A Theoretical Analysis of the Current Situation in Cuba - March 21, 2026
Currently, it must be pointed out that Cuba's current predicament is not merely a localized crisis encountered by a Caribbean island nation under accidental circumstances, nor is it a simple aggregation of diplomatic frictions, US administrative measures, and market fluctuations. The essence of the Cuban issue lies in the complex oppression exerted on socialist countries by the contemporary monopoly capitalist world system under conditions of profound imbalance and escalating hegemonic anxieties. The key issue is not whether Cuba has "offended" a particular major power, nor how many sanctions have been added, but rather that the imperialist state apparatus has combined multiple means—energy, finance, payment settlements, personnel mobility, shaping of public opinion legitimacy, and social structural differentiation—into a clearly defined, progressively advancing, and mutually supportive institutional encirclement mechanism. This mechanism attempts to weaken the socialist state's ability to independently organize social reproduction and undermine its national dominance and political stability in a more modern, technologically advanced, and covert manner.
This is precisely why the Cuban question was never a simple "diplomatic issue" from the outset, but rather one with a distinct class character and a confrontation between systems. The struggle between capitalism and socialism is not presented here as abstract ideological slogans, but rather in its most concrete, realistic, and unavoidable form: whether oil tankers can dock, whether power plants can operate, whether medicines can be stored, whether wages and food rations can be paid, whether the state can maintain public order, and whether the people will attribute the root of their difficulties to imperialist blockade or to their own regime. These seemingly mundane questions are precisely the most acute manifestations of the struggle between systems. Unless this point is clearly understood, all superficial judgments about the Cuban situation will remain merely phenomenal, failing to grasp the essence.
Because the essence can only be grasped through a chain of concrete facts, the analysis of the Cuban situation cannot remain at the level of abstract sympathy or empty support. In the current international geopolitical landscape, the systematic pressure exerted on Cuba by the United States, the administrative and economic measures taken by the Cuban Communist Party to combat the crisis and sanctions, the aid from traditionally friendly countries such as China and Russia, and the actions of the international left and international organizations are not unrelated sets of material, but rather different stages in the same historical process. Only by examining these stages within a unified framework of class analysis can the Cuban question be understood as a unified issue concerning imperialism, the stability of socialist regimes, state capacity, internationalist responsibility, and strategic reform.
I. The Institutional Structure and Class Nature of the Complex Oppression by the United States Against Cuba
First and foremost, it must be pointed out that what Cuba is currently experiencing is not a mechanical aggregation of several scattered measures, but rather a comprehensive national coercive system jointly operated by the White House, State Department, Treasury Department, Commerce Department, and the Border and Security System. Based on the fifth presidential memorandum on national security reinstated by the United States in 2025, and marked by Executive Order 14380 signed on January 29, 2026, and published on February 3, 2026, further strengthened by the technical rules continuously introduced by the Treasury and Commerce Departments between February and March, the United States has transformed its old embargo against Cuba into a simultaneous containment of its energy, financial, transportation, and social production chains. This meticulously planned and unified institutional arrangement demonstrates that the Cuban issue, in Washington's view, has never been a simple bilateral friction, but rather part of a national strategic pressure campaign. The imperialist state apparatus here is not an abstract concept, but a real device of coercion with a clear division of labor, a specific target, and a defined objective.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that this pressure system is organized around the energy issue, where energy is no longer merely an economic input but has been openly transformed into a political weapon. The essence of Trump's Executive Order 14380 lies not only in declaring a new national emergency but also in including third countries supplying oil to Cuba within the scope of US punishment, transforming oil supply from a bilateral trade matter into a strategic lever with extraterritorial deterrence. The problem is not simply that Cuba is "short of oil," but that in modern society, once fuel is cut off, electricity, water supply, transportation, hospitals, schools, food distribution, cold chain storage, and public safety will be rapidly impacted. In other words, the energy issue is crucial here because it can directly translate economic pressure into a weakening of national capacity and infrastructure problems into issues of regime stability. The US has precisely targeted this point, making the energy chain the central axis of its entire containment system.
