TROTSKY AND THE ANTI-LENIN CONSPIRACY.
INTRODUCTION.
AFTER
the defeat of the "July Days", following the February Russian
revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government, under the leadership of
Alexander Kerensky, conducted a 'witch-hunt' campaign against Lenin and the
Bolshevik party. Lenin and his collaborators were accused of being agents of
the German general staff. This anti-Leninist conspiracy influenced many in the
Bolshevik party itself. At this time, Trotsky had begun his collaboration with
the Bolsheviks. This paper examines the role Trotsky played in the anti-Lenin
conspiracy, which reached its high point after the defeats experienced by the
working class and the party following the July events.
The
aim of the anti-Lenin conspiracy was to remove and isolate Lenin from the
Bolshevik leadership, to undermine the party and thus abort any attempts at
socialist revolution in opposition to the aim that Lenin had set himself on his
return to Russia in April 1917.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND.
The
Russian revolutions of 1917, particularly the seizure of power by the working
class led by the Bolshevik party in October (November) of that year, changed
the world. For the first time, the working class had come to power, thus
ushering in a new epoch of world history that reaches down to the present day.
These momentous events, i.e. the seizure of power by the working class, were
made possible by the untiring work of Lenin and his associates. This work
involved, particularly, the struggle against opportunism and revisionism, which
laid the foundations for the success of the Bolsheviks in 'October' 1917.
However, when the February 1917 revolution broke out Lenin had been abroad in exile for many years, and had settled in Switzerland. The alliance against Germany during the First World War had refused Lenin permit to return to Russia through territory under their control. However, acting on Lenin's behalf, socialist sympathisers, in particular Fritz Platten, the Secretary of the Swiss Social Democratic Party, had succeeded in arranging with the German government for the return of Lenin to Russia, which meant travelling through Germany. This became known as the journey in the famous "sealed train" of Lenin and his other companions.
These
events formed the basis for the propaganda of the Russian counter-revolution
that Lenin was a German agent. The real reasons for such slanders against Lenin
had more to do, or rather, everything to do with Lenin's views regarding the
direction of the Russian revolution and concomitantly his attitude towards the
Provisional Government, which had taken over the reins of government after
Tsarism collapsed in 1917.
The First World War had underlined the correctness of Lenin's
struggle against opportunism. To the surprise of Lenin, international social
democracy in all the main belligerent countries had sided with their own
bourgeoisie when war broke out in 1914. Even Plekhanov, "the father of
Russian Marxism" and one of the early mentors of Lenin, had become a
defencist. This betrayal of social democracy continues to be the case down to
this day. By supporting the imperialist bourgeoisie in the imperialist war,
which broke out in 1914, social democracy confirmed that it had become a
pro-imperialist trend within the working class.
The task for Marxists, as Lenin saw it, was to break the
working class from following this pro-imperialist tendency. For Lenin this took
the form of opposing the war, and calling for the working class to transform
this war into a civil war against the bourgeoisie. Lenin was thus, from the
start, at loggerheads with the pro-imperialist right wing of the labour
movement.
The collaboration of social democracy with the most
reactionary imperialist circles in the war meant, for Lenin, that the Second
International had collapsed, as far as the socialist revolution was concerned.
Revisionism had triumphed in the International. Rather than using the
imperialist war to argue for revolution and socialism, these traitors to the
working class excused themselves with the argument that socialism in one
country was impossible, that it had to be simultaneous in all the advanced
countries.
Lenin had shown in his work "imperialism, the highest
stage of capitalism" (1916) that the bourgeoisie in all the imperialist
countries had created a stratum of privileged workers. This satisfied stratum
enjoyed a petty-bourgeois life-style and therefore had an interest in the
continuation of imperialism. They were the agents of the capitalist class in
the working class movement and socialism. They regarded Bolshevism as the
enemy.
The
imperialist war of 1914-18 had irreparably split the working class movement
into two camps: the defencists, who defended their own imperialist bourgeoisie,
and the defeatists, who called for the defeat of their own bourgeoisie. This
was the situation when Lenin returned to Petrograd, Russia through Germany in
April 1917, where the social-imperialists had dominated the Soviets from the
beginning of the revolution.
LENIN
IN PETROGRAD.
The
elimination of Lenin from the revolutionary leadership was the basic purpose of
those who took part in the anti-Lenin conspiracy of 1917. The slander against
Lenin and the Bolshevik party was therefore, from this angle, a foregone
conclusion. The counter-revolution started to spread rumours that Lenin was an
agent of a foreign power, Germany. Since such agents did indeed exist, such
rumours were all the more credible in the eyes of many. These rumours were
being spread even before Lenin's arrival in Petrograd. In fact, the anti-Lenin
conspirators were at work soon after the February revolution broke out, and
were to find unexpected allies in the Bolshevik party itself. On his return to
Russia, on his way to party headquarters, Lenin
'...stopped
repeatedly to address the people, railing against the war, the Provisional
Government, and the Mensheviks as "traitors to the cause of the
proletariat, peace and freedom". His speeches disturbed many of his
listeners. "Ought to stick a bayonet into a fellow like that...Must be a
German agent", Sukhanov overheard one angry remark'. (Ian Grey: Stalin -
Man of History; p. 91).
April
4 was the first working day for Lenin in Petrograd. He attended a meeting of
the reformist dominated Petrograd Executive of the Soviet. Lenin gave an
account of his return to Russia through Germany and asked the Executive
Committee that the journey be approved by the meeting, but
'Lenin's proposals were not accepted'. (Lenin: A biography; Progress Publishers, Moscow; p.238) 1
The
defencist policy of the reformist, opportunist leadership of the Soviets, which
was, at the beginning shared by the masses, ensured that the anti-Lenin
conspiracy had fertile ground on which to develop. This was to come to fruition
after the "July Days", of 1917. Lenin's views on the direction of the
revolution not only placed him at odds with the opportunist, social-imperialist
majority in the Soviets, but also with many members of the Bolshevik party, so
that
'The party was shaken by his aggressive demands for
immediate revolution'. (Ian Grey: Stalin-Man of history; ibid.)
And,
indeed,
'Pravda denounced it as "unacceptable, in that it
starts from the assumption that the bourgeois democratic revolution is
ended."'. (Ian Grey: ibid.)
Opposition
to Lenin was also because
'Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other leading Bolsheviks as well
as many ordinary members opposed not only his main thesis but also his ban on
relations with the Mensheviks '. (Ian Grey: ibid.)
