Myth #191: Stalin did not possess the gift of foresight necessary for a state leader.
Myth #191: Stalin did not possess the gift of foresight necessary for a state leader.
Myth #192: Stalin did not care about the country’s future.
These are the myths of myths! They could easily claim a "worthy place" in the Guinness Book of Records under the heading "Men's Idiocy." As for the authorship of this myth, perhaps the accolade should go to the accursed "demon of world revolution," L.D. Trotsky. In his book "Stalin," Trotsky ranted that Stalin had "neither theoretical imagination, nor historical farsightedness, nor the gift of foresight..."
However, throughout the 20th century, Stalin was the only leader of the world's greatest power who truly possessed the unique gift of unparalleled foresight. Moreover, this was not a gift of extrasensory perception, like the unique gift of Wolf Messing and other prophets, but rather the gift of foresight that develops in people possessing the highest level of competence, profound erudition, and knowledge in various fields of human knowledge, but especially in politics, economics, history, and military affairs. None of his predecessors—not Nicholas II, not V.I. Lenin, not even one of his successors to this day—possessed or possesses even a trillionth of his gift of foresight. He developed this immense gift through persistent, daily self-education throughout his life. This is why he was able to see far ahead in many areas, especially politics and economics. Here are a few examples that clearly illustrate Stalin's outstanding abilities in terms of strategic foresight, including in the economic sphere.
Apparently, Stalin had some serious information about the brewing economic crisis in the West as early as 1928. The fact is, back in 1928, he openly ridiculed the pronouncements of the insufferable chatterbox and demagogue Bukharin, who claimed that the West was all peace and quiet and no cataclysms were expected. And yet, it was precisely in 1928 that the First Five-Year Plan began. This is no coincidence. It's primarily strategic. When the First Five-Year Plan ended, in his speech at the beginning of 1933, Stalin declared something whose underlying meaning has never received much attention. And that's a shame, because it's evidence of a serious strategic plan even at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan. So, here is what he said then: “While the volume of industrial production of the USSR by the end of 1932 had grown to 334 % of the pre-war level, the volume of industrial production of the USA [11] had fallen over the same period to 84% of the pre-war level, England to 75%, and Germany to 62%. While the volume of industrial production of the USSR had grown to 219 % of the 1928 level by the end of 1932, the volume of industrial production of the USA had fallen over the same period to 56%, England to 80%, Germany to 55%, and Poland to 54%.
Stalin's statement is usually used to prove the correctness of his conclusion about the historical victory of the socialist mode of production, traditionally supported by his own words: "What do these data indicate, if not that the capitalist industrial system failed the test in the dispute with the Soviet system, that the Soviet industrial system has all the advantages over the capitalist system." Further, these theses are usually developed in the direction that the West also openly recognized the successes of socialism. Thus, the well-known modern author, Yu. V. Yemelyanov, in his new work, "Europe Judges Russia" (Moscow, 2007), notes: "The successes of the USSR against the backdrop of the crisis of the capitalist system served as proof for many people
1 This is what the USA was called then, that is, the United States of North America.
The advantages of socialism. New York Governor F.D. Roosevelt declared in mid-1930: "There is no doubt… that communist ideas will gain strength throughout the country if we fail to uphold the old ideals and original goals of democracy." Roosevelt found the answer to the "communist threat" in the "New Deal," which he began to implement after his election as US President in 1932 (no matter how much Roosevelt's "New Deal" was praised, in its fundamental essence it was already the tried and tested Stalinist policy of creating an insatiable domestic market. – A.M.). Finding similarities between Roosevelt's methods of economic organization and Soviet ones, the writer H.G. Wells said in his conversation with Stalin on July 23, 1934: "Lenin once said that we must 'learn to trade,' learn this from the capitalists. Now the capitalists must learn from you, comprehend the spirit of socialism" (just 14 years earlier, Wells had called Lenin a "Kremlin dreamer").
All of this is true. Such evidence-based interpretations are undoubtedly valid. But that's far from all that needs to be said. The fundamental point is that, anticipating the imminent global economic crisis, Stalin began implementing the First Five-Year Plan back in 1928 and demanded maximum effort for its implementation precisely because the time factor, during which the West would have floundered in crisis, would have turned into a colossal economic gain for the USSR. Because, objectively and in this case, without any additional effort, the time gap between the USSR's economic development and the West was narrowing! That's precisely why, at the very height of the First Five-Year Plan, on February 4
In the month of March 1931, Stalin declared: "To slow down means to fall behind. And those who fall behind are beaten... We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we will be crushed" (Stalin, I.V. Works, Vol. 13, pp. 38-39). Ten years later, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. And if the Soviet Union had not managed to cover this gigantic distance in its economic and military-economic development, it would not only have been crushed, but also razed to the ground. This is why Stalin spoke with such gusto about the actual decline in industrial production in Western countries.
