INTERVIEW WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY OF TURKEY (TDKP) - 3
ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY AND KURDISTAN
You have indicated that we are heading rapidly towards a new stage in the general crisis of the capitalist system and a period of intensified major conflicts, wars, turmoil. If this is the case, what is Turkey’s situation? Where and what kind of process is the country heading for? Stability or instability?
As one of the imperialist chain’s weak links, if not the weakest one, Turkey is entering a process characterised by a new stage in the general crisis of capitalism. As one of the imperialist chain’s weak links, Turkey cannot be a country heading towards stability at a time when the imperialist-capitalist system is on the eve of a new stage in its general crisis. Turkey’s position in the capitalist world and its internal conditions as well as developmental trajectory imply that elements of instability will be more pronounced as the imperialist-capitalist system moves towards a new stage in its general crisis.
One of the direct consequences of the scientific-technological revolution and the level of internationalisation as well as concentration of capital is the intensification and expansion of the relations between the links of the imperialist chain in political, cultural, diplomatic as well as economic, trade and financial areas. Of course, this development has not eliminated the development gap between imperialist and dependent or semi-colonial backward countries or the relations between the oppressive-oppressed and exploiting-exploited classes. Nevertheless, it created the conditions for single-country economies to be affected by changes in the world capitalist economy.
Irrespective of the demagogies uttered by the representatives of the ruling classes and their dictatorship to the effect that Turkey is developing very rapidly and assuming astatus similar to that of advanced capitalist countries as it bridges the development gap, it is still a dependent and backward country whose resources have been and are still being exploited by imperialist monopolies and states. Just at a time when demagogicclaims are intensively made about bridging the gap between Turkey and advanced capitalist countries as a result of rapid development, the country has become moredependent on advanced capitalist-imperialist countries. Imperialist exploitation isnow more severe than ever before. Increased dependence and intensified imperialistexploitation imply contraction of development opportunities. In fact, it implies anincrease in the capacity of the imperialist countries to make Turkey foot the bill for thecosts incurred as a result of the new stage in the general crisis of the capitalist system.The conclusion to be derived is that Turkey will be directly affected by the emergence of the new stage in general crisis of the capitalist system and existing elements ofinstability will become more pronounced.
In addition to the factors indicated above, Turkey is located in the most unstable region where a new inter-imperialist struggle is going on for the division of the world. When oneconsiders the developments in the Balkans, the Middle-East and the former Soviet republics, it is obvious that Turkey is at the intersection of regions characterised by instability that constitutes a major problem for major imperialist states and monopolies; and this would not disappear in the near future. In addition to this, one must also bearin mind that Turkey is a prison for national minorities and that the Kurdish nation hasalready risen to change this situation. As far as her relations with her neighbours are concerned, Turkey is faced with many long-standing or recently-emerging problems thatcould not be resolved in the short run. Under these conditions, Turkey is bound to beaffected by that instability, which would only be exacerbated as the capitalist system moves towards the new stage in its general crisis.
Although with some differences in their interpretation of Turkey’s economic situation -depending on whether they are in power or in opposition - the bourgeois parties maywell agree that Turkey is a major regional power and that its economy is capable ofsustaining the current growth levels. This, however, does not conceal the fact that thecountry is still not enjoying a relative economic stability compatible with capitalism. Onthe contrary, Turkey will be adversely affected by the existing regional instability as wellas the instability to be caused by the progression of capitalism towards a new stage in itsgeneral crisis. In addition to conjunctural and temporary fluctuations, the Turkish economy is also subject to a more fundamental crisis and the indications are such that this economic crisis is permanent. The short-run recovery (which tends to be for a duration of 3 to 6 months only) that is presented as proof of overcoming the crisis is followed by stagnation and decline. As your journal has already published data on the economic situation, I do not wish to elaborate on them here once again.
There could be no political stability in a country faced with a continuous economic crisis.Although economic stability is not identical and does not coincide with political stability,the latter depends on the former and a stable development of the economy. As it wasthe case with the fascist coup of 12 September, political stability can be attained by intensifying fascist oppression and terror or through other means. However, the political stability achieved through such measures cannot be permanent unless economic stabilityis achieved through a stable development of the economy. Otherwise, the short-term political stability will only lead to the accumulation of the elements of a deeper political crisis. In addition to that, Turkey is currently not heading towards political stability. Nor does it constitute a country where such stability is attained. On the contrary, since mid-1980s, Turkey has witnessed the end of relative political stability ensured by the fascistcoup of 12 September. That relative stability is now being replaced by newly emerging elements of a political crisis.
