Another turbulent time in US proxy wars; crucial developments and peace agreements in Myanmar loom the end of the US proxy war earlier than expected.

Yet, possibly opens the path for a larger proxy war in the region.

 Introduction

The US proxy war in Myanmar, waged through the PDF and Western-backed civil society, is collapsing faster than anticipated.

After the new government took office in April 2026, it made the peace process its top priority, setting a 100-day negotiation period, extending unconditional peace talks to all EAOs, and allocating over 2 trillion kyats in border development funds for this purpose. This peace policy initiative of the SAC dramatically shifted the battlefields of the proxy war. The government has effectively neutralized two key opposition actors based and active on the Chinese border: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Both of them are offshoots of the Myanmar Communist Party (MCP) with a similar socialist structure. That is in addition to another MCP offshoot, the Wa state, which has the most powerful army among them and has autonomy status. After the agreements with major AEOs, Myanmar’s armed forces have been steadily advancing countrywide, which turned the offensive opposition into a defensive one. The government focused on peace talks with AEOs and military attacks (especially against the US proxy PDF) in order to reassert control over key economic centers and border trade hubs. In some cases, it was the practice of overwhelming firepower, in other cases, through the policy of suasion.

The success of the “peace” policy with MNDAA and TNLA and the neutral position of the Wa State Army accelerated the effectiveness of the government’s policy and practices. As a consequence, the government reestablished control over most of the trade highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border and reopened the road between Mandalay and the Kachin State capital for major convoys. As they have alleviated the North East, the military campaign is underway for the North West to secure the trade highway from the Indian border to the south. Similarly, in the Eastern Chin State, they have captured  towns toward the Indian border. 

The focus of SAC is on the “economic” viability of Myanmar, which heavily depends on the elimination of the concerns of China (on the north and the highway to the south) and Russia ( for the powerplant and oil refinery projects).

Peace initiative

In June 2026, the National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) held the second round of informal talks with EAOs that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Both sides discussed 43 proposed amendments to the 2008 Constitution, half of which were agreed upon with the EAOs, and signed a document on the outcomes of the talks.

In June 2026, government delegations held separate talks with the UWSA and NDAA, discussing peace processes, regional development, and other issues Myanmar is facing.

With China's mediation, the government held talks with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA), aiming to find a "political" solution. China indicated that the talks achieved "positive results."

In July 2026, the ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar held talks in Thailand with EAOs and the government's negotiation committee, with both sides expressing openness to dialogue. As the ASEAN envoy met the Myanmar government and Ethnic Army Groups in Thailand , the US proxy NUG-PDF was excluded from the meeting.

Agreements with NCA signatory groups, UWSA, NDAA, and the Northern Alliance (MNDAA, TNLA) have neutralized the armed opposition in the north and east. China's mediation has been instrumental in securing these deals, aligning with Beijing's interests in border stability and economic corridor security.

Military Means and Control Over Key Border and Trade Corridors

Through military offensives, government forces have regained control over multiple strategic trade routes.

Northeast ; Mandalay–China Border Corridor. The military announced it had recaptured the strategic town of Hsipaw. However, major border trade points such as Muse and Chinshwehaw remain under MNDAA control.

Northwest (India-Myanmar) Kalay–Tamu Corridor. The military launched a clearance operation in June 2026 and completely recaptured and reopened the critical Kalewa–Yargyi–Monywa section of the road in July.

West: Pathein–Monywa Highway. The military launched an offensive in July 2026 to seize control of this strategic highway.

Southeast; Myanmar–Thailand Border Crossings. The military controls 3 of the 5 official trade crossings, including Myawaddy, Tachileik, and Kawthaung.

Central Region; Military Offensives Against the PDF. The PDF, the primary US proxy in the central region, has been systematically dismantled.

Key trade highways—Mandalay–China, Kalay–Tamu (India border), and Pathein–Monywa—have been recaptured, restoring economic lifelines.

The central PDF, lacking the support of major EAOs, has no determining power and is being reduced to isolated guerrilla pockets.

