THE SOVIET UNION’S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST THE SPREAD OF FASCIST AGGRESSION

THE SOVIET UNION’S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST THE SPREAD OF FASCIST AGGRESSION 

by I. Koblyakov

(April 1940–June 1941) 

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government were well aware of the danger arising from fascist Germany, who, despite the agreement signed with the USSR on August 23, 1939, continued her aggressive plans vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Germany was a black storm-cloud hanging over the Soviet Union’s Western border. The Party and the Soviet Government therefore observed the strictest caution and restraint, effecting their policy of peace and taking pains not to give any grounds for the USSR’s involvement in military conflict. At the same time all necessary measures were taken to ensure the Soviet Union’s security. Every available opportunity was taken to develop the country’s military-economic potential and build up her defensive might. In pursuing this course, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government were guided by Lenin’s instruction that the main task must be "to ensure the continued existence of an isolated socialist republic surrounded by capitalist enemies." [191•1 

“Our Party and the Soviet people,” noted Brezhnev, “remembered the warning by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin that imperialism could, at any point in time, unleash another period of wars against the Soviet Union, and took measures to build up the country’s economic and defensive might." [191•2 

The Soviet Government’s report at the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which took place from March 29 to April 3,1940, underlined the .task of ensuring peace and security of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet once more asserted that in the 192 sphere of international relations, the Soviet Union would continue to wage a consistent struggle to safeguard peace and ensure its own security, to expose and wreck machinations spearheaded against the world’s first socialist state. "In a word,” noted V. M. Molotov, head of the Soviet Government, "our foreign policy tasks are to ensure peace among nations, and our country’s security. This implies a position of neutrality and non-participation in the war between the big European powers. This position is based on the treaties already signed by us and fully conforms to the Soviet Union’s interests. At the same time, this position helps restrain the spread of war and its fanning in Europe and it is therefore in the interests of all nations striving for peace and who are already suffering the hardships of war." [192•1 This foreign policy course was unanimously approved By the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and was consistently put jnto practice.

After France’s defeat in June 1940, the international situation deteriorated, and there was a growing threat of German aggression against other countries. At the Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in August 1940, a government report was heard on internal and foreign policies. The report held that the world was on the eve of a new stage in the war’s escalation. [192•2 This threat meant an increased danger of war for the Soviet Union, as well. "In this situation,” stressed the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars at the session, "the Soviet Union must show vigilance over its external security, reinforcing all its internal and external positions.” The Soviet Government urged the people to do all they could to ensure a further, even more powerful upsurge in the country’s defensive might." [192•3 Shock labour was the Soviet people’s response to this appeal by the Party and Government. The nation was successfully fulfilling the third five-year economic development plan which provided for the accelerated development of the major branches of the defence industry and the creation of energy and fuel reserves and expansion of industry in the country’s eastern regions. In 1940, 166 million tons of coal were mined, and 15 million tons of cast iron and over 15 million tons of steel were smelted; 48,300 million kilowatt-hours of electricity were produced. By mid-1941, the gross industrial output had reached 193 86% of the 1942 target level adopted by the third five-year plan; output of the means of production had reached 90% and output of the means of consumption—80% of this target. In the first half of 1941, rail freight turnover had reached 90% of the projected 1942 level. [193•1 2,900 new enterprises were brought into operation. 

From 1938 to 1940, the total volume of output by the machine-building and metal-working industries had increased 76% over the 1937 figure. During the first three years of the third five-year plan, the annual increase in production for the defence indusrty was, on average, 39%.

The economic plan for 1941 envisaged a substantial increase in the production of cast iron, steel, rolled metal, and in coal and oil extraction, the Party and the Government thus provided for a further steady consolidation of the Soviet state’s economic might and defence capacity. A powerful war industry was built up on the basis of heavy industry. Industries were created which were quite new to Russia: the aircraft, tank-building, motor-car, tractor, alluminium, magnesium and rubber industries.