The fascist coup of 12 September, even though temporarily, managed to establish political stability by uniting the reactionary forces and oppressing the working class, peasant, youth and Kurdish national movements and inflicting heavy blows on the revolution. Since mid-1980s, as conflicts within reactionary forces intensified and their counter-revolutionary unity around the fascist junta disintegrated, the working class, peasant, youth and Kurdish national movements began to assert themselves again. These developments constitute the major indications of the political crisis.
In order that political stability is ensured and maintained and the disintegration of the reactionary forces be prevented, it is necessary to pacify or stem the working class, peasant, youth and Kurdish national movements - if not liquidating it.
In spite of the reactionary forces’ continuous attempts and their calls for ‘unity on basis of a lowest common denominator against terrorism and for the protection of the national unity’, no stable or permanent unity has been established in the counter-revolutionary front. Also, despite repetitive local and general elections as well as referendums, no segment of the reactionary forces has managed to attain a hegemonic position that would ensure the unification of the rest around it. Neither has any segment succeeded in becoming an alternative for the masses - even in the short run.
In Turkey, as a country that has found itself in the midst of an increasingly deepening economic crisis since mid-1970s, the burden of economic crisis has been placed on the shoulders of the masses and even the remnants of the democratic rights that had been wrested and practically exercised have all been eliminated. During that process, real wages of the working classes fell, unemployment rose, the rate of exploitation increased, and democratic rights as well as liberties were lifted - leading to an increasing deterioration in the working and living conditions of the working people. Under the conditions of high inflation levels and suppressed democratic rights and freedoms, limited improvements in wages and agricultural prices as well as half-baked steps presented asdemocratisation or liberalisation have not proved effective in dampening the expectations of the masses. Therefore, they have not altered the situation in any way. Demands aimed at changing the existing conditions are being raised by the working class, other labouring classes and the youth - in spite of the fact that the majority of them have not yet managed to organise as an independent social force under an appropriate leadership. In a process where the mass movement, with the influence of the revolutionary activity, is starting to evolve from an economic demands-centred to a political-revolutionary demands-centred struggle, the manoeuvring capacity of the bourgeois dictatorship is declining. That is due to the fact that no concession or arrangement will be sufficient for establishing stability and changing the course of the development through pacifying themasses and their activities. This is also valid so far as the Kurdish national movement is concerned - another element of instability for imperialism and the ruling classes in Turkey. The rejection of the masses in Kurdistan to live as before and the extent of the crisis is more pronounced. Neither intensified fascist oppression and terror nor demagogicmanoeuvring of the dictatorship can stem the increase in discontent, anger andresoluteness of the masses.
Of course, as it is the case with spontaneous class movements and national movement slacking a revolutionary proletarian leadership, the working class and Kurdish national movements are faced with major shortcomings. Therefore, they are inflicted with somedegree of instability. In spite of temporary stumblings, however, the movements of theworking classes and the Kurdish national movement have been undeniably characterised by progress since mid-1980s. The conditions that led to the rise of the working class, other labouring classes, youth and Kurdish national movements have not disappeared.On the contrary, they are becoming deeper and more mature.
Following the collapse of the USSR, it has been argued that the new conditions have created new opportunities for Turkey’s development and that Turkey has assumed newroles with the emergence of a ‘Turkic community stretching from the Adriatic Sea to theWall of China’. To what extent did the disintegration of the USSR and the emergenceof independent Republics affect Turkey’s position and extend the opportunities open toit?
It is undoubtedly true that the disintegration of the USSR and the declaration of independence by the former Soviet Republics have provided Turkey, more correctly theruling classes and their fascist dictatorship in Turkey, with some crumbles that would enable them to propagate Turkish nationalism. Those crumbles, however, have been provided in line with the strategic and tactical plans of the imperialist monopolies andstates, especially the US. Turkey is allowed to benefit from those crumbles only to theextent it performs the role assigned to it within those plans. This role will undoubtedly involve costs as it is performed within the imperialist plans and in one of the world’s mostunstable regions where an inter-imperialist struggle of division is being waged. What roleis Turkey going to play in this unstable region where power relations between imperialist countries are in chaos and inter-imperialist conflicts are intensified?