Lenin
was confronted by the fact that
'...not all the members of the Central Committee shared
Lenin's views of the prospect of revolution at that time. Some did not agree
that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was completed and that there
must be a struggle for the transition to a socialist revolution' (Lenin: A
biography: Progress Publishers; p.239)
It
is clear how the anti-Lenin conspiracy of the bourgeois counter-revolution was
to find some sort of support even among some of Lenin's closest supporters at
the time. The anti-Lenin conspiracy was formed on a foundation, which had three
interwoven strands. The first was that Lenin had travelled through Germany on
his return to Russia and was supposedly an agent of the German general staff
who wanted to knock Russia out of the war. To some extent, the previous
accusations against the Tsarina that she was pro-German were transferred on to
Lenin's shoulders. The second strand, related to the first, was that Lenin
favoured the policy of revolutionary defeatism. That Lenin espoused the policy
of revolutionary defeatism, i.e., calling for the defeat of his own Government
served to reinforce the views of the counter-revolution that Lenin was a German
agent. In reality, of course, Lenin was calling for the defeat of the
imperialist Provisional Government, which would further the cause of world
socialism. The third strand in the foundation of the anti-Lenin Conspiracy was
that Lenin was calling, in April 1917, for turning the bourgeois democratic
revolution into the socialist revolution.
Lenin,
therefore, experienced a certain degree of isolation on returning to Russia in
1917, and the struggle to isolate him further found an echo in certain ranks of
the Bolshevik party. To his credit, Stalin was one of the first in the
Bolshevik leadership to adhere to the new line being advanced by Lenin. Lenin's
line was to find another adherent from an unlikely new ally, L. D. Trotsky,
whose theory of permanent revolution coincided with the new line Lenin was
arguing for: turning the capitalist revolution into a socialist one.
LENIN AND TROTSKY.
Trotsky
had been a long-standing rival of Lenin and opponent of Bolshevism in the
Russian revolutionary Marxist movement from about 1903. As late as May 1917,
when he returned to Russia, Trotsky, speaking for himself and the group in
which he was a member, the Mezhrayontsi, or the inter-district group, said 'I
cannot call myself a Bolshevik.... We cannot be asked to recognise Bolshevism '.
(See: Lenin Miscellany IV, Russian edition. pp. 302-03)
So
that in the period of the 1917 revolution, right down to May of that year,
Trotsky was still opposing Bolshevism, i.e. Leninism. This is an important
aspect of the anti-Lenin conspiracy, which light will be thrown on later. Even
in 1917 Trotsky had still not grasped the significance of Lenin's struggle
against opportunism and revisionism. Trotsky, although he had advocated an
ultra-radical theory which he had named "permanent revolution", a
phrase he borrowed from Marx, had never really understood Lenin's struggle on
the question of the party, that is, the importance of forming a party separate
from the opportunists and the revisionists. On this issue Lenin fought Trotsky
all the way. Nevertheless during the 1917 revolution
'In May Trotsky arrived from abroad and greatly
strengthened Lenin's position '. (Ian Grey: Stalin, Man of history; p.91)
Trotsky
had put aside his previous differences with Lenin. This new co-operation
between both men being based on agreement to take the bourgeois revolution
forward to socialism. Gray remarks that
'At the time of his return to Russia, Trotsky was not even
a member of the Bolshevik party, but he was soon to be welcomed with enthusiasm
and elected at once to the Central Committee '. (Gray; op. cit, p. 92)
Trotsky
began to work closely with the Bolshevik party on his return to Russia,
formally joining the party at the Sixth Congress in August together with the
Mezhrayontsi group, following the July days.
During
June 18, in Petrograd, a mass demonstration of about half a million took place
against the new offensive which the Provisional Government had ordered on the
same date, with most of the demonstrators carrying Bolshevik placards and
slogans. In his article "The Eighteenth of June" , Lenin remarked
'In
one way or another, June 18 will go down as a turning point in the history of
the Russian revolution ', (Lenin: C. W. Vol. 25; p.109)
The
June 18 demonstration had revealed the real class polarisation that was
occurring, with the bourgeoisie, Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries on one
side and the working class and the Bolsheviks on the other side. Thus in
Lenin's view,
'The demonstration of June 18 was a demonstration of the
strength and policy of the revolutionary proletariat, which is showing the
direction for the revolution and indicating the way out of the impasse '. (Lenin:
Ibid.)
The
failure of the offensive and the lives lost, again brought out masses of
workers and soldiers onto the streets on July 3-4, demanding a transfer of
power to the Soviets. This anti-government demonstration assumed the character
of a semi-insurrection. Lenin described the July days as more than a
demonstration but less than an insurrection. The result was that the
Bolsheviks, contrary to facts, were accused of leading this mass movement in an
attempted seizure of power. In reality, the Bolshevik leadership had regarded a
seizure of power at this time as premature.
'This demonstration terrified the bourgeoisie and its
Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary hangers-on, as well as the
counter-revolutionary generals and the Anglo-French imperialists '. (Lenin:
A biography: Progress Publishers Moscow; p.249)
The
July protests coincided with news of the defeated offensive, which the
Provisional Government had ordered at the front. The collapse of this offensive
made it easy for the bourgeoisie and their press to start a campaign to prove
that Lenin was a German agent. On the night of July 4, the Justice Minister, P.
N. Pereverzev revealed documents to the press that falsely implicated Lenin as
a German agent. Thus began a period of anti-Lenin, anti-Bolshevik hysteria, and
'The Provisional Government at last decided to take steps
to repress the Bolsheviks '. (Leonard Schapiro: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union;
p. 168)
The
counter-revolution began to gain confidence as a result of which
'The demonstrators were fired upon and the streets of
Petrograd ran with blood '. (Lenin: A biography: Progress Publishers,
Moscow; p; 250)
And
in the following days
'...mass searches and confiscation of arms were carried
out among the workers. Revolutionary regiments were disarmed, arrests were made
among the soldiers '. (Lenin: Ibid.)
The
Bolshevik printing press was wrecked. On the morning of July 5, Pravda
editorial offices were raided.
'Lenin, who had called there just before they raided the
place, nearly fell into their hands '. (Lenin: Ibid.)
On
July 7, following these raids the Provisional Government
'...issued warrants for the arrest and indictment of Lenin
and a number of other Bolsheviks '. (Lenin: Ibid.)
And
the counter-revolutionary newspapers both Constitutional-Democrat and
Menshevik, etc, demanded
'...that Lenin should appear in court '. (Lenin:
Ibid.)
Caught
in the middle between revolution from the left and counter-revolution from the
right, the provisional Government and their reformist, social-imperialist
supporters in the Soviets decided to strike against the left. Lenin's life was
obviously in danger at this point. The claim by the bourgeois press that the
Bolsheviks were German agents led to a temporary collapse of support for
Bolshevism. Bolsheviks were being beaten up on the streets and the party press
suppressed. Thus, after the defeats of the July days it was dangerous to call
yourself a Bolshevik. The events following the July days were a turning point
for Lenin and the Bolshevik party. The counter-revolution was going all out to
destroy the Bolshevik party. Lenin had to go into hiding. But
'Certain Bolsheviks, who did not fully understand the
situation, also considered that Lenin should not remain in hiding, that he
ought to appear in court. If he did not, they said, it would be bad for the
Party's prestige '. (Lenin: Op. cit.; p.251).
Trotsky
called the July days "The month of the great slander" and writes that
'The attacks upon Lenin at that time became a veritable
hurricane '. (Trotsky: The history of the Russian revolution; p.98).