This was undoubtedly one the USSR’s greatest achievements of that time. "Back in the pre-war period,” wrote N. A. Voznesensky, "a war industry was built up in the USSR with specialised aircraft, tank, shipbuilding, and other military equipment and ammunition industries. During the Great Patriotic War, they helped multiply the capacity of the USSR’s war industry." [193•2 

On the eve of nazi Germany’s perfidious attack on the Soviet Union, the Party and Government passed as a precaution the mobilisation plan on ammunition supply for’ the second half of 1941 and for 1942 with a view to switching industry on a war footing in the event of war. [193•3 

In February 1941, the 18th Conference of the CPSU discussed the tasks facing the Party in industry and transport. With the growing danger of attack from fascist Germany, the Conference regarded the development of industry by every possible means as its primary task, and outlined the quickest ways of eliminating defects in industry and transport.

The resolution of the Conference noted that "the production growth rates of the defence industries in 1940 were 194 considerably higher than the production growth rates for industry as a whole". [194•1 

Every month the war industry stepped up its output of new aircraft, tanks, various ordnance pieces, small arms and ammunition. Enterprises connected to the war industry received first priority for the supply of raw materials, equipment, fuel, and electricity. While in 1938 appropriations under the People’s Commissariat of Defence amounted to 2,700 million rubles, in 1941 the figure had grown more than 2.5 times to the tune of 7,100 million rubles. [194•2 

N. G. Kuznetsov, People’s Commissar for the Navy during the Second World War, wrote in his memoirs that "due to the international situation, the Government implemented wide-ranging, energetic measures to build up the country’s defence capacity. There was essentially no limit to the means allotted for defence needs. The war industry sharply increased its output of new aeroplanes, tanks, pieces of ordnance and ships (excepting capital ships)". [194•3 

Thus, as the threat of German attack on the Soviet Union became more tangible, the Party and the Government drew the proper conclusions and speeded up the implementation of defence measures. Soviet foreign policy was of no small account in the matter of ensuring the USSR’s security.

The Soviet Government attached great significance to providing for security in the Baltic. It was important for the Soviet Union that the Baltic countries were not transformed into an open door through which the aggressor could invade.

The treaties of mutual assistance concluded by the Soviet Union with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1939 conformed to the vital interests of those peoples. Apart from creating the conditions for equal and advantageous co-operation with the USSR, they ensured the security of the Baltic peoples from the threat of Hitler aggression. However, these countries’ fascist governments, against their people’s national interests, carried on with their anti-Soviet course even after signing the mutual assistance pacts. The Soviet Ambassador in Kaunas, describing the policy of Smetona and the rest of the ruling clique, wrote to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on June 3, 1940: "After concluding the mutual 195 assistance treaty with the USSR in October 1939, Lithuanian ruling circles started looking for ways of counterbalancing the Soviet influence in Lithuania.” [195•1 

The three Baltic governments’ hostility towards the USSR came to light especially during a discussion on contingents of Soviet armed forces to be stationed in these countries. Their total number had been established when the mutual assistance treaty was signed. However, as soon as the Soviet Union began introducing military units into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, their governments erected every possible obstacle to sabotage the operation. They demanded that negotiations be held on the categories of personnel to be included in the contingent of Soviet armed forces. The "Soviet Government agreed to discuss this matter and also other related questions —when Soviet military units, aircraft and tanks would be introduced and the conditions of leasing land and buildings and constructing military bases. The negotiations began at the end of October 1939, but were drawn out for several months by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In order to cut down the number of Soviet troops to the very limit, the Baltic governments demanded that their overall number should include not only the auxilliary construction units, who would be building and equipping the military bases and settlements, but also the civilian personnel (cooks, waitresses, food and supply workers, teachers, nannies, etc.). Endless disputes on all matters were still unsettled by the time the fascist regimes in the three Baltic countries were overthrown in June 1940. [195•2 