Those who argue that Turkey would succeed in extending its opportunities are basing their arguments on the assumption that Turkey is a large and independent country andcan play an independent role in line with its own imperialist interests. The imperialist circles and their servants in Turkey are poking the historical ties between peoples for their own imperialist plans and objectives. On that basis, they argue that Turkey is a developed and stable power who could play a policing role in the region. They even gofurther and claim that Turkey could become a major factor of stability and improve its development prospects. It would be a totally absurd act to take such theses - supported also by the Trotskyite sub-imperialism theory - seriously.
Let alone being able to get a share from the imperialist plunder by taking part in the imperialist struggle for division, Turkey is a model neo-colony. It is an arena of imperialist exploitation and a target over which major imperialist states are struggling to establish their own hegemony. The increasingly intensifying problems faced by large imperialist states are limiting the amounts of scraps that can be obtained in return for playing a policing role or jumping board for the imperialist capital. The cost of those limited scraps, on the other hand, is to be dragged into regional clashes which would only exacerbate the problems faced by Turkey. As Turkey assumes new roles within the strategic and tactical plans of some imperialist states, it will find itself face to face with other regional or imperialist states. When all these factors are considered, two facts stand out: (i) recent developments in the former Soviet Republics, in contrast to what others would argue, would not provide Turkey with tangible opportunities that would help overcoming its economic crisis; (ii) steps taken with the expectation of benefiting from the alleged opportunities would only lead Turkey into the turmoil and chaos prevailing in the region - hence leading to the exacerbation of the crisis, the cost of which would be imposed on various nationalities and labouring classes.
Just before the last general elections, it was being claimed that the Ozal and ANAP (Motherland Party) government are the source of all problems and that those problems would be resolved once that government was overthrown. Even the most radical circles held the view that the overthrow of the government would constitute the first step in resolving the existing problems. This adherents to such propaganda were not only bourgeois opposition parties such as the DYP (True Path Party) and SHP (Social Democrat People's Party), but also parties and trade-union leaders with socialist labels, the intelligentsia, the press and other allegedly socialist legal groups. After the elections leading to the DYP-SHP coalition, this propaganda was reformulated. Those circles began to argue that the new government was the last chance for solving Turkey’s problems and that it should be given enough time as the existing problems could not be sorted out immediately.
Supported by a wide social and political spectrum, this propaganda and associated tactics generated some expectations among the masses to the effect that their urgent economic and political demands can be met gradually. This propaganda seemed to be effective due to the limited influence of revolutionary and communist activity. The support given to the SHP in the elections by the PKK (the Workers Party of Kurdistan) and other Kurdish nationalist organisations re-inforced such expectations in Kurdistan. It must be indicated, however, that expectation was combined with hesitation. The revolutionary and communist propaganda and agitation as well as the experience of the masses themselves have prevented the emergence of a sanguine expectation and the rise of one bourgeois party as the party of hope.
The existence of an expectation of some sort, even if precarious, has, nevertheless, affected the Kurdish national struggle as well as the working classes, especially the proletariat. It caused a decline in mass movement even though it stopped short of bringing about political stability. That decline, however, was not a result of a frontal attack by the ruling classes. Neither was it due to the erosion of the mass willingness to fight for their demands. That is why the decline contained the seeds of future dynamism and acceleration.
The shop-floor resistance against redundancies right after the establishment of the DYP-SHP government, the increased activity and attempts at organisation-building among government employees, etc. are clear indications of this process. Also, continued economic and political aggression by the ruling classes and their dictatorship, lack of steps towards meeting economic and political demands of the masses, introduction of new aggressive measures, etc. shook the hesitant expectation further and generated new resentment, anger and struggle. All the government could do was to stem the increased resentment and anger by initiating new aggression, using the increased individualistic terrorist activity that emerged as a result of the same conditions as a pretext. Despite these attempts, however, recent May Day celebrations, wage bargaining disputes ad intensified activity of the public sector employees, etc. are all indications of an emerging rise in mass movement.
Our party has consistently emphasised that existing problems could not be resolved by the replacement of the Ozal-ANAP government by another government formed by some party (or parties) of the system - not only after the current government was established and it became clear that existing problems would not be resolved, but also before the elections. We have always explained why urgent demands concerning the working and living conditions and basic democratic rights of the masses as well as the Kurdish nation - let alone their fundamental demands - could not be met through parliamentary activity and changes in government. The experience of this process has confirmed this fact of life, which has been confirmed many times by the experience of our own country and other countries.
