On A Fake History 3
(unedited translation)
Still, the "middlegame" of the special political meanness of this infamous fake is hidden in the alleged date of issuing an alleged power of attorney to G. Muller allegedly for negotiating with the NKVD and signing a supposedly "general agreement" (once again I apologize for "abuse" of the word "allegedly", but otherwise it just does not work).
It would seem that at this date this: November 3, 1938 - it is November 3, 1938. What can there be such a supernatural ?!
Do not tell, for, to a deep regret, this date bears in itself a huge, monstrous in its meanness meaning - as, indeed, November 11, 1938, too.
The fact is that before the Polish Jew Herschel (Herschel) Grinshpan "doused" the guilty third secretary of the German embassy in Paris Ernst von Rath without a fault, there were very serious events that had a wide international resonance, the consequence of which, in any case, , and it was this murder itself.
And the beginning of the sequence of events that led to the murder of E. Rath, and to Kristallnacht, was laid back in March 1938. Then, "in March 1938 the Polish government, using the Anschluss of Austria, declared invalid the passports of all Polish citizens , if they were not in Poland for more than 5 years - Polish officials were afraid that 20 thousand Jews who had Polish citizenship and lived in Austria, after the Anschluss will rush to Poland. Every owner of an overdue (under this law) passport was required to enter the country to get a mark in the Polish consulate.
This law, however, also affected 50,000 Polish Jews who lived in Germany for decades (that is, the total number of Polish Jews falling under this law was 70,000 - AM). Most of these people have been left without any citizenship " 62 .
Here it should be noted that anti-Semitism in the same Poland, in particular, in 1938-39. was an order of magnitude higher than even in Nazi Germany, with all its so-called. "Nuremberg laws" on racial purity and mass anti-Semitic antics of storm troopers.
In 1960, the American historian Hoggan wrote that before the war began, the treatment of Jews in Germany was much milder than in Poland: if before November 8, 1938, 600,000 Jews fled from Poland, then from Germany for the same time ie from 30.01.1933 to 08.11.1938) - only 170 thousand meters
Many researchers rightly emphasize that the anti-Semitism that prevailed in Poland in those years still needs to be evaluated accordingly. Moreover, they equally justly emphasize that "it is difficult to believe only in the humanistic motives of France and England, on the side of Poland who entered the war with Nazi Germany," A. Toynbee pointed out in his time "... 65
"... On the other hand, the Hitler government also lost the opportunity to get rid of Eastern Jews by crossing them across the Polish border, since they were no longer Polish citizens. The Polish-German negotiations on this issue did not lead to anything, the Poles resolutely refused to recognize these Jews as their citizens. The Gestapo received an order within four days to expel all Polish Jews from the country and energetically set to work. The striving of the Nazis at all costs to expel the Jews from the country in 1938 led to the so-called "Zboshchinsky expulsion" 66. The point is that in October 1938, when the Polish authorities annulled the passports of Polish Jews living in Germany and Austria, in order to prevent their return back, the Nazis took counter steps. " 67.
According to various reports, according to the order of R. Heydrich, the German police arrested between 17,000 and 18,000 Polish Jews and transported them to the Polish border 68 .
Again, according to different sources, the following happened: after one version, these Jews were driven to the Polish territory at the muzzle of rifles 69 , on the other - on the night of October 28-29, the SS men forced the first batch of deportees to take with them only the most necessary things, to cross the border 70 .
According to one version, followed by the Polish-German border began to play out gruesome scene when both sides want to get rid of the Jews, and, as evidenced by the foreign sources, according to the cynicism and brutality Polish officials far surpassed Hitlerite 71 .
According to another version, that group of Polish Jews, which was forced to go on the Polish territory on the night of 28 on October 29, came under machinegun fire Polish border guards and when they escape from the fire Poles rushed back, then came under fire already German border guards 72 .
Among these Jews was the family Grinshpanov (Grunshpanov), whose 17-year-old son - Herschel (Herschel) lived in Paris, where he studied.
According to one version, in the course of this bombardment, his father, a tailor, Grinshpann, who lived in Hanover since 1911, was killed (sometimes there is an indication that he was only badly injured), according to another version, having received from the sister a postcard describing the ordeals his family felt on border (much of accidents was deported to the Polish border village Zbonschin where, strictly speaking, and gave its name to this inhumane incident), which was contained in the extremely harsh conditions 74 .
Upon learning of the family tragedy, "the young man decided to act: on November 3, 1938, Herschel Grunshpan (he was mentally not quite a normal person) shot five times on the councilor (in fact, in the 3rd secretary - AM) of the German embassy in Paris, member of the NSDAP Ernst von Rath (he died of wounds) " 75 .
Ironically, and Ernst von Rath, and his father was a staunch opponent of persecution of the Jews (the latter in particular, subsequently provided assistance to Jews in the darkest times) 76 .
Who did not have, at least superficially, no, the more serious political motives, Mr. Grynszpan protested obviously wrong address - a true initiator of all this "Zbonschinskogo expulsion" was Poland 77 .
Nevertheless, Goebbels propaganda presented this case as alleged evidence of a world conspiracy of Jews against Germany. The very next day, the chief official of the Nazi Party, the Berlin newspaper Felkischer Beobachter, published a very meaningful phrase: "It is quite obvious that the German people will draw the appropriate conclusion from this event . " 78
The boss of Nazi propaganda - Joseph Goebbels - very cleverly beat then the fact that this murder was not isolated. The fact is that almost three years ago, on February 4, 1936, a Jewish student David Frankfurter (who was from Hungary, according to other sources, from Yugoslavia) killed the head of the local organization of the NSDAP, Wilhelm Gustloff, in Davos, Switzerland (his name was later named one of the largest ships of Germany, which the glorious Soviet submariner A. Marinesko sank in January 1945, having been awarded the "honor" for it to become Hitler's personal enemy, since along with the ship the entire elite of the German submarine fleet also died) ...
And on November 9, 1938, "at a traditional gathering in Munich in honor of the anniversary of the Beer Putsch" (09.11.1923 AM) in an already electrified atmosphere, Goebbels, the best speaker after Hitler in the Third Reich, delivered an inflammatory speech " . And that same evening, in Germany, the pre-planned monstrous anti-Jewish pogrom, which went down in history as "Kristallnacht" (in the documents of the Gestapo "The Red Rooster") began, as it appears from the above directive of G. Müller. "The crowd thundered shops, beat their owners, the streets of German cities were strewn with broken glass from broken windows. Hence the beautiful, almost romantic name ... " 79
I also do not know what "beautiful, almost romantic" the author of the book "The Secrets of the Special Services of the Third Reich" (M., 2003), Theodor Gladkov, has already seen, but so detailed, including. and with his help, the presentation here of those events was not brought by accident.
After all, if - do not bring, of course, the Lord God - a disgustingly infamous fake about allegedly taking place so-called. "General agreement" was rooted in the sharper information turnover of the so-called "general agreement". "Democratic propaganda," it would have turned out that the USSR, in the person of the NKVD, more than consciously went to this supposedly cooperation with the Gestapo "to combat world Jewry"!
Because the date of issue of the power of attorney G. Muller - November 3, 1938, and even more so the date of signing the "general agreement" should mean that the USSR, in the person of its leadership, knew everything in advance, and nevertheless consciously took such a step!
In the Soviet Union really well knew what was happening on the Polish-German border. And, by the way, for this it was not necessary to use information of intelligence - this was reported by all news agencies and the largest newspapers in Europe. Moreover, this ill-smelling consular-passport squabble Poland started in March 1938. So all the vicissitudes of this unsightly story were well known primarily through open information.
As for reconnaissance, both in Poland and in Germany, both Soviet intelligence services - the foreign policy (ING of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR) and the GRU - possessed extremely strong agent positions and despite the difficulties of a very specific period in our history of 1937-38. timely extracted and reported to the Soviet leadership all the necessary information, including. and on this issue.