And
he continues
'All the insults of the ruling group, all their fears, all
their bitterness, were now directed against that party which stood at the
extreme left and incarnated most completely the unconquerable force of the
revolution '. (Trotsky: op. cit. p.117)
Trotsky
relates that in a conversation with Lenin, the latter asked: 'Aren 't they
getting ready to shoot us all '. (Trotsky: op. cit. p.104)
And
Trotsky's analysis of the situation was that
'Only such an intention could explain the official stamp
placed upon that monstrous slander '. (Ibid.)
In
other words, in his history Trotsky concurs with Lenin that the campaign
against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, following the July days, were aimed at
eliminating the Bolshevik leadership. There is nothing to suggest that he did
not have this same view during the events themselves.
Trotsky
remarks that 'Lenin considered the enemy capable of carrying through to the end
the scheme they had thought up, and decided not to fall into their hands '.
(Trotsky: The history of the Russian revolution, vol. 2 p.104)
He
also reveals that
'On the evening of the 6th, Kerensky arrived from the front
all stuffed full of suggestions of the generals, and demanded decisive measures
against the Bolsheviks '. (Ibid.)
Therefore
there can be absolutely no doubt that Lenin's life, following the July days,
was in mortal danger from the bourgeois counter-revolution. By linking the
defeats on the Russian front with the July anti-government demonstrations, the
counter-revolutionaries were able to argue that the Bolsheviks, in particular
Lenin, were working for Germany. This was the essence of the anti-Lenin conspiracy.
However, an immediate concern for the bourgeoisie and pro-capitalist reformist
leadership of the Soviets was the question of the Petrograd garrison. The
struggle to isolate Lenin was partly related to this question.
At
the time of the February revolution, which led to the formation of the
bourgeois Provisional Government, the Petrograd garrison owed its allegiance to
the pro-capitalist leadership of the Soviets, which in turn supported the
Provisional Government. However, by summer 1917, this garrison increasingly
came under Bolshevik influence. Thus from the bourgeois view measures had to be
taken to discredit Lenin and the Bolshevik party in the eyes of the soldiers.
There was no better way to do this than to spread rumours that Lenin was an agent
working for Germany.
During
the anti-Bolshevik hysteria, whipped up by the bourgeois press, and
particularly directed at Lenin, the latter
'...was preparing his party for a return to clandestinity
'. (Deutscher: The Prophet armed-Trotsky, 1879-1921; p.274)
The
aim of the bourgeoisie and their reformist supporters was to block all attempts
at a workers revolution. This meant turning the army and the masses against
Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The pro-capitalist, social-imperialist leadership of
the Soviets demanded from the Bolshevik Soviet faction 'an immediate,
categorical and clear condemnation' of the party's leaders, for supposedly
instigating an attempted uprising during July 3-4.
At
this time the counter-revolution was putting maximum pressure on the Central
Committee of the Bolshevik party to hand over Lenin to stand trial on the
accusation levelled against him of being a German agent. Trotsky relates that
'...in the Bolshevik ranks -- at least in the upper
circles there was wavering on the subject of Lenin's avoiding an investigation
'. (Trotsky: The history of the Russian revolution, Vol. 2; p.106)
And
Trotsky recounts that 'July became a month of shameless, unbridled and
triumphant slander '. (Trotsky: ibid.)
In
summary, the situation was that this slanderous campaign against Lenin was
translated into attacks on members or supporters of the party. One Bolshevik,
Voinov was killed; his crime, selling a party paper. The Bolsheviks were being
driven back and Lenin was in hiding. One of the provincial heads of the
intelligence services revealed the attitude of the ruling class by expressing
his view that
'The reports of the intelligence services as to the former
activities of Lenin, as to his connection with the German staff, as to his
receipt of German gold, are convincing enough to hang him immediately '. (Trotsky:
The history of the Russian revolution, Vol. 2; p.110)
The
lynch mob atmosphere against Lenin was raised to white heat, and Trotsky in his
history of the revolution, comments that 'The history of all revolutions and
civil wars invariably testifies that a threatened or an overthrown ruling class
is disposed to find the cause of its misfortunes, not in itself, but in foreign
agents and emissaries '. (Trotsky: op. cit. p.120-121).
In
his autobiography, Trotsky wrote that
'...the streets of the capital teemed with slander against
the Bolsheviks '. (Leon Trotsky: My Life; penguin books; p.302).
And, 'They did not shoot us down one by one, although they
were not far from it. Bolsheviks were being beaten down in the streets and
killed '. (Trotsky: My Life;
pp. 325-326).
THE DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER LENIN SHOULD APPEAR IN COURT.
After
the July days, the counter-revolution was on the march. For the bourgeoisie, it
became clear, if it was ever doubted, that the Bolsheviks represented a mortal
threat to its rule. This situation formed the general background to discussions
that started in the Bolshevik party about whether Lenin should give himself up
and face the charges of treason directed at him. If convicted the penalty for
treason would have been death or a long term in prison. 2
This
was also the ideal opportunity for those who wanted Lenin out of the way. Those
who wanted to remove Lenin from the leadership for either political reasons or
reasons of ambition could now hide behind the anti-Lenin conspiracy, which in
the party assumed the form of the debate about whether Lenin should turn
himself in to the authorities and face the courts. 3
It
is obvious, of course, why the imperialists and their reformist social-imperialist
stooges wanted Lenin out of the way. Less obvious are the reasons why some in
the party wanted Lenin to go, either temporarily or permanently from the scene.
On his return from exile, as we have shown, Pravda opposed the direction in which
Lenin wanted to lead the revolution. This opposition was led by Kamenev.
Trotsky recounts that while Lenin was away in hiding
'...Kamenev's wing was raising its head '. (Trotsky:
My Life; p.326)
Kamenev
wanted Lenin out of the way for political reasons. He was one of those who
together with Rykov and Zinoviev opposed Lenin's new political line, aimed at
the seizure of power by the working class. They favoured the continuation of
the revolution along bourgeois democratic lines, arguing that Russia had not reached
a stage of development, which made socialism feasible. There were Bolsheviks
who believed that Lenin should turn himself in to the authorities and counter
the charges against him. They argued that this would benefit the party by
exposing the anti-Bolshevik slanders. This, however, was a misreading of the
nature and purpose of the anti-Lenin conspiracy. The Conspiracy was not
concerned about establishing the truth on the basis of facts, but rather the
purpose was to destroy the Bolshevik party, reversing its increasing political
influence. This would need the arrest and isolation of Lenin from the party and
his murder. Lenin had called for a Soviet Inquiry Commission to examine the
charges against himself and Zinoviev " ...in conditions precluding the
danger of attack from the counterrevolution" . Trotsky writes that
'The disinclination of the Soviet Commission to begin the
promised investigation finally convinced Lenin that the Compromisers were
washing their hands of the case, and leaving it to the mercies of the White
Guards '. (Trotsky: The history of the Russian revolution, Vol. 2; p.105) 4
It
is here that we have to look at the role of another person in these events.