As it has been the case until now, the new government established by the bourgeois parties DYP and SHP will also try to make the workers, the peasants, and all labouring classes foot the bill of the crisis. The essence of the government policy is to maintain andensure the political stability of the system based on the dominance of the imperialist andlocal monopolists as well as large landlords. Maximum profit is the fundamental economic law of this system. No party that bases its programme and activity on the maintenance of this system and its stability can pursue policies that would limit the profit in a way that could lead to improvement in the working and living conditions of the working classes.
In spite of its democratic rhetoric, the DYP-SHP government is not a bourgeois-democratic government. As it has been indicated in one of your journal’s leaders, it is agovernment of terror. The attainment of democratic rights and freedoms is not a constitutional or legal matter. First of all, it is a matter of removing all barriers to the democratisation of the country and the society, and their re-organisation on a democratic basis. This target can only be attained through a revolutionary mass struggle that is not constrained by any law and aimed at destroying the fascist dictatorship through a struggle against imperialism, monopolist bourgeoisie and landlords.
Pointing to the developments that followed the events at Newroz (the Kurdish national festival), the government have been arguing that the PKK are pushed into a corner andthat significant success has been achieved in establishing stability as well as state rule in Kurdistan. They also argue that government forces have re-gained the moral superiority that they had lost previously. Do you think
the PKK and the Kurdish national movement are faced by a serious blow?
It is not possible to give a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to your question even if we try to limit our focus to the impact of post-Newroz developments and the Kurdish national movement on the political life of Turkey. Therefore, we have to respond to various parts of your question in turn and by pointing to some facts emphasised above. I will try to remain within the framework of your question and express my views on the current situation that has been overlooked or covered up both by the government and by some left opposition forces for various reasons.
I must straight away indicate that the government and reactionary forces have gained amoral and tactical superiority after Newroz and the developments that followed. Therewere various factors that prepared the ground for the government’s moral and tactical victory over the Kurdish people. As indicated above, the last general elections had caused some changes in Turkey’s political situation and generated some support for the government and fostered some democratic expectations on the part of the press, the trade union leaders, the majority of the ‘left’ intellectuals, and some sections of the ‘left’political movements. In other words, forces that had at least acted as parliamentary opposition against the ANAP government before the election have begun to support theDYP-SHP coalition. As we have indicated previously, the aggression campaign that the new government initiated in Kurdistan coincided with various developments: the relative stagnation in the working class movement, the emergence of a ‘consensus’ in the reactionary-fascist camp to rally around the government, the impact on the petit-bourgeois strata of the campaign organised around the emergence of ‘Turkic Republics’, etc. In addition, the Kurdish bourgeoisie, with the support of the PKK, have increased their organisational activities and taken steps towards fostering expectations among the Kurdish people and anchoring them to the ‘central parliament’ and the current ‘statusquo’. Also, the Turkish government have managed to generate a relative increase in the support they receive from imperialist countries.
These were the conditions and relative advantages under which the government and fascist reactionary forces announced the ‘Spring Operation’ towards Newroz time.
It was obvious that the Kurdish people were not sufficiently prepared to challenge this extended and re-inforced aggression. The Kurdish people were hostile to the dictatorship, but it also was without an organisation. PKK’s pronounced orientation towards parliamentarism before and after the general elections has increased the Kurdish bourgeoisie’s capacity to increase its influence on the un-organised working people and confine their movement to the limits imposed by the system. This orientation has also contributed to the result that ‘relative democracy’ could be expected of the DYP-SHP government which, in fact, was nothing but a government of terror. Also, the weakening of the revolutionary front in the face of the government’s phycological war and the PKK’simproper and conflicting announcements (calls for and against uprising and indications of willingness to enter into dialogue with the government) before Newroz have enabled the government to attain a moral-psychological superiority.
As we know, Newroz celebrations proved less effective than expected. In the rural areas of the ‘south’ where mass resistance took place, some of the factors that caused thefailure of the un-organised mass demonstration were (i) the failure to establish therequired relation between the mass and armed parts of the movement and (ii) theutilisation of the mass movement as a ‘reason’ for engaging in armed struggle. The ‘left’Kurdish bourgeoisie dominating the movement in large cities (especially Diyarbakir) havemanaged to exploit that situation and pacify the urban working classes against the attacksof the dictatorship.