Suffice it to say that only at the Foreign Ministry of Germany, the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR had such agents as Vin-terfeld and Marta (she was also Augusta, she was Yuna, the wife of a prominent German diplomat), not to mention other and military intelligence was almost literally "under the hood" kept by the entire German embassy in Warsaw, in which three of its agents - Ilsa Stöbe (Alta), Rudolf von Schelia ("Aryan") and Rudolf Gernstadt, worked at once.
But, of course, one of the most valuable agents, "our man in the Gestapo", the now famous "Breitenbach" - Willie Lehman, was the consummate diamond of the Soviet intelligence service network (INO GUGB of the 11th Interior Affairs of the USSR), whose stable connection was maintained until the end of November 1938 in
Communication with the "Breitenbach" was interrupted due to the death of an employee of the Berlin residence of A.I. Agayants (died in early December 1938 during surgery directly on the operating table). To restore the connection with the agent turned out to be very difficult, first of all because because of treachery and escapes of the former high-ranking intelligence officers - Walter Krivitsky (Samuil Gershevich Ginzburg), Alexander Orlova (Leiba Lazarevich Feldbin), etc., under the threat of decryption and failure a significant part of the experienced scouts, incl. and illegal aliens, as well as agent networks. In this situation, no reconnaissance can not do without, unfortunately, a period of passive waiting, the purpose of which is to check the extent of the damage incurred, to identify the unencrypted links of its network, to establish other,
During the first 10 years of cooperation with our intelligence - i.e. from 1929 to November 1938 inclusive - "Breitenbach" presented, as indicated in official intelligence documents, "an extremely plentiful amount of material covering the personnel and structure of the political police, and then the Gestapo, as well as military intelligence, warned about the upcoming arrests of illegal and the legal workers of our residence tour in Berlin, reported on the persons being developed by the Gestapo, most recently gave materials on military construction in Germany. He also directed inquiries on investigative cases in the Gestapo, which we were interested in, covered the general political situation in the country. "
Soviet intelligence had a large number of original documents and personal reports. "Breitenbach", up to 28 volumes, i.е. Based on the then accepted rules of secret record keeping from the agent, it was received from 8,400 to 9,800 pages of various information (300-350 pages in one volume)!
The best aces of Soviet intelligence worked in the German direction in those years, not to mention the fact that "Breitenbach" himself was a professional of the highest class and knew perfectly well what his Soviet "friends" were interested in.
In the presence of such a tandem and especially so many materials, it is completely out of the question that the Breitenbach did not inform the Soviet intelligence about the Polish-German conflict on anti-Jewish grounds, much less so that he did not disclose the planned Gestapo anti-Jewish pogrom on an all-German scale. Not to mention the information of other agents, as well as embassies, TASS and foreign correspondents of Soviet newspapers. And that if there are such data, Stalin would go to cooperation with the Gestapo ?!
However, the meanness of a fake is not limited to the above.
Apparently, its main goal was still in another, more precisely, in an attempt to provoke the emergence in a wide circle of "democratic public" of an extremely false impression that, having signed such a "general agreement", the Soviet Union allegedly was quietly approved the dirty Munich deal of the West with Hitler! That very deal, as a result of which Czechoslovakia was put to the mercy of not only the Hitlerites, but even Poland, insolent, right under the nose of Hitler, occupied Teshinskaya region of Czechoslovakia (at that time there lived 156 thousand Czechs and only 77 thousand Poles who did not crave, like the Sudeten Germans, to fall into the so-called "paradise" called Poland)!
On November 3 and 11, 1938, these are the dates that followed the Munich deal, and if the text of the "general agreement" includes unprecedented insanity about alleged "cooperation and prosperity" between the USSR and Germany, then, consequently, it must come out that the USSR Tacitly approved the Munich deal !?
Firstly, for six months preceding the Munich deal and the occupation of the Hitlerites of the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union Ten Times officially, to the whole world, declared that it would fulfill its mutual assistance agreement in repelling the aggression that was signed between the USSR and Czechoslovakia as early as May 16, 1935 (this agreement was crossed and was closely interrelated with a similar treaty between the USSR and France on May 2, 1935. 80 )
Secondly, the Soviet Union four times privately reported this to France! 81
Third, Four times about the same and also privately reported to the government of Czechoslovakia, but Eduard Benes - the president of this unfortunate country - under the pressure of the West, surrendered his homeland to the Hitlerites! 82
Fourth, Three times about the same and also confidentially declared to the government of Great Britain! 83
Fifthly, the Soviet Union explicitly stated that it would fulfill its obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia, even if France refused it (under these treaties it was provided that the USSR would render assistance to Czechoslovakia only if the same thing, but in advance, will make France)! 84
Sixthly, thereby the Soviet Union clearly declared its readiness to enter into war with Germany, Poland and Romania (Poland at that time had a non-aggression treaty with Germany from 1934, more like a military alliance against the USSR, and an agreement with Romania, on mutual assistance in the struggle against the USSR, which eventually created a triumvirate of bandits to attack the USSR), even if it was necessary to fight only in an alliance in Czechoslovakia (as of autumn 1938, Czechoslovakia was one of the strongest states in Central Europe militarily, and that's why could easily crush even alone were just forming then Hitler's Wehrmacht) 85 . However, as indicated above, the head of Czechoslovakia, E. Benes, surrendered his homeland to the Hitlerites.
Seventh, as early as September 1938, when Poland began to prepare for an attack on Czechoslovakia and concentrate its troops at its borders, the USSR clearly and unequivocally warned Poland that if it were to attack Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would tear up the Soviet-Polish pact on nonaggression without notice 86 .
It was at this moment that something happened that completely excludes the conclusion of any "general agreement".
As soon as the official Warsaw enlightened what this very insinuating hint of the Kremlin meant, it naturally rushed to the Nazi leaders who were dear to its heart for help. And they, of course, promised that "in the case of the Polish-Soviet conflict, the German government will take a more than friendly attitude towards Poland." Thus gitleryugi the mouth of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich Ribbentrop made it clear that the German government would have in this case help Poland 87 .
Stupefied by the Nazi "surprise", the Lyahs shouted with joy that "it is absolutely unbelievable that the Reich could not help Poland in its struggle against the Soviets" - in 1938 it was still like this, and only on September 1 of the following year, 1939 ., the Lyahs finally realized that the Polish goose of the Nazi pig is not a comrade!
In Moscow, of course, immediately learned about this. And who would now explain how, in such a situation, the Kremlin could allegedly go to the cooperation between the NKVD and the Gestapo "for the sake of prosperity of friendship and cooperation" between the USSR and Germany, as alleged in paragraph 1 allegedly § 2 of this "general agreement"? !! Especially if we take into account not only all the above circumstances, but also the fact mentioned earlier that even in the spring of 1938 the prolonged period of the Soviet-German treaty on neutrality and nonaggression of April 24, 1926, in connection with which, and as a result of the dirty Munich deal British prime-scum N. Chember-lin literally demanded of Hitler to attack the USSR!
And finally, although indirectly, but very weighty falsified about the so-called. "General agreement" reveals the following fact.
Already in the spring of 1939, clearly seeing that the West was still deliberately and maliciously unwilling to work with the Soviet Union to create a collective security system in Europe in order to resist the fascist aggression with a united front, and fully aware that the same West, primarily Britain, is quite consciously leading the matter to the USSR having to make an agreement with Germany on the eve of the latter's attack on Poland, which London already knew at the end of March 1939, and to the Kremlin even earlier, the Soviet arms The party decided to provide advance information preparation for such a deployment of events. And this was expressed in the following: in the Central Archives Office - and it, by the way, was then part of the NKVD of the USSR - within its structural subdivision,89 .
So, who would have explained what kind of horseradish leadership of the USSR, incl. and the NKVD of the USSR, took such a step, if they allegedly were supposedly supposed to have a "general agreement" allegedly with the Gestapo ?! And even for the sake of "the development of friendship and cooperation" ?!