This person is Trotsky himself. Unlike Kamenev, Zinoviev and Rykov, Trotsky agreed
with Lenin that the revolution should be led towards a seizure of power by the
working class. Lenin had based this political line on the concrete conditions
arising from the imperialist war. Trotsky had based the same conclusion on his
abstract theory of "permanent revolution" , although without wartime
conditions, a revolution against Tsarism would have taken a different course
reducing the chances of the Bolsheviks taking power or at least holding on to
it. 5
Although
agreement on the seizure of power led Trotsky to work with and later join the
Bolsheviks in August, Trotsky had regarded Lenin as more of a rival than as a
collaborator. This rivalry had motivated many of Trotsky's actions in the past,
that is before the 1917 revolution, and during the revolution. It would
continue to do so in future as well. During the revolution, Trotsky's rivalry
with Lenin took several forms. It showed itself distinctly three times. The
first was when in May, in negotiations to join the Bolshevik party, he declared
that he could not call himself a Bolshevik. In effect this was saying that the
party should change its name. 6
The
second time Trotsky's rivalry with Lenin revealed itself was when warrants were
issued for the arrest of Lenin and Zinoviev and Kamenev. Trotsky, instead of
going into hiding as Lenin had done, in fact had done the opposite. Trotsky
wrote a letter to the Provisional Government requesting the issuing of warrants
for his own arrest as well. Thus, Trotsky saw warrants of arrest as a badge of
honour, which he had at all cost to wear if Lenin wore one. In this way, we see
that Trotsky not only placed his own life in danger, but his own personal glory
before the interests of the revolution.
In
his autobiography, Trotsky relates how he had informed the
counter-revolutionary authorities about his desire to be arrested along with
Lenin. He wrote a letter to the Provisional Government remonstrating
'You can have no grounds for exempting me from the
action of the decree by virtue of which Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev are subject
to arrest; you can have no grounds for doubting that I am as irreconcilably
opposed to the general policy of the provisional Government as my
above-mentioned comrades '.
Trotsky
was promptly arrested. Unlike Lenin, he had foolishly handed himself over to
the counter-revolution. In order to gain the 'prestige ' of having a warrant
out for his arrest, so as not to be out done by Lenin, with whom he was in
constant rivalry, Trotsky gave himself up to the Provisional Government. Historically
Trotsky obviously wants us to believe that in demanding to be arrested he was
expressing solidarity with Lenin, but the best way to have shown solidarity was
to remain or to have gone into hiding himself, regardless of whether a warrant
was issued for his arrest or not. Trotsky comes out of this small drama looking
rather foolish or fearless depending on your point of view.
The
third and most dangerous form in which Trotsky's rivalry with Lenin expressed
itself was on the issue of whether or not Lenin should turn himself in to the
Provisional Government and appear in court 7 This was a question, which divided leading
circles in the Bolshevik party. Lenin, at first, had decided to hand himself in
and make a court appearance if he could get assurances about his safety. Such
assurances were sought from the Executive Committee of the reformist dominated
Petrograd Soviet who were in cahoots with the Provisional Government, but no
assurances were forthcoming, and Lenin sensibly decided to remain in hiding. Stalin,
at first, argued Lenin's line that if there were firm assurances safeguarding
Lenin's life, an appearance in court would be possible. Later Stalin came out
against Lenin appearing in court altogether. This was noted by Kruptskaya on
the evening of July 7. 8
Trotsky's
role in the matter of whether Lenin should turn himself in to the
counterrevolutionary authorities is a matter of historical controversy. The
record suggests that Trotsky was in favour of Lenin appearing in court, i.e.,
turning himself over to the counter-revolutionary lynch mob, which was baiting
the Bolsheviks, and had already attacked and killed members of the party.
The
question, which begs itself, is: what was Trotsky's motive in wanting Lenin to
hand himself in to the counter-revolution?
The
matter of whether Lenin should surrender himself to the authorities was
resolved at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party, which was held in secret
from July 26 to August 3, 1917.
'The Congress discussed whether Lenin should appear for trial.
Kamenev, Rykov, Trotsky and others had held even before the Congress that Lenin
ought to appear before the counter-revolutionary court '. (History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks] short course, Foreign
Languages Publishing House Moscow, 1939; p. 198)
We
know that Kamenev and Rykov disagreed with Lenin's political line, aimed at
socialist revolution. We can therefore surmise that these would have been quite
happy or relieved had Lenin been removed from the leadership at this time.
However, the question of Trotsky's motives for wanting to see Lenin removed
from the leadership of the Bolshevik party cannot be traced to matters of
political orientation in regard to the issue of the seizure of power. Unless we
assume that Trotsky was completely naïve, and that he actually believed that
the bourgeois counter-revolution would deal with Lenin according to the rules
of justice, we are compelled to arrive at the view that Trotsky's motives were
Machiavellian and of a personal nature.
Trotsky
was motivated purely by his personal rivalry with Lenin. Inferentially we can
say he was prepared to sacrifice Lenin to the counter-revolution in the
interest of his own pursuit of power. That this surrender of Lenin would have
entailed his imprisonment and inevitable murder at some point was of secondary
importance to Trotsky. As shown, the decision of the Sixth Congress of the
party was that Lenin should not appear in court because the court was still in
the service of the counter-revolutionary class. Stalin, in particular, fought
against Lenin appearing.
'Stalin was vigorously opposed to Lenin appearing for
trial’. (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks]
short course; p.198)
Stalin's
view had been the position of the Congress:
'This was also the stand of the Sixth Congress, for it
considered that it would be a lynching mob, not a trial '. (Ibid.)
Unlike
Trotsky, who wanted to hand Lenin over to the reactionary lynch mob as a means
of removing Lenin from the Bolshevik leadership, and hence the leadership of
the revolution, the Sixth Congress
'...had no doubt that the bourgeoisie wanted only one
thing -- the physical destruction of Lenin as the most dangerous enemy of the
bourgeoisie '. (Ibid.) 9
If
the Sixth Congress entertained 'no doubt ' that Lenin would have been murdered
by the counter-revolution, there is no reason for believing that Trotsky, who
knew the histories of revolutions, could have had any doubts about the results
of handing Lenin over to the counter-revolutionary officers of the bourgeoisie.
Later
when Trotsky wrote a rather bilious account of Stalin's life, he unconvincingly
claims, in an attempt to re-write the story of these events, that he had never
participated in discussions about whether Lenin should appear in court, i.e.,
give himself up to the authorities. Trotsky writes casually that
'As a matter of fact, I personally took no part in those
conferences, since during those hours I was myself obliged to go into hiding '.
(Stalin, an appraisal of the
man and his influence, p.212)
But
whether Trotsky took part in 'conferences ' is hardly the issue. 10 It remains inconceivable that Trotsky never
took part in discussions about whether to give up Lenin to the Provisional
Government. He was working closely with the Bolsheviks at this time. It is
obvious that he participated in discussions relating to this matter and was in
favour of surrendering Lenin to the counter-revolution. Trotsky could hardly
have opposed Lenin's surrender to the bourgeois courts, if he had himself
written to the Provisional Government inviting his own arrest. We have seen how
Trotsky's actions was motivated by his rivalry with Lenin, not out of
solidarity as he later claimed.
