THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST
Outbreak of the
Japan-China War
On July 7,
1937, Japanese troops provoked an incident will) Chinese forces in the area not
far from Peking. Thai was the start of the Japanese invasion of North and then
Central China.
The Japanese government had worked out a plan to
establish Japanese domination of Eastern Asia—"Basic Principles of
National Policy”. First, of all, the Japanese militarists intended to capture
North China and then the rest of China. Japan proposed to swell her armed
forces stationed in Korea and Manchuria so as, subsequently attacking the USSR,
"strike a decisive blow at the Russians at the very outbreak of the war”.
They planned, besides, to penetrate the South Seas area. It was found necessary
to speed up and bring off the preparation of Japan’s Armed Forces for war in
order to achieve all those designs. “119”
The Japanese ruling quarters believed that the intervention by Germany and Italy in Spain created a favourable context for their aggressive plans to be carried out. The U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles pointed out in that connection that the "bandit nations drew together; their respective policies became more and more clearly synchronized". “12”
Once through with her preparations, Japan set about
carrying out her far-reaching plans of aggrandizement in July 1037. That was
how the Japan-China war started.
It was one of the conflagrations later to become part
of the Second World War.
The Soviet government clearly realised the full
gravity of the situation as it shaped up both in Europe and in the Far East. Izvestia
unequivocally put the question: "Peace or War?" in its leading
article "Against War, Against Fascism”. This question, the paper pointed
out, sounds today as ominous as never before for it is agitating the minds of
millions of people anxious about their future.”121”
Japan’s aggressive action was exacerbating the
international situation and seriously affected the interests of the monopolies
of the United States, Britain and France. The 122Anglo-Franco-American
alignment was potentially far stronger than Japan. Joint action by these three
powers could have deterred the aggressors. All the more so since Japan’s war
plans could have been nipped in the bud, should the U.S., Britain and France
have established co-operation with the Soviet Union. The governments of the
three powers, however, wanted no trucks with the USSR, although they were
thereby undermining their own positions.
The reactionary quarters of the Western powers still hoped that the war between Japan and the USSR would begin sooner or later. And in that case, they presumed, Japan would have to stop her expansion into the areas where she would be threatening the interests of the United States, Britain and France. Moreover, the Western powers expected that such a war would certainly weaken both the USSR and Japan which would give the United States, Britain and France an opportunity not only to maintain their positions in the Far East, hut even reinforce them.
British imperialists kept on conniving at aggression
in the Far East as well as in Europe. They clearly sought a compromise
arrangement with Japan at China’s expense. However, they were not averse to
their interests being defended by others. It was a war between Japan and the
USSR that, as stated earlier on, suited Britain most of all.
The United States thought its interest to be far more
hurt by Japan’s actions in China than by the Italian aggression in Ethiopia,
the German and Italian intervention in Spain and other developments in Europe.
Japan was the United States’ major imperialist rival. Nevertheless, the U.S.
also took up a rather restrained position over the Japanese invasion of China.
The U.S. ruling circles feared, in particular, that should it have joined the
war against Japan, Britain and France would shift its brunt to the United
States. This led to the U.S. together with Britain and France conniving at
Japanese aggression. Measures, taken by the U.S., Britain, and France in
connection with the Japanese aggression boiled down to an attempt at somehow
protecting their major interests in China by means of an imperialist collusion
with Japan. The ruling quarters of those countries did not so much as contemplate
any defence of China’s interests or any assistance to it in resisting the
Japanese invasion. On the contrary, the imperialist powers feared that the
Chinese, should they have succeeded in healing back the Japanese imperialist
incursion, could have also expelled other colonialists from their country.
The Soviet Union at China’s Side
The Soviet Union was alone ready to lend a helping
hand to China in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors. The Soviet
government had no particular contractual obligations to China. Nevertheless,
true to its policy of supporting the victims of imperialist aggression, it was
ready and willing to come to the aid of the Chinese people in their .struggle
against foreign intervention.
The Soviet government took advantage of Anthony Eden’s
visit to Moscow in 1935 in order to talk the issue of a Pacific Pact over with
him. What the Soviet Union offered to conclude was no longer a non-aggression
pact but one of mutual assistance. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs said on the eve of Eden’s visit: "We are prepared to co-operate
with Britain as well as with other nations in securing peace in the Far East.”