It would be much simpler - and Stalin and Beria, by the way, were the highest class masters to find the simplest solutions in any complicated situations - through the channels of such alleged cooperation, called on the sly, to "rub out" the issues of mutual interest and, not collecting information on the crumbs, agree on a non-aggression pact!
However, the leadership of the state went exactly along the above path, incidentally very closely watching all the West's shabbiness with Hitler. In short, although indirectly, this fact also means that there was no "general agreement" at all!
And, incidentally, also because the grieving falsifiers clearly did not know that if such an "agreement", for example, was in reality, then after June 22, 1941 it should have been, according to the then existing rules, in the Special Archives of the NKVD, which, in turn, was to receive a corresponding documentary reflection, at least in the form of an imprint of a stamp that indicated the transfer of the file to the archive, but the NKVD archive!
But falsifiers for that and falsifiers to present to the world a stupid cover on which the CPSU is typographically printed, although, if for some reason, an idiotic legend, it should be so:
firstly, on the cover of the case should be the identification details of the NKVD of the USSR; most likely, the requisites of Beria's personal secretariat already as a People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR;
secondly, identification details on the transfer of this case to the Special Archive of the NKVD of the USSR;
thirdly, the identification details of the re-registration of the archive file of the NKVD of the USSR in the archive file first by the USSR NKGB, and then by the USSR MGB - after all, after the war, there was the MGB;
Fourthly, identification details about the transfer of this archive file from the Special Archive of the USSR MGB to the Special Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU after 1953, etc. etc. And since there is nothing like this, the eloquent lack of such mandatory attributes is all the more indicative of a fake, especially in combination with all of the above. However, this is not all that needs to be said about this infamous fake.
The point is also that the texts of the documents of 1938 and the texts of the documents of 1942, the little-informed readers are "gently" hammered into an extremely false impression not only about the fact of their being in nature that never happened, but primarily about the alleged existence between them direct, eulogized Yudofobskoy connection, as evidence of a similar policy of Stalin.
Look closely at the "content" of paragraph 4 of the supposedly "proposals to the German command", allegedly signed by Stalin, and the "content" of the third paragraph of the "report" Merkulov addressed to Stalin, and then compare with the content of §2 allegedly "general agreement".
The falsely disregarding the need to know not only history in general, but also its details and nuances, the falsifiers and their supporters brought the matter to the point that, in asserting that "Stalin did not betray his Jews," in fact "solidarized" Stalin with a vile the Nazi idea for the so-called. "The final solution of the Jewish question in Europe"!
As a result, despite all his curtsey towards Stalin and his USSR, Karpov, of course, unwillingly, nevertheless simply framed both the USSR and Stalin, not only under accusations of vain anti-Semitism, but also under threat of accusations almost in practical assistance to Nazi crimes! Well, in fact, you must at least be a little more careful and more attentive to be with History: the "surprises" that she can present are unpredictable!
The fact is that a month before the beginning of the so-called. "Negotiations between Soviet and German scouts in the city of Mtsensk," ie, January 20, 1942, well-known for the history of World War II, but sadly "famous" Wannsee conference, which was adopted plan for the destruction of Jews in Europe. The conference was held at the villa of the SS, in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee, where its name comes from; until 1924 it belonged to the notorious in the history of the Russian revolution, AL. Parvus.
Pay attention to the fact that in this case, too, the time factor is played out very cunningly: on January 20, 1942, the Wannsee Conference, and on February 19, 1942, allegedly Stalin's proposals to the German command.
The fact is that at the time when this fake was being cooked, and it was evidently in 1998-1999, it was already known that the USSR even then, in early 1942, knew exactly about the Van-zee conference and its inhumane decisions (these were materials of British intelligence, which through the channels of the "Cambridge Five" came to Moscow). Accordingly, it should have been "unobtrusive" to get the impression that Stalin knew everything exactly, and yet, like in 1938, quite consciously entered into negotiations with the Hitlerites from the standpoint of rabid anti-Semitism! What did he really not suffer at all and what really was not and could not be!
But it could not be for the following reason. On Stalin's instructions on January 6, 1942, the NKVD of the USSR published for the first time an official document-note "On the widespread plunder, the ruin of the population and the monstrous atrocities of the German authorities in the Soviet territories that they had captured." The whole world then learned about the "terrible slaughter and pogroms committed in Kiev by the German invaders" against the Jews. In addition, the note also reported other horrific massacres of unarmed and defenseless Jews. Such was the official position of the USSR, Stalin and the NKVD subordinate to him.
The position is genuinely humanistic, principled, state. Stalin never forgot about Soviet citizens temporarily in trouble and did everything in his power to ease their situation.
It is interesting how, especially in the light of the just mentioned fact and against the background of all the above, Stalin should have had (and should have been) the idea of a joint struggle against world Jewry with the Hitlerites ?!
After all, even the very attempt to offer the Hitlerites such a deal would already have meant the deadliest compromising evidence against him, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin!
Because, if you get such information into the hands of a Hitler, then this beast would certainly use such priceless dirt to destroy and eliminate even the shadow of a hint of an anti-Hitler coalition!
Being neither an anti-Semite, nor even a anti-Semite, Stalin, naturally, from the very first months of the war included the "Jewish factor" in the struggle against Germany. Already August 24, 1941 in the open air of Radio Moscow, the first radiomiting representatives of the Jewish people, who exposed the atrocities gitleryug on Soviet territory, and called for Jews to actively fight against the enemy 90 . From this begins the prehistory of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which became organizationally organized in the days of our glorious counter-offensive near Moscow. On December 15, 1941, the candidacy of S. M. Mikhoels was proposed and approved for the post of chairman of the JAC, and S. Epstein 91 became its executive secretary .. And on February 5, 1942, proposals on the functions, structure and tasks of the JAC were already considered and approved, including the following:
"First, through the means of propaganda pro-Soviet to set up the world community by establishing contacts with Jewish international organizations,
and, secondly, to attract a wide stream of Western aid to Russia" 92 .
As evidenced by the history of foreign policy intelligence of the Soviet Union, the most acute in the second half of 1941 the threat of the opening of a second front of aggression against the USSR, i. with the participation of Japan, was eliminated, incl. ive primarily at active use of intelligence "Jewish factor", as Stalin knew 93 .
Virtually all of the agents and confidential communication of the Soviet intelligence, who participated in a haunted this particular objective of the operation "Snow", was influential in the United States of President Roosevelt surrounded by Jews 94 .
Speaking about the role of the "Jewish factor" in 1941, we must not forget also that in no small part thanks to him could not only seriously hinder but actually stall the onset of the Finnish army against Leningrad 95 . It was the threats of the United States to Finland that played one of the decisive key roles in that Finland fairly tempered its fighting ardor. But before this happened, the Jewish lobby surrounded by Roosevelt did a great job ... 96
Yes, this does not mean, of course, that Mannerheim extended the hand of friendship to Moscow - with all these idiotic tales that the "Führer" of Finland was of kindness and nostalgia for kindness (Mannerheim lived for a long time, served and studied in Petersburg) has stopped the offensive on Leningrad, it's time to finish. Like any other politician, Karl-Gustav Mannerheim understood only the arguments of force that, at the request of Stalin, he was demonstrated by the United States! I emphasize that a significant role in this played very skillfully and very skillfully included by Stalin in the struggle for power "Jewish factor"!
With the help of the same "Jewish factor," Finland was eventually withdrawn from the war in 1944 - with the assistance of the world-famous Jewish banking clan Wallenberg ...
Well, as it was possible, as a Hero of the Soviet Union, to substitute, let him already sinking into oblivion of the USSR under accusations of almost direct indulging in Nazi atrocities ?!
But in fact, as we know, Russia is the legal successor of the USSR on the international arena with all the ensuing consequences. Well, is it really so difficult to show maximum caution in matters the true background of which is unknown and which, unfortunately, they even did not want to find out ?! But personally, Karpov personally has simply colossal possibilities for this!