Countervailing the new government’s ‘Spring Operation’ as designed by the fascist generals was crucially dependent on Newroz and May Day celebrations. As you know, Newroz remained a local ad weak resistance limited mainly to Kurdistan. The calls for resistance were replaced by calls for ‘mourning’ after Newroz. Obviously, one of the main reasons that led to this result was the lack of powerful protests in large cities in the west. In conclusion, Newroz constituted a point at which the government attained moral and tactical superiority and the Kurdish people suffered a moral-psychological retrogression. May Day celebrations took place right after Newroz at a time when the government was able to exploit the moral-tactical victory it won in Kurdistan and the working class movement was in a relative retardedness due to political changes mentioned above.
The government managed to survive from Newroz up to now by exploiting various advantages including the existing wave of chauvinism and the adverse impacts of theshort-sighted terrorist activities. It must, however, be indicated that the bourgeoisie’s moral-tactical victory does not mean that ‘stability’ and ‘state rule’ have been established in Kurdistan or Turkey. First of all, the national demands of the Kurdish people are becoming more wide-spread and the objective conditions on which they are basedcontinue to exist. In other words, the Kurdish people’s lack of confidence in the established ‘status-quo’ and the ‘system’ as well as the government is continuing and deepening. The operation conducted by the government in and outside Turkey isproducing new foci of opposition and resistance. As the main ally of the Kurdish people, the proletariat is accumulating new experiences and its expectations are becoming increasingly frustrated. Irrespective of the moral-tactical victory and advantages of thegovernment, the Kurdish question is and will continue to be the topical issue in Turkey. Returning to ‘good old days’ and ‘stability within the established system’ is only a dream of the past. The dictatorship is largely devoid of any solution and condemned to casual policies aimed at ‘saving the day’. Briefly stated, today the Kurdish national resistance isonly going through a process of uniting with the worker-peasant movement, providingitself with a breathing space. Also, the current ‘superiority’ of the government has novalue in terms of establishing ‘stability’ and ‘state rule’. We can be absolutely sure thatthe bourgeoisie and its dictatorship will be disappointed if they are counting on the current ‘moral-tactical superiority’ established by this government. In Kurdistan, ‘stability’ within the existing status-quo is by and large an illusion. The possibility of such a stability, even temporarily, has been curtailed substantially.
So far as the ‘encirclement’ of the PKK and the ‘heavy blow’ it is faced with are concerned, it is true to say that the PKK’s influence on the Kurdish people has been shaken and its advantages across the border have been curtailed for the time being. Itis also true that the government has been trying to exploit and the collaborationist, reformist Kurdish bourgeoisie is actually exploiting this situation. Nevertheless, it is also true that ‘encirclement’ of the PKK is not the correct word to use. As the economic andpolitical conditions mentioned above continue to exist in Kurdistan; as the working class movement renew its dynamism; as events continue to develop in the Kurdistan and theMiddle-East in ways that work against Turkey; and as inter-imperialist conflicts withrespect to the Middle-East and Turkey become more pronounced, it would be more appropriate to speak of Turkey’s rather than PKK’s ‘encirclement’. The government’s declarations to the effect that they have ‘encircled the terrorist organisation’ or have‘damaged’ it badly are nothing but hollow propaganda statements. They would produceno result apart from temporary impacts.
The problem faced by the PKK today is not ‘being encircled’, but the political line to befollowed and the type of activity to be performed. The conditions in Kurdistan that would lead to a revolutionary elan and national revival and to the transformation of these developments into a workers and peasant’s movement still exist and are maturing. This is also true of the rise and maturation of revolutionary socialism and communism.
The difficulties faced by the PKK and the Kurdish national resistance are essentially due to reformist and parliamentarist orientations, attempts at constructing alliances with imperialist countries, and diluting the lines that differentiate them from the reformist Kurdish bourgeoisie, who are after a new agreement with Turkey. Also, the deformation of the link between the guerrilla war and the organised mass struggle as well as the underestimation of the need for Kurdish workers and labouring classes to be organised in their own organisations and rise as an organised people have weakened and eroded the movement of the Kurdish people and provided the government and the bourgeoisie with advantages.
