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Stalin, Soviets and İsraeli Question - then and now - 11 - Additional Secret Documents

Stalin, Soviets and İsraeli Question - then and now 

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RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND SYRIA D.S. MALT WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF LEBANON H. FRANGIER

April 30, 1948

Secret

I met with Frangier, who had returned from Cairo, to find a way out of the impasse in the issue of transferring the plot to us. [...]

Referring to the decisions taken by the political commission of the Arab League on the Palestinian issue, Frangier said that Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt and, it seems, Saudi Arabia agreed to the proposal of the King of Transjordan Abdullah to occupy Palestine with his troops. When I asked whether we are talking about the whole of Palestine or only about its Arab part, as all local newspapers note, Frangier replied that the Arab part of Palestine will remain Arab anyway, so there is no need to occupy it, we are talking about the whole of Palestine. But to my additional question whether Abdallah agreed with this, because in this case he will have to conduct serious battles with the Jews, Frangier avoided a direct answer, which may mean that he himself is not sure whether Abdallah will decide to occupy the Jewish part of Palestine.

To my attempts to find out what caused the decision of the Arab countries to give their consent to the occupation of Palestine by the Transjordanian troops, since Abdallah does not hide his claims to Palestine, Frangier explained that Transjordan is not a member of the UN, therefore it is not bound by any obligations towards this organization. In addition, the capture of Haifa by the Jews shows that the Arab volunteers are not able to achieve a decisive advantage over the Jews, so some more organized force is needed to successfully fight the Jews. Currently, the Arabs have no other choice, and besides, it will be possible to cope with Abdallah.

When it came to the general discussion of the fundamentals of the participation of Arab countries in the Palestinian struggle, Frangier noted that the Arab countries openly help the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle against the Zionists and thus violate the general provision of non-intervention necessary in such cases.

But this happened because almost all the other countries that make up the UN also openly help Zionists and Jews in carrying out continuous immigration to Palestine and in arming Jews in Palestine. Consequently, the Arab countries are doing nothing more than the rest of the countries are doing.

However, to my attempts to find out which countries are helping Jews and contributing to illegal immigration to Palestine, Frangier evaded a direct answer, making it clear that the main one is the United States. Developing his thought, Frangier added that the Arabs would allegedly agree to end the struggle in Palestine if the United Nations could completely suspend Jewish immigration to Palestine and the delivery of weapons to Jews.

When it came to the possibility of establishing a truce in Palestine, Frangier said that the Arabs were supposedly ready for a truce, and not only in Jerusalem and Jaffa, as the newspapers write about it, but throughout Palestine. As for the transfer of Palestine under the tutelage of the United Nations, the Arab countries allegedly agree to it, but on the condition that it will be temporary and will lead to the independence of Palestine. However, Arab countries will never agree to custody in her current American proposal.

Speaking about the ongoing negotiations in Amman between the leaders of Arab countries, Frangier confirmed newspaper reports that Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Solkh left for Amman, ostensibly to finally settle the order of military events in Palestine, but when active Arab hostilities begin countries in Palestine and what their order is, he did not want to tell. According to Frangier, Riad Solh from Amman should return to Beirut and after supposedly, together with the Prime Minister of Syria Jamil Mardam Bey, fly to Saudi Arabia for negotiations with Ibn Saud.

Note: These reports from Frangier regarding the consent of the Arab countries to the occupation of Palestine by the Transjordanian troops mean that the Arab League has completely ceded to the British on all Middle East issues and that the British have decided to keep Palestine after May 15, but through Transjordan, if the Transjordanian troops are not defeated in battles with Jews.

At the same time, there is every reason to believe that King Abdullah gave his consent to the Arab countries to occupy all of Palestine, but in reality he will limit himself only to the occupation of its Arab part in order to preserve his army and have it ready for the subsequent formation of Greater Syria, because, in the event the defeat of the Transjordanian army in the fight against the Jews, it is possible that Transjordan itself will either be completely captured by Syria, or divided between Syria and Saudi Arabia, and Abdallah, if he survives the defeat of his army, will repeat the last days of his father’s life, who just like Abdallah, dreamed of becoming a great Arab king and ended up fleeing to the island of Cyprus.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 8.D. 7.L. 82-86.


RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND SYRIA D.S. MALT WITH A. GEYLANI

May 10, 1948

Secret

As it was agreed upon by chance meeting, Geylani went to the mission and told the following in a conversation:

1. The development of Palestinian events has greatly undermined the authority of the Arab League, the current leaders of the Arab countries, especially in Syria and Lebanon, and the Jerusalem mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, who were the main initiators and conductors of the current course of the active armed struggle of Arabs against Jews in Palestine ... In their calls for an armed struggle and in their promises of preserving the Arab character of Palestine, they went so far that, in the end, they succeeded in convincing the broad Arab masses of a successful outcome of this struggle and instilling such strong nationalist sentiments that turned into extreme chauvinism, which in total led to general excitement in the Arab countries. However, the inability of the Arab League, the Jerusalem Mufti and the current Arab leaders to organize the struggle in Palestine, the disorganization in the Arab Liberation Army, 1 the loss of Arab positions and especially the fall of Haifa caused extremely strong discontent among the Arab masses, pushed them away from the current organizers of this movement and led to a sharp and serious criticism even from such Arab figures as the Minister of Internal Affairs of Lebanon Kamil Chamoun and the former Minister of Education of Syria, MP, Emir Adel Arslan.

2. In the process of organizing the armed struggle in Palestine, it turned out that the Syrian army is extremely weak, poorly organized, insufficiently trained and almost unarmed. At the same time, Geylani noted that the British put up very strong resistance to the armament of the Syrian army. He personally, through the Americans, wanted to supply weapons to the Syrian army, but the British and their supporters in the Syrian government stalled the matter.

The weakness of the Syrian army turned out to be so striking that when Syrian President Shukri al-Quatli summoned the commander of the Syrian army, General Abdullah al-Atfe, and asked how many soldiers Syria could allocate for sending to Palestine, the latter named only 1,000 people out of 15,000 of the entire Syrian army. Thus, a very scandalous situation became clear.

In addition, the Syrian government is very concerned about the extremely tense situation within the country, as such mohafezats as Jebel Druz and Latakia, in which the Druze and Alawites were persecuted and oppressed due to the unreasonable policy of repression by the Syrian government against the Druze and Alawites, may rise up against government, in the event of any movement in Syria. In addition, the Syrian Bedouins are of great concern to the Syrian government, because among them there are a large number of staunch supporters of King Abdullah, who did not abandon his project of creating a Greater Syria.

The size of the Lebanese army does not exceed 3,500 people, so Lebanon cannot allocate a single soldier for Palestine at all.

Egypt, in view of its special relations with Great Britain and the very uncertain position of the current government and the ruling classes in general within the country, is afraid to send its troops to Palestine, trying to limit itself to agreeing to financial assistance to the Palestinian cause.

Saudi Arabia refrains from sending its troops to Palestine, because, due to the increased popularity of King Abdullah of Transjordan, it does not exclude the possibility of his attack on Saudi Arabia to reclaim the Hijaz.

Only Iraq goes unconditionally along with Transjordan, but there are many internal dangers in Iraq as well.

3. Recently, the position of the King of Transjordan, Abdullah, has noticeably improved and his popularity has increased. The main reasons for this improvement in the position and growth of Abdallah's popularity are his open criticism of the actions of Arab leaders, therefore it is quite natural that the discontent of the Arab masses with the actions of the leaders turned into a favorable attitude towards Abdallah, the complete failure of the Arab volunteer army in Palestine in the fight against Jewish armed organizations, which caused more than hostile attitude towards the volunteers and transferred all hopes to the Transjordanian army, known as the Arab Legion, which is well trained, well equipped with weapons and accustomed to discipline - all this presented it in the eyes of the broad Arab masses, very warmed up to the occupation of Palestine, the only real a force capable of carrying out this occupation, the all-round strengthening of the position of Abdullah by the British and the support of their agents among the current Arab leaders of Abdullah.

4. The weakness of Syria, the indecision of Egypt, the fears of Saudi Arabia and the impossibility of retreating in front of the propagated public opinion in the Arab countries forced the named countries to agree to Abdallah leading the movement of the military invasion of Palestine. At the same time, Geylani noted that Syria does not believe Abdallah and began to gather all his opponents in Damascus. In particular, the Jerusalem mufti arrived in Damascus, which is the center of the grouping and activation of anti-Hashemite elements. Saudi Arabia is also beginning to intensify the activities of former Iraqi Prime Minister and leader of the uprising in May 1941, Rashid Ali Geylani, who is in Riyadh, and is taking measures to achieve reconciliation between him and the mufti, since, according to Geylani, in Germany during the Second World War During the war, they allegedly differed in views. But the Hashemites also did not remain idle and began to take measures to neutralize the Geylanists. For example, recently in Iraq the former Minister of Internal Affairs in the government of Geylani Shevket Naji was released from prison. According to the plan of the Iraqi regent, he is to win over most of the Geylanists to the side of the current Iraqi government.