Wish he, in a day's time, would have had reliable information about the origin of this whole story, with the allegedly taking place at the beginning of 1942 of the Soviet-German negotiations in Mtsensk!
Any myth, any falsification, any lie at its core always has some real fact. It is another matter, of course, that within their framework, naturally, it will be greatly "distorted", down to a fundamental distortion. This is exactly what happened in the history we are considering.
In the spring of 1942, on the way to a new duty station, owing to the tragic error of the pilots in the Mtsensk occupied by the Nazis, the Soviet military transport aircraft, sent to Yelets, with the newly appointed commander of the 48th Army, Major-General AG, landed. Samokhinym on board. And the pilots and passengers of the plane were captured 97.
During the war years, this was by no means a rarity - such cases have taken place both among our, and among the Hitlerites, and with the allies of both sides. Therefore, it would be possible not to focus attention on this case, if, as always, not one "but": Major General A.G. Samokhin before the war was a Soviet military attache in Yugoslavia and under the pseudonym "Sophocles" headed the "legal" residence of the GRU in Belgrade . 98
Moreover, after a short time - from July to December 1941 - the command of the 29th Rifle Corps and the post of deputy commander of the 16th Army for the rear, in December 1941 Alexander Georgievich Samokhin was again transferred to the GRU. At first he was an assistant to the chief, and then up to April 21, 1942, he was the head of the 2nd GRU Department. "
Thus, as a result of the tragic error of the pilots, a high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer had fallen into Hitler's captivity in the past.
This is the true fact, and the already clearly distorted rumors about which, according to the malicious will of the falsifiers, were again distorted and this time almost to the point of being completely unrecognizable!
"String" on the textured allegedly "rod", which was twice subjected to deep distortion, necessary, according to the plan of genuine falsifiers (by the way, they are not members and not even the leadership of "Pamyat" - they are just a mouthpiece for those who are hidden behind the scenes) , the components of supposedly authenticity are not so difficult.
Something was diminished, something added, and - on you, not wanting to know and find out, but supposedly enlightened "democratic opinion", a new fake about the bad Stalin!
This is, in fact, the answer, in particular, to the question of why the allegedly Soviet-German secret talks between representatives of the intelligence services of both sides "occurred" in early 1942 and precisely in Mtsensk!
The history of the capture of Major-General A.G. Samokhin leaves a distinctly ambivalent impression.
Firstly, due to the fact that the versions of the history of his capture differ in details. For example, in the exposition of the military historian Viktor Aleksandrovich Mirkiskin, it reads: "On the way to a new duty station, his plane landed in the German-occupied Mtsensk instead of Yelets" 100 . Those. understand as you want, or indeed by mistake the pilot landed there, whether intentionally (including maliciously), or something else ...
In turn, the authors of the extensive directory "Russia in the faces. GRU. Cases and people "and did go a strange way. On one page, they indicate that Samokhin "... because of a pilot's error was captured by the Germans" 101 . It would seem that an unambiguous version ... However, two hundred pages after this statement, the same authors apparently did not bat an eyelid, reported that Samokhin "... flew to Yelets, but the pilot lost his bearings and the plane was hit over the location of the Germans. Samokhin was captivated by " 102 .
And now do not consider it agreeable to work, naturally, on the sound thinking that it's just not right where to land, it's one thing, by mistake the pilot landed not where it should be - another, but quite another - to make a forced, emergency landing due to the fact that the aircraft was hit, since the pilot lost his course.
The existence of three versions hardly helps to establish the truth. And, frankly, it's hard to believe that during landing, for example during the day, the pilots did not notice that they were landing at the German airfield: at least a couple of aircraft on the airfield stood, and the Luftwaffe crosses painted on them were clearly visible from afar. By the spring of 1942 our pilots had a good look at them. So, with regard to the first two versions, the question immediately arises: why did the pilots, who could not help but notice that they were landing on the Nazi airfield, did not try to turn around and fly away from the Germans ?!
The only thing that could remove this issue is the fact of a night flight. But in this case, of course, another circumstance will interfere. The fact is that during the war years, the commanders of armies and fronts were flown by a minimum of fighter jets, that is, three fighter planes. Moreover, if this flight was carried out from Moscow, and even with the documents of the Stavka (if you believe these versions). Measure, this is understandable, far from superfluous, especially in war.
Then it is asked, how did the fighters allow this? This issue becomes even more acute for the third version: how could it happen that our fighters, and yet these same combat pilots, allowed the pilot of the wrecker plane to know where to fly and besides it was also hit over the territory occupied by the Germans ?! No, something is wrong with these versions ...
Secondly, as the former chief of staff of the 48th Army, later Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, asserted after the war, "the Germans then seized, apart from Samokhin himself, Soviet planning documents for the summer (1942) offensive campaign, which enabled them to take timely action countermeasures ". In 1964, Biryuzov died in a strange plane crash during a visit to Yugoslavia.
The authors of the above-mentioned handbook on the GRU assert roughly the same thing - that "the enemy has mastered the operational map and the command of the RVGK" 104 .
If we take these two versions to be faithful, then, after excluding the more or less justified finding of the operational map under Samokhin, we will immediately rest on the depressing question: why did the newly appointed commander have, by definition, especially secret documents - the Supreme Headquarters Supreme Command directive and documents Soviet military planning for the summer campaign of 1942?! After all, in principle, the instructions of the Stavka were addressed to the commanding directions and fronts. But not the armies!
And Samokhin is not just a directive of the Supreme Headquarters, but "documents of Soviet planning for the summer (1942) campaign"!
To put it mildly, this is not his level, so that, as the well-known song says, "to know for the whole of Odessa" !?
And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin was by no means so simple as to send his directives so. During the years of the war, the rules of secret correspondence, especially between the Supreme Command and the fronts, armies, etc., were very strictly observed. And without that, always secret courier service carried out the transportation of secret documents between the Stavka and the fronts under the special armed guard of the NKVD (since 1943 - Smersha).
However, the most depressing begins when you try to answer the above question, depending on the version of Samokhin's capture.
The range of answers is really disappointingly unpleasant because of its breadth: from the inevitable suspicions that some military intelligence operation was carried out (by whom and for what purpose?) - the right to this is provided by a history of the most sophisticated confrontation of intelligence services, rich in such examples, in two world wars XX century., - to criminal negligence (not excluding the option of playing under it), which, unfortunately, even then was by no means a rarity ...
Well, in fact, if, for example, we assume the most innocuous option, i.e. that the pilot really lost his course, as a result of which he got into the zone of reach of German air defense means (and what was the fighter at that time doing?), was hit and, as a result, was forced to make an emergency landing at an enemy airfield (even under the coercion of Luftwaffe fighters, which, naturally, sharply exacerbates the above question with regard to our "falcons"), what kind of question is being asked ... the professional scout, the army commander and finger did not move to destroy the secret documents of the Supreme Headquarters ?! Well, it was not a suitcase with documents he had on hand? Just a package and a map ...
Under what category of negligence (and whether negligence at all), will you order this option?
Doubts about the fact that it was negligence at all, unfortunately, reinforce the following facts.
In 2005, V. Lot's very interesting book, The Secret Front of the General Staff, came out of print. Exploration: open materials. " 410-th and 411-th pages are devoted to the fate of General AG. Samokhin. I also do not know how this could happen - after all, apparently, V. Lot - very knowledgeable in the history of military intelligence author - but from the very first lines devoted to the fate of AG. Samokhin, a respected colleague straight enters into a hurry. V. Lota points out that before appointment in the middle of April 1942 to the post of commander of the 42nd Army Samokhin was the chief of the Information Department of the GRU, an assistant to the chief of the GRU, and immediately adds that he was in military intelligence for only about two months! But this is complete nonsense! Samokhin had served in military intelligence before the war and was a resident of the GRU in Belgrade.
