Fight for the Pacific - America vs. England after World War I
V. Y. Avarin.
2. America vs. England after World War I
Having advanced ahead of other capitalist countries by virtue of the law of uneven development, American imperialism strove to establish its dominance throughout the world. British monopoly capital, owning almost one-third of the surface of the earth, brutally exploiting, and oppressing more than a quarter of the world's population, established its control over most of the world's communications and also sought to further expand its dominance. British imperialism saw its main task after the First World War in protecting the loot from its rivals. Britain's position in the Pacific rested on an unstable foundation. The diplomatic maneuvers of the British government and its entire policy here were therefore of a particularly zigzag nature.
The capitalists of both England and the United States sought to profit as much as possible from the exploitation of the Chinese people, but that is precisely why their interests in China came into conflict with each other. The largely identical methods of their policies arose in a number of cases precisely from the difference in their interests. England dominated China for a long time. It sought to maintain its dominance there and secure forever the exploitation of the Chinese working people through the policy of "equal rights" and "open doors", by fighting other rivals and suppressing the national revolutionary movement in China, which had grown so strong after the socialist revolution in Russia. The American capitalists, who so far had only a small piece of the Chinese pie, set themselves the goal of strengthening their influence through the same policy as the British one.
Weakened England even before the war of 1914-1918 often made compromises, bribing the Japanese and German imperialists, promising to give them special rights in certain territories of China, and thus pitting them against the United States.
The United States, as the economically most powerful imperialist power, was reluctant to compromise, stubbornly striving to establish its dominance over all of China.
The Anglo-American differences at the Paris Peace Conference relating to the Pacific Ocean related to the Shandong question. The London government was ready to cede to Japan the Shandong Peninsula (formally, the former German rights in this area of China), as well as part of the German islands in the Pacific Ocean. The purpose of British policy was to create a barrier against US expansion in the Pacific and to counter Japan with the US. As early as February 16, 1917, this prompted the British government to conclude a secret treaty with Japan, according to which it agreed to support Japanese claims regarding Shandong and the Pacific islands. Another reason for the conclusion of this treaty was the fear of the British imperialists that Japan, if the Allies did not make concessions, would not go over to the side of Germany. (At that time Germanophile tendencies were strong among the Japanese bourgeoisie.) The British monopolies wanted to snatch a piece of the Pacific pie for themselves as well. Under the same secret agreement, Japan undertook, for its part, to support British harassment in relation to the German islands located south of the equator. In addition, the British imperialists intended to use Japan as a gendarme of imperialism against the national liberation movement in China, and also to incite Japanese imperialism against Russia. Britain believed that after the war the national movement in China would be directed primarily against Japan, which had seized Shandong, and that Japan, in the general interests of the imperialists, would play the role of the main suppressor.
However, the American bourgeoisie was at the end of the war against the strengthening of Japanese positions in the Pacific and China. The monopoly capital of the USA has already considered this area of the globe as its possessions. The American imperialists began a struggle against the Japanese and their allies, primarily the British. President Wilson won some nominal concessions. The Caroline, Marshal, Mariana and Palao Islands were formally transferred only under the mandate of Japan, although Japan itself considered them to be its possessions; it was also granted the economic "rights" that had previously belonged to Germany in Shandong - the province formally remained under the sovereignty of China. But in fact, the American president had to give in on these issues at Versailles.
Many American bourgeois leaders also spoke sharply against the statute of the League of Nations. Senators Lodge and Borah began to fight against the entry of the United States into the League of Nations, declaring that the League was created in the interests of England and would be used by the latter to support its expansion. In the words of Bohr, the Charter of the League of Nations is "the greatest triumph of English diplomacy" (1). The American press pointed out that England, together with the dominions, would always have six votes at her disposal, while the United States would have only one vote and would always be at a disadvantage (2) .
After a long internal struggle, the American Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles, of which the statute of the League of Nations is an integral part.
President Wilson also agreed with Lloyd George and Clemenceau on the conclusion between France, Britain, and the United States of a guarantee treaty under which the United States and Britain pledged to provide armed assistance to France in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany. France, therefore, refused to annex the Rhine and Saar regions. This treaty was also not approved by the United States.
In August 1921 the USA signed separate peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary (3) . Even then, the American monopolies were striving to retain a free hand for arming German imperialism and turning it into a weapon of war against the USSR. This is one of the main reasons for the "anti-Versailles" policy of the US ruling circles.