In order to politically prepare the Baltic peoples for a war against the Soviet Union, the ruling circles of those countries were at pains to spread anti-Soviet propaganda. One of its targets was also the Red Army units stationed in the Baltic countries. "With the authorities’ knowledge and on their initiative,” wrote the Soviet Ambassador in Riga to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, "the most absurd and hostile rumours are circulating in Latvia concerning our Red Army.... As soon as our troops arrived, the authorities themselves started creating a defamatory and malignant atmosphere.” "The Latvian Government,” the report reads further, "has launched a campaign of terror against all who sincerely express sympathy with our Red Army and see it as genuine support for Latvia’s independence. The high-ranking 196 officers and government circles are waging a cowardly and base war of propoganda against the Soviet Union." [196•1 

Describing this anti-Soviet policy of the Baltic countries’ fascist governments, the journal Bolshevik wrote: "Despite the mutual assistance pacts between the Soviet Union and these Baltic republics, the corrupt governments in power in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have done all they could to sabotage peaceful cooperation, to reverse everything and turn the Baltic into a springboard against the Soviet Union. The ruling circles of these countries not only shunned their commitments: they defied the will and vital interests of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia." [196•2 

In the light of these circumstances, the Soviet Government decided to take additional measures to ensure the security of its western borders and their approaches. This was especially necessary since by mid-1940, with the increasing threat of German attack on the Baltic countries, it became plain that the bourgeoisie .of these countries were incapable of defending their nations from nazi aggression. A crisis arose in the ruling strata which created favourable conditions for the people’s victory over the bourgeoisie. The ruling circles in the Baltic used repressive measures in an effort to forestall the imminent revolutionary crisis. At the same time, they stepped up acts of sabotage against the treaties with the USSR, since these isolated them from international imperialism. Moreover, the governments of these countries embarked on «a course of uniting all reactionary forces for an onslaught against the Soviet Union. In December 1939, a conference was held in Tallinn on the question of organising a military alliance of the Baltic countries which would be spearheaded against the USSR. In March 1940, another conference took place in Riga on the same issue. In June 1940, a so-called Baltic week took place in Tallinn, which was something in the nature of a demonstration of the Baltic countries’ anti-Soviet forces. The ruling circles of these states increasingly appealed to Berlin for help and even intended asking Hitler Germany to establish her protectorate over the whole of the Baltic. Every month saw increased provocations against the Red Army servicemen stationed there according to the treaties; a hostile, anti-Soviet atmosphere was deliberately built up. [196•3 

In mid-June, the Soviet Government made representations to the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviet Government demanded that governments be formed in these countries that would, both in word and deed, fulfill their obligations under the treaties of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, [197•1 These Soviet statements helped the broad masses of the people in the Baltic to realise the anti-popular nature of the ruling circles’ home and foreign policies. The working people of the Baltic countries therefore ardently supported the Soviet demands. Their patience finally ran out and anti-government rallies and demonstrations began to crop up all over the Baltic.

The ruling cliques, being isolated from international imperialism, did not risk using force against their peoples. Besides, the presence of Soviet units in the Baltic countries had a sobering influence on the most bellicose bourgeois circles, deterring them from this extreme measure. In connection with the revolutionary situation which arose in Estonia in early 1940 and the favourable conditions for the Estonian people’s peaceful victory over the bourgeoisie, A. I. Mikoyan noted: "The Estonian bourgeoisie found themselves isolated and, in contrast to their 1918 or 1919 position, they were now unable to rely on direct military help from the imperialist powers. The working people were backed by a truly mighty force —the Soviet people, who had, by that time, gained decisive victories in socialist construction and in turning their country into a mighty socialist power. All this ensured a quick victory by the people and, moreover, with neither bloodshed nor armed conflict. Power passed peacefully into the hands of the working people." [197•2 A similar situation took shape in Lithuania and Latvia, where the working people seized power peacefully. Popular Front governments were formed: in Lithuania the government was led by the eminent progressive journalist Justas Paleckis, in Latvia, by Professor August Kirhenstein, in Estonia, by a well-known poet J. Vares. In those historic days, Bolshevik wrote the following about these events: "The Chinese wall which these pitiful governments attempted to erect between the USSR and the Baltic countries has collapsed. A broad popular movement has risen up and cast out from their long-occupied positions the riff-raff that had seized power and scoffed at the working people for many years." [197•3 