If the PKK and the Kurdish people manage to adopt a revolutionary, popular and anti-imperialist approach toi these problems, they will be well placed to overcome the existing difficulties. Otherwise, they are going to be faced either by a vicious circle condemning them to similar difficulties or by the danger of a further drift towards parliamentarism and surrender to imperialism. The point to which the Palestanian movement -a movement with better social and international resources relative to the Kurdish national movement- has been pushed as a result of Yasser Arafat's policies is clear enough. The position into which the Iraqi Kurdistan has been dragged by Talabani's and Barzani's movements is also clear. In our opinion, the problem faced by the Kurdish popular movement and the PKK as its strongest segment is to have an anti-imperialist, democratic position and develop a sound understanding of mass struggle, organisation as well as armed uprising. Let us not forget that natinal liberation is only possible by people's emancipating themselves of imperialism and all types of reactinary forces. This emancipation can be achieved not only by forming popular 'armies', but also by the uprising of organised and armed people who would exercise their own self-determination.
Everybody is debating the question of how the Kurdish national question would beresolved. Federal solution, federation, etc. is one of the alternatives on which the debatetends to be concentrated from time to time. What do you think about the solution to theKurdish national question?
The federal ‘solution’ or ‘federation’ has been discussed as a ‘practical solution’ in the period before Newroz. The parties to that debate were Turgut Ozal and the PKK. During that period, our party expressed its views on this ‘proposal for solution’ and was engagedin activity in line with that explanation.
In our party’s view there is only one revolutionary solution to the national question: theself-determination of the oppressed nation without interference. There is only one interpretation of this solution: the oppressed nation or people possesses the right toorganise as an independent state and to exercise this right freely. Self-determination, that is to say the right or organise (and separate) as an independent state is an absolute rightfor the oppressed nation without being subject to any condition. What is the way tha twould be more appropriate and revolutionary for this right is to be exercised? The position of our party (the content of its propaganda) on this question will be determinedby the concrete conditions prevailing at the time when the right to self-determination isto be exercised. No doubt, this position is not in conflict with the propaganda and activity that must be undertaken with respect to the unity of the proletariat and the people. Our party is in favour of unity between peoples and sections of the proletariat. This, however, does not imply imposing conditions on the right to self-determination. If the oppressedpeople or nation - having obtained the conditions to exercise freely its right for self-determination (including separation as an independent state or merging with other states)- prefers to live within the same state, that union will be based on equality of nations andtrue democracy. These are the views of our party in general. Our approach to theKurdish national question is based on this general view.
The ‘federal solution’ or ‘federation’ proposal that emerged before Newroz as matters of practical negotiation, were presented in a way that negate the Kurdish people’s rightfor self-determination, i.e. organisation and separation as an independent state. Turgut Ozal, as the most daring representative of the fascist reactionary forces, proposed this ‘solution’, to a certain extent, on the basis of the assumption that the current ‘status-quo’in Turkey’s Kurdistan has already become outmoded. On the other hand, he was alsoaware of the fact that the dictatorship needed time given the current conditions in Turkey and the world. Ozal’s initiative for a ‘federal solution’ was a desperate initiative so far as the dictatorship was concerned. But it also implied a perception that it might lead to‘pacifying’ the struggle in Kurdistan for some years to come. In the mean time, Turkeycould use this proposition as a means of tackling the Kurdish question in neighbouring countries and manipulate the Kurdish people against them - thereby becoming asignificant force in the Middle-East and assuming an increased importance for imperialist countries. The ‘Kurd-protecting’ image displayed by Turgut Ozal was in fact nothing buta manoeuvre to justify Turkey’s intervention into Middle-Eastern affairs and pulling the Kurdish movements in others countries into Turkey’s orbit. The ‘federal solution’ was an initiative that would provide credibility to the ‘protector’ role.
One should take this fact into account: under the current conditions that imply an unstable status quo for Turkey, the maintenance of the Turkish state’s unity is possible only if the kurdish people can be deceived through an extensive manoeuvre. The ‘federal solution’ is not only constituting a ‘solution’ implying a potential for compromise with Kurdish bourgeoisie, it also enables Turkey to pose as the bully of the Middle-East. Turgut Ozal may be reckless, but he is also the representative of a political current that understands thoroughly the kind of ‘solutions’ needed by imperialism and the bourgeoisie.Although ‘federation’ is not mentioned as a solution at the moment, it cannot be ruled out that this fake ‘solution’ could be imposed on the Kurdish people if new uprisings are to emerge in Kurdistan. Unless it is prevented by the conditions generated by revolutionary developments or by inter-imperialist conflicts, the Turkish bourgeoisie - although it appears to be avoiding the issue - could well favour a ‘federal solution’ and try to benefit from the advantages that it would provide. Ignoring these facts isimprudence if not any thing else.