The contradictions with Britain, which occupied a dominant position at the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, and the desire for world domination led to the fact that after the war, American imperialism, without joining the League of Nations, separated itself from other major capitalist powers from the camp of the Entente.
As a result of all this, the Anglo-American imperialist contradictions intensified still further, and this weakened the camp of imperialism. The USA everywhere developed an economic offensive against the positions of British capital. In particular, American exports to Asia increased from an average of $125 million a year in 1911-1914. to 533 million dollars in 1921. American exporters vigorously pushed back British trade.
In this situation, the British and American monopolists, under pressure from the masses of the people who are revolutionizing and striving for peace, began to think about a temporary compromise and about formalizing it by contract. American and especially British diplomacy began to grope for the terms of a compromise and the way to it after it became clear that the United States would not join the League of Nations and would not ratify the Treaty of Versailles.
(1) Cited. by Bailey, p. 660.
(2) The opposite situation has developed in the United Nations. If we count only the Latin American satellites of the USA, then the American monopolies have more than 20 votes at their disposal. But in the United Nations, England itself plays the role of the backing voice of the US financial oligarchy.
(3) Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919. It was not until June 2, 1921 that the American Congress adopted a resolution declaring the end of the state of war with Germany.
(...)
4. US-UK-Japan imperialist triangle
While trying on occasion to lean on Japan and oppose it to their main imperialist rival, the London and Washington governments at the same time pursued a common policy towards Japan to a certain extent. Not only the United States, but also England was interested in limiting the expanded Japanese expansion in China. Japan was by no means satisfied with Shandong, it laid claim to the whole of China, but the US imperialists and the British colonialists also laid claim to the whole of China.
The national liberation movement in China posed a threat to all imperialists, and the revolutionary movement in Europe threatened to narrow the base of world capitalism. This also encouraged the British and American imperialists to pursue a common policy on a number of occasions and seek compromise on certain controversial issues. Thus, after a long shaking of diplomatic swords, the question of Mesopotamian oil was settled. However, the main "stumbling block" in Anglo-American relations was the question of naval armaments, which at that time was especially closely connected with the international situation in the Pacific. The Anglo-American imperialist rivalry after the First World War was particularly evident in the naval arms race. The United States initially set itself the goal of building a navy that would have no equal in the world. England, having just dealt with the German fleet with difficulty, found itself in the face of a new formidable naval rival. The building of the fleet in the United States proceeded on such a scale and at such a pace that, from the point of view of the British government, the solution of the question of naval armaments could not be postponed. One of the options for resolving this issue could be to strengthen the alliance with Japan and present the US government with a joint ultimatum to cease further American naval armaments. But this option was very risky, and it was not easy to carry it out in the conditions of the growth of the working-class and revolutionary movement, which developed in all countries and in England itself under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia and in an environment of anti-war sentiments among the masses.
On the other hand, a strong movement for the reduction of armaments has developed among the popular masses in the United States. Under the influence of the ideas of the Russian socialist revolution, sentiments against the war and the arms race grew stronger among the masses of the United States. In this regard, the isolationists also sought to strengthen their positions, some of whom, in narrowly selfish and reactionary political interests, played along with the mood of the masses. Fearing further growth of popular discontent, Wilson also began to make public promises to reduce military spending in the future. Republicans held elections that gave them victory under the slogan of arms reduction and tax cuts. In fact, this meant a reduction in taxes levied on the profits of big capitalists. At the end of 1920, Senator Borah demanded that an international conference be convened to discuss the question of cutting spending on naval armaments, with a view primarily to the disarmament of the rivals of American imperialism.
England, out of necessity, was preparing to change the principle of "equality of the British fleet to the fleets of the two strongest maritime powers taken together" to the principle of "equality of the fleet of one strongest maritime power." This new principle began to be put forward at the end 1920 as the basis for a possible agreement with the United States. However, publicizing it, even in an official manner, in itself could not yet lead to practical results. An Anglo-Japanese alliance stood in the way. Advocates of an unlimited naval arms race in the United States declared that the Anglo-Japanese alliance, now that there is no imperialist Russia and that Germany has been defeated, is directed exclusively against the United States. Therefore, a fleet must be built that can withstand the British and Japanese fleets combined.
Describing the situation that had developed by 1920, Lenin wrote in the preface to the French and German editions of his book Imperialism, as the Highest Stage of Capitalism that on the globe the division of booty “occurs between 2-3 world-powerful predators armed from head to toe (America, England, Japan), who draw the whole earth into their war because of the division of their spoils” (19).
Of course, the struggle for dominance in the Pacific Ocean and for supremacy in Asia was only part of the general Anglo-American rivalry.