Complementing this energy deterrence is the meticulous segmentation of transaction structures implemented by the U.S. Treasury and Commerce Departments, a key element in understanding the true nature of U.S. policy hierarchy. On the one hand, the Treasury retains permitted space for specific oil transactions targeting the Cuban private sector and individual consumers, and not settled through the Cuban state system; on the other hand, it explicitly excludes Cuban state institutions, the military, intelligence systems, entities on the State Department's restricted list, and all Cuban banks. The Commerce Department further suspends facilitation of foreign exchange deposits into Cuban banks, while retaining pathways for private sector and individual end-user purposes. This results not in simple "loosening" or "tightening," but in a highly defined institutional "state-private dualism": economic activities not organized by the unified socialist state can partially continue, even to a limited extent; however, anything essential to maintaining Cuba's national finances, settlement, energy allocation, public services, and overall governance must be continuously targeted, weakened, and isolated.
This makes it easier to understand why the US policy of "helping the Cuban people" cannot be viewed as a neutral humanitarian technical issue. While maintaining limited aid through churches and specific charitable channels, the US simultaneously raises the cost of living and uncertainty for the Cuban people by suspending visas, imposing visa deposits, reducing immigration visas, and restricting the movement of people. While claiming to be unwilling to allow a "humanitarian disaster" in Cuba, the US continues to crack down on energy and banking channels. There is no such thing as value neutrality here, because the institutional definition of "helping the people" actually means: it can help social forces that are detached from the overall organization of the socialist state, but it absolutely forbids assistance to the financial, energy, banking, and administrative systems that form the backbone of the Cuban socialist state. The modern form of imperialism is increasingly less about direct traditional colonial occupation, and more about restructuring the relationship between the state and society through institutional fragmentation, and eroding the integrity of the socialist regime by fostering "denationalized" economic and social spaces.
Furthermore, the change in Trump's own rhetoric has made the subjective intent of this institutional project even clearer. In early February, he spoke of Cuba primarily in a negotiator's tone, claiming that "a deal will be made," as if the issue remained at the level of negotiation and exchange. By mid-March, he had openly used dominant language such as "friendly takeover," "I would be honored to take Cuba in some way," and "I can do whatever I want with it." Although the U.S. Southern Command subsequently stated publicly that it was not preparing for an invasion or occupation of Cuba, meaning that the U.S.'s primary form of action was still economic warfare rather than direct military occupation, this precisely illustrates that imperialism does not always resort to landing ships and Marines first; it can completely dismantle its opponent through energy suffocation, financial blockade, technological blockade, and institutional division. The verbal "takeover" stance and the institutional "separation" arrangements are two sides of the same strategic logic.
Ultimately, the US's multi-pronged approach towards Cuba is not aimed at any specific Cuban diplomatic stance, nor at general national discord, but rather at the Cuban socialist state's capacity for independent reproduction. The US does not oppose all Cuban economic activity; it opposes those activities that maintain the unity, political autonomy, and organizational capacity of the Cuban socialist state. The US does not simply reject all private business; it even selectively preserves channels for the Cuban private sector, but only on the premise that these channels weaken, rather than strengthen, the state system under the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party. Therefore, the underlying logic of this struggle is not an abstract debate about "market versus non-market," but rather a class question: "Who organizes social reproduction, who controls strategic resources, and who determines the direction of social development?"
It is in this sense that the US sanctions against Cuba must be seen as an economic war, a systemic war, and a slow-moving political war of disintegration waged by the contemporary international monopoly capitalist state apparatus against a socialist regime. It targets not only Cuba's current difficulties, but also the very possibility of the continued existence of socialism as a real system. Since the essence of the problem lies here, the Cuban issue cannot be reduced to a matter of US-Cuba relations, but must rise to the level of a struggle between capitalist and socialist systems worldwide. It is from this logical starting point that the Cuban issue naturally transforms into an internationalist issue, rather than a marginal matter that any bystander can coldly observe.
If the above analysis reveals the institutional structure and class nature of imperialist pressure, then the next question that inevitably arises is: since Cuba is facing an organized encirclement targeting the socialist system, what responsibility do international socialist forces, traditional friendly countries, and all anti-hegemonic forces in the world bear? This requires us to delve into the second level of the Cuban question.
II. The Internationalist Dimension of the Cuban Question and the Real Responsibilities of the Socialist Bloc
First, we must correct a superficial interpretation: the simplistic understanding of Cuba's current attacks as "the consequences of sanctions stemming from anti-American sentiment." While the Cuban issue and the Venezuelan issue erupted around the same time, they are fundamentally different. Simplifying the Cuban issue essentially substitutes diplomatic psychology for a fundamental social analysis, thus narrowing the understanding of the problem from the outset. The repeated use of phrases like "communist Cuban regime," "support for hostile actors," and "poses an unusual threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy" in official U.S. documents clearly indicates that the target is not some emotional anti-American attitude in Cuba, but rather the institutional fact that Cuba adheres to communist leadership, a state-led economy, and an anti-imperialist, independent development path. In other words, Cuba is a target not because of "what it said," but because of "what it is." For imperialism, a Cuba that has long existed in the Western Hemisphere and continues to exist as a socialist state represents a systemic negation.