The restoration of Soviet power in the Baltic states, as well as being a victory for the peoples of those countries, was also a triumph for the Soviet people and the Leninist national policy. At the same time, it was a success of Soviet foreign policy; the Baltic peoples had been rescued, if only for a short while, from the blows of the imperialist war, and the security of the USSR’s North-West borders had been consolidated.

Once Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia became part of the Soviet Union, the latter’s position in the Baltic was strengthened, which in turn promoted peace in Scandinavia.

The consolidation of the USSR’s position in the Baltic Sea was also significant in that it enabled the Soviet Union to scotch the far-reaching plans of the German General Staff, viz. to turn the Baltic Sea into an "internal German sea”. This would have allowed Germany to supply Finland, her ally in the war against the Soviet Union, by sea. Besides this, the nazis were planning to make use of this "internal German sea" for a rapid seizure of Leningrad.

The fact that the Soviet armed forces occupied positions west of the former borders meant, actually, that an “eastern” front had been organised against the aggression of fascist Germany. [198•1 

The question of recovering Bessarabia was also of great importance to the USSR. The Soviet-Rumanian conflict over Bessarabia arose in 1918 when the bourgeois-landowner government of Rumania, incited by the Western powers, who were out to weaken the Soviet state, seized this parcel of Soviet territory. The Soviet Union had never accepted the fact of Bessarabia’s forcible annexation and had made repeated statements to this effect. A new statement was made at the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the spring of 1940. [198•2 

However, instead of making a realistic appraisal of the situation and entering into negotiations with the Soviet Government to solve the Bessarabian question, the Rumanian Government started a Inilitary built-up in preparation for war and appealed to a number of governments for help, including fascist Italy and Germany. [198•3 The anti-Soviet attitude of the Rumanian Government gave rise to its policy of rapprochement with the fascist powers, Germany in particular, turning Rumania into the latter’s obedient satellite.

In the light of the tense, alarming state of international affairs, the USSR could no longer accept the Bessarabian situation. In the evening of June 26, 1940, Davidescu, the Rumanian Envoy in Moscow, was summoned to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and handed a Soviet Government statement on the Bessarabian question. "The Soviet Union,” it read, "has never accepted the fact of Bessarabia’s forced annexation and has repeatedly made public statements on the matter. Now that the USSR’s military weakness is a thing of the past, and the present world situation demands a rapid solution of questions which have long been left unsolved, in order to lay a foundation for durable peace between the nations, the Soviet Union considers it necessary and timely to start working jointly with Rumania towards an immediate solution of the question of Bessarabia’s return to the Sovjet Union to restore justice.” Furthermore, the Soviet Government declared that the question of returning Bessarabia was integrally tied up with the question of returning to the USSR "that part of Bukovina whose population was largely related to the Ukraine, both by their common historical fate and their common language and national composition". [199•1 

The Soviet demand for the return of Northern Bukovina reflected the national aspirations of the latter’s population: in November 1918, the People’s Vetche of Bukovina adopted a decision on reunification with the Soviet Ukraine. [199•2 

In conclusion, the statement said that the Soviet Government proposed to the government of Rumania that:

1. Bessarabia be return to the Soviet Union.

2. Northern Bukovina be passed over to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government expressed the hope that the Rumanian Government "would accept the present proposals amd enable the protracted conflict between the USSR and Rumania to be settled peacefully". [199•3 The Tatarescu Government gave the required answer on June 27, 1940.

“His Majesty’s Government declares,” it stated, "its readiness to enter immediately, in the broadest sense, into a friendly discussion by mutual agreement, of all the Soviet Government’s proposals." [199•4 

This declaration of readiness to "solve by peaceful means" and discuss in "a friendly spirit all proposals" was intended to screen 200 the Rumanian Government’s reluctance to give a clear answer to the USSR’s demand for the return of primordial Soviet territory, Bessarabia.