Therefore, if we take into account the service biography of A.G. Samokhin in the first six months of the war, it was necessary to indicate that these same "about two months" Samokhin served in the central apparatus of military intelligence, and not in general in the GRU system. So, obviously, it would be more correct, although this is inaccurate, for he was appointed to those posts in December 1941 and, therefore, by the time of his appointment to the post of commander, it was the fifth month of his tenure as assistant to the head of the GRU, (and not the Information Department) of the GRU.
Thirdly, A.G. Samokhin was appointed commander of the 42nd Army, which operated under Kharkov, that is, on the South-Western Front, and the 48th Army of the Bryansk Front. The difference still exists especially when you consider that there was no 42nd Army near Kharkov. And the fronts by name are fundamentally different ...
Fourthly, V. Lot argues that in the beginning A.G. Samokhin flew to the headquarters of the front, however, does not specify what. If we proceed from his statement about Kharkov, then it turns out to be a nonsense - what was he to do at the headquarters of the USP, if he was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front ?!
If, however, to take V. Lot's words seriously, there will be something sinister at all. Because, according to him, he received some instructions at the headquarters of the front, then he was transferred to another plane and then he was captured ...
However, in this case it is inappropriate to treat V. Lot's words seriously, because A.G. Samokhin flew all the same to the Bryansk Front, and not to the SWF.
Fifth, now take a look at the map and see for yourself: how could you please get to Mtsensk, having the purpose of appointing the Elets? The distance between them is more than 150 km! The flight to Yelets, especially from Moscow, in fact, strictly to the south, the flight to Mtsensk - to the south-west, in the direction of the Eagle ...
Sixthly, because of this strange flight, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was forced to cancel its decision of April 20, 1942 to hold operations in the beginning of May of the same year by forces of two armies and a tank corps on the Kursk-Lgov direction with the aim of mastering Kursk and cutting railroad Kursk-Lgov (History of World War II, Moscow, 1975. T. 5. P. 114). And, perhaps, this is one of those fatal premises for the tragedy of the offensive near Kharkov, because one of the two armies that were supposed to attack Kursk was headed by Samokhin. By the way, apparently, he had in his hands the Directive of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on April 20, 1942 on the above-mentioned offensive on Kursk (and Kursk-Lgov), and not at all documents of Soviet military planning for the entire spring-summer campaign of 1942, as it is usually written.
Seventh, according to V. Lot's statement, the fate of A.G. Samokhin cleared up after the Battle of Stalingrad. However, if we proceed from his own words, then it is painfully strange that it clears up. On the one hand, he points out that Samokhin was listed as missing since April 21, 1942, on the other, he reports that on February 10, 1943, the Main Directorate of Personnel losses of the Red Army issued Order No. 0194, according to which Samokhin was identified as missing , that, you see, does not bring any clarity. Because if the order was issued only on February 10, 1943, then it appears that since April 21, 1942, the fate of Samokhin was not known at all in any way, even to enroll him in the list of missing persons. And this is already superstrange, because the disappearance of the army commander, especially the newly appointed one, is an emergency of the highest category! This is the very state of emergency,
This is not a joke - the commander of the army disappeared, who a few days ago was a very high-ranking member of the GRU! Naturally, this was immediately reported to Stalin, and, believe me, the relevant strict instructions to the state security agencies and all military intelligence units to immediately find out the fate of the commander Supreme immediately gave.
V. Lot, however, reports that during the Battle of Stalingrad, a senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht was captured, who during interrogations told that he took part in the interrogations of Major-General Samokhin, emphasizing in particular that "the plane of which by mistake landed on the captured Germans airfield. " According to this Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, Samokhin allegedly concealed his "short service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, gave himself up for an army general who had served all his life in the army, and behaved himself dignifiedly during interrogation." He did not say anything special about the Germans, referring to the fact that he was appointed to the post in mid-March and just arrived at the front. "
It's hard to say whether V. Lot noticed the obvious absurdity in his words or not, but it turns out that in the Abwehr there were round idiots! Yes, like the Wehrmacht, the Abwehr suffered a crushing defeat - Soviet state security agencies (both intelligence and counterintelligence) and military intelligence have directly won that fatal duel on the invisible front. But, deservedly proud of this immutable fact, one should not believe that the Abwehr consisted entirely of idiots. It was one of the strongest military intelligence services in the world of the Second World War. And if I was captivated by a Soviet general, especially a newly appointed commander, the Abwehr also stood on its ears, trying to squeeze out as much information as possible from such a captive. Moreover, the capture of the generals, and even more so of the army commanders, was immediately reported to Berlin. And if the army abwerovtsev Samokhin could still cheat, hanging them noodles on the ears, then the central apparatus of the Abwehr - a feature of a bald! All documents, incl. and personal, were with him, and as soon as in Berlin received a special message about the capture of the newly appointed commander of the 48th Army of the Bryansk Front, Major-General AG. Samokhin, they immediately checked him for his records of Soviet generals, and the clumsy crap immediately got out. Samokhin was almost immediately installed as a former resident of Soviet military intelligence in Belgrade! With the identification of the photo, tk. any military intelligence carefully assembles photo albums for all military intelligence officers, especially those states that consider their adversary. And Samokhin was the official military attaché of the USSR in Belgrade and, naturally, his photo was in the Abwehr.
So he, according to that Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, that's why he did not tell the Germans anything special on the first or second interrogations, that he was immediately transferred to Berlin.
This is a completely natural, normal practice of military intelligence and not only the Abwehr; by the way, ours did the same, and such important prisoners were immediately sent to Moscow.
Yes, in general, it was easy to expose the lie to expose the Abwehr people also because all personal documents of Samokhin were with him, including. and the order to appoint the commander of the 48th and the order of the Supreme Headquarters to arrive and take office on April 21, 1942. So it was unlikely that he had held out with his lies for more than an hour - his own documents had been convicted of him.
But then the fact is that the Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, who participated in the interrogations of Samokhin, was interrogated after the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended, as is known, on February 2, 1943. But then why the Main Directorate of the losses of the Red Army personnel on February 10, 1943 issued the very order No. 0194, according to which Samokhin was included in the lists of missing persons, not to mention why this order was canceled only on May 19, 1945, if immediately after the Battle of Stalingrad it became known what had happened to him? !! Despite the fact that the terrible war was still going on, there was not any more confusion in documents like the one that was going on in the first months of the war, at least on the scale that was then taking place. Not to mention the fact that it was still a major general, the army commander, and their accounts were conducted (and conducted) separately. AT.
So fast cancellation of the order of 10.02.1943 - as early as May 19, 1945 - for the victorious May 1945, a fantastic phenomenon: just 10 days after the Victory !? Then from the captivity were freed millions of our compatriots and so that the gears of the squeaky mechanism of personnel registration in the army would turn so fast! Yes, no zhist! And not because there were villains-idols, but because in order to cancel such an order, Samokhin had to go through the filtration of Soviet counterintelligence (Smersh), completely to be identified and identified exactly as Samokhin, brought to Moscow and only then, according to the logic of the cadre work of that time and taking into account all the specific specifics of that time, such an order could be canceled. And ten days after the Victory - this is even for the general too soon. Moreover, if we recall those facts, that they concern the further fate of Samokhin in captivity and after his release from captivity. According to the authors of the above-mentioned handbook on the GRU, in captivity Samokhin behaved decently, in May 1945 was liberated by Soviet troops105. Upon his arrival in Moscow he was arrested, and on March 25, 1952, he was sentenced to 25 years of labor camp 106. (V. Lot, and at all informs science fiction that on December 2, 1946 Samokhin was dismissed to the reserve, and on August 28 - without indication of the year - the order for dismissal was abolished, Samokhin was enrolled as a student of the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff, which really plunges into a "tailspin" of perplexity).
However, 200 pages before this statement, the same authors of the same GRU reference book indicated that in May 1945 General Samokhin was taken from Paris (?) To Moscow . 107
Immediately note that the Soviet troops did not release France and they were not in the territory of this beautiful country. There was only a Soviet military mission. Consequently, if it was the Soviet troops who liberated him, then, it seems, if it happened in May 1945, this happiest for a prisoner of Hitler's concentration camp Samokhin took place in Germany.