Because the crux of the problem lies here, for China, Cuba is by no means a distant, ordinary diplomatic partner, but rather a part of the still-existing socialist camp. Its status as the only socialist country in the Western Hemisphere is not a mere formality, but an international political fact: within the strategic space closest to the United States, Cuba continues its anti-imperialist, anti-hegemonic, and anti-dependent development path as a communist-led socialist state. This dictates that Cuba's fate cannot be understood solely through the lens of Caribbean affairs; it is also intertwined with the events in Venezuela in January 2026, culminating in Maduro's illegal arrest and imprisonment—the current Cuban issue must be understood within the broader context of the international balance of socialist power. For socialist countries, the Communist Party of Cuba is not merely a ruling party in the conventional sense, but a fraternal party, a force that has shared historical responsibility in the long-term anti-imperialist struggle and socialist construction.
Therefore, aid from China and Russia, Cuba's traditional friendly nations, should not be interpreted as mere diplomatic goodwill, but rather as a practical action to maintain the balance of power within the socialist system. The aid framework already established by China is not a one-off symbolic gesture, but rather structural support including emergency financial aid, food donations, solar equipment, and photovoltaic projects. It aims both to alleviate immediate difficulties and to help Cuba reduce its fragile dependence on external liquid fuels. The special significance of this aid lies in the fact that it is not simply patching up problems, but rather an attempt to simultaneously address both national capacity and the fundamental needs of the people, helping Cuba rebuild a more resilient production structure, rather than merely maintaining short-term superficial stability.
Complementing China's position is Russia's role in providing strong political backing, financial commitments, and direct fuel supplies. Russia has publicly stated its continued support for Cuba, including financial assistance; simultaneously, the deployment of Russian oil tankers and diesel shipments to Cuba demonstrates that Russia is addressing Cuba's most pressing fuel shortage. The significance here is not to romanticize any particular nation, but to recognize that internationalism today is not a singular form, but rather involves a real division of labor. For a socialist country facing energy constraints, risking sanctions and shipping risks to provide direct fuel supplies is itself a politically significant action. It shows that Cuba is not completely isolated, and that imperialist attempts to create political isolation through supply chain disruptions have not entirely succeeded.
Connecting with the two relatively typical forms of narrow internationalist support from China and Russia is a broader support network comprised of Mexico, Brazil, Canada, the international left, and the United Nations system. Even after Mexico was forced to suspend oil supplies to Cuba under US pressure, it still shipped large quantities of humanitarian aid to Havana; Brazil prepared to send bulk food; Canada provided nutritional assistance through the World Food Programme and UNICEF; relevant UN mechanisms publicly characterized the new US measures as a "fuel blockade" and emphasized its humanitarian consequences; more than ninety political organizations jointly signed a statement in support of Cuba, and convoys of European and American left-wing convoys, medical supplies, and hygiene products also arrived. This multi-tiered aid structure indicates that support for Cuba is no longer limited to traditional interstate relations but is beginning to expand into a complex structure comprised of states, international organizations, political parties, trade unions, social movements, and transnational public opinion.
It is crucial to grasp that the very diversity of these aid efforts demonstrates that internationalism in its broadest sense has entered a stage of specialization and institutionalization under contemporary conditions. China prioritizes structural energy and basic livelihoods; Russia focuses on direct fuel and political guarantees; Mexico and Brazil emphasize food and emergency supplies; the UN system prioritizes legitimacy and humanitarian channels; and the international left emphasizes public opinion, political mobilization, and symbolic efforts to break the blockade. These forces should not be viewed as isolated fragments simply because they manifest themselves differently; on the contrary, they collectively constitute a real-world form of the international support chain for socialism under anti-blockade conditions. Internationalism today is no longer primarily manifested as a single-center, command-style support, but rather as multi-point coordination, multi-layered support, and functional complementarity forming around a pressured socialist country.