Here is how he saw the spatial contours of a future armed conflict with the West.
In 1934, at the 17th Party Congress, Stalin raised the issue of developing a powerful agricultural production base beyond the Volga, keeping in mind "all possible complications in the area of international relations." In other words, already in 1934, Stalin clearly foresaw that the impending clash with the West would transform the European part of the Soviet Union into a theater of fierce military operations, as a result of which the agriculturally developed regions of that part of the country would be unable to provide the army and the population with food. Therefore, he demanded the creation of a new agricultural base beyond the Volga. It was this base that saved the Soviet Union—both its people and its army—from starvation during the Great Patriotic War.
Another example comes from the military sphere. For example, everyone is still convinced that the entire history of the famous war, which radically changed the course of not only the Great Patriotic War but also the Second World War, is
The Battle of Stalingrad begins with the famous order No. 227 of July 28, 1942, better known as “Not one step back!”
In reality, preparations for the Battle of Stalingrad began back in those days of 1941, when the fate of Moscow itself was being decided. True to his unshakable tradition of looking far ahead even in the most difficult moments, relying on impeccable intelligence data and his strategically infallible vision of the situation's development, Stalin began preparing for the battle for Stalingrad and the Caucasus as early as early October 1941!
The first order concerning preparations for the Battle of Stalingrad was issued on October 2, 1941. On that day, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) received the following directive: "The Supreme Command Headquarters considers it necessary to immediately begin fortifying the Taman Peninsula and occupying its troops. The plan for organizing defensive work and deployment considerations are to be communicated by telegraph on October 5. Work is to commence immediately." Those who don't believe me should look in the archives— TsAMO. F.48a. Op. 1554. D. 91. L. 314.
And already on October 9, Headquarters indicated to the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District specific areas for defensive work:
“The People’s Commissar of Defense (i.e. Stalin. – AM) ordered the construction of field fortified lines:
1. Along the line - (excl.) Novokhopersk, along the river Khoper to Ust-Khopersky, Mashinsky, station Surovikino, Nizhne-Chirskaya, then along the river Don to Azov (incl.).
2. Along the line - Novyi Biryuzyak, along the Kuma River to Velichaevskoye, then along the southern bank of the Manych River to Manychskaya (on the Don River) - with the front facing northeast.
3. Along the line - Krasny Yar, along the Medveditsa River to Ust-Khopersky - with the front facing west.
4. Bypass of the city of Stalingrad along the line - Kamyshin, Zenzevatka, Solodcha, Ilovlya station, along the Don River to Kalach, Lyapichev station, Bratsky, vye. 150, Krasnoarmeysk (the main events of the Battle of Stalingrad will take place in those places. - A.M.).
5. To cover the Kerch Strait and strengthen the Taman Peninsula, construct field fortified lines along the line: 1 - Fontalovskaya, Akhtanizovskaya, Komyshana village; 2 - Temryuk, Anapa.
6. To cover the city of Novorossiysk from the sea and prevent enemy amphibious landings in this area, build a defensive line along the line: Krasno-Medvedovskaya (now Raevskaya. - AM), height 540, B. Tsemesskaya, Shapsugskaya, coordinating its construction with the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet.
The North Caucasus Military District Military Council is responsible for conducting reconnaissance missions. Reconnaissance missions are to be conducted primarily at the first line of defense and, once completed, to the remaining lines of defense.
Conduct reconnaissance and construction to the depth of regimental areas.
First of all, conduct reconnaissance and construction of battalion areas of the first echelons of regimental sections, after which proceed to reconnaissance of battalion areas of the second echelons of regiments.
When conducting reconnaissance, follow the instructions of the General Staff and the approximate diagram of the battalion area.
Construction is entrusted to:
a) the first and second lines of action against the Chief of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army by forces of the armies being formed, sapper units and the local population;
b) the fifth and sixth lines to the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District. Furthermore, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District is to organize the construction of the Rostov city perimeter.
First of all, carry out the construction of anti-tank obstacles (ditches, scarps, counter-scarps, antitank obstacles, etc.) and structures along the front line.
During construction, special attention must be paid to the constant readiness of the structures being erected and to artillery anti-tank defense.
The Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District is to mobilize for construction the required number of workers from the local population, tools, motor and horse-drawn transport, materials, and food for the entire working local population, and transfer everything to the disposal of the Chief of the Main Military Engineering Command of the Red Army within the timeframe agreed upon with the Chief of the Main Military Engineering Command of the Red Army.
Construction organizations are allowed to cut down trees on site in the required quantity.
Reconnaissance completed:
a) first and second lines - 10/25/41.
b) other borders - 11/10/41.
To the head of the Main Military Engineering Institution of the Red Army on the construction of the line
start 10/25/41
The full deadline for the line's readiness is November 25, 1941." Again, those who don't believe it can look in the archives.
The coordinates of the archival storage are the same, only D. 10, L. 352–353.
Since these instructions were being implemented slowly, on November 22, the Supreme Command Headquarters was forced to draw the attention of the North Caucasus Military District command to the unacceptability of the slow pace of defensive work. Headquarters also drew the attention of the North Caucasus Military District command to the need to conduct defensive work not only from the sea, but also from the land: "We have
According to current information, defensive work on the Taman Peninsula and in the North Caucasus (including that of the 51st Separate Army) is being carried out insufficiently organized and at a slow pace. I propose:
1. By all means, accelerate the construction of defensive lines on army territory, and first of all on the Taman Peninsula and in the areas of the naval bases of Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik, and Tuapse.
2. Equip the Tuzla Spit (now so famous - AM), the Chushka Spit, the Cordon, elevation plus 6.0 (3 km west of Batareika), height 35.8 (3 km north of Maly Kut, Golopuzivka), Taman, Ryb. pr., Gadyuchy Kut with permanent fortifications, reinforcing these positions with mortars and air defense systems in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the Kerch Strait on floating craft and on ice.
3. Defensive work in the areas of the ports of Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik and Tuapse will be carried out not only from the sea, but also from the land, having coordinated the defense system with representatives of the Navy.
4. Relieve the port of Novorossiysk of evacuation cargo from Odessa and Crimea, using the available positional assets at the Novorossiysk base for defensive work on army territory.
5. Make extensive use of the capabilities of Novorossiysk and Krasnodar for the supply of cement and the production of blocks for long-term fire points” (archival storage coordinates - ibid., L. 150-151).
Stalin concentrated enormous forces there. The sapper units from Stalin's personal reserve—the 24th Directorate of Defensive Construction of the Supreme Command—alone dug 1,448 kilometers of trenches and ditches. In total,
Taking into account the labor force of Soviet civilians, 2,572 kilometers of trenches and anti-tank ditches were dug, as well as 57 kilometers of anti-tank ditches, 51 kilometers of escarpments , 8 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles, 24,400 firing points, and the installation of 1,112 tons of metal structures and 2,317 cubic meters of reinforced concrete. This entire gigantic volume of work was completed long before the Nazis reached Stalingrad. And precisely because everything had been prepared in the Stalingrad area in advance, a powerful force of 1.1 million men was transferred there in advance. 15,500 guns were concentrated there—129 and 115 artillery regiments and separate battalions of the famous Katyusha rocket launchers from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Reserve alone, respectively. In addition, there were 1,500 tanks (the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Armies) and 1,300 aircraft. This is precisely why, despite the complexity and severity of the Battle of Stalingrad, Soviet troops not only held firm but, having inflicted irreparable damage on the Nazi forces, managed to successfully encircle them and force them to surrender. Moreover, it is precisely because of this that the Battle of Stalingrad became the only major battle of the Great Patriotic War in which the average daily losses of personnel were 2–2.5 times lower than in any other battle. In the Battle of Moscow - 10,910 people, at the Kursk Bulge - 11,313, in Operation Bagration (the liberation of Belarus) - 11,262, in the Berlin Operation - 15,712, and in the Battle of Stalingrad - only 6,392 people!
1 An anti-tank obstacle in the form of a steep wall of an external fortification ditch on the side closest to the defender, or on the slope of the terrain facing the enemy.
Another example. It will surely come as a revelation to many that, for example, at the very beginning of the war, amidst dire setbacks and losses, Stalin personally signed GKO Decree No. 348ss on August 1, 1941, on the construction of a jet-powered interceptor! There were shortages of aircraft at the front, but look where he was looking! That's precisely why, as early as February 1942, pilot Bakhchivandzhi first flew the first Soviet jet aircraft.
