Kherson defeat; high emotions and jubilations
The withdrawal of Russians from
western (or northern) Kherson have created an atmosphere of nervousness, high
emotions, jubilations, and excitements depending on the side one is. It is
inevitable for human beings to be subjective when it comes to such issues
involving competing, confronting sides. However, Marxist Leninists are
objective analyzers and for one they look at the overall picture in dialectic
connections with the “particular, and they rely on concrete data and concrete assessments.
In the case of Ukraine war, Marxist
Leninist approach is always carried out with the study of the historical past from
yesterday to years back, which also includes the “balance of powers” as far as
the military strength is concerned.
Not every war is the same. For so many years people in general are used to witnessing or reading wars that really do not have so many battles in it, but one main battle with heavy bombing of all the infrastructure, communication, and cities regardless of the civilian casualties -despite the heavy civilian loss in an incredible ratio which is called “collateral damage”. This specific war so far has been a different type with so many “battles” on the ground without a serious bombing from the air- in fact the air force of Russia is still nowhere to be seen except for few cases. It is assessed by a large number of military analyzers as “the calm before the storm”. Will the conditions bring about the “storm” is debatable but highly likely.
In any kind of comparison, Ukraine,
despite all the “aids” of any kind from US-NATO is not a match for Russia -
meaning that the consequence of the war is known and admitted even by the western
think-thank analyzers.
As far as the Kherson question is
concerned, we always should approach and analyze the war battles from the point
of view of sustainable non-sustainable gains, recoverable- non recoverable
losses. And we should compare the military strength and capability of reproducing-replacing the equipment and manpower of belligerent countries. Meaning the overall war in dialectical
connection with all the rest of the subjects.
Kherson defeat
Regardless of the fact that
Russians withdrew from Kherson without any loss, by definition, in political and
military sense, it is a defeat on Russian part. However, that gain does not have any decisive
significance for the overall war other than the outcome of it may or may not be
a long delaying factor for the invasion
of Nikolayev and Odessa.
In the article titled “Ukraine
Military- A Guinea pig of US-NATO experiment in studying Russian Military
tactics”, I had noted that “Ukraine’s offensives conclusion of my observation is that the offensives are politically motivated rather than militarily, and that
derives from the tactics and practice of US-NATO using the Ukrainian army in
experimenting and studying the Russian responses.” In this sense, US-NATO
tacticians beat the Russians in north Kherson specific.
Withdrawing with no men and equipment
loss, is not a loss in military sense. The fact is that Ukraine is not
"liberating" regions but walking into the no man's land where the
Russians leave. This has been the trend so far. In reality, Ukraine was defeated
in all their offensives prior to withdrawal with heavy losses. This applies to
all fronts.
Possible reasons
As most military analyzers argue
that the possible reason for the “withdrawals” except for the “good will
withdrawal” after the Istanbul agreement was, not calling for reserves early on when the
contract soldiers’ agreements expired in June and 30 to 50 thousand of them
left the fronts. Between June and October Ukraine had multiple call for
reserves which increased their strength close to 5 times that of Russians on
the fronts. That late call on reserves affected the Kherson region in addition
to its logistical negative situation. That is why the decision for the
withdrawal may have been made way before the assignment of General Surovikin.
Due to its geographical
situation, north (west) Kherson was and has become a logistical hardship aside
from being a region with a 30,000+ military man was held up in defense
position, rather than diverted to the regions like Zaporizhia where the
logistic was not an issue due to its proximity to Russia without any natural
hindrance like a river. Realizing this,
the US-NATO tacticians concentrated on Kherson offensive especially after the
statement of newly assigned General Surovikin
that they would make the difficult decisions of withdrawal.
Its significance
The question is how
"sustainable" Kherson gain is in
military sense and will be for Ukraine. Regions like Kharkov, Kherson can be
recoverable but the loss of military equipment and especially men cannot easily
be recovered. Considering the declared and observed fact that most of the
forces from the “liberated” Kherson area is being transferred to other regions,
again, turns the “gain” in to a “non-sustainable one”.
Kherson is “liberated” without a
resistance but a withdrawal leaving the region with no military and significant civilian population. It saved
lives of military men and kept the military equipment and is being transferred to a front where they can
make a difference. In this sense it has no military significance, but a big
political one that triggers the emotions and jubilations. It makes one side
nervous and the other side delusional.
Change of tactics based on the
revisions in the strategy.
It seems that the first military
strategy was to force Ukraine to sit for an agreement and concessions. That did
not work. Military strategy is revised in conjunction with its political strategy. The strategy which required not to use their air force but keeping it for
the future, if and when, it is required to do so. Military Strategy is revised with
the referendums and Ukraine’s attacks to these regions causing civilian deaths.
They were content with inflicting the necessary damage to Ukraine through the use of
Drones and missiles. Withdrawal from Kherson changed the tactical plans again.