If the severe setbacks of the world socialist system at the end of the 20th century were largely manifested in the collapse and destruction of the Soviet Union, the de facto center of the international communist movement, leading to the breakdown of international support chains, the disintegration of the economic mutual aid system, and the passive acceptance of capitalism as the "only path," then the same historical logic must not be allowed to repeat itself in the Cuban question today. The issue is not merely whether Cuba can weather its current difficulties, but whether the working people of the world will once again stand idly by while imperialism, through prolonged blockades, energy suffocation, and internal social disintegration, forces a socialist country into a passive retreat, isolation, and eventual loss of institutional initiative. Historical experience has shown that setbacks for socialism are never merely domestic events in a single country, but are immediately exploited by imperialism as ideological weapons and opportunities for political expansion on a global scale.
This leads to a significant conclusion: supporting Cuba is not about emotional alignment, but about upholding proletarian internationalism, the principle of anti-hegemony, and the historical rationality of a development path that opposes dependency. Therefore, for international aid to truly have an impact, it cannot remain merely an abstract statement; it must be integrated with Cuba's internal capacity building, organizational stability, and policy adjustments. External aid is necessary not to replace Cuba's own historical initiative, but to enable that initiative to translate into tangible results. This naturally leads to the next level of question: what is the true political and economic significance of Cuba's current reforms and adjustments?
III. Strategic Adjustments and Consolidation of Socialist Regime
Beyond internationalist responsibilities, it is crucial to understand the internal logic of Cuba's current reforms, because without internal reorganization, external support cannot be transformed into lasting strength. The Communist Party of Cuba faces not merely a general economic slowdown, but a complex crisis compounded by fuel shortages, a fragile power grid, a contraction in transportation, strained healthcare, rising local discontent, and intensified international pressure. Under these conditions, any truly responsible socialist party cannot maintain order solely through slogans; it must reorganize state capacity, social protection, production recovery, and organizational integration. Cuba's current policy is precisely a form of "crisis-driven opening" and "organizational reconfiguration" unfolding under these conditions of strong external pressure and high vulnerability. This "opening" is not a capitulation to capital; this "reconfiguration" is not a temporary administrative patch, but a focused, boundary-bound, and targeted rearrangement of the state and social order, ensuring that the working-class regime does not lose strategic initiative.
From the perspective of the structure of administrative measures, Cuba's anti-crisis policy was not primarily expansionist, but rather centered on a reordering of priorities. Fuel was prioritized for water supply, healthcare, food production, defense, and security; the transportation system was reduced to a minimum operational level; schools and universities shifted to semi-in-person or localized arrangements; and workers were reassigned to public services, agriculture, and community work with wage guarantees and union involvement. Simultaneously, grassroots representatives were freed from their original posts to better engage in community work, explain policies, gather suggestions, and participate in price and supply monitoring; the media system, while reducing print media, shifted towards digital dissemination and free mobile access. This arrangement demonstrates that the Cuban Communist Party was not simply shrinking the state, nor was it leaving everything to the market to regulate; rather, it was redefining the priorities of state functions under conditions of scarce resources, ensuring that limited capacity was prioritized for key aspects of maintaining overall social reproduction. The logic here is clear: what a socialist state must first preserve during a crisis is not the rate of profit, but the people's livelihood, basic order, and the state's organizational capacity.
From the perspective of the structure of economic measures, Cuba is not passively waiting for the external environment to improve, but is actively rebuilding several key aspects of socialist reproduction. The original government plan for "correcting deviations and revitalizing the economy" has been updated into the 2026 Economic and Social Plan, with expanded specific goals, actions, and indicator systems. Arrangements such as enterprise autonomy, local autonomy, cooperation between state and non-state sectors, foreign exchange self-financing schemes, closed-loop foreign exchange operations, expanded municipal approval powers, and the maintenance of the social protection system indicate that Cuba has linked crisis management with institutional adjustments. In particular, the 86 foreign exchange self-financing schemes and the continued support for vulnerable families, mothers with three or more children, and key communities demonstrate that Cuba does not interpret adjustments as abandoning social responsibility, but rather is attempting to maintain organizational ties and the distribution of responsibility between the state and the grassroots through more flexible mechanisms.
The most theoretically significant point here is that Cuba, while recently opening up to private and expatriate capital, has not relinquished state leadership. Instead, it has restructured the role of market elements within a framework of state regulation. Allowing overseas Cubans to invest in private enterprises on the island, participate in non-bank financial institutions and investment funds, open foreign exchange accounts, and connect with Cuban private entities through the Foreign Investment Law certainly signifies a new stage of economic openness. However, equally important is that Cuba has not relinquished this openness to unrestrained market logic. Instead, it simultaneously incorporates newly entering economic forces within the institutional boundaries set by the state through energy licenses, foreign exchange account rules, local approval procedures, and state-non-state cooperation mechanisms. Market factors are not declared as the supreme principle here, but rather used as an instrumental element for the state to restore production and replenish resources. In other words, the core issue has never been the existence of market factors, but rather who holds political dominance, who defines institutional boundaries, and who determines the overall social purpose that these market factors ultimately serve.