Here it is asked, how, miles sorry, he was brought to Moscow from Paris, where there was only a Soviet military mission ?!
Our generals, in fact, really flogged openly, but they were not so foolish in the euphoria of the Victory, that after the liberation of all Europe from fascism to export the liberated from Hitler's captivity the compatriot-general to Moscow through Paris ?! From Berlin to Moscow, whatever one may say, the path is shorter.
But if indeed Samokhin was taken out of Paris, then it is really bad. After all, the Hitlerites brought there all more or less significant prisoners of war, especially from among the scouts, for organizing reconnaissance and disinformation games against Soviet intelligence and the Soviet military command. It is interesting to note in this connection that in 1942 there were also massive failures of Soviet intelligence agents, including and military, in Europe, including Germany, especially the "Red Chapel", as well as in the Balkans. We should not forget that led Samohin 2nd GRU Office 108 , ie, he knew a lot, and many.
As already mentioned above, during the Great Patriotic War, 83 generals of the Red Army found themselves in captivity among the Hitlerites. 26 of them died for various reasons (shot, killed by camp guards, died of illness and exhaustion). The remaining 57 people. after the Victory they were deported to the USSR. Of these, 32 people were repressed (7 were hanged in the Vlasov case, 17 were shot on the basis of the Stavka order No. 270 of August 16, 1941 "On cases of cowardice and surrender and measures to curb such actions") and for "wrong" behavior in captivity 8 generals were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. The remaining 25 people after more than a half-yearly checks justified " 109 .
Wishing once again to throw a cobblestone in the address of Stalin, the newly quoted author completed this phrase with the words "but then gradually fired into the reserve." This is true, and a lie. Some generals were left on active military service, as, for example, the former commander of the 5th KOVO Army M. Potapov and others. And some were fired for health reasons: it was hardly possible for the author of this quote to forget that Hitler's concentration camp is not a sanatorium of the Ministry of Defense.
Those. almost 44% of the generals were acquitted, and it took a bit more than six months to do this. Consequently, there can be no question of any bloodthirst of Smersh or Stalin's justice. Moreover, another 14% (8 people) of life was saved - they received different terms of imprisonment.
Among these most 8 people. (14%) - General Samokhin. But here in fact that is surprising. They arrested him in the same May 1945, but by 25 years ITL was sentenced only on March 25, 1952! Those. Samokhin was under investigation for almost 7 years!
And whatever the attitude towards Smersh or the MGB, it's absolutely obvious that the case with Samokhin was from the category of "difficult nuts".
Obviously, a laborious, painstaking test was conducted, as a result of which something was established, and something - and no. That is why the sentence is not executed. But all right, the dramatic odyssey of General Samokhin would have ended on that one. No sooner had the sarcophagus with Stalin's body put in the Mausoleum, as in May 1953 the verdict against Samokhin was abolished! And then, in May 1953, General Samokhin was rehabilitated! (V. Lota justifies the fact of the rehabilitation of AG Samokhin with the materials of the interrogation of that senior Lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, who was captured in the Soviet captivity during the Battle of Stalingrad.)
But if it was not only the sentence against Samokhin that was canceled for that period of time was already a colossal rarity - this is what unbelievable speed of actions was given to the apparatus of law enforcement bodies of the post-Stalinist USSR - but also the general's rehabilitation took place, which was even more unprecedented in the state of things for May 1953, especially with respect to the military, then why were not the general reinstated in military service? After all, he was appointed to the position of only senior teacher of combined arms training at the military department of Moscow State University! "
Yes, we can assume that such a decision was made on medical indicators, but the point is that Samokhin was then only fifty-one years old (1902) and his, as well as other prisoners released from exile and rehabilitated, could be safely treated, and then reinstated in active military service. According to the general's status, they would be cured with an extra class! .. That was, for example, Potapov. But no, from the snags were dragged out to the senior teachers at the military department of the Moscow State University!
Do you understand what the whole "zagulina" is? On the one hand, the "reactive" rate of pulling Samokhin out of the Gulag and its rehabilitation - only 2 months and 25 days (!) Have passed since the funeral of Stalin, and on the other - they immediately threw on the citizen.
The result is this: someone closely followed the Samokhin case, but under Stalin could not do anything, and as soon as the leader was spilled out into the next world, then Samokhin was yanked out of the Gulag, the verdict was canceled and rehabilitated, but they were still pushed out citizen.
What did he know of such-and-such, who in his case so closely watched why this someone had to be extremely influential - so much that he could pull it out of the Gulag and even rehabilitate it less than three months after the funeral of Stalin?
Samokhin air of freedom left to breathe for only two years - July 17, 1955, he died 113 .
Naturally, in a human sense, it is truly a pity that General Samokhin passed away at the age of 53. It is all the more regrettable, considering that many of the prisoners of the Nazi concentration camps, as well as those who served their sentences in the Soviet penitentiary system, have survived to the present day.
And the next, in 1956, the first explosion took place, the furious anti-Stalinism of Khrushchev's "bottling" was swept away - a dirty wave of brainless, vile accusations of Stalin, including. and first of all for the tragedy of June 22, 1941, with simultaneous, but no less indiscriminate and stupid obelenie of the whole generalship.
You will look at this chronology and involuntarily think about whether the former high-ranking military intelligence officer, the 48th Major-General Samokhin, who did not take command of the army, left the life too "in a timely manner", so to say, in a preventive manner.
And this thought will be all the more sad depressing if it is imposed both on the chronology of the war and on certain events of the summer of 1953.
If you go back to the fact of capturing Samokhin, then you are surprised to learn that shortly after he fell into the captivity of the Germans under strange circumstances, Soviet pilots intercepted a German aircraft, whose passengers had been seized with documentation on plans to hold a summer (1942) campaign of German army 114. It is a question of the important staff documents captured by the Soviet troops, captured on June 20, 1942, incl. and related to Operation Blau. They were transported by plane to the Major of the Staff of the 23rd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht Reichel. The plane was hit by Soviet air defense. The pilot and two officers accompanying Reichel were killed when the plane fell to a neutral strip. Reichel miraculously survived, but in a shootout with Soviet soldiers was killed at the time of the attempt to burn documents. By the end of the same day, at the personal order of Commander Yuzef Tymoshenko, the captured documents were delivered to Stalin. Stalin, by that time, already had extensive and reliable information about Operation Blau and did not see anything particularly new in the captured documents. Moreover, he acted on his own plan, in order to certainly break the ridge of the Wehrmacht. As for Mirkinkin's statement, that ignoring Stavka (Stalin) of the documents seized led to the defeat near Kharkov, then, let the colleague be forgiven, is a blatant lie. The Kharkov offensive operation began on May 12, on May 18, it was already drowned, and on the afternoon of May 19, the commander of the Yuzef Tymoshenko was forced to give a clearly belated order to go over to the defense. By May 30, the operation ended with the actual rout of our troops, which suffered heavy losses in manpower and technology. Documents transported by Reichel fell into the hands of Soviet troops only on June 20, that is, twenty days after the Kharkov operation under the command of Tymoshenko ended with another tragedy for the Soviet troops, since the commander of the USF still did not see a shuck of the new in the strategic experience of the Wehrmacht.
Reporting on this, the military historian mentioned repeatedly, VA Mirskin, notes that "Moscow either got wrong conclusions from them (ie from the contents of captured documents .-- AM), or ignored them altogether, which led to the defeat Soviet troops near Kharkov " 115 (I'd add that it has also led to the further promotion and gitleryug deep into Soviet territory, up to Stalingrad and the Caucasus -. AM).
It is difficult to say whether the distinguished colleague saw in his own words a certain ambiguity or not, but in the end, perhaps, contrary to his desire, it was she who turned out. For it turned out that there was a certain exchange of messages about plans for the summer campaign of 1942
Worse than that. With the inevitable emergence of suspicion of this type, the following fact becomes sinister.