By attempting to embark on a prolonged correspondence on this issue, Tatarescu wanted to play for time to enlist the support of the fascist powers and other states for opposing the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government immediately saw through this "peaceful manoeuvre" by the Rumanian authorities. It declared the Rumanian Government’s answer to be “indefinite” for it had not given a clear acceptance of the USSR’s proposal that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina be returned directly to the Soviet Union. The USSR therefore demanded a plain answer to its question and. when Davidescu stated that Bucharest agreed to accept the Soviet proposal, suggested that within 4 days the Rumanian troops should Vacate the territory of Bessarabia and North Bukovina and Red Army units enter the territory. The Soviet Government demanded a reply from Bucharest no later than 12 noon on June 28, 1940. Tatarescu gave Moscow a positive reply before this deadline. On the same day, units of the Red Army entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and on June 30 reached the River Prut, which now marks the border of the Soviet state. The Red Army was greeted with immense joy by the inhabitants of the towns and villages which it liberated. Bessarabia was reunited with Soviet Moldavia which was proclaimed on August 2, 1940 the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The removal of historical injustice by returning Soviet lands formerly annexed by the Rumanian landowners and capitalists meant that the Leninist principle of the self-determination of nations had been put into practice.

At the same time, Bessarabia’s return to the Soviet Union had a great political and strategic significance. The Soviet Union was again a Danube state and made every effort to reestablish its rights as a Danube state. It demanded the right to participate in the drawing up of a new Danube navigation regime and also the restoration of the other Danube states’ rights which had been grossly violated by the Entente powers at the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty.

At that time, the USSR continued its active diplomatic drive against fascist aggression in South-East Europe. The Balkans had long been small change in the political game played by the big imperialist powers. The latter had, in their own mercenary interests, used every means possible to stir up the strife and hostility between the peoples of the Balkan countries. This was also the 201 situation in the initial period of the Second World War, when the Balkans continued to remain the powder-keg of Europe.

Nazi Germany represented a particularly serious threat to the peoples of South-East Europe, and the danger increased after France’s defeat. From the middle of 1940, the fascist "Third Reich" assumed the offensive and aspired to subordinate the South-East European states both economically and politically. Germany needed these countries for raw materials, food-stuffs, and as cheap labour reserves. The Balkans also constituted an important springboard for a German attack on the USSR.

At the same time, Germany saw the Balkans as the shortest route to the British and French colonies in the Middle East. The Hitler Government therefore strove to turn the Balkan countries into German satellites and station its troops there.

The Soviet Union was the only country whose policies conformed to the interests of the Balkan countries. The main aims of the Soviet policy towards the Balkan Peninsular were to bar the German fascists’ way to the Balkans, help the Balkan peoples preserve their freedom and independence and prevent the spread of war into this part of Europe.

However, this Soviet policy was opposed by the British and French ruling circles as well as by Hitler Germany. After France’s defeat, Britain took up an even more obstinate stand.

In the given situation, the Balkan countries could only preserve their independence and resist German pressure and the intrigues of other imperialist powers with Soviet backing and political and economic co-operation. The Soviet Union was making serious efforts in this direction. This is illustrated by Soviet policy towards Bulgaria.