Another example. Few people know that Stalin's so-called conversion of the country's military-industrial complex, so ineptly and utterly criminally carried out by liberals, was distinguished by astonishing thoughtfulness and thoroughness, and, moreover, began a year before the Great Victory, without compromising the state's military might! Thus, on Stalin's personal initiative, the State Defense Committee (GKO) on May 23, 1944 , adopted a resolution establishing an industry for the prefabricated production of houses at a rate of 3.6 million square meters per year. This same resolution also provided for the creation of factories for the production of gypsum and cinder concrete houses at a rate of 1 million square meters per year.
A brief comment. Incidentally, the background to this decree is no less curious. I don't know how Stalin learned about French architects developing a technology for constructing inexpensive panel housing built within a short timeframe, but the fact remains—Stalin paid close attention to this information. He summoned Professor Karasev, who was well-known in those days—yes, yes.
Stalin, a man of considerable stature in the construction industry, set him the task of creating a housing construction industry in the USSR using the information he had received. The task was completed. Unfortunately, by that time Stalin had been assassinated. And all the credit for solving the housing problem in the 1950s went to his assassin, Khrushchev. Moreover, Khrushchev significantly distorted Stalin's housing standards for the Soviet citizen. Stalin set the standards for apartments in such a way that they were very impressive: ceiling height—3–3.5 m, the minimum area of a one-room apartment—40–45 sq. m, a two-room apartment—at least 70–75 sq. m, a three-room apartment—approximately 100 sq. m, and a separate bathroom everywhere. Khrushchev, however, cut everything by two or three times, as a result of which even a three-room apartment in the buildings nicknamed "Khrushchev" did not exceed 55 sq. m. m, and the bathrooms were combined in such a way that each family would then form a queue to get to the toilet.
At the same time, orders were given to restore furniture factories, and at a number of military plants, also at Stalin's initiative, work began in earnest to create new types of civilian products and develop new technological cycles for their mass production. By the third quarter of 1945, the share of civilian production in Soviet GDP had reached almost 60%!
And who, for example, now knows that even ten years after his assassination, a number of Soviet industrial enterprises were built according to decrees signed by Stalin!
Or here's an example. Not long ago, in 2004, the 60th anniversary of the USSR anthem was celebrated,
Which, albeit with minor changes, remains the anthem of our state. Just consider this: work on selecting the music and lyrics for the future anthem began on Stalin's orders in the fall of 1942! In other words, Stalin was making comprehensive preparations well in advance for the turning point in the war, the success of which he already, back in 1942, had no doubt about! Moreover, this means that Stalin not only had no doubt about the coming Victory, but also foresaw that the USSR would emerge from the war completely different, renewed, even with a different national anthem, befitting its status as the Greatest Power in the World and the Main Victor of the War!
Finally, let's consider Stalin's purely political foresight. Recall his famous statement: "I know that when I'm gone, they'll pour buckets of dirt on my head, and heaps of rubbish on my grave. But I'm confident that the winds of history will blow it all away!"
And one more prediction. Its essence relates to our times. Back in November 1939, Stalin told the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, A. M. Kollontai: "Many of the deeds of our party and people will be distorted and slandered, primarily abroad, but also in our own country. Zionism, striving for world domination, will cruelly avenge our successes and achievements. It still views Russia as a barbarian country, a raw materials appendage. And my name, too, will be slandered and maligned. Many atrocities will be attributed to me."
World Zionism will strive with all its might to destroy our Union, so that Russia can never rise again. The strength of the USSR lies in the friendship of peoples. The spearhead of the struggle will be aimed, above all, at breaking this friendship, at tearing the outskirts away from Russia. Here, it is necessary
Frankly, we haven't done everything yet. There's still much work to be done. Nationalism will rise with particular force. It will suppress internationalism and patriotism for a time, but only for a time. National groups within nations will emerge, and conflicts will arise. Many pygmy leaders, traitors within their own nations, will emerge. Overall, the future will see more complex and even turbulent developments, with extremely sharp turns. The East is poised to become particularly agitated, with sharp contradictions emerging with the West.
And yet, no matter how events unfold, time will pass, and the eyes of new generations will be turned to the deeds and victories of our socialist Fatherland. Year after year, new generations will come. They will once again raise the banner of their fathers and grandfathers and pay us full tribute. They will build their future on our past."
The only thing I'd like to correct Stalin on is the issue of Zionism. That's not the whole point. It's primarily the West's zoological, pathologically incurable hatred of Russia. It's that very hatred that stems from the West's essence— aggression— which can never be reconciled with Russia's essence— security!