As I have pointed out in a previous article, differentiating between forces (EAOs) with agreements and those without (PDFs) is a necessary analytical distinction. Based on statements from EAOs and the State Administration Council (SAC), the situation as of July 2026 presents two distinct and opposing trends: the steady decline of PDF-controlled territories in the central heartland, and the consolidation of near-total control by the Arakan Army (AA) in the west.

Based on the latest status of control ratios, the US Proxy PDF is on the defensive in the heartland. The PDF, which is primarily the Bamar ethnic majority forces operating in the central "dry zone," has been the main target of SAC’s military offensives since the new government took office. Unlike ethnic armies, the PDF has no major peace agreement with the SAC and is viewed as the primary US proxy force to be eliminated.

The SAC has successfully reestablished control over key routes that were previously held by the PDF. This includes the strategic Mandalay Madaya Singu Thabeikkyin route, which is a vital link connecting PDF strongholds in northern Shan State to those in Sagaing Region. The military has also recaptured towns like Tagaung, Indaw, and Mawlu, which were under PDF control.

While exact figures are contested and fluid, the SAC's counteroffensives have clearly pushed the PDF back. The military's control is now concentrated in the central Bamar heartland and fortified urban centers. PDF resistance territories in Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magwe regions are under immense pressure, with military operations actively shifting to clear their remnants from these areas. The PDF's ability to hold territory in the central region, without the support of major EAOs, has been critically weakened.

China's Role and Concerns

China's core concerns are ensuring the stability of its border areas and protecting its economic interests in Myanmar, with a focus on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and large-scale projects such as oil and gas pipelines. In June 2026, President Min Aung visited China, and the two sides issued a joint statement committing to accelerating the implementation of CMEC projects. China expressed its support for Myanmar's efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. They discussed reopening border trade points.

China actively provides platforms and assistance for negotiations between the government and northern EAOs.

Russia's Role and Interests

Russia's cooperation focuses on the energy and military sectors. In 2026, the two sides signed multiple energy cooperation agreements. Russia's Inter RAO signed a memorandum of understanding with Myanmar to build a 660 MW coal-fired power plant at the Dawei deep-sea port. Negotiations are also underway for the construction of an oil refinery with a capacity of 100,000 barrels per day.

Russia has become Myanmar's largest supplier of military hardware and provides training on drones and snipers.

Possible transformation from one proxy (PDF) to the other (AA); from national (Myanmar)to multinational (India, Pakistan) proxy war

An Ascendant Power in Western Myanmar: The Arakan Army (AA)

In stark contrast to the declining PDF, which is losing towns and strategic corridors to SAC offensives , the expanding Arakan Army has become the most dominant nonstate armed group in the country, consolidating control over Rakhine and expanding into neighboring regions. So, its trajectory is one of expansion and consolidation. While negotiations are going on with SAC, AA has no agreement but a high-intensity conflict with SAC. The AA now firmly controls 14 out of 17 townships in Rakhine State. This includes the entire border with Bangladesh and Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin State. The government forces are now pinned down in just a few urban enclaves like the state capital Sittwe, the strategically vital port of Kyaukphyu, and Manaung Island.

The AA's influence is not confined to Rakhine. It has been actively fighting alongside local PDFs in neighboring regions like Magway, Ayeyarwady, and Bago. The group has captured military outposts in Ayeyarwady Region's Yekyi Township and is contesting the strategically important Pathein Monywa highway. The AA has effectively placed Sittwe under siege, with its forces advancing to within miles of the city. The group's Commander-in-Chief has publicly vowed to capture the remaining townships—Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung—by 2027, signaling an intent to achieve a "final victory" in the state.

The AA's capacity for state building, its geopolitical leverage over India's Kaladan Project, and its anti-Muslim policies create a complex, long-term challenge. Given India's strategic need to secure its connectivity projects and its alignment with US Indo-Pacific objectives, there is a potential for AA to evolve into an Indian proxy. That’s why, among all of Myanmar's ethnic armed organizations, the Arakan Army (AA) presents the most complex and lasting challenge for the government. While the PDFs in the central region are being systematically dismantled, the AA has evolved into a formidable force that the State Administration Council (SAC) is struggling to contain.