In view of PKK’s search for a ‘federal solution’, our party states that this ‘solution’ couldbe achieved only by over-ruling the Kurdish people and their democratic freedoms - ifthe conditions in Turkey remain the same as they are today. Our party has defended this revolutionary stance in its publications too. The essence of this stance was as follows: if‘federal solution’ or ‘federation’ is to be discussed as a practical solution now, our party’s view is that Kurdistan should organise into a an independent state and separate. As long as the current conditions prevail, ‘federation’ is a reactionary solution. It is nothing butto deny the Kurdish people their right to self-determination and it would not constitutea ‘solution’ whether it is proposed by Kurdish or Turkish revolutionaries. If the revolutionin Turkey is somewhat a remote possibility and revolutionary developments in Kurdistan are not powerful enough to shake the current status quo, the only solution that constitutes a blow to reactionary forces and brings democracy to Kurdish people is theseparation of Kurdish people as an independent state. The problem is that ‘federation’was raised as a solution before the emergence of the conditions that make ‘separation’a practical issue. Afterwards, the PKK explained the ‘federation’ proposal as an interim tactic on the road to full independence. This explanation, however, is wrong in theoretical terms and implies a move away from Kurdish people and national freedom in practicalterms. That is because, under existing conditions, is compatible only with the demands of the Kurdish bourgeoisie and acceptable for the Turkish bourgeoisie who are trying tocobble up a new agreement with its Kurdish counterpart given the collapse of the previous agreement that worked for the last seventy years. That is why it was not possible for our party to endorse that solution. One should not be confused with the fact thatthose who are in favour of unity between people and the proletariat are supportingseparation against a ‘federal solution’.
We know that issues like unity and legal party are being discussed by people across awide spectrum, who present themselves revolutionary, socialist or even communist. Whatdo you think about these two issues and what are your propositions in relation to those matters?
As far as I can understand, your question is about unity between socialist and communist. Especially in the last five-six years, unity meant two things: lack of principles and disintegration. In addition, one also need to mention the dishonesty and revisionist and liquidationist legacy of international revisionism and the TKP (the Communist Party of Turkey) in both ideological as well as organisational terms. ‘Unification’ has almost become a commodity, a means of mutual tricking, dividing and weakening as well as a platform that conceals the avoidance of responsibility in the day-to-day struggle. Also, in most cases, it has been transformed into an acceptable and innocent way of covering up the fact that the participants lack confidence in their potential abilities to cope with the difficulties of the revolutionary and socialist struggle. In that sense, ‘unification’ becomes a degenerated issue.
One should not derive the conclusion that our party is against the party unity of socialists. We have always been and will continue to be in favour of unity. The Unity we favour,however, is based on principles and honesty. It must be established and re-inforced in the course of struggle and capable of carrying out the revolution.
What we understand of unity is to unite with the new proletarian forces awakened by the proletarian movement on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist ideology within a political partylinked to Bolshevik traditions and committed to surpassing the Bolshevik Party as a resultof its fighting power and commitment to the people. This unity requires the existence ofa theoretical platform that is capable of (i) responding to the needs imposed by thecurrent state of the revolution and (ii) renewing the theoretical basis of the internationalproletarian revolution. Without a theoretical platform the major aspects of which havebeen dealt with in the first chapter, it is impossible to be communist and remain Marxist-Leninist.
Our party has already made this platform as the basis of its renewal and unity.This platform is also the theoretical basis for the transformation of the proletarianmovement into a socialist movement. The political programme of the revolution inTurkey and the life of our party as the vanguard party of the proletariat are beingreshaped on this basis.
I have stated that our understanding of unity implies unity within the party with new and young forces of the proletariat. Of course, this understanding of unity does not imply that we are not prepared to encourage other forces who may be coming near to this platform, or to unite with such forces within a party as they adopt that platform. Nevertheless, those groups who talk about ‘the unity of socialists’ do not reflect an encouraging positionso far as their theoretical and organisational platforms are concerned - this is true even for those who remain outside the revisionist camp. Whilst some of them are positioned along a ‘socialist spectrum’ ranging from Brejnevism through Maoism to Trotskyism, some others are stuck to the pre-1980 theoretical platform which is now irrelevant. Some other ‘socialist’ groups, on the other hand, are far away from the proletarian platform and attached to a petit-bourgeois spirit in terms of their practical, political and organisational stance. To what extent is it possible to establish party unity on the basis of proletariansocialism under these conditions?