After the war, the ex-head of the Nazi foreign policy intelligence service (VI RSHA Directorate) Walter Schellenberg showed during an interrogation with the American investigator that "in the spring of 1942, one of the Japanese naval officers in a conversation with the German Military Attache (AM) in Tokyo raised the issue on whether Germany would not go to the honorary peace with the USSR, in which Japan could help. This was reported to Hitler "(Motov V. NKVD v. Abwehr, M., 2005. S. 282).
The ominous significance of this fact is manifested first of all in the time of its accomplishment - in the spring of 1942.
Why should this happen, in fact, a unique (up to a certain) parallel-consecutive coincidence of events: in the spring of 1942, a plane with Samokhin horseradish knows why he flies to the Hitlerites, and he has in his hands documents of Soviet military planning for the summer campaign of 1942, in t.ch. and the directive of the Northern Caucasus High Command, as well as the operational map, a little later on, again, the hell knows why the Hitlerites come to us with their documentation of the plans for holding the summer 1942 campaign of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht, and at the same time a strange probing by a Japanese naval officer his German counterpart in Tokyo on the subject of the possible consent of the Reich to conclude a secret separate peace with the USSR on honorable terms ?!
First of all, it should be borne in mind that under the impression of a powerful counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow, the Japanese leadership discussed in mid-February 1942 the demand of the Germans to act against the USSR and came to the conclusion that it was premature. This meant that the threat of an attack by Japan on the USSR was reduced. And this despite the fact that Hitler personally pressed on the Japanese ally, demanding from him to speak in the spring of 1942, promising that a major offensive would be resumed on the Eastern Front. In short, Tokyo sent Hitler's demands to the "Japanese mother", and Stalin knew about it.
Accordingly, it turns out that the sounding was an initiative purely Japanese. And considering that the probe was carried out by a Japanese naval officer, that the leadership of the Japanese Navy had already clearly realized what it had got into by attacking the US - the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Navy were colossal. And the more furious was the fury of the Americans, who were furious at Tokyo because of Pearl Harbor. There is an involuntary impression that this was a serious provocation designed to drive a wedge between allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (the Japanese, by the way, did the same thing in the spring of 1943, that is, after the Battle of Stalingrad), in the first turn between the USSR and the United States.
At the same time, one cannot but note that the impression that it was a provocation was an impression, but what, miles, sorry ... it should, firstly, coincide in time with both strange airs of ours and Hitler's high-ranking officers with the most important documents on their hands, and secondly, in the main features, the scenario of a tripartite military-geopolitical plot involving German, Soviet (led by Tukhachevsky) and Japanese high-ranking military, whose main Soviet unit was About liquidated as far back as 1937.
Who would explain what is behind all this? Especially considering how aggressively the USSR sought after the war to interrogate the same W. Schellenberg, and the former allies not only did not openly interfere with this, they also finally arranged for the former Reichs' obsequious boss "hurricane cancer", as a result of which he quickly "Gave the oak," not waiting for the first-dreaded Allies to deserved a meeting with Soviet Chekists.
And yet, in relation to the spring of 1942, one of the numerous reports of the illegal resident of the GRU in Switzerland, "Dora" (Shandor Rado) of September 25, is kept in the Central Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Issue 24121. D. 3. L. 599) 1941 In view of its brevity, I will quote the contents of the report completely: "From the Berlin representative of the Japanese agency, Domei received the following information:" In the high circles of the German officers, the point of view is increasingly strengthened that, in view of the failure of the plans for a blitzkrieg, victory is impossible, and we must wait for defeat and Bolshevisation of all Euro s, if you can not make a separate peace with England. But for this it is necessary first to liquidate Hitler and establish a military dictatorship. Most of the generals still still for Hitler and agree to a coup in Germany only if the victory is not achieved in the spring of 1942.
So, who would have explained in a really intelligible manner why, between such scattered facts, suddenly, for no apparent reason, the lines of mutual attraction begin to spring up almost on the verge of autonomous alignment, although vague, but still some kind of the overall picture?
True, wishing to bow to the option that after all it was an accident, i.e. the arrival of Samokhin into temporarily occupied territories, anyone will be forced to slow down their desires, because before the defeat near Kharkov, our troops "valiantly" brought all the same Tymoshenko, to whom and so immense fault for the tragedy of June 22, 1941 (for good reason he is up to end of life stubbornly refrained from writing memoirs), and the tragedy near Kharkov strikingly recalled the tragedy of June 22, only on the scale of one front, and one of the most vile enemies of our country - in the near future the infamous bald corncobble-Trotskyite "Maki and "Khrushchev.
However, even though this was a stretch, it could also be attributed to chance, if not, as always, not one "but", however, even a few.
The fact is that Tymoshenko and Khrushchev knew in advance, in March 1942, that the Hitlerites would strike on the southern flank. "5 And Samokhin was the source of their knowledge about this!" Here the whole "zagulina" is that in March 1942, Samokhin's classmate at the academy, head of the operational group of the South-Western direction, Lieutenant-General Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) flew to Moscow from the front, Bagramyan, naturally, visited the GRU and from his friend Alexander Georgievich Samokhin, who was already the head of the 2nd Directorate Ia GRU learned of intelligence about the plans of the Nazis in the summer of 1942 Returning to the front, Baghramyan shared this information with Timoshenko and Khrushchev - they were his direct superiors 116 .
Tymoshenko and Khrushchev cheerfully promised Stalin that the Hitler in the South would be defeated, begging for the promised success huge forces. But, alas: in the words of a bald maize, so that, having killed a lot of people and equipment, they suffered a crushing defeat.
And they ditched with absolutely "inexplicable" stubbornness in the unwillingness to see the obvious, for even when the General Staff from Moscow saw the colossal threat of an offensive operation near Kharkov and therefore insistently recommended measures to prevent it, it was Tymoshenko who in unanimity with Khrushchev persistently misinformed Stalin about allegedly a notable success, until once again a bloody tragedy broke out.
Now it's time to compare: the investigation into the Samokhin case lasted almost seven years, although with others it was sorted out quickly enough and 25 generals were rehabilitated under Stalin, but as soon as the leader was gone, Samokhin was immediately torn from the Gulag, revoked the sentence, rehabilitated, but pushed out onto the citizen, and two years later Samokhin is no more. The speed of the accomplishment of these events was simply inconceivable for that time, for then at the top there was a bitter prickle for the liberated throne and in principle there was very little to rehabilitate one of the many.
Well, that's not all. Moreover, if we remember that on Khrushchev's falsified case against Beria, on June 26, 1953, without trial, the illegally murdered Lavrenty Pavlovich, in hindsight, tried in vain to "sew" an accusation that he was allegedly preparing to defeat the Soviet troops in the Caucasus, to the approaches to which the Hitlerites broke through to a great extent thanks to the "valorous" command of Tymoshenko and Khrushchev, the Kharkov operation ...
But who always screams louder than all: "Hold the thief!"? Correctly...
Then, in 1942, the situation almost became stalemate: on the one hand, as has been repeatedly noted above, after the catastrophic failure of the Kharkov operation (and, after it, also the Crimean operation), Stalin simply did not remain, as evading major battles , only to draw the Hitler into the depths of Russia, in order to inflict the first truly, Stalinally, fatal blow to Hitler.
In stating this, I nevertheless can not help but recall that, since the defeat of our troops near Kharkov, the involvement of the Hitler in the depths of Russia was already firmly embedded in Stalin's plans. This was discussed in Chapter II of Section III. Conclusions Stalin made his conclusions.
But, on the other hand, Stalin himself nearly got a death blow - in the same year of 1942 "generals organize the defense of passes very badly, pulling their divisions into thin lines" 117 , i.e. in fact, willingly or unwittingly projected the tragedy on June 22. Projected in the version of the static front "narrow tape"! "The Soviet generals act as if they are subject to the will of another, making the most stupid decision" 118 .