Unlike the other EAOs, the AA is not just holding its ground; it is expanding. It now operates as the de facto government in western Myanmar. It has effectively besieged the state capital Sittwe and the strategic port city of Kyaukphyu, even capturing the SAC's Western Regional Command at Ann. Its operations have also extended into the Ayeyarwady, Magway, and Bago regions. AA is actively building the institutions of a parallel state. Through its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), it has established administrative, judicial, and taxation systems across its territory. It is even in the process of launching its own banking system. This capacity to govern gives it a level of legitimacy and staying power that pure guerrilla forces lack.

In addition, AA's strategic location gives it immense leverage that shields it from external pressure. It controls access to the Bay of Bengal and the entire border with Bangladesh. Crucially, it holds territories vital to India's Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-Transport Project, a multimillion-dollar initiative designed to connect India's northeast to the Bay of Bengal. This has forced New Delhi to engage with the AA, as the project's viability now depends on cooperation with the group.

China’s leverage over the AA is severely limited. The AA is geographically distant from Chinese borders, and Beijing cannot risk pushing it toward rival powers like India. This is why China has adopted a softer, more diplomatic approach with the AA.

The Rohingya Question

It is important to note that AA’s consolidation of power is not without serious consequences. There are numerous, well-documented reports of the AA and ULA engaging in systematic land confiscation, forced labor, and the displacement of the Rohingya population. The group has been accused of a "campaign to permanently erase the Rohingya from northern Maungdaw". This policy, while reinforcing a Rakhine ethnic identity, is creating a humanitarian crisis and potential for future instability that could draw in international actors, particularly Bangladesh.

In essence, the AA presents a generational problem for the central government. It is not a proxy force that can be isolated, nor an ethnic army that can be easily bought off with promises of autonomy. It has become a powerful, independent regional hegemon with its own state-building project, deep geopolitical leverage, and the military capacity to defend its ambitions. For the SAC, the AA is not just another rebel group; it is a rival claimant to statehood in western Myanmar. Thus, the Arakan Army (AA) could potentially evolve into an Indian proxy in Myanmar is a highly perceptive and strategically astute argument. The current situation already possesses almost all the preconditions for such a shift. The relationship between the AA and India is rapidly moving from "informal contact" toward "strategic dependency. The current relationship between the AA and India has surpassed mere "contact" and entered a phase of "mutual need" based on pragmatic interests.

The flagship project of India's "Act East Policy"—the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit -Transport Project (KMMTTP) —has its core areas (including the key hub of Paletwa) overwhelmingly under AA control. If India wishes to advance this project, securing the AA's cooperation will be unavoidable. This compels India to establish some form of working relationship with the AA. The AA is acutely aware of the risks of overreliance on its northern neighbor. One of its strategic objectives is precisely to balance the northern neighbor's influence in the region. Developing close ties with India is a critical step in diversifying its external relations and reducing dependence on any single external power.

The possibility of India acting as a tool of the United States is precisely the key external factor driving this "proxy-zation" shift. Within the framework of the US-led "Indo Pacific Strategy," India is regarded as a crucial "anchor" to counterbalance the northern power. This structural pressure inevitably colors India's actions in western Myanmar with shades of serving US strategic interests.

Analyses indicate that Myanmar's conflict is increasingly becoming a "proxy war" driven by external forces. Reports suggest that with the US supporting border armed groups in Myanmar through institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID, India may also be coordinating, to some extent, with US strategic deployments.

Although conditions are maturing, the AA still retains considerable autonomy, which is the key reason it has not yet fully become a proxy. AA's core objective is to pursue "The Arakan Dream", restoring the historical sovereignty of the Arakan Kingdom. This endogenous nationalist aspiration is the starting point for all its actions. AA leadership has explicitly stated its willingness to engage in political dialogue with all parties, including the northern neighbor. Under the current conditions, AA deeply understands that maintaining strategic neutrality is its most advantageous path to survival. Its engagement with India is driven more by pragmatism than ideological alignment.