"In concrete terms we contemplate a regional Pacific Pact of Mutual
Assistance involving the USSR, China, Japan, Great Britain, the United States,
France, Holland.. .” The Pact meant essentially that "Japan’s further
aggression would be resisted by the forces of all the other parties to the
Pact." ”122”
On March 28, 1935, the Soviet People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs emphasised in a conversation with Anthony Eden that for a
lasting peace to be ensured in the Pacific "there must be collective
efforts by all the interested nations”. However, Eden did not go along with
that proposal. He questioned the United States’ readiness for active
cooperation in safeguarding peace and security in the Far East.”123”
The British government was not inclined to share in setting
up a collective security system in the Far East, but it sought to put the blame
for abetting the Japanese aggression on the United States.
The U.S. government still preferred a different, way
of ensuring its interest in the Far East. That was stated quite openly by
Walton R. Moore, U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State, in a conversation with
the Soviet Charge d’ 124Affaires in the United States A. F. Neuman. ft
will take several years, he said, for the United States to gain superiority
over Japan. "It hoped,” Nenman commented, "that the USSR would make
things easier for it by starting a war against Japan." ”124”
The Chinese Head of Government Kung Hsiang-hsi (
President of the Executive Yuan) asked the Soviet Ambassador 1). V. Bogomolov
in October 1935 whether China could count on getting any war equipment from the
USSR in case it needed to put up armed resistance against Japan. On November
20, 1935, the Soviet Ambassador informed Kung about the Soviet consent to
supply China with war equipment. ”125” The Chiang Kai-shek
government, however, hoping to avoid an outright armed conflict with Japan
through concessions, had itself begun stalling negotiations on the enforcement
of that accord.
In the meantime, the Japanese militarists were
increasingly aggressive. Japan’s expansionist plans were still directed against
the USSR as well. The German Ambassador to Japan, von Dirksen, reported to
Berlin on December 28, 1935, that Japan was hostile towards the USSR and "
determined" to settle her differences with the Soviet Union "by force
of arms as soon as she feels militarily strong enough".”126”
The Japanese octopus began to stretch out its
tentacles towards the Mongolian People’s Republic as well, intent on capturing
it as a stepping-stone in preparation for war against the USSR. On March 28,
1936, the Kwangtuug Army Chief of Staff, General Itagaki, in a conversation
with Foreign Minister Arita, explained what the seizure of the MPR could mean
to Japan: "Should Outer Mongolia be annexed to Japan and Manchuria, the
security of the Soviet Far East would be struck hard. . . Therefore, the Army
is planning to extend the influence of Japan and Manchuria to Outer Mongolia
with all the means at its disposal". ”127” In view of the threat
of Japanese aggression, the Soviet government had concluded a gentleman’s
agreement with it back on November 27, 1934- at the request of the MPR
government—providing for "reciprocal support by all measures in preventing
or forestalling the threat of an armed attack and also in lending one another
assistance and support in the event of any third party attacking the USSR or
the MPR".”128”
Since the danger from Japan continued to grow (it came
to full-scale lighting across the MPR border), the USSR and the MI’H signed a
protocol on mutual assistance on March 12, 193(>. Referring to the import of
that protocol, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs pointed out in a
letter to the Soviet, Ambassador in Japan that it "is a new link in the
chain of consistent actions whereby we are curbing the aggression against the
MPR. Now Japan is, of course, in no doubt that her conquest of Mongolia would
lead to a war against the Soviet Union." ”129” That protocol,
just as the gentleman’s agreement, was of tremendous importance for
safeguarding the security of the MPR and strengthening peace in the Far East.
On March 1, 1937, Litvinov took the question of a pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance up with the
Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Jiang Ting-hi. "It is my conviction,” he
said, "that such a pact alone can definitely stop Japan’s aggression and
ensure peace in the Far East.” He went on to point out that this had to be
brought home to the other powers, particularly Great Britain and the United
States, and that both Chinese and Soviet diplomacy had to work towards that
end.”130”
The Soviet Ambassador to China (Nanking), 1). V.
Bogomolov received detailed directives in mid-March for his negotiations with
the Chinese government. The directives proposed concluding a treaty of
friendship with the Nanking government providing for "either party to
refrain from taking any step or concluding any agreement which could benefit a
third state threatening to attack the other contracting party”. It also
provided for both parties to take steps "with a view to protecting their
common interests”. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to conclude a
military and technical agreement with the Nanking government providing for the
sale of aircraft, tanks, and other military and technical equipment to be paid
for out of a 50 million dollar credit granted to this end, as well as for
Chinese airmen and tankmen to be trained in the USSR.
The Soviet Union called for the treaty of friendship
to incorporate a pledge by both parties to do their utmost towards the early
conclusion of the Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance. On April 1, Bogomolov
passed these proposals to Kung Hsiang-hsi.”131”
However, the Chinese government was still wavering.