Evidence in point is the instruction from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador in Bulgaria to declare to the Bulgarian Government that "if the Bulgarians,get into any kind of difficulties, they can count on the Soviet Union which will not abandon them and, if the Bulgarians wish, will be ready to render them effective assistance." [201•1 The USSR’s suggestion to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria illustrates its desire to help Bulgaria safeguard her independence and sovereignty. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs made this proposal to the Bulgarian Envoy in Moscow, Antanov, on September 20, 1939. The latter promised to hand the Soviet proposal over to Sofia and report his government’s reply. [201•2 

On October 16,1939, the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs advised the Soviet Charge" d’Affaires in Sofia that Bulgaria could not conclude a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. On December 13,1939, Antanov informed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Bulgarian Government considered it impossible to conclude any kind of political treaty with the USSR. [202•1 

There were a number of reasons for the Bulgarian refusal. A significant factor was British and German pressure. According to the Soviet Embassy in Sofia, Britain threatened the Bulgariar Government that "if it agrees to further rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the British Government will denounce its credit agreement and will demand payment of all debts from Bulgaria". [202•2 

Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Government once more suggested a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria. A. A. Sobolev, General Secretary of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was sent to Sofia with a special mission. On November 25, 1940, Sobolev informed King Boris III of the Soviet Government’s statement to the effect that the USSR, taking into account the community of interests of both countries, "renews its proposal of September 1939 to conclude a mutual assistance pact "and that it was ready to "render Bulgaria all manner of assistance, including military, in the event of a threat of attack on Bulgaria, any financial help, foodstuffs, arms and supplies in the form of a loan, if Bulgaria needs it. At the same time, the USSR is prepared to increase its purchases of Bulgarian goods". [202•3 In conclusion, Sobolev asserted that "The Soviet Union considers it expedient to conclude precisely a pact of mutual assistance which, unlike unilateral guarantees, stresses the full equality of both interested parties." [202•4 

Several days later, the Bulgarian Government informed the Soviet Government of its rejection of the Soviet proposal. [202•5 

Despite this refusal, the Soviet initiative in extending the hand of friendship to Bulgaria played an important role. Large sections of the public in the Balkan countries regarded it as an act aimed at keeping the Balkans out of the war zone. 

The Bulgarian workers’ party put out a special leaflet containing the text of the Soviet proposal. An article supporting this proposal 203 was printed in Rabotnichesko delo, the newspaper published illegally by this party. It read: "The overwhelming majority of the Bulgarian people, irrespective of organisational affiliation and political conviction, enthusiastically welcome the pact and proclaim their support for its acceptance. The campaign for a petition in favour of the pact has turned into a genuine public plebiscite.... The Bulgarian people —workers, peasants, artisans, intelligentsia, all honest Bulgarians who love their native land, including those sons of Bulgaria who have been sent abroad in soldier’s garb —declare their support for the Soviet proposal." [203•1 

The USSR could do nothing to prevent Bulgaria being turned into a German satellite, since the fascist ruling clique, led by King Boris III and Prime Minister Filov, were blinded by class hatred and were pursuing, against the people’s interests, a policy of collusion with Hitler. In mid-November 1940 King Boris III and Hitler came secretely to an understanding about Bulgaria joining the aggressive Triple Pact.

To justify this policy, the Filov Government spread the rumour that it had the support of the Soviet Union, which allegedly had no objection to the introduction of nazi troops in Bulgaria. On January 13, 1941, TASS published a statement refuting these false allegations. The statement emphasised that "if German troops are in fact in Bulgaria, and if their further movement into Bulgaria is actually taking place, then this is all being done without the knowledge or agreement of the USSR...." [203•2 

On January 17, 1941, the Soviet Government made a representation to the German Ambassador in Moscow to the effect that the USSR could not remain indifferent to the events in the Balkans. On the same day the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin made a representation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that "the Soviet Union warns against the entry of German troops into Bulgarian territory and into the straits zone, since, as it has repeatedly informed the imperial government, it regards these territories as a zone of its security". [203•3 

On February 28, 1941, the Soviet Government reaffirmed its position in relation to Bulgaria. Nevertheless, Filov’s monarcho-fascist clique clinched its deal with Hitler: on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria was proclaimed signatory to the Triple Pact and the 204 fascist Wehrmacht entered Bulgaria. She thus became Hitler’s satellite and a springboard for a German fascist attack on the Soviet Union.