As we have noted during the early
days of the war, invasion of Odessa was a possible last region to integrate to Russia. Loss of Kherson which was a
bridgehead to Odessa made the cleaning up of Donetsk and Lugansk, securing Zaporizhia
priority. As a matter of fact, most military analyzers were arguing that
Donbass and Zaporizhia should have been the priority early on.
Recoverability and non-recoverability
The questions of sustainable and non-sustainable military gains,
recoverable and non-recoverable military
losses are dialectically connected and have decisive factors in winning a war of
this type.
Losses of military men are
non-recoverable. It may be replenishable for most countries with higher
population of man, however continuing losses will turn that in to “not-recoverable”
loss. Ukraine’s losses are huge in manpower despite its foreign legions. It is
reported that after the third reserve call, now Ukraine is calling men over forty-five to
reserves. Ukraine has reached its limit as far as the military manpower is concerned. Any
losses after this point will be in the category of non-recoverable losses.
Similarly, once having a strong
military army with hi-tech equipment, Ukraine has reached its limit as far as
the military equipment and supplies.
Military equipment losses are
recoverable as far as Russia is concerned, but not in the case of Ukraine.
Russia reproduces the arms and ammunitions in short time, but Ukraine cannot
for its production capabilities are diminished along with Its energy required
for production. The US-NATO military
aid, especially in air defense is depleted, they themselves have concerns with their own stack. Russia’s successful missile and drone attacks allover
Ukraine is a clear indication of the fact that skies belong to Russia with no
serious threat to them.
Fuel is the most important logistics for the use
of most military equipment. Ukraine’s fuel reserves have been destroyed by
Russian attacks; they will continue to do so.
Considering the coming winter,
energy crises, it will not only affect the production of military arms and
ammunitions, but repair of existing ones. Supplies in the form of “aid” from the West,
especially the air defense ones are not technologically developed ones, but the
production of those that have been stopped ages ago. In other words, the “aids” have the purpose of cleaning their own house from the
antiquated arms- of course at the expense of taxpayers and at the
expense of agricultural lands of Ukraine more than 70% of which fell in the
hands of US finance capital.
Why Special Military
Operation, rather than “war”.
This question puzzles the minds
of everyone. Not even one military
analyzer has a clue as to the reason. After
referendum, Russians called these regions as part of “Russian land”, after the
withdrawal from Kherson, they made the stamen that “Kherson remains part of
Russia “. Ukraine is bombing Russian
villages north of Kharkov. Yet, they still call it SMO-Special Military Operation.
I do not have any answer to that, because it does not make any sense whichever
way you look at it.
How Russia sees this war
Russia sees this war not against
Ukraine but as an indirect war against US-NATO which has the possibility of
turning into a direct war at any given time.
Its strategy and tactics are focused on military gains in the long run
rather than political, emotional gains at any given time. For that reason, Russia
is trying to be very vigilant which may be another reason why Russia has taken it slow, keeping its air
force intact, not using its heavy, supersonic missiles, keeping the losses at
minimal, and concentrating on certain
regions and on sustainable military gains. They may well have the possible
wider-range war in mind. That condition may require not to expand, especially
to the areas where the logistics will create problems and may end up
unnecessary heavy losses in case NATO directly participates in the war.
They are not driven by politics
and emotions but calculated military consequences.
How is the war going on?
The war in Ukraine never had the
characteristics of a “short war”, but a long-lasting war for both belligerent
powers. US-NATO and Russia had their own strategy that required the dragging of
this war. Russian tactic is not a full-scale war but a gradual increase in
offensive which may have a huge escalation in coming weeks.
Territorial Gain vs Military
Victory
If we go back and study, we can
see that Russia did not have and does not have the intention to invade all
Ukraine. It has its strategic goals, one of which is the attrition and
destruction of Ukraine army. This strategy requires different tactics than
"territorial gain" tactics- especially if that "territorial
gain" is unsustainable. Each
territorial gain brings about the stretching of one’s military power and thus
weakens the possibility of sustaining that gain. This is a repeated mistake of
Ukraine even in Kherson from where they relocate the military to other fronts and
leaving the gained area with minimal force.
Russia had that sustainability problem in Kharkov, withdrew its forces. The same problem with north (west) of Kherson surfaced, they withdrew their forces
without any loss. At each case Ukraine
suffered heavy losses and continue to suffer.
For Kherson and Kharkiv alike, the
issue is that the "attrition" and "destruction" of
overstretched Ukraine military will inevitably bring about the regaining of these
regions much easier- as some military experts argue; through the cleaning up of
Donbass, Dnieper, and Nikolayev, cutting Kherson from Ukraine from the north and
annihilating the remnants of already weakened Ukraine's military.
The question of recoverable and
non-recoverable losses comes forward repeatedly. Ukraine is in no condition of
recovering its losses whether it be manpower or equipment, Russia however is.