On 126June 16, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador in China reported to the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Chinese government looked
askance at the idea of a Pacific Pact because it, was afraid of arousing
Japan’s displeasure and "finally closing the door to a bilateral agreement
with Japan which Chiang Kai-shek was still hoping for”. The Chinese were giving
no reply to Lo the proposal for concluding a treaty of non-aggression and
helping China with supplies of war equipment.”132”
On May 14, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons of Australia
also came forward with a proposal to conclude the Pacific Pact, which, however,
was a pact of non-aggression, rather than one of mutual assistance. The Soviet
government decided, therefore, to try once more to get the Pact concluded.
In the latter half of May, Litvinov while in Geneva
for a session of the Council of the League of Nations, was negotiating the
Pacific Pact with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and the
President of the Executive Yuan of China, Kung Hsiang-hsi.”133” The Soviet
Ambassador in London I. M. Maisky was instructed to talk the matter over with
Lyons. The Ambassador was asked to inform the Australian Prime Minister about
the Soviet Union’s positive response to his proposal, but along with suggesting
a pact of mutual assistance.”134”
On June 15, Maisky had an appropriate conversation with
Lyons. The latter reacted favourably to the idea of concluding a pact of mutual
assistance, but suggested that neither Britain nor the United States were
prepared to conclude such an agreement. ”135”
The Soviet Ambassador in Washington Troyanovsky was
asked to find out where the United States stood on the matter. "True,” the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote to him, "we meant a
Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance, while Lyons is reducing the whole thing to a
pledge of non-aggression." ”138”
Roosevelt, however, showed no desire to join the pact.
He told Troyanovsky on June 28 that the U.S. could not enter into any alliances
or any similar agreements. As to Lyons’ proposal for concluding a Pacific Pact
of Nonaggression, Roosevelt did not second it either on the plea that there was
no point in concluding such a pact with no Japan in it.”137”
When the Japanese invasion of China began on July
7, 1271937, The Soviet press roundly condemned that action of the Japanese
aggressors. "This is a new and important stage in the imperialist struggle
in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific”, the Izvestia wrote,
"and a new and essential stage in the aggression of Japanese imperialism
seeking to subjugate the Chinese people." ”138”
It was on July 19, 1937, that the Chinese government
finally ventured to accept Soviet aid. It asked the USSR through the Soviet
Ambassador to provide war equipment and grant appropriate credits.”139” The
Soviet government responded to China’s request for aid. On July 29, the Soviet
Ambassador to China was instructed to inform the Chinese government about the
Soviet consent to meet its request.”140”
While expressing its readiness to supply China with
war equipment, the Soviet government found it necessary for the USSR and China
to conclude, tentatively, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression because
there had to be a guarantee that "our weapons will not be used against
us”. The Soviet Ambassador raised the matter several times with representatives
of the Chinese government. ”141”
Meanwhile, China was pressing hard for the conclusion
of a Soviet-Chinese treaty of mutual assistance. The matter was raised with the
Soviet Ambassador on July 16 by the President of the Legislative Yuan of China,
Sun Fo. Chen Li-fu, who was negotiating with the Soviet Ambassador on instructions
from Chiang Kai-shek, insisted on such a treaty being signed when he conferred
with him three days later. ”142” Explaining the sum and substance of
those Chinese proposals, the Soviet Ambassador wrote in his dispatch to Moscow:
"Banking on a Japanese-Soviet War remains Chiang Kai-shek’s idee
fixe." ”143”
As China was already in a virtual state of war with
Japan, the Soviet government, naturally, did not find it possible to conclude a
bilateral treaty of mutual assistance with her.”144” Maxim Litvinov wrote
to the Soviet Ambassador that "the idea behind the Chinese insistence on
this issue at the present moment is, in point of fact, that we should get
involved in a war with Japan right now".”145”
On August 21, 1937, the USSR and China signed a treaty
of non-aggression which was, under the circumstances, one of supreme importance
for strengthening China’s international position. In an editorial on the
treaty, Pravda emphasised that the treaty was a fresh expression
of the 128friendship which the peoples of the USSR had for the Chinese
people in battle for their freedom and independence. The Soviet-Chinese treaty,
the article pointed out, practically confirmed and anchored the principle of
the indivisibility of peace and the need to defend peace both in the West and
in the East. "The Soviet-Chinese Treaty shows to all nations the way to
oppose the war threat... It is a new instrument of peace." ”146”
The conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Non–
Aggression, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan Slavutsky pointed out, produced a
"tremendous impression" in Japan.”147” Tokyo qualified the
treaty as a diplomatic setback for Japan.