To justify this perfidious policy, which was against the people’s interests, the Filov Government announced to the Soviet Union that it had agreed to the introduction of German troops into Bulgaria allegedly in order to "preserve peace in the Balkans”. On March 3, the Soviet Government once more asserted that such a policy "leads not to the strengthening of peace, but to the enlargement of the sphere of war, and to Bulgaria’s involvement in that war.... The Soviet Government, faithful to its policy of peace, cannot, in view of this situation, render any kind of support to the Bulgarian Government in pursuing its present policy". [204•1 

The USSR took great pains to prevent Germany advancing into Yugoslavia and spreading the war into that country. To this end, on April 5,1941, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. Clause 2 of the treaty stated that if one of the contracting parties were subject to attack by a third state, the other contracting party pledged "to observe a policy of friendly relations towards it". [204•2 

By concluding this treaty, the USSR confirmed its friendly relations towards Yugoslavia. In those difficult days, this constituted valuable moral and political backing for the people of Yugoslavia.

On April 6, 1941, Hitler Germany, without declaring war, invaded Yugoslavia. Nazi Germany had thus decided to turn a deaf ear to the Soviet Union’s warnings, one of which was issued on April 6, 1941, to the German Ambassador. [204•3 

The security of Turkey as well as the Soviet Union was threatened by the German occupation of the Balkans. During that uneasy period the USSR came out in support of Turkey: on March 9, the Turkish Ambassador was invited to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs where he was informed, on the Soviet Government’s behalf, that "if Turkey is actually subjected to attack by any foreign power and is compelled to take up arms to protect the inviolability of her territory, then Turkey may rely on the Soviet-Turkish non-aggression pact and can count on the full understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Union". [204•4 The Turkish 205 Ambassador replied that this "declaration will be of great moral support to the Turkish Government" and that it "has no doubt that the Soviet Union will not attack Turkey if the latter is subject to an attack by any power” [205•1 

The threat of an attack through the territory of Finland became ever more obvious. After signing the Moscow treaty, the Finnish Government stepped onto the path of drawing closer to Germany and preparing a new war against the USSR. The Finnish Minister of Defence Niukkanen declared that peace meant "coming over to the side of Germany”, and so Finland became an ally of Germany and joined in the preparation of war against the USSR. She allowed German troops, which were preparing to attack the Soviet Union, to be deployed on her territory.

The Finnish Government, in violation of clause 5 of the peace treaty, began to erect fortifications in the Petsamo region, build air bases, and extend moorings in Liinahamari, etc. Finnish reactionary circles regarded the treaty with the USSR as a means of playing for time while preparing a new war against the Soviet state. Ryti, the Finnish President, admitted in July 1941 that "three weeks after signing the peace treaty it became clear that we would again be waging war against the Soviet Union". [205•2 

In order to prepare the people ideologically for such a war the Finnish Government launched an intensive anti-Soviet campaign and banned the Society for Peace- and Friendship with the USSR. Aiming to intimidate anyone who showed feelings of friendship towards the USSR, the Finnish Government organised police reprisals and used firearms to break up a meeting of the above-mentioned society in Turku. These and other measures were all part of a plan to prepare the country for war against the Soviet Union. [205•3 

Finland failed to fulfil her obligations under the trade agreements with the USSR, while the latter was irreproachably supplying Finland with provisions. [205•4 Ryti had to admit this on August 18, 1940. [205•5 

On June 22, 1941, Finland, along with Germany, attacked the Soviet Union. Ryti, however, tried to conceal this from the Finnish 206 people, declaring that Finland had become the “victim” of Soviet aggression. [206•1 

The USSR did everything it could to preserve the independence of Sweden who, already in the spring of 1940, after the seizure of Denmark, was under threat of attack from Germany.

Günther, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an interview with the newspaper Dagens Nyheter in April 1946 commented on Sweden’s position after the Germans had occupied Denmark and Norway: "On April 9, 1940, hardly any of the members of the government believed —I for one did not —that Sweden would be able to avoid war in the long run." [206•2

Published by Progress Publishers (Moscow)