That
Trotsky's action was motivated by his rivalry with Lenin is underscored by his
remark that
'Stalin was not arrested and was not even formally
indicted in this case for the simple reason that he was politically
non-existent as far as the authorities or public opinion were concerned '. (Trotsky:
Stalin; p.212)
Trotsky
writes that 'During the fierce persecution of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, myself
and others, Stalin was hardly ever mentioned in the press although he was an
editor of Pravda and signed its articles '. (Trotsky: ibid.)
All
this goes to show Trotsky's competitive streak in his relations with other
people in general and Lenin in particular. The question which can be
legitimately raised is, if Trotsky was being fiercely persecuted as he suggests
above, he would hardly have needed to write a letter to the Provisional
Government inviting his own arrest. The letter was written because Trotsky was
in rivalry with Lenin, and in this instance, the rivalry took a foolish form of
submitting himself to the counter-revolution. This was done to look good in the
eyes of history, so to speak.
Trotsky
tries to extricate himself from being implicated as one of those who argued for
Lenin to hand himself over to the counter-revolution, but fails. Although the
suggestion that he had not participated in discussions about whether Lenin
should appear in court is obviously disingenuous; had he not participated in
such discussions he would certainly have known about them, and his opinions on
the matter known. Lunacharsky, who was from the same group as Trotsky -- the
Mezhrayontsi, knew about them, participated and in fact changed his position
from Lenin appearing in court to one of not appearing. Nogin did the same.
Non-participation by Trotsky would have been intentional, in order to help
those who wanted Lenin to appear in court.
Trotsky
recounts a story told by one General Polotovsev and writes
'To what extent the opponents of Lenin's surrender to the
authorities were right was proved subsequently by the story of the officer
commanding the troops, General Polotovtsev. "The officer going to Terioki
[ Finland] in hopes of catching Lenin asked me if I wanted to receive that
gentleman whole or in pieces...I replied with a smile that people under arrest
very often try to escape" . For the organisers of judicial forgery it was
not a question of "justice" but of seizing and killing Lenin, as was
done two years later in Germany with Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg '. (Trotsky:
The history of the Russian revolution, Vol. 2; p.212)
Thus,
what was being debated was not simply a matter of Lenin appearing in court to
defend himself against charges of being a German agent, or of leading the July
'insurrection '. The real issue was Lenin's life and the evidence suggests that
Trotsky criminally wanted Lenin to be handed over to the counter-revolution.
His own biographer, Isaac Deutscher, reveals that Trotsky thought
'...that Lenin had nothing to hide, that, on the contrary,
he had every interest in laying his record before the public, and that in this
way he could serve his cause better than by flight, which would merely add to
any adverse appearances by which people might judge him '. (Isaac
Deutscher: The prophet armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921; p.274)
But
Deutscher avoids the question of Trotsky's real motive in wanting Lenin to
appear in court, in an attempt to exonerate Trotsky. We assume of course that
Deutscher, who is indulgent towards Trotsky, had some notion of Trotsky's
intrigue against Lenin during the anti-Lenin conspiracy. The British
Trotskyist, Alan Woods, is no better in this respect. On the question of
whether Lenin should be handed over to the counter-revolution, he tries to
cover for Trotsky. Woods argues that
'The party leaders finally persuaded Lenin to go into
hiding. That was undoubtedly the correct line of action. Lenin was more use to
the revolution alive than dead or locked up '. (Alan Woods: Bolshevism: the
road to revolution; p.565)
Without
mentioning the role of Stalin who defeated the camp of those who wanted Lenin
to appear in court, Wood writes that
'It is true that a section of the party was in favour of
Lenin going on Trial, with the idea of defending himself from the accused's
bench, as Trotsky had done in 1906. But such an idea would have been madness '.
(Alan Woods: ibid.)
Bu
this 'madness ' was fought by Stalin, of whom, in regard to the question of
Lenin being handed over to the counter-revolution, Trotsky himself remarks that
'Stalin held out more tenaciously than others and was
proved right'. (Trotsky: Stalin; p. 212)
Woods
avoids, like Deutscher, raising the thorny issue of Trotsky's real, but
concealed motives for wanting Lenin to appear in court. All we are offered in
lieu of an explanation, and in way of an apology is that Trotsky defended
himself in court in 1906, following the defeat of the 1905 revolution. Nor does
Woods raise the question relating to Trotsky's later unconvincing denials about
not participating in discussions about whether to hand Lenin over to the
counter-revolutionary authorities or not.
Woods
writes that
'Later, the majority of the Sixth Party Congress, which
met in Petrograd at the end of July, considered the question correctly and
concluded that Lenin would never have reached the courtroom, but have fallen to
some assassin's bullet, "shot whilst trying to escape" . Even if that
were only a possibility, the party had no right to risk the life of Lenin on a
gamblers throw '. (A. Woods: Bolshevism, road to revolution; p.565-566)
Woods
is right of course, although it was less a question of a "gamblers
throw" and more a question of throwing Lenin to the wolves. At the centre
of the anti-Lenin conspiracy of 1917 was the question of whether Lenin should
make a court appearance, in other words, whether Lenin should be handed over to
the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie or not. There can be little doubt that
the issue at stake was whether Lenin should live and retain his freedom to act,
or to die. This is recognised clearly by Woods who is adamant that
'There can be no doubt that Lenin's life was in danger at
this moment in time. The counter-revolution was rampant '. (Alan Woods:
Bolshevism, road to revolution; p.566)
That
Lenin's life was in danger is obvious to Woods. It was also obvious to the
Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party. In fact it is obvious to any student of
the Russian revolution. Therefore, that Lenin's life was in danger must also
have been blatantly obvious to Trotsky. Anyone who argues that this was not
obvious to Trotsky is arguing that he was an utter naïve parliamentary cretin,
which he clearly was not. The danger to Lenin's life eventually became obvious
to Nogin, Lunacharsky and of course was obvious to Stalin.
Alan
Woods remarks that
'Given the general atmosphere of hysteria and the
accusation directed personally against Lenin as a German agent, it would have
been the height of irresponsibility to entrust him to the tender mercies of the
"law" in a period of counter-revolution '. (A. Woods: Bolshevism,
road to revolution; p.566)
For
Woods, it would have been only a question of "irresponsibility " to
give Lenin over to the tender mercies of the "law" , i.e., throw him
to the wolves at a time of counter-revolutionary hysteria. Marxist-Leninists
beg to disagree with Alan Woods on this point. What was involved here cannot
simply be interpreted as "irresponsibility" in the camp of all those
who wanted to surrender Lenin to counter-revolution. Involved here was also a
matter of intrigue to remove Lenin from the party leadership. The camp which
wanted Lenin to appear in court contained naïve elements as well as intriguers
against Lenin's leadership.
What
is clear is that the Bolshevik party was, following the July 3-4
demonstrations, or semi-insurrection in Petrograd, polarised between two views.