And if it had not arrived in Tbilisi Lavrentiy Beria, "people will truly armor and powerful intellect," that the Caucasus would be captured gitleryugami 119 .
It was he, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, in recognition of even the most vicious and rabid modern anti-Stalinists (for example, V. Beshanov, author of the book "Year 1942 -" educational. "Minsk, Harvest, 2002), saved the Caucasus!
Then what must the false screams of the bald Trotskyite-corn culprit and his camarilla, who had gone mad from impunity, mean that they allegedly wanted to hand over the Hitlerites to the Caucasus ?! What does this mean if, for example, it's hard to remember the answer to the question, who is the loudest screamer: "Keep thief!". That's what it is ...
And what, in this case and in this light, should mean the facts of an unprecedented speedy reversal of the severe sentence of Samokhin, his rehabilitation, but pushing him to the citizen, along with the escaping of life on the eve of the unbridled bacchanalia of despicable and vile accusations against Stalin, which was accelerating for a 53-year-old man? !!
Should this mean that Samokhin, who was sitting in the Gulag, was an extremely dangerous witness for someone at the top and that is why he was urgently pulled out and then, after rehabilitating (by the way, it is not very clear how it happened) was sent to a citizen. Where just two years later he passed away. In 53 years something ?!
It is immensely difficult to say anything definitely, but all the above circumstances can not fail to attract attention.
Obviously, the matter is now in time - this is the only unquestionable "Archimedes' lever," which alone can crack the notorious seven seals behind which the Genuine History of the Great Patriotic War hides. A story that they still hope to keep secret from the people.
Because she will leave, the True History of the Great Patriotic War, then she will silently, without any emotion, even the dead, make her on her knees beg forgiveness from Russia for the most important crime of hers - for insolent theft from our national heritage of the Brilliant The grandeur of the Generalissimo Stalin, and therefore of the Mightiest Greatness of Russia!
Note.
1 Karpov V. The Generalissimo. M., 2002. T. 2. S. 9-14,
2 NF Chervov. Provocations against Russia. Pp. 187-192.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the US Presidents and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T. 2. Correspondence with F. Roosevelt and G. Truman (August 1941-December 1945). M., 1957. S. 17.
4 Ibid. Pp. 17-18.
5 Ibid. C. 18.
6 Ibid. Pp. 18-19.
7 Ibid. Pp. 19-20.
8 See: Pavlov V. Operation "Snow". M., 1996.
9 On this topic, especially "overdone" LA. Bezymensky (see, for example, his book: Operation "Myth", or How many times Hitler was buried., M., 1995. pp. 29-32).
10 See No. 8.
11 Platonov O. Secret History of Russia. XX century. The Epoch of Stalin. M., 1996. P. 136.
12 IEE. 2001. №45.
13-19 Essays on the History of the Russian External Intelligence. T. 4. M., 1999. P. 527-552. I ask you to pay special attention to the special reservation of the editorial board of the SVR: "Documents are published with preservation of style, spelling and punctuation of copies stored in the Archive of the SVR."
20 The Duel. 1999. № 13. C. 3.
21 ~ 24 See No. 13-19.
25 See also Sukhomlinov A. Who are you, Lavrenty Beria? C. 117-
26 Ibid.
27 On this issue, see: Essays on the History of the Russian External Intelligence. M., 1996. T. 3.
28 ~ 31 Mlechin L. Chairmen of the KGB. Declassified Fates M., 1999. P. 178-179.
32 Melnikov D., Chernaya L. The Empire of Death. M., 1987. P. 176.
33 Ibid. P. 70, and also: Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services III Reich M., 2004. P. 81.
34 Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich S 64-65
35 See No. 33. from. 81.
36 See No. 34, p. 85.
37 Mader U. In the footsteps of a man with a scar. M., 1963. S. 29.
38 Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich. 74; No. 32 C 196
39 See No. 28-30.
40 See No. 24.
41 The year of the crisis 1938-1939. T. 2. M., 1993. P. 319-321.
42 See also: Zhukov, Yu. Ina Stalin. M., 2003
43 See No. 32, 34.
44 See No. 37, p. eleven.
45-46 doc TV movie about the fate of M. Rosenberg, prepared by the son of the famous scout Sudoplatov; the film was shown on ORT on August 8, 2004 and during its show five close-ups were shown the cover of a genuine case from the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.).
47 Kremlev S. West against Russia. Russia and Germany: The Way to the Covenant. M., 2004. P. 10.
48 See No. 13-19, p. 663.
49 See No. 37, p. 29.
50 Ibid.
51 ~ 53 See the interview of J. Medvedev "A and F". 2003. № 51. P. 13.
54 Perin R. Guillotine for the demons. St. Petersburg, 2001. P. 32-33.
55 ~ 56 See Mukhin Yu. Anti-Russian meanness. M., 2004. P. 128; Rozanov GL. Stalin and Hitler. M., 1991. P. 95.
57 ~ 58 Border troops of the USSR. 1939 - June 1941: Sat. documents and materials. M., 1970. S. 17; Mader Yu. Imperialism: Spying in Europe yesterday and today. M., 1984. P. 151.
59 ~ 61 Schmuhl H.-W. Rassen-hegiene in Deutschland-Eugenik in der Sowjetunion: Ein Vergeleich // Beyrau D. (Hg) Intellektuelle Prafessionen unter Hitler und Stalin. Tubingen, 2000. S. 366; Plenkov O.Yu. III Reich. Socialism of Hitler. M., 2004. P. 237; Dugin AG Conshyrology. M. 1993. P. 77.
62 Grame H. Reichskristallnacht. Antisemitismus und Judeverfolgung im Dritten Reich. Munchen, 1988. S. 10-11; Mommsen H. Der Weg zum Volkermord an europiiiche Juden // Universitas.1995. No. 5. S. 433.
63 ~ 64 See: Eich E. Die unheilichen Deutschen. Dusseldorf, 1963. S. 172.
65 Plenkov O.Yu. III Reich. Pp. 326-327.
66-78 ibid. 327; Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich. Pp. 362-364; see also No. 62; Grenville D. The history of the XX century. People. Developments. Data. M., 1999. P. 241; Graig G. Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1945. Munchen, 1983. S. 559; Maser W. Das Regime. Alltag in Deutschland. Munchen, 1983. S. 1195; Bracher KD Deutschland 1933-1945. Dusseldorf, 1992. S. 279 et al.
79 Gladkov T. Secrets of the special services of the III Reich. 364.
80-86 Meltukhov M. Soviet-Polish wars. M., 1991. P. 162; Mukhin Yu. Anti-Russian meanness. M., 2004. P. 100.
87 Meltyukhov M. Decree. op. 162.
The year of crisis. T. 1. P. 37-39.
89 Shishkin O. To Kill Rasputin. M., 1996. P. 7.
90-92 Kostyrchenko G. In the captivity of the red pharaoh. M., 1994. P. 27-29, as well as: RChIDNI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 59. L. 29; D. 35. L. 62-63; D. 103. L. 1-3; D. 112., L. 126.
93 ~ 94 See No. 8. 95 ~ 96 See No. 3, p. 3, 281.
97 IEE. 2004. № 16.
98 GRU. Business and people. M., 2003. P. 96-97. "See No. 97-98.
100 See No. 97, p. 97.
101 See No. 98, p. 296.
102 See No. 98, p. 296.
103 See No. 97.
104 See No. 98.
105 Ibid., P. 97.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid. С. 295.
108 See No. 98.
109 See No. 97.
110 See No. 98, p. 296.
111 Ibid.
112 GRU. Business and people. С. 295.
113 See No. 98, p. 295.
114 See No. 97.
115 Mlechin L. Joseph Joseph Stalin, his marshals and generals. M., 2004. S. 540. 117-119 Kalashnikov M., Krupnov Yu. Great confrontations. Saddle the lightning! America against Russia. M., 2003. P. 87-88.
Source Stalinism RU
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