Because of this inherent tension, Cuba's reforms cannot be vulgarly reduced to a retreat to capitalism, but should be understood as a strategic maneuver to preserve and reorganize socialist forces in a hostile environment. The "state-private dualism" promoted by imperialism aimed to separate the private sector from the socialist state as a whole, making market forces a wedge against national unity. Cuba's current policy, however, is the opposite; it attempts to re-weave private and expatriate capital, local economic vitality, and national development goals, preventing non-state factors from becoming mere proxy variables for external pressures. The key issue is not whether market elements exist, but who holds political dominance, who controls strategic resources, and who dictates which social goals market forces should serve. As long as this remains unchanged, strategic adjustments cannot be simply equated with institutional surrender.
From a comparative historical perspective, there are indeed serious points of comparison between Cuba's current policies and China's reform and opening up that began in 1978, but this comparison can only be established under strict limitations. One similarity is that neither began with abandoning the leadership of the Communist Party, but rather allowed non-state economies, external capital, and local dynamism to play a role within certain limits, while maintaining the socialist political premise. The differences are even more important, because China's reform and opening up unfolded under relatively stable external conditions and broader domestic resources, while Cuba today is pursuing "crisis-driven opening up" under conditions of a comprehensive embargo, energy suffocation, financial disruption, and shipping self-avoidance. Therefore, simply comparing Cuba to "a repetition of China" is superficial; however, completely severing the common approach of "economic flexibility under political continuity" between the two is equally incorrect.
From the perspective of scientific socialism, the fundamental spirit revealed by Lenin's New Economic Policy does not lie in the worship of the market, but in allowing necessary strategic retreats while maintaining the strategic initiative of the proletarian regime, in exchange for the conditions for production recovery, social reorganization, and future offensive. The key issue has never been whether market relations exist, but whether these relations are constrained by the strategic direction of the socialist state and whether they serve the recovery of production, the consolidation of power, and the expansion of the social base of the proletariat and the working masses. In this spirit, "retreating for a better advance" is not a defensive slogan, but a political and economic judgment with strict preconditions: only when the state still holds the strategic high ground, and only when the leadership of the Party and social protection have not collapsed, are necessary adjustments a means of building strength, not a defeat.
Observing Cuba using this approach helps us understand why the current "crisis-driven opening up" contains both risks and possibilities. On the one hand, opening up to foreign capital, expanding private activities, decentralizing local authority, and introducing more foreign exchange mechanisms could indeed lead to new social divisions, differences in interests, and governance complexities. On the other hand, if the fuel crisis, production stagnation, and resource shortages are handled in the old ways under the current extremely severe crisis, the actual capacity of the socialist state will be eroded more quickly, ultimately creating conditions for the political disintegration desired by imperialism. The true socialist stance is never to reject all adjustments, but to safeguard the bottom line of the nature of the regime, strategic resources, and social protection during adjustments, and to incorporate necessary strategic maneuvering into the overall interests of the proletarian state.
Linked to this policy maneuvering is the continued decisive significance of the organizational stability currently exhibited by the Communist Party of Cuba. To date, there is no evidence of an open split or large-scale reshuffling at the top levels of Cuba; Díaz-Canel, Marrero, Roberto Morales Ojeda, and the core leaders of the military, interior, and state organs continue to handle crisis, defense, and foreign engagement issues collectively; Raúl Castro still appears in strategic pronouncements as the revolutionary leader. This indicates that Cuba's primary contradiction at present does not lie in the collapse of top-level power, but rather in the immense pressure on the middle and lower-level implementation chains, the increased burden on local governance, and rising social and emotional instability. Therefore, the destructive protests against local Communist Party committees in Morón and other places, as well as the nationwide power grid collapse, should neither be exaggerated as evidence of impending regime collapse nor downplayed as insignificant isolated incidents; they should be understood as signals that the state's capacity and organizational resilience are undergoing a severe test under high pressure.