Those in favour of Lenin appearing in court, which was also Trotsky's position,
and those against. At the Sixth Congress, Stalin led the camp of those who were
against Lenin appearing in a counter-revolutionary court, that is against
turning Lenin over to certain imprisonment or assassination, or judicial
murder. Theja Gunawarhana upholds the Marxist-Leninist accounts of these events
and relates that
'...following a resolution put by Stalin (i.e., for
socialist revolution, Ed.) the Sixth Congress next considered whether Lenin
should appear for trial since Rykov, Trotsky and Kamenev were contending that
Lenin ought to appear before the counterrevolutionary court. The Congress
opposed Lenin's appearance for a trial which was bound to be more a lynching
than trial '. (Theja Gundawardhana: Khrushchevism; p.103)
It
is no exaggeration to say that the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party which
assembled between July 26 to August 3, 1917, is probably the most important
Congress in Twentieth Century political history, because this Congress, led by
Stalin decided the fate of Lenin and consequently the Russian revolution. In
these fateful days, Stalin led Sverdlov, Molotov and Ordjonikidze, in fact the
majority of the Congress, to protect the life of Lenin. Stalin was able easily
to defeat the pro-trial camp because its leaders were in hiding.
If
anyone doubts the fateful role played by Stalin in these events at the Sixth
Congress, they have only to remember the fate of Rosa Luxembourg and Karl
Liebknecht. Writing on the murder of the aforementioned, Alan Woods, although
covering up for Trotsky's intrigue against Lenin and his indifference to the
latter's life, remarks that
'Two years later, during the Spartakist uprising in Berlin
-- a movement which was strikingly similar to the July Days -- Rosa Luxembourg
and Karl Liebknecht failed to take the necessary precautions and were arrested
by counter-revolutionary officers. They did not believe that they would be
murdered in cold blood, but that is just what happened. The murder of the two
most outstanding leaders of the German working class had a disastrous effect on
the whole course of the German revolution and the history of the world. Yes,
they showed personal bravery. But what a terrible price was paid for that
mistake! If they had gone underground, as Lenin did, the future of the German
revolution would have been in safe hands '. (Alan Woods: op. cit. p. 566)
In
his anti-Stalin biography, Trotsky tells us cynically that
'The question of who "saved" Lenin in those days
and who wanted him "ruined" occupies no small place in Soviet
literature '. (Trotsky: Stalin, an appraisal of the man and his influence;
p.211)
Although
it is clear who saved Lenin's life, that is who argued against a court
appearance, i.e., primarily Stalin, Sverdlov, Molotov, Ordonikidze and those
they led, it has been less clear who wanted Lenin "ruined" .
Bourgeois writers mostly ignore this question. The same applies to Trotskyist
writers. This is particularly easy to do because the motives of those who were
in favour of handing Lenin over to the counter-revolutionary courts were mixed.
Irresponsibility was mixed with naivety and conscious intrigue against Lenin's
leadership. The intrigue against Lenin's leadership was itself a combination of
straightforward political differences on the question of the seizure of power
for socialism (Kamenev) and longing-standing personal rivalry (Trotsky).
Trotsky's concealed intrigue against Lenin's leadership is not surprising
although it sheds light on his duplicity.
We
have already mentioned Alan Woods, who gives no credit to Stalin for the role
he played in saving Lenin. There can be no doubt about Stalin's role because
Trotsky himself recounts a story told by Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, that on July
7 at the Alliluyev's apartment, Lenin had made up his mind to appear in court,
but
'...Stalin and others persuaded Ilyich (Lenin, ed.) not to
appear in court and thereby saved his life '. (Trotsky: Stalin -- an
appraisal of the man and his influence; p.211)
The
attitude of Trotsky to the efforts of Stalin and others to save Lenin's life is
remarkable. Trotsky relates a story told by Ordzhonikidze of how he met Stalin
at the Tauride Palace, the enemy headquarters, and how both were able to leave
unpunished. Trotsky's motive here is to discredit Stalin, because he was not
seized at the Tauride Palace. Trotsky does not see that seizing Stalin and
Ordzhonikidze at this point would have blown the attempts of the authorities to
lure Lenin into their trap. Needless to say, Lenin's close collaborators would
have been under close surveillance by the agents of the authorities in the hope
that one of them would lead the authorities to Lenin's hideout.
As
for the question of whether Lenin should go into hiding, Trotsky remarks
indifferently that
'The same old argument was renewed at the Alliluyev's
apartment; to surrender Lenin or to hide? ' (Trotsky: Stalin, an appraisal
of the man and his influence; p.211)
In
the story related by Ordzhonkidze and recounted by Trotsky, we are told that
'More categorical than any other against surrender was
Stalin: "The Junkers [military students, equivalent of West Pointers]
won't take you as far as prison, they 'll kill you on the way." '
Trotsky
writes that 'At that moment Stasova appeared and informed them of a new rumour
-- that Lenin was, according to the documents of the Police Department, a provocateur
'. According to Ordzhonkidze, Lenin ' " ...declared with the utmost
determination that he must not go to jail " '. (Trotsky: ibid.)
Trotsky
confesses that those, who like Stalin, was against surrendering Lenin to the
counter-revolution, were proved right, but of course can say nothing about his
role in the intrigue against Lenin. Trotsky's use of the phrase 'the same old
argument was renewed' on the question of Lenin giving himself up or not,
certainly does not suggest the attitude of a person who was concerned about
Lenin's fate. Although these lines were written some years after the events to
which they refer, what they reveal is Trotsky's real feelings, his lack of
concern and indifference about the threat posed to Lenin's life at that time.
There
were those on the side of Lenin appearing in court who may have been indignant
at the thought that Lenin had accepted money from the German Government,
according to the rumours spread by the Provisional Government and
counter-revolutionary press in Russia. As Leonard Schapiro writes,
'...there were many in the party for whom the acceptance
of money from an imperialist power for the purpose of making revolution was
contrary to Bolshevik ethics, and the suspicion that Lenin might have done so
may perhaps explain their subsequent readiness to jettison him as a leader '. (L.
Schapiro: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union; p.179)
Among
these there were, no doubt, Bolsheviks who thought that by going on the run
Lenin would give credence to the anti-Bolshevik slanders that Lenin was a
German agent.
In
any event, those who wanted Lenin removed from the party leadership, and there
was a mixture of motives at work here, regarded the aftermath of the July days
as the best opportunity they had of achieving their purpose. Trotsky's motives,
as we explained, was based on ambition. His rivalry with Lenin had kept him out
of the Bolshevik party from its foundation. On being invited to join the
Bolshevik party on his return to Russia in May 1917, Trotsky made it clear to Lenin
that he could not call himself a Bolshevik. This attitude was an expression of
the rivalry, which Trotsky had maintained against Lenin for many years.