Taken together, the risk of the AA becoming a de facto Indian proxy is extremely high. This is not only because India has historical precedents for using nonstate actors to contain rivals, but also because the current objective conditions are rapidly compressing the AA's strategic options. As some analyses have pointed out, the AA is becoming an "unstable proxy," and any miscalculation could damage India's regional credibility.

All of these point to a prospect that is highly destabilizing for regional stability. AA could gradually evolve from an armed organization seeking ethnic self-determination into a pawn exploited in great power rivalries. More dangerously, this could form a "conflict trap" with which the external forces support the AA to counter the northern neighbor, and the AA's growing strength in turn encourages India to increase its investment, ultimately plunging the region into prolonged turmoil. This is the most classic characteristic of a proxy war.

China and Russia's most likely Strategies on the Arakan issue

Faced with the potential proxy relationship between India and the Arakan Army (AA), China and Russia will not stand idly by. However, their counterstrategies are rooted in fundamentally different national interests and strategic tools.

China's strategy is to "secure the overall situation with the economy as the anchor," which focuses on economic anchoring; protecting investments, securing corridors, and implementing a dual-track engagement policy with both the SAC and EAOs like the AA.

For China, Myanmar's core value lies in its geo-economic significance. It is a strategic passageway for China to break out of the "Malacca Dilemma" and reach the Indian Ocean directly. Therefore, all of China's countermeasures revolve tightly around protecting its vast economic interests and ensuring the security of strategic corridors. China's top-level approach is to clearly articulate and codify its security concerns. The June 2026 “China Myanmar Joint Statement” directly enshrined a core principle: "Both countries shall not allow their respective territories to be used for activities that undermine the other side's security interests. " This sends an unambiguous signal to the Myanmar government and all forces (including India) that any activity using Myanmar's territory as a springboard against China is absolutely unacceptable.

China fully understands that in a complex environment like Myanmar, economic projects must be premised on absolute security. Therefore, China has adopted a strategy of "security cooperation precedes economic cooperation. " Before major construction begins on core projects like the Kyaukphyu port and the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, China first establishes a "security partnership" with the Myanmar side, formalizing in writing the obligation to protect Chinese projects and personnel.

China does not place all its chips on the Myanmar central government. Instead, it adopts a pragmatic dual-track strategy. At the central level, it maintains diplomatic relations with the military government to facilitate the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. At the local level, it engages directly with ethnic armed organizations that impact its economic lifelines, such as holding dialogues with the Arakan Army (AA) on issues like security for the China-Myanmar railway. This multichannel communication aims to maximize the protection of its interests across all fronts.

To hedge against India's influence in western Myanmar, China is actively promoting the construction of a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC) . This corridor would bypass India entirely, directly connecting China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. It not only opens up a new economic passage for China but also serves as a geopolitical counterbalance to India.

So, the core objective is to protect economic investments and strategic corridor security, break out of Western encirclement, and project geopolitical influence.

Russia's strategy is to "expand space with security as the spear," which focuses on military and security cooperation, providing the SAC with the tools to survive and project power.

Unlike China's economic focus, Russia's involvement in Myanmar carries a distinctly geopolitical and military character. Its core objective is to transform Myanmar into a strategic foothold for projecting influence into Asia and breaking out of Western encirclement. This is Russia's most crucial leverage. Russia's military assistance to the Myanmar military far exceeds China's in scale and depth. The two sides have signed the “2026–2030 Military Cooperation Plan”, which covers the supply of Su30SM fighters, nuclear technology transfers, and even joint patrols in the Indian Ocean. Russia provided reconnaissance drones and satellite imagery centers that have directly assisted the Myanmar military in achieving battlefield gains. This combination of "military hardware - tactical support" is difficult for any other country to replace.

Russia's support goes far beyond arms sales. In May 2026, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu personally visited Myanmar to sign a comprehensive package agreement covering military, cybersecurity, energy security, and even space technology. From training personnel to building satellite systems, Russia is committed to constructing an independent, complete national security system for Myanmar that is separate from the West, thereby deeply binding Myanmar to its own strategic orbit.