5. Taking advantage of the difficult situation created by the Arab Governments and the Arab League, Abdallah, even before his military entry into Palestine, achieved a number of serious concessions from the Arab countries. For example, at first Syria insisted on the formation of a Palestinian Arab government and offered to carry out all actions to seize Palestine on behalf of and under the leadership of this government, but Abdallah resolutely opposed this proposal, and Syria was forced to yield.

This means that Abdallah is pursuing his own goals in Palestine, which do not correspond to the intentions of the rest of the Arab countries. The main of these goals of Abdallah is to seize, first of all, the Arab part of Palestine. But at the same time, Geylani is sure that Abdallah will definitely try to seize the Jewish part of Palestine as well. Moreover, if the first main battle with the Jews is successful, Abdallah will certainly continue to advance to capture the entire Jewish part of Palestine, if the first battle is unsuccessful and Abdallah's attacks are repulsed by the Jews, then he will stop the offensive and blame the rest for his failures. Arab countries.

6. The main goal of Abdallah and the British behind him in preparation for the armed seizure of Palestine, all or only its Arab part, is the subsequent creation of Greater Syria. Moreover, if Abdallah manages to capture the whole of Palestine, which is very unlikely, then his popularity, power and importance will increase to such an extent that none of the current Arab leaders dares to oppose him in his plan, if he limits himself to seizing only the Arab part of Palestine, then he will be able to bring such serious accusations against the current Syrian leaders and they will become so unpopular among the broad masses, and the supporters of Greater Syria will become so strong that it will not be too difficult for Abdallah to implement his plans, especially since the Prime Minister of Syria Jamil Mardam Bey never did not refuse to support the Bol'shessirian movement.

The advantage of Abdallah's current position lies in the fact that now no one can oppose him and against his real intentions, because Arab public opinion is still on his side, and anyone who would try to attack him from the rear will be considered a traitor to Arab case.

Touching upon the position of Lebanon in relation to the future Greater Syria, Geylani said that, according to the general opinion of the majority of the Bolsheviks, including Abdullah himself, Lebanon should remain independent outside Greater Syria, since in Lebanon such an environment is needed so that Christians do not feel fear from the Muslim sides did not seek the protection of the Christian state or would not create a pretext for the intervention of the Western European powers in Lebanese affairs.

Note: Geylani's message deserves serious attention, for in many points it corresponds to the course of the current events related to the resolution of the Palestinian question.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 8.D. 7.L. 102-105a


RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsko with the EGYPT'S MESSENGER IN THE USSR BINDARI-PASHOY2

July 1, 1948

Secret

Today at 13.00 I received the Egyptian envoy to the USSR, Bindari Pasha, at his request.

At the beginning of the conversation, the envoy spoke at length about the friendly feelings he has towards the Soviet Union and its leaders, and about the fact that he, Bindari Pasha, made a lot of efforts to thoroughly explain the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to Egyptian statesmen. ... The envoy emphasized that he used his recent stay in Cairo to tell the Egyptian leaders in detail about the true aspirations of the Soviet Union, which are deliberately distorted by Anglo-Saxon propaganda. At the same time, the envoy noted that he managed to do a lot towards finding a basis for close and friendly cooperation on an equal basis and on the principles of mutual respect between Egypt and the USSR. In this regard, Bindari Pasha stated that his government and especially the king, who is a great nationalist and firmly defending the national independence of Egypt, gave him, Bindari Pasha, high confidence and instructed him to continue to carry out his mission in Moscow in the interests of strengthening friendly relations between Egypt and the USSR.

After such an introduction, the envoy, on behalf of his government, proceeded to set out the main purpose of his visit, warning that he was doing this in a strictly confidential manner.

The envoy said that the main principle of Egypt's foreign policy is based on the geographical and economic characteristics of the country. Egypt is the undoubted factor of peace. He is fighting for his independence and does not want to join any bloc. In accordance with this policy, the Egyptian government rejected the offer of the Greek government for Tsaldaris to visit Cairo in order to organize a conference of representatives of Egypt and the countries of the Middle East, including representatives of Turkey, to work out a treaty based on the same principles on which the treaty concluded between England is based. France and Benelux. The envoy explained that the main purpose of the treaty would be aimed at combating communism and against the Soviet Union. The envoy said that the Egyptian Foreign Minister, on behalf of the government, categorically rejected the offer of Tsaldaris and the Greek government. At the same time, the minister said that the issue of communism is an internal affair of each country. As for the pursuit of a policy directed against the USSR, then, according to the envoy, the Egyptian government cannot join such a policy, since Egypt has no claims against the Soviet Union. This was stated by the Egyptian government to Tsaldaris.