Well, so what? Did Stalin possess the gift of foresight and historical farsightedness or not?!
Myth #193: Stalin instituted strict censorship in the USSR.
An extremely stupid and inappropriate myth. For one thing, censorship has existed since time immemorial and in all countries. It's an objective necessity, or rather, an integral attribute of statehood. No one would ever think of screaming about the complete abolition of law enforcement agencies. So why should we do the same with censorship? Is the state obligated to dump everything on the public record? Doesn't it, by definition, have the right to some secrets? If every person in a democratic society has the right to privacy, then on what grounds should we deprive the state of this same right?!
As for the facts of history, they are as follows. Many believe that the history of Soviet censorship begins on October 27, 1917. That is, on the very day the Provisional Revolutionary Committee adopted the Decree on the Press. Under this decree, 575 independent publishing houses and over 2,000 newspaper and magazine titles were classified as sowing discord, which almost automatically made them subject to a ban. But this is not censorship as such—it is elementary political struggle.
In fact, the history of Soviet censorship begins on December 23, 1918, when the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic introduced military censorship. Trotsky himself was the initiator of this decree. Whatever one's opinion of him, he was right on this point. If the government wants to win in a country engulfed in a civil war accompanied by foreign interventions, censorship of military communications is simply unavoidable. Otherwise, the enemy will know everything. Incidentally, there is a special branch of intelligence work now known as legal espionage. This is a systematic, thorough, analytical study of all publications on issues of interest to a given intelligence agency, which leads to very serious conclusions, often of the highest political nature.
Accordingly, protecting military and state secrets in the media is a matter of great national importance. It is one of the front lines of defense for national independence, sovereignty, and the economic, military, and political power of the state, and is carried out in the interests of all citizens of a given country.
Almost immediately, censorship was transferred to the Cheka's supervision. Many still scoff at this to this day. But what's there to scoff at when it's clear that the function of ensuring state security cannot be carried out without appropriate oversight, including over media publications. Otherwise, they'll say such things... Just recall the years of Gorbachev's catastrophe, and everything will become clear to you.
Or, for example, they often make sarcastic reference to the March 1927 order of Glavlit, which stated: “To all Gublits, Oblits, Krailites. Urgent. Secret.
Upon receipt of this, do not allow in print… any information or discussions of an alarming nature regarding the prospects for the harvest this year, and this information should also include information that, although it does not directly refer to the harvest itself (for example, unfavorable meteorological observations, etc.), can be interpreted as a threat to the harvest. It is forbidden to publish information: 1) about grain exports; 2) the existence of various types of censorship; 3) the work and structure of the OGPU; 4) about the Kremlin; 5) about train wrecks; 6) cases of suicide and insanity; 7) the location of members of the Government; 8) the devaluation of the chervonets."
Take, for example, the ban on publications concerning the grain harvest and exports. As early as the fourth book of the five-volume set, it was pointed out that, as soon as the course toward industrialization had been announced, the West imposed a so-called "gold blockade" against the Soviet Union, under which the USSR was required to pay for industrial equipment supplied in grain, not gold. Consequently, possessing even minimal information about harvest prospects would have allowed the West to drive down prices on Soviet grain, severely damaging industrialization plans. In turn, any alarming information about domestic harvest prospects could have directly provoked a rise in grain prices within the Soviet Union, which would inevitably have led to a social upheaval with extremely negative political and other consequences. Moreover, 1927 was a year of "war anxiety"—the Soviet Union feared an armed attack by consolidated Western forces. And an internal upheaval was all our country needed.
If you had at least a basic understanding of these historical nuances, you wouldn't even think of making fun of such censorship restrictions. But, alas, our journalists are only capable of living up to the proverbial "galloping through Europe"—knowing nothing, yet uttering the latest nonsense with the air of all-knowing experts. "Lord Journalism! A fool, given the power of columns to fool three thousand fools every morning!" —as Alfred de Musset once said.
Take the ban on publishing information about the OGPU's structure. Honestly, where have you ever seen an active intelligence agency that would publicly display its internal structure? This is complete nonsense from a national security perspective!
Take the ban on publishing information about the Kremlin or the whereabouts of government members. It should be clear that this falls under the realm of state security, and therefore, by definition, should not be reported to the press. At least, especially insofar as it concerns the intentions of this or that government member to travel to this or that location. Because there could be assassination attempts. No one can count how many there were. But for the readers' information, I will inform you that it was in 1927, on orders from abroad, primarily from Great Britain, that the internal opposition openly began to pursue a course of terror, primarily against government officials, both central and local. The OGPU had documentary evidence to this effect.