Agreement on the actual deliveries of war equipment to
China on account of the Soviet-granted long-term credit was reached as early as
September 14. The delivery of the first batch of aircraft was to be within the
shortest possible time-limits at the request of the Chinese delegation. The
Soviet side undertook to ship the first 225 aircraft, including 02 medium
bombers and 155 fighter planes to China by October 25, 1937. ”148” The
Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Jian Ting-fu declared in a conversation with
Deputy People’s Commissar Stomonyakov that the Chinese were most pleased with
the spirit and outcome of the negotiations which had given China even more than
they had expect- ed. ”149”
By the middle of 1938, the Soviet Union had delivered
to China 297 aircraft, 82 tanks, 425 guns and howitzers, 1,825 machine-guns,
400 motor vehicles, 360 thousand shells, 10 million cartridges and other items
of war equipment. ”15”° Soviet aid made it possible for China to hold out,
avoid being defeated arid having to surrender, and to keep up resistance to the
Japanese aggressors.
Because of Soviet aid to China, however, the danger of
Japan attacking the USSR had increased. The French Foreign Minister, Delbos,
told the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, on August 26, 1937, that he had
received a message from the French Ambassador in Japan saying that "Japan
is likely to declare war on the Soviet Union”. The British Ambassador to Japan
Craigie also pointed out that the Japanese "would have to square their accounts
with the USSR”. The U.S. Assistant Military Attaché in Japan Weckerling wrote
to Washington that "the Japanese Army regards Soviet Russia as its
principal enemy”, and that there 129was a feeling of certainty that
"nothing can prevent another Russo-Japanese war.”151” The Soviet
Ambassador to Japan, Slavutsky, states that the Japanese militarists were
trying with might and main to make the Japanese people accept the
"inevitability of an imminent war with the Soviet Union".”152”
What complicated the Soviet Union’s international
position even more was that in the event of war in the Far East, it would have
to reckon also with serious complications across its Western border. The
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin told the French Ambassador A. Francois-Poncet
that the German and Italian governments had promised to Japan "active
military aid in the event of the USSR being involved in a Far Eastern conflict
on China’s side".”153”
The position of Poland also aroused grave
apprehension. The Japanese military attaché in Poland General Sawada asking the
Polish government on August 24, 1937, to support the Japanese during the
discussion of the Japan-China conflict in the League of Nations, stressed that
China was co-operating with the USSR while Japan and Poland had "common
interests" in respect to the Soviet Union. The Polish government readily
responded to that request in the belief that "Japan is Poland’s natural
ally".”154”
Japan did not venture, however, into a war against the
USSR. Along with the rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union, its defence
capability was mounting. Besides, the Soviet government had been constantly
giving most careful attention to strengthening the defences of its Far Eastern border.
This could not but produce a sobering effect on the Japanese aggressors.
Japanese Aggression and the League of Nations
In mid-September 1937, the Chinese government
officially asked the Council of the League of Nations for sanctions against
Japan under the terms of the Covenant. The Soviet government informed China
that it would support its request.”155”
The governments of Britain and France found it
undesirable for the Japanese aggression to be considered in the 130League of
Nations, first of all, because they did not propose to take any measures
against Japan. Besides, if there was no way at all of avoiding a discussion of
this issue, London and Paris wauled it to involve also the United States of
America. Therefore, Britain and France preferred to see the Japan-China
conflict considered in any agency representing the United States as well,
rather than in the League of Nations.
Speaking before the Assembly of the League of Nations
on December 21, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov
emphasised that aggression was manifesting itself in new and more violent
forms. However, the League of Nations stayed out of those events, without
reacting to them. The People’s Commissar called on all nations to pool efforts
in working for peace and opposing aggression. Ho pointed out that the
"League’s resolute policy in dealing with one case of aggression would
spare us all other cases. And then, only then, would all nations come to see
that aggression does not pay and that aggression is not worth making.” “156”
The Soviet Union has gone down in the history of the
League of Nations as the most consistent champion of the victims of the German,
Italian and Japanese aggression, and as the protagonist of those forces in it
which demanded the full maintenance of the Covenant.”157”
In advance of the League of Nations’ discussion of
Japanese aggression, scheduled for September 27, the People’s Commissar had
received the following directive: "It is desirable for us both to see
Japan voted aggressor and most effective sanctions applied against her.