In 1919, the main forces of the American fleet were transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The United States already had a strong navy, large contingents of trained reserves, not to mention a powerful military industry and great economic potential. All this stimulated the American expansionists and militarists to stubbornly expand their expansion, to demand significant concessions from their opponents.
Among the leaders of the British Empire, almost until the end of 1920, there were significant differences on the question of which path to take in relation to Japan and the United States. When China in June 1920 formally protested the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as affecting its interests and contrary to the statute of the League of Nations, England and Japan published a joint declaration that, when the agreement was renewed, it would, they say, be concluded taking into account the statute of the League of Nations (2). However, in December 1920, the British had already announced that in the event of war between Japan and the USA, they would not consider themselves obliged to take up arms against the USA. The Americans were not satisfied with this. The British statement did not have the character of a formal obligation, while the Anglo-Japanese alliance not only existed formally, but to a certain extent was already a tradition.
Taking advantage of its position as a creditor, the United States exerted increasingly energetic financial and diplomatic pressure on London, trying to get England to support them against Japan. At the time, the naval arms race was much stronger than American imperialism, which possessed greater economic and financial power than England.
The British imperialists were reluctantly ready to put up with the temporary (as they hoped) loss of the position of "mistress of the seas" by England, hoping subsequently to overthrow their American rival.
(1) V. I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 22, p. 179.
(2) Sun Yat-sen protested publicly on June 10, 1920, against the resumption of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. He stated: “I strongly object to any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, because this alliance is directed against China. When Japan takes the path of aggression, why does England help her in this? .. All Chinese are opposed to Japan, and if the Anglo-Japanese alliance is again concluded, we will also oppose England" ("North China Herald", June 12 , 1920).
5. Anglo-American contradictions and the Washington Conference of 1921-1922
When the British government became convinced that the Harding government was not inclined to rush into an international discussion of the question of limiting naval armaments (1), it decided to show its own initiative in this matter. Only a decade and a half later, in connection with the publication of the documents of Oks, the publisher of the New York Times, some secrets of the diplomatic kitchen where the Washington Conference was being prepared were revealed. The proposal to establish parity between the fleets of England and the United States and conclude an agreement between them on this issue was first made by the First Lord of the British Admiralty (i.e., Secretary of the Navy) Lord Lee in a public speech delivered on March 16, 1921, although the inspiration for this idea is considered Lloyd George. The British imperialists believed that one should choose the lesser of two evils. Better a formal parity than a naval construction race in which England will be left behind.
The British government hoped that Lee's speech would attract the attention of American diplomacy and that negotiations and discussion of this proposal would begin. Despite the movement of the masses for the reduction of armaments in America itself, Washington, however, remained deaf to Lee's speech, and American shipyards continued to operate at full capacity. Then the British began to act more decisively, but still unofficially. In April 1921, Oke, who happened to be in London, received an invitation to visit Lord Lee. The First Lord of the British Admiralty asked him to convey unofficially to the Washington government that England "is ready to abandon the traditional policy of maintaining a fleet equal to the other two strongest fleets in the world, and to agree with the United States on the equality of their fleets" (2) .
Lee also agreed to give the United States dominance in the Pacific while retaining British dominance in the Atlantic.
E. Marshall, the New York Times correspondent in London, was also involved in the case, and Lee's proposals were passed on to Danby, the US Secretary of the Navy. Official negotiations soon began between the two imperialist rivals, in which America put forward a proposal on its part to abolish the Anglo-Japanese alliance, while indicating that Canada "probably" would also support this demand.
Bohr's resolution to convene an international conference now received rapid progress. It was passed unanimously by the Senate on May 25, 1921, and almost unanimously by the House of Representatives on June 29. At the beginning of July, the British Foreign Secretary, pursuing the aims of imperialist policy, had already formally proposed to the American Ambassador that he recommend that Harding take the initiative and propose that a conference be convened to discuss the question of naval armaments. The British government, not without reason, still feared that, in view of the traditional American suspicion and antipathy towards England, the open British initiative might meet resistance among the American bourgeoisie. Under the conditions of the American initiative, it was also more convenient for England to play the card with the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
Meanwhile, the American imperialists made no secret of the fact that, from their point of view, the Pacific problem is closely connected with the question of naval armaments and with the international situation as a whole. Harding in one of his speeches stated: “... The eyes of the whole world are turned to the Pacific Ocean. In an exhausted Europe, conflict is unlikely to brew soon, but the Pacific Ocean carries threats that concern us closely” (3) .