Therefore, the true measure of Cuba's reforms lies not in the absolute size of market share, but in whether the state can continue to maintain strategic high ground in energy, finance, social protection, organizational mobilization, and ideological leadership. As long as the Communist Party leadership, the state-led strategic direction, the protection of vulnerable groups, and the organizational embedding in local society remain, the limited introduction of private and expatriate capital does not necessarily signify a capitalist restoration; on the contrary, it could become a necessary link in restoring production, alleviating supply shortages, stabilizing expectations, and expanding the effectiveness of international aid. The issue is not whether to use certain market tools, but whether these tools are tamed by the proletarian state and incorporated into the overall goals of socialism.
Therefore, our conclusion is quite clear: only by understanding Cuba's current reforms as a political economy for consolidating the socialist regime, rather than imagining them as the beginning of de-socialism, can we avoid conceptually repeating the narrative traps presupposed by imperialism. Imperialism hopes that Cuba will either stagnate and bleed out, or disintegrate and collapse; however, if Cuba can combine "crisis-driven opening" with "organizational reallocation," it may avoid both stagnation and disintegration, and form a more resilient form of socialist governance in a highly hostile international environment. This is not a risk-free path, but in real history, true socialism has never progressed in a risk-free vacuum; it has always preserved itself, rebuilt itself, and continued to move forward amidst contradictions, pressures, and necessary adjustments.
In conclusion: Supporting Cuba is supporting socialism, internationalism, and the struggle against hegemony.
In conclusion, the situation in Cuba today forces us to re-examine a question that is not new, but has long been deliberately downplayed by many: can socialism continue to exist as a state form under the highly technological, financialized, and mediated encirclement of imperialism? The pressure exerted by the United States on Cuba has shown that contemporary imperialism does not necessarily resort to open invasion first; it can erode the reproductive foundation of a socialist state through energy suffocation, changes in payment pathways, restrictions on the movement of people, and the "state-private dualism." Cuba's response, on the other hand, demonstrates that socialism does not mean rigidity; it can transform necessary adjustments into tools for defending the regime and restoring production through "crisis-driven opening" and "organizational reconfiguration." Here, dialectical materialism is not abstract philosophy, but rather the dynamic form of realpolitik itself.
Therefore, the significance of supporting Cuba must be clearly defined as: supporting socialism, supporting internationalism, and supporting opposition to neo-imperialism, neo-hegemonism, and neo-fascism. Anti-neo-fascism today is not merely opposing a historical name, but opposing all political practices characterized by collective punishment, disregard for sovereignty, economic suffocation, and dominant "takeover" rhetoric; internationalism is not abstract sympathy, but opposing the isolation and depletion of a socialist country through prolonged encirclement; supporting socialism is not ignoring real problems, but adhering to the understanding of the unity of reform, aid, and struggle based on the nature of the regime, the state's capacity, and the interests of the working people. In other words, Cuba is not an object to be passively observed, because the Cuban question tests the fundamental question of whether socialism can still stand as a real historical force in the world today.
Therefore, support for Cuba cannot remain merely a moral gesture; it must be transformed into a higher level of theoretical and practical awareness. We must more clearly expose the true nature of the US sanctions against Cuba, not embellishing them as "democratic pressure" or "humanitarian concern," but explicitly pointing out that it is a long-term siege of a socialist country by the financial capitalist state apparatus, an institutional project attempting to achieve political subversion through economic warfare. We must more resolutely support the efforts of the Cuban Communist Party and the Cuban people to safeguard national independence, uphold the socialist direction, and protect the basic livelihoods of the masses under extremely difficult conditions. We must also more profoundly understand that internationalism is never a mild expression of sympathy, but a serious historical responsibility: to ensure that, under the real conditions of the struggle between capitalism and socialism, socialist countries are not isolated, the working people's regime is not stifled, and imperialism cannot accomplish, under the guise of "technical sanctions," the goals it failed to achieve through direct aggression.
Cuba's difficulties, risks, and contradictions today are real; but equally real is that socialist countries have not lost their capacity to fight, internationalist forces have not completely broken down, and the world's people's stance against hegemony and oppression has not disappeared. The key lies in whether these scattered and sometimes unstable forces can be reorganized and transformed into a real force for defending socialism, opposing imperialism, and rebuilding a just world order. If this can be achieved, Cuba will not merely be a passive victim of pressure, but will continue to exist as a strong fulcrum in the historical process of world socialism. Only in this sense is the Cuban question not merely a Cuban question, but a mirror, a front line, and a test of the entire contemporary struggle between capitalism and socialism.
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