However, in case of an obviously passive reaction of other states . .. we do
not consider it politically expedient for the Soviet delegation to be the
pace-setter risking straining still more the Soviet Union’s relations with
Japan and to give more food for charging us with incitement. Should, however,
the other members of the League of Nations show a serious intention to raise
the question of Japan’s responsibility and of declaring her to be an aggressor,
you ought to be active in supporting this effort. Since it takes a unanimous
vote for her to be found guilty of aggression, it is doubtful that such a vote
could be obtained. If, after all, in spite of all expectations, such a decision
were taken and the question of sanctions automatically arose, nothing would
prevent you from 131declaring ... for the application of most effective sanctions
against Japan." “158”
The representatives of Britain and France in the
League of Nations did not conceal that the two powers did not intend to take
any steps against the Japanese aggressor.”159” They referred to the fact that
they did not know the position of the United States.
Under instructions from Moscow, the Soviet Charge d’
Affaires in the United States, Oumansky, approached Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles asking him to explain the position of the United States. The
latter replied that the U.S. government was not in a position to draw any
distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression and "to
sympathise with the victim on any ground whatsoever". “16”° After hearing
Welles make his point, Oumansky described the U.S. policy as "very
discouraging".”161”
Under those circumstances, the League of Nations’
decisions on Japanese aggression adopted on October 6 turned out to be
extremely inconclusive. The League limited itself to stating that Japan had
broken its commitments under the existing treaties and to declaring "moral
support" for China. It recommended to the Powers concerned to call a
special conference on the matter.”162”
The Brussels Conference
Preparations began, under a decision of the League of
Nations, for a conference of nations with a stake in the Far Eastern situation.
Brussels had been chosen as the venue for it.
The question of attendance arose right away. It was
the United States, Britain and other sponsors of the conference that were
particularly anxious to get the Japanese aggressors invited. Owing to this,
Litvinov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States Troyanovsky that
by urging the Japanese to attend the conference, they were assured in every way
that "it will consider a reconciliation rather than any measures against
Japan whatsoever." “163”
The Government of Japan declined, however, to attend the conference.
In the opinion of the U.S. government, the conference
was to have tried to reconcile Japan and China. Roosevelt told the leader of
the American delegation at the conference 132Norman Davis that the word
"sanctions is to be rigorously avoided".”164”
The British government also proceeded from the
assumption that "the conference was not meeting in order to consider whether
sanctions should be imposed against Japan,” but for "restoration of peace
by agreement".”165”
Only the USSR was still urging effective steps against
the Japanese aggressors and for the defence of China. The Soviet delegation in
Brussels worked under instructions to press for a declaration or a resolution
of the conference to recommend to all participants "to render China all
possible and maximum assistance both individually and collectively". “166”
Litvinov wrote on October 20, 1937, that the USSR considered it desirable for
effective sanctions to be applied against the Japanese aggressor.”167” In a
conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR on October 29, the People’s
Commissar again stated that the Soviet Union was seriously interested in ending
the aggression and establishing peace and collective security. The USSR was
prepared to take up a resolute stand in co-operation with the United States, France,
and Britain, he declared.”168”
It was the U.S. delegation that called the tune at the
Brussels Conference, which opened on November 3, 1937, with its programme of
“appeasement” of the Japanese aggressors. Norman Davis did not find it right
and proper to point out in his speech who was the aggressor and who its victim.
Japan and China, he said, "have come into conflict and have resorted to
hostilities”. And he proposed that the conflict should be solved on a basis
that is "fair to each and acceptable to both".”169” That could mean
only one thing: the United States was prepared to see Japan’s aggressive
ambitions gratified at China’s expense, and the Chinese people humbly putting
up with it. The British and the French followed in his footsteps. Anthony Eden
and Yvon Delbos declared that they subscribed to all Norman Davis had said.
It was the Soviet delegation alone that took up a
position of principle at the conference. The leader of the Soviet delegation in
Brussels, Maxim Litvinov, in his speech on November 3 expressed his
disagreement with the policy of the United States, Britain and France which
advocated a peace "acceptable to both”. He pointed out that there was
nothing easier than to say to the aggressor: "Take your plunder, take
what you have seized by force, and peace be with you,” and to say to the victim
of aggression: "Love your aggressor, resist not evil”. But that
can call forth nothing but more acts of aggression, he emphasised. In such a
case, the conference could turn out to be a "tool of the aggressor”,
instead of acting against aggression. Having reiterated the oft-stated position
of the USSR regarding action to oppose aggression, Litvinov stressed the
necessity of rallying the nations working to keep the peace. “17”°
The assessment of the Soviet delegation’s position
given by Norman Davis is noteworthy. "Litvinov is arguing to me”, he wrote
to Washington, "in favour of close co– operation and understanding between
Britain, the United States and Russia on the ground that if Japan were
confronted with such a combination, she would agree to stop hostilities.” “171”
On November 6, the conference drew up the text of
another appeal to Japan inviting her to join it. Then it was adjourned pending
her reply.