Or a ban on information about the devaluation of the chervonets. Firstly, a significant portion of information about the financial system and government policy in this area is by definition classified, and often top secret. Not only its stability, but the stability of the entire state depends on this. Not to mention the fact that any leaked information on this matter could lead to extremely negative consequences. This is a rule observed in virtually all countries worldwide. Secondly, at that time, Western countries were implementing a series of measures to undermine the Soviet Union's financial system, including through the massive influx of counterfeit Soviet banknotes into the USSR. Accordingly, any information about the authorities' actions to protect their financial system should have been classified a priori.
Finally, regarding the ban on publishing information about train accidents, mental illnesses, and suicides. First of all, information about such accidents has at least two negative connotations. On the one hand, it undermines trust in the state's transportation system, and at that time, rail transport was (and still is) of exceptional importance, including for transit. And who would benefit from publishing reports of train accidents from morning until night, given that the Soviet Union made a substantial profit from transit rail traffic?
As for the reports of insanity and suicide, the nature of their negative impact on society hardly needs to be explained in detail. And at the time, such information was unacceptable for publication, particularly because it was so cleverly exploited in the West. Look, they say, at what the Bolsheviks had accomplished with their plans to transform society—people were losing their minds and committing suicide. So, did the Kremlin really need all that?
There were, of course, obvious distortions in this policy. For example, few people know that Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, who died in complete madness, served until her death as the head of a ferocious ideological inquisition. It was she who drew up the first list—in Inquisition terms, an interdict—of literature, especially children's literature, whose publication was banned in the USSR. This list included many classic works by Russian and foreign writers, including even those that constituted and continue to constitute the golden treasure of the literary heritage of all humanity. It's fortunate that Stalin eventually overturned the literary bans imposed by this insufferable widow, who deprived Soviet children of many literary treasures.
They're especially sarcastic about Stalin. They say that if an author didn't mention Stalin in any way in a piece of writing, then, "naturally," the censors would remove it from print. The only thing I can say on this matter is this: it's utter nonsense. To understand what's going on here, let's turn to Lion Feuchtwanger—after all, he was the first to describe what was happening at the time using precisely these definitions. So, here's an excerpt from Feuchtwanger's book, "Moscow. 1937. A Trip Report for My Friends" (cited in Moscow, 1937, pp. 47–48).
"The Cult of Stalin. The adoration and boundless cult with which the population surrounds Stalin is the first thing that strikes a foreigner traveling through the Soviet Union. On every street corner and intersection, in appropriate and inappropriate places, gigantic busts and portraits of Stalin are visible. Speeches one hears, not only political speeches but even reports on any scientific or artistic topic, are peppered with glorifications of Stalin, and this deification often takes on tasteless forms.
Examples. Here are a few. If at the construction exhibition I admired… busts of Stalin are displayed in various rooms, that makes sense, since Stalin is one of the initiators of the project for the complete reconstruction of Moscow. But, at the very least, it's unclear what a colossal, unsightly bust of Stalin has to do with an exhibition of Rembrandt paintings, otherwise tastefully arranged. I was also quite puzzled when, during a lecture on the technique of Soviet drama, I heard the speaker, who had hitherto shown a sense of proportion, suddenly burst into an enthusiastic hymn in honor of Stalin's achievements.
Reasons. There is no doubt that this excessive worship is, in the vast majority of cases, sincere. People feel the need to express their gratitude, their boundless admiration. They truly believe that everything they have and are, they owe to Stalin. And although this deification of Stalin may seem strange, and sometimes even repulsive, to someone arriving from the West, I have never found any signs indicating the artificiality of this feeling. It grew organically, along with the successes of economic construction... The people must have someone to whom they can express gratitude for the undeniable improvement in their living conditions, and for this purpose they choose not an abstract concept, not abstract "communism," but a specific person—Stalin. The Russian is prone to exaggeration; his speech and gestures express, to a certain extent, the superlative, and he rejoices when he can give vent to the feelings that overwhelm him. This boundless veneration, therefore, does not apply to Stalin the man—it applies to the representative of an obviously successful economic construction. The people say: "Stalin," meaning by this name growing prosperity, growing education. The people say: "We love Stalin," and this is the most direct, most natural expression of his confidence in the economic situation, in socialism, in the regime."