Regarding
Stalin's argument shared by the majority of the party that Lenin should not
appear in a counter-revolutionary court, that he would be killed before
reaching the courtroom, Trotsky remarks in his biography on Stalin, that
'Stalin was more convinced than the others of the
inevitability of a bloody reprisal; such a solution was quite in accordance with
his own cast of thought. Moreover, he was far from inclined to worry about what
"public opinion" might say '. (Trotsky: Stalin, an appraisal of
the man and his influence; p.212)
Trotsky
does not reveal what his own views were at the time. His interpretation of
Stalin's determined efforts to save Lenin's life in the days of the anti-Lenin
conspiracy is certainly the diametrical opposite to Lenin's interpretation.
After Stalin and others, on the evening of July 7, had persuaded Lenin not
surrender to the counter-revolution, on July 8, Lenin wrote his article
entitled: 'The question of the Bolshevik leaders appearing in court '. This
article states the following:
'Judging by private conversations, there are two opinions
on this issue. Comrades succumbing to the "Soviet atmosphere" often
incline towards appearing in court. Those closer to the workers apparently
incline towards not appearing.
In principle, the question chiefly boils down to an
estimation of what is called constitutional illusions. Anyone who thinks that a
regular government and a regular court exist or can exist in Russia, that a
Constituent Assembly is likely to be called, may arrive at a conclusion in
favour of appearing.
That idea is completely erroneous, however. It is the latest
events, after July 4, that have most vividly shown that the Constituent
Assembly is unlikely to be called (without a new revolution), that neither a
regular government nor a regular court exists or can exist in Russia (at
present).
The court is an organ of power. The liberals sometimes forget
this, but it is a sin for a Marxist to do so.
Where, then, is the power? Who constitutes the power? There
is no government. It changes daily. It is inactive.
The power that is active is the military dictatorship. Under
these conditions, it is ridiculous even to speak of "courts" . It is
not a question of "courts" , but of an episode in the civil war. This
is what those in favour of appearing in court unfortunately do not want to
understand.
Pereverzev and Alexinsky as initiators of the
"case"!! Isn't it ridiculous to speak of courts in such
circumstances? Isn 't it naïve to think that, in such conditions, any court can
examine, investigate and establish anything?
Power is in the hands of the military dictatorship. Without a
new revolution, this power can only become stronger for a certain time,
primarily for the duration of the war.
"I have done nothing against the law. The courts are
just. They will sort things out. The trial will be public. The people will
understand. I shall appear" .
This reasoning is childishly naïve. The authorities need
not a trial but a persecution campaign against the internationalists. What
Kerensky and Co. need is to put them in goal and keep them there. So it was (in
Britain and France), and so it will be in (in Russia).
Let the internationalists work illegally as much as they can,
but let them not commit the folly of appearing in court of their own free will!
(Lenin: Collected Works,
Vol. 25; pp. 174-175, July 8 [21], 1917).
We
have shown that Trotsky, of his "own free will" , wrote a letter to
Kerensky inviting the Provisional Government to arrest him, so that he could
supposedly demonstrate his "solidarity " with Lenin and the Bolshevik
party. This party had been driven under ground by the same Provisional
Government. However, in his article, Lenin makes clear that those who are
against appearing in court are usually those who are closer to the working
class. In other words, Lenin clearly believes that the question: for or against
appearing in court, is a class question, at least in the aforementioned
circumstances. On the basis of Lenin's arguments, we can say that Stalin's
opposition to Lenin appearing in court was determined by his class orientation.
On the other hand, most of those who stood for Lenin appearing in court had
succumbed to what Lenin called the "Soviet atmosphere" and they
suffered from constitutional illusions.
'The court is an organ of power. The liberals often forget this, but it is a sin for a Marxist to do so ', Lenin remarks, and he regards these types as 'childishly naïve'.
'The court is an organ of power. The liberals often forget this, but it is a sin for a Marxist to do so ', Lenin remarks, and he regards these types as 'childishly naïve'.
Whether
or not these points were aimed mainly at Trotsky's supporters, some of whom,
like Trotsky, was in favour of Lenin appearing in court, is not clear. In any
case, one cannot convincingly argue that Trotsky was overcome by
"constitutional illusions" in the aftermath of the July days. This
factor would therefore not have affected Trotsky's judgement when he argued
that Lenin should appear in court or in other words, hand himself over to the
counter-revolution.
A
case could be made that Trotsky did, in fact, suffer from "constitutional
illusions" , on the basis that he willingly turned himself in, writing a
letter to the Provisional Government asking to be taken into custody. Such an
argument would be unconvincing because of what we know of Trotsky, and in any
case would not withstand serious consideration in view of what has already been
said regarding Trotsky's longstanding rivalry with Lenin. It was this rivalry
which motivated Trotsky to incite the Provisional Government to take him into
custody, i.e., put out a warrant for his own arrest. As was said previously,
Trotsky wanted to wear his arrest as a "badge of honour" , rather
than risk leaving this "honour" to Lenin alone, and the others who
had warrants out for their arrest. Trotsky wanted to ensure he was regarded as
someone in the same league as Lenin by being arrested himself. Thus, Trotsky
was prepared to sacrifice his own safety out of competition with Lenin. This is
confirmed by the fact that he later used the "prestige" of being
arrested by the Provisional Government to attack Stalin, because the latter had
not been arrested.
In
trying to arrive at an understanding of why Trotsky wanted Lenin to appear in
court, in a period after the July events, that is, in the period of
counter-revolution and mass hysteria against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, whipped
up by the bourgeoisie, we need to place Trotsky's motives within the context of
his long-standing rivalry with Lenin over the question of leadership of the
revolutionary movement, which in 1917 was the Bolshevik party.
Due
to his long-standing rivalry with Lenin, which is fully documented, Trotsky,
after leading the 'interdistrict group' (Mezhrayontsi) into the Bolshevik
party, following the July days, was presented with a golden opportunity to
remove Lenin from the Bolshevik party leadership. Trotsky therefore argued that
Lenin should appear in court. But he was obliged to pursue a two-track policy.
On the one hand, he had to vigorously oppose the slanderous accusation that
Lenin was an agent of the German general staff, while, on the other hand,
siding with those who wanted Lenin to appear in court to face these charges. In
other words, Trotsky sought to turn the anti-Lenin conspiracy to his own
advantage. Trotsky supported those, whom for whatever reason, wanted to throw
Lenin to the wolves of counter-revolution following the July days. However,
Trotsky supported them for his own concealed motives.
Had
Lenin, instead of going into hiding, given himself up to the Provisional
Government, as Trotsky and others desired, his fate would have been sealed. He
would have been murdered by counter-revolutionary elements, as in fact was
later to be the fate of Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht, during the
Spartakist uprising in Berlin, Germany, 1919, which as the Trotskyist, Alan
Woods claims
'...was strikingly similar to the July days... ' (A.
Woods: Bolshevism, the road to revolution; p. 566)
Lenin's possible, or rather, inevitable incarceration and
murder, had he handed himself over to the bourgeois counterrevolution, as
Trotsky and others desired, apparently meant nothing to Trotsky. When Trotsky
was cheated of this prize, after Stalin on the evening of July 7 persuaded
Lenin to go into hiding, Trotsky had nothing left to do apart from inviting his
own arrest by the Provisional Government, which he later displayed for all the
world to see. This would ensure that Trotsky, like Lenin, would be regarded by
history as one feared by the bourgeoisie, a status, which, due to Trotsky's
rivalry with Lenin, he could not leave to Lenin.