The so-called " Western Aid" has become a fantasy and headline
deception. Territorial gain without the man and equipment power to sustain it,
only forces to stretch the military and opens the door for military loss. That
in return brings about territorial loss in the final analyses. Military destruction
brings about sustainable territorial gain for the other side, but a territorial gain
without military destruction does not bring about a military victory.
The forecast
Currently Ukraine is dizzy with
militarily insignificant success and getting ready for another ambitious offensive plans -as a fantasy- from Zaporizhia to south to the sea. According
to the news and observations Ukraine is transferring 40,000 men to Zaporizhia. Zaporizhia (east of Dnieper River section) however, unlike Kherson, does not have a
logistic problem. All the necessary supplies to the front can be made without
any barrier. At the same time Russia is transferring troops from Kherson. Plus, the reserves being trained Melitopol will be ready to support the defense- or even for an offensive in Zaporizhia.
The remaining 200,000 plus reservists
have not been introduced to the fronts yet.
Russians are heavily trenched, fortified in Kharkov regions and so Ukrainians in Ugledar and Bakhmut. Most
likely the Russian offensive will be focused on Bakhmut and Ugledar defeat of which
will open up the vast lands without any trenched and fortified defense and push
all the way to the borders.
Without the clearing of Donbass
and of Zaporizhia section at the east bank of the Dnieper River, Russia cannot recover and conquer the other four regions (unless
they wage an all-out war for these regions). Recent news confirming that the village in the hills overlooking Ugledar has
been captured by Russian. (The pictures of hundreds of dead soldiers who were
not picked up by Ukraine military are saddening but an inevitable reality of
war- why they were not picked up is another issue related to the corruption that
extends to the Ukraine military)
Similarly, news confirming that
another village has been captured in Bakhmut area. In other words, Russia is on
offensive in Donbass.
Winter will not in any way hinder
the Russians but more likely the Ukrainians for one; the supply of the troops, fuel and ammunition will be a serious
issue for them, and second having relied on large numbers of mercenaries who
are not accustomed to fighting in winter condition.
Possibility of agreements?
Looking at the history, puppet,
proxy foreign policy of US has never
been a reliable one for the puppets, they never restrained cutting the strings of
the puppets when it fit their strategic interests. The changes in Zelensky’s
attitude for an agreement corresponding
the changes in that of US, is a clear indication of this “puppetry”. However, an agreement is impossible under the current conditions.
Degree of the achievement of success in the
strategy will be decisive in order to sit down for an agreement not only for
one side, but for both belligerent side for US and Russia alike - that is excluding puppet government of Ukraine.
Have the US achieved its strategy
for the proxy war in Ukraine against Russia?
Short answer is no. Except for some political but superficial gains, neither
economically nor militarily US-NATO have achieved any success. The US military industrial complex has gained economically,
but NATO member countries lost both economically and politically which will
increase as the winter approaches and most likely the protests will continue
and will become widespread. Although there are voices in the US think-tank and
bureaucrats for agreement talks, Neo-Cons are totally against it with their
illusions.
Have Russia achieved its strategy
for the war in Ukraine against US-NATO? Short answer is no. However, Russia’s gains so far are
sustainable and not-negotiable ones. Russian military is intact, its economy in
good shape and with the developments in BRICS may even reach one of its
strategic goals earlier than expected.
Under these conditions to reach
an agreement is impossible, that is why even the talk of agreement is almost nil
other than wishful thinking or propaganda purposes.
As we have noted early in the
war, this war will drag in order for the strategy of both major belligerent
countries achieved significant degree of success. At current situation neither of
them has such a gain to sit for an agreement.
Conclusion
Even the western media confesses
that it is impossible to supply the needs of Ukraine as quick as they deplete
supply. The West facing huge economic crises, turning in to an extension of US, and opposition from public, very soon,
will have to desert Ukraine or lose more than it could have imagined.
The war in Ukraine is a proxy war
in which Ukraine has no chance of winning. Putin’s words actually make one
think that there is a possibility of having no more a Ukraine as we have known
if the conditions and situation reaches to the level (whatever it is) that
Putin has in his mind.
The Kherson “defeat” has no
decisive, significant military value but political value. However, that political
value may become meaningless and short lived based on the developments that
will follow it, or at some later point
in the war. Despite all the occasional political,
headline gains of Ukraine, it has no chance of winning this war. The war will
drag, not because of the resistance of Ukraine, or of the mistakes of Russia,
but because Russian strategy requires it so. Russia will decide to end it or
not at some point depending on the achievement level of successes of its strategy.
In such an important issue, especially
in worst case scenario, one should never think of Russia isolated from China (and of
course for similar and other reasons from North Korea). Defeat of one, soon or
later, brings about the defeat of the other.
Erdogan A
November 15, 2022
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