There's no doubt that Feuchtwanger honestly and sincerely described what he personally saw and heard. But who could explain where Stalin's cult-like hand or the censorship under his control is at work here? They're absent, by definition! Because Feuchtwanger clearly noted that this is clear evidence of both the people's sincere feelings and blatant sycophancy (though he didn't use those words).
As for the sycophancy, there's probably no need to explain. In our country, it's everywhere, even every quarter step. Who, for example, forces State Duma deputies to hang portraits of the president on the walls of their luxurious offices—first one, then another, and then "strictly based on election results"?! Who forces bureaucrats to inflate the president's personality cult and quote him appropriately, and often inappropriately? Who forces them to scream at the top of their lungs about the need for a third term for the president, when the latter is already tired of explaining that he doesn't even want to try? In short, as far as the sycophancy goes, everything is clear.
As for the manifestation of popular sentiment, Feuchtwanger was objective here too—he directly linked the expression of popular sentiment toward Stalin with the country's economic recovery. What's surprising about that, and where's the cult in that? Especially since, if these manifestations are to be called a cult, it certainly isn't a cult of Stalin himself, but of what Stalin's name symbolized. The outstanding German humanist writer also noted this quite accurately, pointing out that
"The boundless respect... does not apply to Stalin the man - it applies to the representative of a clearly successful economic upsurge."
The very fact that Stalin personified such boundless veneration is due to the fact that, as Joseph Vissarionovich himself explained to Feuchtwanger, people must believe in something. There is no Tsar, God has been taken away, but they still need to believe in something. Incidentally, almost ten years before meeting Feuchtwanger, at a Politburo meeting, Stalin said that "a peasant cannot revere an entire collective—a peasant needs one individual!" And when, in the words of a German writer, "an obviously successful economic upswing" became evident to everyone, the peasant personified his veneration in the name most closely associated with this upswing. This veneration was also manifested in the media. For such a time-honored ideocratic country as Russia—that is, a country where one idea or another has reigned supreme since time immemorial—this is hardly surprising.
Interestingly, Stalin himself, not without a sense of humor, clearly grasped the profound significance of this reverence for his name. He once admonished his youngest son, who was trying to prove something to someone by relying on his surname, Stalin. Joseph Vissarionovich replied quite seriously that neither he, Vasily Stalin, nor, especially, he himself, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, was the Stalin revered by the people. The Stalin revered by the people was the one depicted in the portrait. He pointed to his portrait and said, "That's Stalin!" As a child, Vasily didn't immediately grasp the significance of this, but as an adult, he fully grasped the essence of his father's response.
At the same time, one cannot help but note a certain exaggeration in L. Feuchtwanger's perception of Stalin's "boundless veneration." Of course, for Westerners, this was a novelty, but not so unusual as to insist on "boundless veneration." The fact is that during Stalin's time, there existed a sort of unspoken ban, though not imposed by him personally, on the frequent mention of his name. And although, frankly, this ban was not strictly observed, I cannot help but draw the attention of modern readers to one curious detail in several dimensions.
1. The author's home library contains many books on various topics published during Stalin's time. Besides the astonishing breadth of information and depth of analysis of the phenomena they describe—the books are primarily on history, politics, and economics—it's also deeply impressive that, for example, in a 500-page book, you'll barely find a couple of references to Stalin's works! Older people remember well that during the time of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or the chatterbox Gorbachev, every third word or expression was a reference to these figures. But in the books published during Stalin's reign, there's nothing of the sort.
2. Yu. I. Mukhin, in his famous book, "The Assassination of Stalin and Beria," describes a case in which he analyzed illustrations in the back issues of the same magazine, Ogonyok, from 1952 and 1999—that is, from the Stalin period and today. What particularly struck him was the paucity of photographs of Stalin (and politicians of that time in general) compared to how often the faces of modern political figures appear in print. What Mukhin described is consistent with a sixfold difference. Under Stalin, his photographs were published six times less frequently than the faces of any modern political figure. And yet, not a single modern political figure is worthy of comparison, even with the dust from Stalin's boots.
3. On March 1, 1936, Stalin gave an interview to Mr. Roy Howard, chairman of the American newspaper group Scripps Howard Newspapers. At the time, it was called a "conversation." In this interview, Stalin spoke at length and in great detail about the new USSR Constitution, the new electoral system, and the hopes he placed in this new system of universal, direct, secret elections on an alternative basis.