Their approach to the AA is to engage in dialogue to ensure project security and indirectly counterbalance by strengthening Myanmar's military.

There is strategic synergy between the two in their shared objective of "countering Western pressure." China's economic support provides the Myanmar regime with a survival base, while Russia's military support offers it a means of protection. Western fantasy and wishful thinking that their involvement in Myanmar will create conflict between the two is no more than cheap propaganda. The West has long hoped to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow through false narratives. Their cooperation in Myanmar is mutually reinforcing, not contradictory. Russia provides the military muscle that keeps the SAC in power, while China provides the economic lifeline that keeps the country functioning. Neither wants to see the other fail in Myanmar, because a Western-backed or Indian backed alternative would be far worse for both.

Conclusion

The US proxy war in Myanmar is effectively ending through a combination of Myanmar's own peace initiatives, China's economic diplomacy, Russia's military support, and the pragmatic calculations of EAOs. The only remaining wildcard is the AA, but even there, the trajectory is toward containment and negotiation rather than outright defeat. The AA as a wildcard is a long-term challenge rather than an immediate existential threat to the SAC's reconsolidation. The Arakan Army is not merely a "resistance movement"; it is an armed organisation with a clear agenda of ethnic nationalism, historical revisionism, and territorial expansionism. Its practices in Rakhine State, including large‑scale atrocities, systematic oppression, and forced displacement of Rohingya Muslims, constitute an ongoing process of ethnic cleansing, not the "national liberation" it claims to pursue. As the AA consolidates its control over Rakhine State, ethnic conflict and the humanitarian crisis in the region are likely to intensify rather than diminish. In either case, neither China nor Russia can remain idle on any development towards involvement of external forces, and Arakan’s becoming a proxy.

Myanmar, in general, is on a path toward stabilization shaped by regional powers acting in their own, convergent interests. US-backed proxy front collapsing under the weight of its own fragmentation, while regional powers (China and Russia) and pragmatic local actors (the EAOs) quietly reshape Myanmar's future without Western participation.

Overwhelming data on trade corridor re-openings, peace agreements, and the PDF's strategic marginalization support the argument that the US proxy war seems to be ending “earlier than expected”.

Myanmar is an "indirect existential question" for China, even more challenging than Taiwan. Because,  while Taiwan is a matter of reunification, Myanmar touches on China's core strategic vulnerabilities, such as energy security, overland trade routes, and the stability of its western hinterland. A destabilized Myanmar under hostile influence could choke China's access to the Indian Ocean, which is a far more immediate and tangible threat than any cross-strait scenario.

Erdogan A

July 16, 2026

"I acknowledge the use of DeepSeek as research and editorial aid for data and structuring. All theoretical frameworks, political conclusions, historical interpretations, and final editorial decisions remain solely my responsibility."

Attachment

Arakan- Rakhine history in brief

The Rakhine state historically was called Arakan. It was inhabited by the Arakanese, ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, and Muslim traders had come to the Kingdom of Arakan in the 8th century. In the 18th century, tens of thousands of Bengali Muslims were captured. Arakan was conquered first by the Burmese army and then by the British in 1825.

In 1982, the Arakan law denied the Rohingya Muslims the right to Myanmar citizenship. Their rights to study, work, travel, practice their religion, vote, enter certain professions like medicine, law, or run for office, and access to health services have been restricted.

They have been facing rape, torture, and murder to the extent of being burned alive.

The "Arakan Dream" and the "Way of Rakhita"

The ideological core of the Arakan Army (AA) is built upon historical revisionism, nationalism, militarism, and pragmatism. This theoretical framework is formally known as the "Way of Rakhita" (WoR) , which was officially proclaimed in April 2014 following the "Arakan Dream" declaration.

The AA's most central political objective is to restore the glory and sovereignty of the historical Arakan Kingdom, which was conquered by the Burmese Konbaung Dynasty in 1784, and to establish a "confederate" status; a unitary state with a degree of power devolution greater than federalism, but not yet full independence. This puts the AA in fundamental political divergence from most other resistance organizations in Myanmar, which pursue federal democracy.