In the meantime, Japan went on intensifying and
expanding her military operations in China. On November 12, Japanese troops
captured Shanghai, thereby appreciably strengthening their foothold in Central
China. On the same day, the Japanese government once more rejected the appeal
from the Brussels Conference.
The Brussels Conference resumed on November 13. The
Chinese representative raised the question of economic sanctions against Japan
and assistance to China. However, the representatives of the United States,
Britain and France turned a deaf ear to it. Norman Davis intimated that he was
still hoping to get Japan to co-operate.
The Soviet delegation again came out in support of the
Chinese proposal. Potemkin, who now led the Soviet delegation, declared that to
end the aggression there would have to be "co-operative and effective
efforts by the powers interested in keeping the peace in the Far East. Every
concrete initiative in this sense would be supported by the Soviet Union.”172”
Davis reported to Washington that Potemkin "was very insistent in urging
us to recommend concrete measures against Japan" because there was no
other way to stop the conflict. Potemkin reiterated that the USSR "would
join in anything the British and ourselves might be prepared to do”.”173”
On November 24 the conference adopted a declaration to
say that it was suspending its sittings temporarily in order to afford the
participating governments the time "to further explore all peaceful
methods by which a settlement of the dispute may be attained.” “174” That was
the last meeting of the conference.
The breakdown of the Brussels Conference was a direct
sequel to the policy of abetting the Japanese aggression which was pursued by
the United States, Britain and France, While the major responsibility for
“non-intervention” in the German-Italian invasion of Spain lay with the British
and French “appeasers”, the main blame for the policy of abetting the Japanese
aggression rested with the United States.
The ruling circles of the United States, Britain and
France considered that the best way out of the situation thus created was
through an imperialist collusion with Japan for the “peaceful” plunder of China
by all of them so as to have the Japanese aggression turn against the Soviet
Union. Since the Japanese imperialists continued their acts of aggression in
China, in violation of the interests of the United States, Britain and France,
and showed no intention of attacking the USSR for the time being, the governing
quarters of the Western powers tried to push the USSR into some kind of action
against Japan. That came to light in the closing days of the Brussels
Conference.
Potemkin wrote from Brussels, reporting his
conversation with the Chairman of the conference, Paul Spaak, Belgium’s Foreign
Minister, that the latter had provocatively declared that "the best means
to make Japan more tractable was by sending a few hundred Soviet aircraft to
give Tokyo a scare”. Potemkin replied that there must have been some in
Brussels who evidently were too fond of " having others pull the chestnuts
out of the fire for them".”175”
The Soviet government gave a sober assessment of the
situation. It was prepared to undertake most effective measures in assisting
China in its struggle against the Japanese aggressors, but it wanted to do so
together with the United States, Britain and France. The Soviet Union could not
fail to take into account under the circumstances the fact, in particular, that
in the event of war with Japan, it could have run the risk of being attacked by
Germany and even, perhaps, by some other of its Western neighbours who had
135long been co-operating with Japan on an anti-Soviet ground.
After the conference, Litvinov, writing to the Soviet
Ambassador in the United States, Troyanovsky, pointed out that the USSR had,
right from the start, been skeptical of the possible outcome of the Brussels
Conference, and, therefore, had held a "rather restrained position"
at it, but the conference ended "even more disgracefully than one could
have expected it to".”176”
The utter futility of the Brussels Conference because
of the position of the Western powers had the effect of intensifying the
Japanese aggression in China. On November 27, that is, two days after the
conference was over, Japanese troops launched an offensive against Nanking,
which was the home of the Chinese government at the time. The city fell to them
on December 13.
Japanese Aggressors Defeated at Lake Khasan
The events which occurred in the area of Lake Khasan,
the Soviet Far East, in July and August 1938, provided clear evidence of the
Soviet Union’s determination and readiness to give a resolute rebuff to
aggression.