Japan made no secret of its desire to maintain a military-political alliance with England. In the summer of 1921, when the question was being decided in London whether or not there would be an Anglo-Japanese alliance in the future, the Tokyo government sent the heir to the throne, the future Emperor Hirohito, to England with instructions to influence the British in the direction of renewing the treaty. The use of Japan as a watchdog for British imperialist interests in the Pacific has become "flesh and blood" of British Far East policy. The British imperialists were therefore reluctant to liquidate the military-political alliance with Japan.
In June 1921, at the Imperial Conference, Prime Minister Lloyd George, Foreign Secretary Curzon, and the entire British government were still pushing for a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Australian Prime Minister Hughes also proved to be an ardent supporter of maintaining this union. Only Canadian Prime Minister Meyen, under the influence of the American imperialists, advocated the liquidation of the Anglo-Japanese agreement. He was supported in part by Smuts, the representative of the Union of South Africa. The Canadian Prime Minister's view of an alliance with Japan, reflecting that country's heavy dependence on Wall Street, won out in the end. This is explained by the fact that US President Harding supported it in his letter, and also by the fact that the rejection of an alliance with Japan was one of the conditions on the basis of which London could reach an agreement with America on the issue of naval armaments.
England had no reason to regret this change in her Pacific policy, since at the Washington Conference, which opened on November 12, 1921, she managed to achieve the maximum favorable results that, in the given international situation, she could generally count on. At the same time, the concessions which she was forced to make were very significant.
The US government agreed to the parity of the main categories of ships with England, but in reality, the American fleet, as the American naval minister later asserted, did not even become equal to the British: already in 1924, the actual ratio was 4: 5. In the same way, its actual ratio with the Japanese the fleet was not 5:3, but 4:3. In addition, England, obviously to its own advantage, having a wide network of naval bases, had every opportunity to develop a cruising fleet and other categories of light ships, since no restrictions were set here. By nominally granting the Pacific Ocean to America, British imperialism thus pushed the latter even further against Japan and increased the possibilities of broad maneuvering between them. American imperialism, on the other hand, for a certain period avoided the danger of the formation of an Anglo-Japanese coalition, which could throw its combined naval forces against it both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. The American government was forced to make this compromise also because of the resistance of the masses to the naval arms race.
The US monopolists hoped that by making a treaty on the temporary limitation of the naval arms race they would secure the payment of war debts by the "allied" powers. With huge amounts of money spent on armaments, the payment of debts would immediately become almost impossible. The British debt of the United States alone, after its consolidation by 1923, was determined, including interest, which had grown by that time, to a huge amount of $ 4.7 billion. Payment of it was to continue until 1984.
The Nine-Power Treaty, signed at the Washington Conference on February 6, 1922, satisfied the British imperialists at that time. This treaty meant the conspiracy of the United States, England and Japan on how to rob China. Comrade Stalin, speaking of the temporary stabilization of capitalism, pointed out in May 1925 that, in particular, “the stabilization of capitalism was expressed in the fact that British, American and Japanese capital managed to temporarily agree on the establishment of spheres of influence in China, in this vast market of international capital, about how to steal it. Can this collusion be considered durable at all? Again, you can't. Firstly, because those who conspired are fighting and will fight to the death among themselves because of a share in the robbery; secondly, because this conspiracy took place behind the backs of the Chinese people, who does not want and will not obey the laws of foreign robbers. Doesn't the growth of the revolutionary movement in China mean that the machinations of foreign imperialists are doomed to failure?"(4)
The four-power treaty signed at the Washington Conference—the United States, Britain, Japan, and France—formally of a "defensive" nature, meant the formation of a disguised anti-Soviet bloc of imperialist countries under the leadership of the United States. However, by the time of the Washington Conference, the failure of the anti-Soviet intervention in the Far East was fully determined, so the imperialists began to resort to new maneuvers.
The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic did not receive an invitation to the Washington Conference, although it was one of the main Pacific powers and the agenda of the conference included issues that directly affected its interests. The US government, in response to the demand of Soviet Russia for the admission of its representatives to the conference, brazenly replied that "the protection of Russia's interests is transferred to the entire conference."
The government of the RSFSR declared a strong protest against its exclusion from participation in the conference "which directly concerns it, as well as against any intention of any power to make decisions regarding the Pacific Ocean without the knowledge of Russia" (5). This protest was sent to the governments of the Great Powers on July 19, 1921, and repeated on the eve of the opening of the conference on November 2 of the same year. The government of the RSFSR declared that "it will retain complete freedom of action in all matters that will be discussed at this conference and will use this freedom in all cases and by all means that it deems appropriate." Finally, on December 8, 1921, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a note of protest to the powers participating in the Washington Conference against the discussion of the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as an issue "concerning exclusively China and Russia" (6) .
