apparatus between two Bamar elite factions (Junta vs. NUG), with each
backed by rival global powers (China/Russia vs. US/West). This is the war of
legitimacy, diplomacy, and ultimate constitutional vision, 2) The
Military/Territorial War. This is where the picture becomes more complex.
On the ground, the military struggle is not neatly segregated.
In the Bamar heartlands
(Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay divisions), the war is indeed primarily between
the Junta and local PDFs (with some EAO support/logistics, like from KIA or
AA).
In the Ethnic Borderlands,
the war is a multi-sided contest. The primary fight is often between a
powerful EAO and the Junta. The local PDF here is usually a junior partner
or an allied auxiliary force to the EAO, not the other way around. The
convergence happens because the EAOs have realized that to secure their own
territories (Kachin, Shan, Rakhine), they must weaken the Tatmadaw
nationally. The best way to do that is to open new fronts in the Bamar
regions, effectively making the Bamar civil war their own battleground.
They are not fighting for the NUG; they are fighting in parallel to it,
creating a de facto, if tense and opportunistic, nationwide military coalition.
That is why an objective, critical minded analyzer dismisses the oversimplified
"national uprising" narrative
and propaganda. The core political conflict is a Bamar civil war magnified
by a US-China proxy struggle. However, the military mechanics of that civil
war have been fundamentally transformed by the agency of major EAOs, who are no
longer confined to their regions and are now active, decisive participants
in fighting for the future of the entire country—a future they insist must
include their autonomy. The war, therefore, is becoming both: a Bamar
elite schism and a simultaneous, coordinated eruption of the long-suppressed
ethnic conflicts, with both layers exploited by external powers.
This complexity is what makes it so intractable and so devastating for the
people of Myanmar.
The conflict is fundamentally
a war of Bamar character, within which other complex, long-standing
conflicts are now operating and being leveraged.
The Geopolitically, this Bamar
civil war provides the perfect theater for US-China competition. Washington's
engagement with the NUG and Beijing's hedging between the junta and EAOs (like
the Wa and the Brotherhood Alliance) are not driving the conflict's origin, but
they are profoundly shaping its resources, duration, and potential outcomes.
China's need for energy security
(bypassing the Malacca Strait) and overland connectivity to the Indian Ocean
via the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)” and “Kyaukphyu Port” is an
objective, material imperative. It is a strategic necessity driven by China's
position in the conflict with US hegemony. Chinese investment in infrastructure
(ports, pipelines, railways, SEZs) represents a massive potential capital
injection to Myanmar. It can consolidate a specific form of "stability” in
Myanmar. Contrary to rhetoric of
“economic imperialism”, in world with so many countries trade-investments are an inevitable
necessity. And trade is not charity but must benefit both parties. What is important is whether the investments
are made with unfair social, political,
and economic “strings attached to them” like those of the Western colonial
powers in the South. Myanmar is
simultaneously a theater of intense internal dominant class and ethnic
conflict and a critical piece on the chessboard of US-China systemic competition.
Chinese capital seeks to build through the war, creating pockets of contested,
investment-driven "growth" within a shattered national economy.
China, as a producer
economy needs stability for trade and infrastructure. It has pursued a dual-track policy: maintaining
formal relations with the junta (as the UN-recognized entity) while conducting
ceasefire talks with EAOs (like the AA) to secure its border and projects. It
seeks “manageability” within the Myanmar
instability”, not necessarily a “democratic victory” for there is no
serious power fighting for “democracy”.
The US & Allies'
Interest lies in their policy of
weakening a Chinese partner, denying strategic gains, and promoting a pro-Western alignment. Support for the
NUG, PDFs, and some EAOs is a tool of “geopolitical denial”. Sanctions
aim to cripple the junta's economy, making it a liability for Beijing.
Therefore, the conflict in
Myanmar is objectively a proxy battlefield. The junta relies on Chinese
(and Russian) material support. The resistance seeks recognition and support
from the West. The EAOs navigate between these poles to maximize their
autonomy.
NEXT; The issue of Legitimacy of Junta
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