But here's what's astonishing. This interview wasn't published as a separate brochure until 1937! It turns out that, during the supposed "personality cult" and "brutal Stalinist repressions," the Partizdat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) managed to drag its feet on publishing the leader's works, which addressed the most pressing issues of the time. What struck me most was the following circumstance. The text of the conversation was submitted to the printer on December 15, 1936, but it wasn't signed for publication until March 26, 1937! The brochure, meanwhile, is only eighteen and a half pages long, including the title page! And how long did it take to publish a short interview with the leader? The same leader who allegedly fostered his own personality cult and whose censorship was so draconian?
4. If you look at pages 63-64 of the memoirs of the former Soviet military intelligence officer Leopold Trepper, published under the title "The Great Game" (Moscow, 1990), you will be able to read the following. L. Trepper vividly described how, in the mid-1930s, that is, when Stalin's personality cult was allegedly inflated and "cruel Stalinist repressions" were carried out, the editor-in-chief of the daily Soviet Jewish newspaper Der Emes ("Truth"), Moshe Litvakov, at that very time, categorically refused to publish any articles about Stalin, even those written by prominent members of the Central Committee. So, how do you like this "cruel" Stalinist censorship?
Those who like to sneer at Stalin-era censorship are especially outraged when it comes to the last two years before the war. More precisely, starting with the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939. The main principle of this sneer is as follows. Previously, they say, the word "fascist" was used exclusively as a swear word, not only in newspaper articles and books but also in everyday life, but as soon as Stalin became friends with Hitler, everything miraculously changed. This is all a lie, a vile lie. After all, there was no such thing as "becoming friends," and before the Non-Aggression Pact was signed, both sides agreed to sharply tone down, as they say today, the rhetoric in the media! This same agreement continued to be in effect. Because the basic normalization of interstate relations cannot be achieved in a situation where both sides are diligently and subtly bashing each other...
Nevertheless, journalists happily cite facts such as the October 1939 ban on the publication of Academician Yevgeny Tarle's article "The Fascist Falsification of Historical Science in Germany" or the ban on Sergei Prokofiev's opera "Semyon Kotko." And, most interestingly, they cite the censorship justification for these bans, which clearly demonstrates the agreement in place at the time to sharply reduce the intensity of rhetoric in the media. For example, regarding Y. Tarle's article, it was stated that it "contained negative assessments of Hitler, Goebbels, and other fascist leaders," and regarding the opera's libretto, that it "included an episode involving the Austro-German occupiers."
But whatever one's attitude toward these individuals, at that time they were officials of a state with which the USSR had signed a Non-Aggression Pact. Hitler, after all, was a single figure—Führer of the German Nation, Reich Chancellor, Reich President, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Did Stalin really need to exacerbate relations with Germany in October 1939 through all sorts of insults and attacks in the press? After all, at that time—the fall of 1939—everyone in the West wasn't trying to provoke a deadly clash between the USSR and Germany. British intelligence alone was practically weekly sending Soviet embassies abroad and German diplomatic missions in various countries various trumpeted letters threatening attack by one side or the other. In such a situation, harsh rhetoric in the media or art was all that was needed to spark a war. For Stalin, it was more important to pump out the latest industrial equipment and the latest military hardware from Germany, for which, by the way, he paid mainly with fish bladders and pig bristles, down and feathers!
Attacks on censorship during wartime occupy a special place. They desperately relish the censorship's efforts to ensure the security of the army and the home front—they say, "countless soldiers' letters from the front arrived with carefully redacted words and lines. This is how army censorship prevented leaks of 'undesirable information' from the front lines." Well, one must at least understand a little what the security of the army and the home front means, the security of the unity of the army and the home front in such a terrible war as the one waged by the Soviet Union! Even with the best intentions—and, as we know, the road to hell is paved with them—one must not allow negative information about the situation at the front to leak to the rear. Otherwise, the threat to the front will come from the rear. Not to mention that, given the massive infiltration of agents into the Soviet rear (both deep and near the front), which Hitler's intelligence services, especially the Abwehr, practiced, such information could have caused colossal damage to the plans of the Soviet command. During wartime, intelligence agencies are always on the hunt for soldiers' letters. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet censors prevented the publication or distribution of 82,161 materials, information, and data, 36,121 of which were for state secrets, 17,047 for political reasons, and 28,902 anti-Soviet materials were removed from foreign publications. What journalists see as wrong with this is more than difficult to understand.
Censorship has always been, is, and will always be. Naturally, times change, and so do the objectives of censorship. But they have always been, are, and will always be of a purely state-run, sovereign nature.
Myth #194: After the war, Stalin carried out the predatory monetary reform of 1947.