To reconcile Trotsky's deplorable behaviour in these events
with the generally held view of Trotsky held by many among the left
intelligentsia is only possible to those who have made a study of Trotsky's
long-standing rivalry with Lenin, a rivalry centred on the question of the
leadership of the Russian revolution.
Trotsky had a gift of being able, with a measure of success,
to conceal his own opportunism from many. He preened himself in the mirror of
history, to mould an image appropriate to the stature and grandeur in which he
held himself. Trotsky carefully nurtured his image for posterity with
consummate skill, like a Shakespearean hero on stage. However, when this veil
is ripped away, what emerges is a man motivated by an irrepressible lust for
glory, unconscionable in the highest degree.
To
Trotsky, Lenin's imprisonment or murder by an hysterical counter-revolution was
a small price to pay if this would ensure the centre stage role Trotsky had
marked out for himself.
Before
the Russian revolution of 1917, Lenin's nickname for Trotsky was "Judas
Trotsky", Judas being one of the disciples who betrayed Jesus to his
executioners for a pot of gold. Judas is also a central character in M. N. Saltykov-Shchedrin's
novel, "The Messrs. Golovlyovs", who conceals his treachery beneath a
screen of hypocritical phrases.
That
Lenin had to write an article to defend his stand, which was encouraged by
Stalin and others, of not appearing in court, that is, in other words, not
handing himself over to the bourgeois counter-revolution, is certainly
testimony to the existence of a strong group within the Bolshevik party which
based itself on the calculation of using the anti-Lenin conspiracy to remove
Lenin from the leadership in the aftermath of the July days crisis. To this
grouping Lenin's demise, whether through imprisonment or more likely
assassination, was of secondary concern. That these events roughly coincided
with the entry of Trotsky's Mezhrayontsi group into the Bolshevik party at its
Sixth Congress, July 26 - August 3, can hardly be considered to be purely
accidental.
CONCLUSION.
The
anti-Lenin conspiracy was organised by those who wanted to keep Russia in the
imperialist war of 1914-1918. When Lenin returned from exile in April, he
outlined a political line aimed at working class political power. This brought
him into conflict with leading Bolsheviks who wanted to continue with the
bourgeois democratic revolution.
These
elements would have been happy to see Lenin go. Others thought that Lenin could
best dispel the charges of being an agent of the German imperialists and of
accepting German gold by appearing in court. Trotsky, who was a long-standing
rival of Lenin, joined the Bolshevik party after the semi-insurrection of the
July days. Trotsky was one of those who argued that Lenin should appear in
court. Trotsky's motive was to capture the leadership of the Bolshevik party.
This meant surrendering Lenin, throwing him to the counter-revolutionary wolves,
so to speak. Thus, Trotsky joined the intrigue to remove Lenin from the
Bolshevik party leadership after the July days in 1917.
For
Trotsky, Lenin's arrest or assassination by the counter-revolution was a small
price to pay if this would ensure him a position of dominance in the leadership
of the revolution. This was the reason why Trotsky argued for Lenin to
surrender himself to the counter-revolutionary courts in the post-July
persecution of the Bolshevik party in 1917. Any argument to the effect that Trotsky
was unaware of the mortal threat hanging over Lenin's life at this time cannot
be taken seriously. We therefore have to conclude that since Trotsky was well
aware of the threat posed to Lenin's life by the counter-revolution and still
argued for Lenin to appear in court, that this was a manoeuvre by Trotsky aimed
at setting-up Lenin for elimination from the revolutionary leadership.
Those
who disagree with this thesis and its conclusion would have to prove
satisfactorily that Trotsky was so naïve in 1917 that he could not possibly
have been aware of the threat posed to Lenin's life by the
counter-revolutionary developments following the July days. This would be the
unconvincing argument that Trotsky had extreme constitutional illusions in
1917, extreme enough to endanger Lenin's life. 11
T.
Clark,
Communist
Party Alliance.
NOTES.
1.
This
edition of Lenin's biography was published under the Soviet revisionists and
does not mention Stalin's role in saving Lenin's life in 1917.
2.
On
a similar note, in 1916, the Irish Volunteers staged a rebellion in Dublin,
proclaiming an Irish Republic. Sir Roger Casement, who appeared in Kerry from a
German submarine carrying a consignment of rifles, was caught by the British
and executed for treason after his conviction.
3.
Lenin's
conviction and execution would have thrown the Bolshevik party into disarray.
There would have been no 'October'!
4.
Trotsky
later claimed he did not participate in debates about whether Lenin should
appear in court. This claim is not supported by direct or even circumstantial
evidence. Trotsky's claim, however brings to mind what he claimed the
opportunist Soviet leadership did, i.e., "washed their hands" of the
Lenin case.
5.
It
took the Great War to bring the Bolsheviks to power. Any attempts to realise
Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, even if in the practice of revolution
he had corrected his position on the peasantry, in the absence of those
specific conditions created by the war, would have had tragic consequence for
the Russian proletariat.
6.
The
Bolshevik Party did change its name. There is no evidence that Trotsky had
anything to do with this. In any case, the name 'Bolsheviks ' was retained in
brackets, i.e., CPSU(B)
7.
The
basic thesis presented in this paper is that Trotsky concealed his intrigue to
eliminate Lenin from the revolutionary leadership behind the anti-Lenin
conspiracy of the bourgeoisie and the social-imperialists.
8.
Stalin's
own position seems to have been complete opposition from the start to Lenin
appearing in court, although for a time he argued Lenin's position of appearing
in court if he could get assurances regarding his safety. It seems that Stalin
argued Lenin's position reluctantly.
9.
This
paper argues that Trotsky must have been aware that the bourgeoisie sought
Lenin's physical destruction, which coincided with Trotsky's intrigue to remove
Lenin from the revolutionary leadership.
10.
The
public clamour for Lenin to appear in court to defend himself would have been
known to everyone involved in the politics of the time. For Trotsky to claim he
remained silent on this issue because he was in hiding is certainly incredible.
If this were true, it would throw doubts on his motives from another angle.
11.
In
his autobiography Trotsky made or supported proposals to the social-imperialist
leaders for a coalition presidium. Trotsky writes:
'We offered to form a coalition with the Mensheviks and the Populists. Lenin, as we afterwards found out, was displeased at that, because he was afraid that it implied conciliatory tendencies on our part'.
(Trotsky: My Life; Penguin Books, 1975; p. 331).
'We offered to form a coalition with the Mensheviks and the Populists. Lenin, as we afterwards found out, was displeased at that, because he was afraid that it implied conciliatory tendencies on our part'.
(Trotsky: My Life; Penguin Books, 1975; p. 331).
Trotsky's conciliationist tendencies, which came to the fore
when Lenin was in hiding, may also have provided additional, underlining
motives for Trotsky at this time to want Lenin out of the way. Trotsky does not
say who else was involved with these proposals.
Communist Party Alliance