In fact this situation is not unique to Turkey alone. It is a reflection of the theoretical and organisational turmoil and following ‘renewal’ that reproduce the pre-1980 groupings atthe international level after the collapse of the Eastern Block. Despite this stark picture,our party sincerely hopes that the situation will change and that those radical and revolutionary groups who move towards Marxism-Leninism would eventually unite under the banner the proletarian party. One aspect of the party’s struggle is to attain this goal.But let me emphasise that our party will never allow the dilution of Marxist-Leninist principles by petit-bourgeois socialism for the sake of ‘unification’. This stance is definite and will not change.
Everybody knows that our party is arguing for unconditional alliances as far as defending materialism, engaging in ‘unity of action’ against imperialism and fascism, and fighting forthe daily interests of the proletariat and working people. Our party has no interest butthat of the proletariat and the people. Therefore, I think there is nothing new to add except stating that we will continue our efforts and policy line in that direction.
So far as the issue of legal party is concerned, we differentiate between two concepts: the concept of block party established for tactical reasons or to formalise a block of revolutionary classes; and that of an open labour party in contrast to the term ‘socialistlegal party’ used in current discussions.
As we have stated to your journal previously, the open party of the working class mustbe established as a Marxist-Leninist mass party of the working people and should beorganised as the movement of the socialist sections of the working class.
In that respect, our approach to the issue of open socialist party is different from thatof other groups coming together to establish ‘a party’.
First of all, our party does not consider the open socialist party as the platform over which existing groups could establish ‘unity’. The attempts by those groups to form a legalor open party are due to either a search for a platform that would unite them (or more correctly, enable them to fight with each other) or refrainment from entering the areaof illegal activity where they have been ‘beaten’. Parties established in that way can only‘serve’ the objectives held by the participants. They, however, cannot be the instrumentof proletarian revolution. Behind these attempts that have been made or being plannedthere lies distrust against the working class. Because they are based on the observation and belief that the increasing number of workers deserting social democracy would notform an illegal organisation. In that sense, the existing debate on this issue constitutes nothing but a wish on the part of some groups to have a platform of ‘own publicity’.
This is what our party thinks so far as current organisational objectives are concerned: on the one hand, the current conditions in Turkey confirm the necessity of an illegalorganisation and increases as well as reproduces the possibilities of re-inforcing it at workplaces and other units. On the other hand, the conditions impose on us a duty to expand, spread and make good use of legal possibilities.
In other words, we need a policy orientation that envisages a deepening of the illegal organisation and extending as well as enriching the legal organisation activities so that it embraces the ranks of the working class. The political conditions in Turkey, the position of the working class movement, the balance of power between the revolution and counter-revolution, etc. are developing in a direction that renders the open working class party a feasible instrument and that increases the chance of utilising open and legal opportunities. In short, the establishment of an open working class party will not lead todeterioration and inactivity on the part of our party’s illegal organisations. On the contrary, their activities will increase and become multi-dimensional.
Nevertheless, the fact that an open working class party is becoming more and more feasible does not imply that all conditions required for its establishment already exist. The minimum condition for establishing such a party is the formation of organisational units that represent the majority of at least the mobilised sections of the workers belonging to major enterprises in urban areas.
Today, this is difficult objective to achieve, but it is not impossible to attain in the near future. The open working class party ought to be established on the basis of such organisational units and must emerge as the representative of the proletariat’s mobilised sections. In other words, it ought to be formed as the organisation of the open working class movement on a socialist basis. If this or that ‘socialist group’ is represented within the open working class movement, that ‘socialist group’ will also be represented in the open party - provided that an agreement is possible on the general policy direction.
Conditions in Turkey are unstable and they may change rapidly. Such an open party may not emerge; the illegal communist party may seize the opportunity of working under semi-open conditions; or it may have to organise in ways that cannot be determined inadvance. Given the existing conditions, however, the policy that we pursue is the one explained above. That is why we are not taking part in the discussions going on among various groups in relation to the issue of ‘socialist party’. And we will not take part unless the theoretical and practical platform of those groups undergo a radical change.
To sum up, one of the current tasks faced by our party organisations is the organisation of the open working class party as an instrument of revolution. Even though theconducive conditions for organising such a party may disappear in Turkey in the near future (a small probability), this line of action will be useful for the proletariat as well as our party.
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