While waging their war against China, the Japanese
imperialists began to show themselves aggressive throughout the Far East,
including the areas close to the Soviet frontiers. The Soviet government had to
make repeated representations to the Japanese authorities. The Deputy People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Stomonyakov drew the attention of the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu, to the fact, that there was a systematic
campaign of slander and propaganda of war against the Soviet Union in Japan,
often with the involvement, of official institutions and personalities. The
Japanese military leaders did not stop short of direct calls for a war against
the USSR. ”177”
Japanese troops systematically violated the Soviet
border. About a dozen Japanese combat aircraft invaded Soviet airspace on April
11, for example. On June 8, the Japanese attempted to land a 29-man armed band
on (lie Soviet bank of the Amur River. The Japanese authorities had more than
once detained Soviet ships without any excuse 136whatsoever. On February
19, they seized the Soviet freighter Kuznetskstroi in a
Japanese port, with a crew of 35 and 37 passengers. The Soviet press had every
reason to qualify that as "yet another deliberate Japanese
provocation".”178”
At the same time, the Japanese ruling circles,
drilling the nation for a war of aggression against the USSR, were stoking up
anti-Soviet feelings in Japan. "Japan’s position with regard to the USSR,”
the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said, "has become still more
aggressive and arrogant.” The Japanese militarists "are systematically
striving to exacerbate relations, without missing a single occasion or
opportunity for it. They have Japanese diplomacy, with Hirota and Shigemitsu in
the lead, at their service." ”179”
The Japanese acts of provocation had attained a
particular degree of intensity by the middle of the year. The Japanese press
(as the Asahi, Yomiuri and other newspapers) was openly
calling for a war against the Soviet Union and the capture of the Soviet Far
East. The Japanese troops stationed in Korea deliberately started acts of
provocation against the Soviet frontier guards at Lake Khasan.”180”
In mid-July, the Japanese Charge d’Affaires in Moscow
turned to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with an unjustified
claim that Soviet troops were illegally holding the western shore of Lake
Khasan. The Japanese diplomat was offered to look through the 1869 Hunchung
Agreement with a map appended to it which left no room for doubt that the
western shore of the lake was part of Soviet territory.”181”
Calling on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs on July 20, Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu once more demanded the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area concerned. "Otherwise,” the
Ambassador threatened, "Japan would have to conclude that she has to
resort to force.” Litvinov reminded the Ambassador that the Japanese Charge
d’Affaires had been shown the official documents which quite clearly indicated
the borderline passing through the mountains west of Lake Khasan. Soviet
frontier guards in that area have no other object, the People’s Commissar said,
than to defend the Soviet frontier. "There is complete peace on the
border, and it can only be broken by the Japanese-Manchurian side which, in
that case, will be held responsible for the consequences.” "As to the
resort 137to force,” the People’s Commissar emphasised, "if Mr.
Ambassador considers such a threat and intimidation to be a good diplomatic
expedient which may have an effect on certain states, in fact, he must know
that such an expedient will not work in Moscow." ”182”
On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops launched military
operations against the Soviet frontier guards on the Western shore of Lake
Khasan. With a wealth of facts at its disposal, the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East found in its indictment of the major Japanese war
criminals that the Japanese attack at Lake Khasan had been deliberately planned
by the Japanese. The Tribunal stated that "the operations of Japanese
troops were of a demonstrably aggressive character." ”183”
Early in August, the Soviet forces launched resolute
counter-action against the Japanese aggressors and cleared them out from Soviet
territory on August 9. Heavily trounced, the Japanese had to retreat. A
cease-fire agreement was achieved on August 10.
The defeat of the Japanese invaders in the area at
Lake Khasan was a telling blow to the aggressive designs of imperialist Japan,
those against the USSR, in particular. The Soviet head of government V. M.
Molotov, summing up the events at Lake Khasan in his report to a meeting of the
Moscow City Soviet on November 6, 1938, stated: "Can there be any doubt
that the Japanese attack on our maritime provinces was a test of strength for
launching a war in the Far East? Should the Soviet Union have failed to
demonstrate the firmness of its foreign policy in real action and its immutable
commitment to the defence of its frontiers by the force of the Red Army, that
could well have served as an occasion for staging further acts of aggression.
Our adamant position during those events brought those high-handed
adventure-seekers both in Tokyo and Berlin back to their senses and compelled
them to beat a retreat. Beyond dispute, the Soviet Union has thereby rendered
the greatest possible service to the cause of peace." ”184”
The defeat of the Japanese troops at Lake Khasan was,
in particular, a case of minor assistance to the Chinese people who went on
fighting against the Japanese aggressors. Having demonstrated that the Japanese
invaders were by no means omnipotent, those events went far towards reinforcing
Chinese people’s will to resist the aggressors.