A compromise between Britain, the USA and other participants in the conference was achieved to a large extent at the expense of the interests of Soviet Russia and China. The decisions of the conference were directed against them. In particular, regarding the CER, resolutions were adopted affirming the "right" of the powers to interfere in the affairs of Soviet Russia and China. The American embassy in China tried to use these resolutions in early May 1924 by making representations to the Chinese government with the aim of preventing the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet agreement on the CER. This move by the American embassy was only part of those intrigues and diplomatic maneuvers by which the American and British imperialists sought to disrupt the treaty establishing diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China.
The Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference gave false assurances that Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Primorye and Soviet Sakhalin. Of course, Japan then did not even think about fulfilling this promise. The "acceptance" of the Japanese assurances at the conference, without setting a timetable for the evacuation of the troops, was interpreted by the Japanese imperialists and world public opinion as the de facto consent of the United States and Britain to the continuation of the occupation of the Soviet Far East, as it actually was. The Manchester Guardian praised the "decisions" of the Washington Conference on Siberia as "a big win for Japan." However, even before the conference, The Times reported a plan to "let the Japanese north of China" as compensation for Japanese concessions in China itself. The Japanese newspaper Ji-ji wrote: "Resolutions of the Washington Conference grant Japan the right to continue intervention in Siberia." The newspaper wrote that in response to a request from Ambassador Hayashi, a response was received from Lloyd George, saying that Japan could leave its troops in Siberia indefinitely.(7) . The policy of the United States, as well as that of England, towards the Soviet Union, as before, was distinguished by the greatest hypocrisy and hostility.
Only the patriotic, heroic struggle of the Far Eastern partisans and Soviet troops forced the Japanese invaders to get out of the Pacific Soviet lands. Noting the liberation of the Far Eastern outpost of the world's first socialist country, V. I. Lenin said: "... Vladivostok is far away, but, after all, this is a city of ours" (8) .
But at the same time, imperialist rivalry during this period significantly influenced the position of the Soviet country in the Far East. Already in May 1918, Lenin noted that the rivalry between Japan and America was the second contradiction, "determining the international situation and Russia...” (9) . He explained that, in addition to the danger of revolts in their own rear, Japanese offensive aspirations are held back by "some antagonism of America, which is afraid of the strengthening of Japan ..." (10) .
In 1920, Lenin qualified the relationship between Japan and America as one of the three fundamental opposites that existed in the relationship between the capitalist countries of that time.
In the spring of 1923, summing up the anti-Soviet war, noting again the significance of the imperialist contradictions, Lenin stated that “the campaign of the Western European counter-revolution aimed at supporting the Russian counter-revolution was thwarted because of the contradictions in the camp of the counter-revolutionaries of the West and the East, in the camp of the exploiters of the East and the Western exploiters , in the camp of Japan and America ... " (11) .
(1) Senator Borah on February 24, for reasons chiefly of demagogic domestic party politics, introduced a resolution in the Senate calling for a tripartite conference on the limitation of naval armaments, but Harding, in the interests of the monopolies, took steps to have this resolution shelved.
(2) E. Young, Powerful America, New York 1936, p. 49-50.
(3) S. Beard, Rise of American Civilization, 1933, vol. II, p. 683.
(4) I. V. Stalin, Soch., vol. 7, p. 99.
(5) "Soviet-American relations", p. 48.
(6) Ibid., p. 52.
(7) " Ji-ji”, March 2, 1922
(8) V. I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 33, p. 399.
(9) V. I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 27, p. 331.
(10) Ibid., p. 326.
(11) V. I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 33, p. 458.
“The economic center is moving from Europe to America, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Ocean. Thus, the share of America and Asia in world trade is increasing at the expense of Europe.”
Citing a number of figures, Comrade Stalin said:
“... if the share of Europe in world foreign trade in 1913 was 58.5 percent, the share of America was 21.2 percent, and the share of Asia was 12.3 percent, then in 1925 the share of Europe fell to 50 percent, the share of America rose to 26.6 percent, and the share of Asia rose to 16 percent.” (1) .
“What does the failure of the tripartite conference on the reduction of naval new imperialist wars mean that the “powers” do not want to disarm or reduce armaments?” (4) .
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