The term "Rakhita" refers to a community that takes pride in its national traditions, ethics, morality, and racial heritage. The core of Rakhine nationalism is to reclaim this "honored" ethnic identity, an honor that peaked during the Arakan Kingdom and was later "humiliated" during the Burmese conquest, British colonial rule, and Japanese occupation. This ideology is essentially an exclusionary nationalism centered on the Rakhine (Arakanese) Buddhist community.

AA’s territorial ambitions beyond Rakhine state, the expansionism is manifested not only in ideology but also in concrete military operations. AA’s expansion has clearly extended beyond the borders of Rakhine State. It has taken control of Paletwa Township in Chin State, which borders India. Region: It has launched attacks in the Ayeyarwady region. It has conducted military operations in these core Bamar‑populated Bago and Magway Regions. Some analysts point out that the AA is the only ethnic armed organisation in Myanmar that has extended its geographical and political influence on such an extent.

The AA pursues a dual strategy of "fighting while building, building while fighting". While AA is militarily expanding, it simultaneously establishes administrative and governance systems in occupied territories. Its subordinate bodies, the "Arakan People's Power Authority" (APA) and the "Arakan People's Revolutionary Government" (APRG), have already taken over key administrative functions such as the judiciary and public health.

Policies Toward the Rohingya: Ethnic Cleansing and Atrocities

The AA's policies toward the Rohingya Muslims are highly consistent with the long‑term repressive policies of the Myanmar military, and substantial evidence indicates that the AA is perpetuating, rather than ending, ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. AA uses the Same Racist Discourse as the Military, referring to Rohingya armed groups as "Bengali Muslim terrorist organisations".

A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in May 2026, titled “Skulls and Bones Scattered Everywhere: Arakan Army Massacres Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Hoyaar Siri”, documents large‑scale AA atrocities; “AA fighters opened fire on unarmed villagers who had sought safety near a Myanmar military base amid clashes,” “ hundreds of Rohingya Muslims were killed and wounded, and villages were burned down,” “ Survivors have not been able to return to their homes to this day, and many are effectively detained by the AA.”

The AA imposes trade blockades, forced recruitment, and escalating abuse on the Rohingya, leading to acute malnutrition (especially among children) and the displacement of families. Rohingya civilians are forcibly conscripted by both the AA and the military junta and used as human shields. The AA arrests Rohingya on charges of "suspected support for the military or Rohingya armed groups".

Buddhist Nationalism and the Role of Monks

The AA effectively employs religious nationalist discourse to garner support from the Rakhine Buddhist population. Its narrative of "restoring the Buddhist kingdom" is deeply rooted in the widespread sentiment among the Rakhine that they have been marginalized and neglected by the Bamar‑dominated central government.

During Aung San Suu Kyi's tenure (2016‑2021), Buddhist monks in Rakhine State played a significant role in inciting anti‑Rohingya sentiment and providing religious legitimacy to military operations. The AA's rise is closely intertwined with this Buddhist nationalist movement, whose primary target has been the large Muslim and Rohingya population. The AA enjoys broad support from Rakhine civil society and religious circles.

Comparison with Israeli Policies

The AA's ideology and practices share the following structural similarities with Israeli policies in Palestine:

Dimension	Arakan Army	Israel
Historical narrative	Restoring the Arakan Kingdom conquered in 1784	Restoring the biblical homeland from 2,000 years ago
Nationalism	Exclusionary nationalism centred on the Rakhine Buddhist community	Exclusionary nationalism centred on the Jewish people
Territorial expansion	Beyond Rakhine State into Chin, Ayeyarwady, and other areas	Beyond the 1967 borders into the West Bank, Golan Heights, etc.
Policy toward indigenous/minority populations	Systematic oppression and displacement of Rohingya Muslims	Systematic oppression and displacement of Palestinians
Religious legitimacy	Buddhist nationalism, support from monks	Religious Zionism, support from rabbis
International response	Accused of genocide, facing international legal proceedings	Accused of apartheid, facing international legal proceedings