The envoy then said that Egypt is determined to defend the principles of its foreign policy, which are based on the desire of the Egyptian people to free themselves from the influence of Western European imperialism. In furtherance of these principles, Egypt refused to sign a treaty with Britain and will not sign a similar treaty with any other country that would wish to use Egypt as a strategic base. According to the envoy, such a policy of the Egyptian government could lead Egypt to a conflict with the Anglo-Saxons.

Bindari Pasha then dwelled on the economic features of Egypt. He said that Egypt needs to develop its industry in the import of the necessary raw materials, chemical products, oil and products derived from it. Egypt is also in need of equipment for military factories, etc.

In this regard, the envoy said that after some success he had achieved in clearing up the gloomy atmosphere created by foreign propaganda in Egypt around the Soviet Union, he would like to discuss with the representatives of the USSR to what extent cooperation in its specific form between Egypt and USSR, the shape and volume of which will be dictated by the circumstances.

The envoy asked if Egypt could count on Soviet assistance in the following areas:

1. To obtain oil and products derived from it.

2. For economic assistance so that Egypt would be able to fulfill its program of maintaining complete independence from Western countries. In connection with this point, the envoy made a proposal to conclude a commercial agreement, similar to the agreements concluded by the USSR with Poland and Romania.

I asked the envoy to clarify the nature of the agreement.
The envoy replied that this was an economic agreement. A political agreement may follow after a certain period.

3. To provide weapons and equipment for newly built military factories.
For its part, Egypt, according to the envoy, has the ability to supply cotton and other goods to the Soviet Union. For some goods, Egypt could pay with mottos.

The envoy concluded by saying that he wanted the Soviet Government to consider as soon as possible the proposed proposal, which was of a strictly confidential nature. The envoy especially stressed that he wanted the Soviet Government to believe in Egypt's sincere desire to establish strong friendly relations with the USSR.

At the same time, the envoy noted that the king also adheres to this point of view, around whom, unfortunately, harmful rumors are spread that the USSR is working against him. The messenger stated that he sought to dispel these rumors.

In conclusion, the envoy noted that the USSR can in the future rely on Egypt with full confidence to wage the struggle against the Western imperialists.

I replied to the envoy that the USSR is always positive about the possibility of strengthening cooperation and friendly relations with those countries that are striving for the same. With regard to the statement I heard and the proposals set forth by the envoy, I believe that both the statement and the proposals deserve serious attention. I firmly denied the provocative rumors spread by hostile propaganda in Egypt that the USSR was allegedly working against the king, stressing that, as the whole world knows, the USSR does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

In conclusion on this issue, I made it clear to the envoy in a general way that the issue of providing weapons to the country should be resolved within the framework of a UN resolution in connection with the war in Palestine.

The envoy made an attempt to start discussing the Palestinian question. But I rejected this attempt, stating that the position of the Soviet Union on this issue is completely clear, and therefore I do not see the need to consider this issue. The envoy hastened to declare that the main issue he raised in today's conversation is in no way connected with the Palestinian problem, and therefore he does not intend to dwell on it. At the same time, the envoy noted that the British are trying to drown the Egyptian question into the Palestinian problem.

Then the messenger handed me two notes (see appendix) 1. In the first note, the Egyptian Government asks the Soviet Government to allow it to send its representatives in accordance with the existing agreement on the supply of grain dated March 3, 1947 to the points of grain dispatch to establish control over the quality of the shipped cargo. In a second note, the Egyptian government asks the Soviet Government to support its request to determine the location of the UN Economic Commission for the Middle East in Cairo.

I told the envoy that both notes would be transmitted by me to their destination.

Before leaving, the envoy made a personal request to assist him in organizing his trip to Siberia. I did not engage in the envoy, referring to the difficulties in organizing this trip, since Intourist did not develop its work in this direction. At the same time, the envoy asked to help him in the opportunity to go in for water sports.

I promised to take an interest in this issue. The conversation lasted 1 h. 30 m.

A. Vyshinsky
Comrade Starikov was present at the conversation.
WUA RF. F. 087. Op. 11.P. 16.D. 5.L. 16-21.

Translated From Russian; Svitlana M

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