China Aided by the USSR Alone
Getting war equipment abroad was still much of a
headache to China. In January 1938, the Chinese government sent an emergency
mission to the USSR, Britain and France, led by the Chairman of the Legislative
Yuan, Sun Fo, to ask the governments of these countries for aid to China in her
struggle against aggression. On his arrival in Moscow, Sun Fo told the Deputy
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Stomonyakov, that "in waging their
war against the invaders, that is, for their liberation, the Chinese people are
drawing their strength from the sympathies and support of the USSR”.”185”
From Moscow Sun Fo proceeded to London and Paris only
to return several months later empty-handed. In a conversation with Deputy
People’s Commissar Potemkin on May 19, 1938, he admitted that the results of
his tour were discouraging and that Britain and France avoided giving any aid
to China. "The USSR remains the only country to l)e giving real aid to
China," ”186” Sun Fo declared.
Britain’s position in relation to China could be
clearly seen from the memorandum submitted by the Foreign Office to the British
government’s Foreign Policy Committee on May 31. China, the memorandum said,
"is fighting our own battle in the Far East, for, if Japan wins, our
interests there are certainly doomed to extinction. The Japanese Army and other
high authorities have left us in no doubt about that. Our immense vested
interests in North China and Shanghai will be the first to go and the Japanese
Army and Navy set no limits to their appetites on the Continent and in the
South Seas. If China can only fight Japan to a stalemate, we and the Americans
will then be able to intervene with effective results and safeguard our
position for another generation.” ”187”
On the following day, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
John Simon flatly declared in the Foreign Policy Committee, which was
considering the matter, that there could be no question of a British government
loan to China. He also expressed some very serious apprehension that assistance
to China, even if insignificant, could entail most negative consequences for
Anglo-Japanese relations.”188”
China was still getting aid From the Soviet Union
alone. Another agreement was signed between the USSR and 139China in
Moscow on July 1, 1938, under which the Soviet Union supplied China with 300
aircraft, 300 guns, 1,500 automatic rifles and 500 machine-guns, 300 lorries
and other war equipment.”189”
In a letter to the Soviet government, the President of
the Executive Yuan of China Rung Hsiang-hsi expressed "most profound
gratitude" for "effective sympathy and genuine friendship”. Kung
Hsiang-hsi pointed out that as a result of the "splendid and valuable
assistance" in the shape of combat aircraft and other war equipment, China
got an opportunity of "wearing out the enemy’s aggressive forces and
keeping up a sustained struggle". ”19”° The British historian Keith
Middlemas pointed out that the USSR, supplying China with munitions once more
"appeared as champion of the free world against aggression".”191”
Experienced Soviet military advisers (V. I. Chuikov,
P. S. Rybalko, P. F. Batitsky, A. I. Cherepanov, to name just a few) arrived in
China to share in making plans for the conduct of war against the Japanese
invaders and in training Chinese officers and men. Over 90,000 people had their
training under the guidance of Soviet instructors in various educational
establishments and units of the Chinese Army. Soviet airmen had volunteered to
join the battle against the aggressors in China.”192”
In the summer of 1938, particularly in the face of the
determined position taken up by the Soviet Union during the armed conflict at
Lake Khasan, the Chinese government was once more pressing hard for a
Sino-Soviet alliance to be concluded and for the USSR to enter the war against
Japan.”193” However, the Soviet government exercised the necessary
caution. While providing China with an increasing amount of war equipment, the
Soviet Union did not find it possible to go to war against Japan. The Soviet
Ambassador to China, I. G. Luganets-Orelsky emphasised in a conversation with
Sun Fo that the Soviet Union, by its military, diplomatic and economic moves,
had already prepared extensive ground for the development of Soviet-Chinese
relations whereas to have concluded the pact as proposed by China could have
had some materially negative consequences. ”194”
On September 8, 1938, the Soviet Ambassador had
received the following instructions as to the answer to give to the Chinese
government:
“1. At present
the USSR does not consider it expedient to go to war against Japan in isolation
from Britain or the United States. . .
2. The USSR will go to war against Japan only under
Hie following three conditions: a) if Japan attacks the USSR; b) if Britain or
the United States join the war against Japan; c) if the League of Nations
obliges the Pacific Powers to confront Japan.
3. The USSR is prepared, under all circumstances to
help China by supplying her with defence facilities under the treaties
concluded between China and the USSR.” ”195”
On the same day, Luganets-Orelsky passed this reply to
Sun Fo.
The defeat of the Japanese aggressors at Lake Khasan
and the Soviet Union’s effective assistance to China clearly demonstrated the
potentialities of the USSR as well as its determination to Lake the necessary
steps towards checking the aggressors.
Next
Chapter III
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