The General Strike Against War; Celebration of May Day Brussels 1891
The Second International Congress, which was held in Brussels in Au-gust 1891, dealt principally with the question of the trade unions, of strikes and particularly with the general strike against war. The question of the danger of war and the struggle against war, which has been discussed at every inter-national workers’ congress, was of peculiar urgency at that time, because of the alliance concluded between France and Russia, in answer to the triple alliance concluded between Germany, Austria and Italy in 1883. The Congress failed to define its attitude to the existing international situation; the discussion, which turned mainly upon the demand for a “world strike” against war put forward by the Dutch anarchist Nieuwenhuis. consequently remained abstract, especially as at that time the workers had no experience of the political mass strike, and even the attitude of socialists to the strike as a weapon in the economic strug-gle lacked clarity.
The resolution of the French and English majority on the question of trade union organisation, of the strike and the boycott, recommended the workers to prepare for a general strike by building up a strong organisation, but described the strike as a double-edged weapon which should only be em-ployed after mature consideration of all the circumstances; it advised the work-ers to “resort rather to mediation and arbitration, than to declare a strike,” if that were possible and if it did not injure their honour. Similar ideas were ex-pressed in the counter-resolution moved by the Germans, who recognised the strike as a necessary method of struggle, but added:
“Since, however, strikes and boycotts are double-edged weapons which, if used at an incorrect time or place, endanger rather than promote the interests of the working class, the Con-gress recommends the workers to weigh carefully all the circum-stances in which they desire to make use of these weapons.”
A resolution calling for the establishment of an international trade union organisation was rejected by the German vote; the German delegates pointed out that it was impossible to do this legally considering the legislation on this subject in the different countries. The attitude of the Germans was character-ised by that caution which the party had exhibited since the abrogation of the anti-socialist laws (1890).
In 1891, for the first time, reformism in the German Party came out openly with its own programme. In his notorious “Eldorado Speeches”1 Vollmar recommended the “tactics of reformist operations, which will achieve the object desired by the only possible means of practical partial successes,” and de-scribed the triple alliance as a guarantee of peace. Thus, although it was pre-cisely the German Party which was most interested in the differences of princi-ple determining the ideas of the reformists, it was the Germans who opposed the suggestion, coming from the Dutch delegates, to include on the agenda the question of tactics, of the means to be used in the struggle for the emancipa-tion of labour, and the question of alliance with bourgeois parties. They de-clared that these points could not be discussed at an international congress, “for the deciding factor was the economic and political development of the re-spective countries, and of that only the comrades of the country concerned were competent to judge.”
1 So called from the meeting place in Munich in which the speeches were delivered.
In spite of this conception of the role of the International, which was characteristic of the prevailing opinion of the time, the question of tactics was discussed. In the resolution submitted by the Commission on Labour Protec-tion, which Vandervelde moved, it was stated that the ruling and exploiting classes are opposed to any effective labour legislation and that the workers must unite against the capitalist bourgeois parties; nevertheless, “wherever they are in possession of political rights, they should refuse to vote for any candidates who do not bind themselves to support their demands.” The de-mands meant were those for labour legislation put forward by the Paris Con-gress, and thus the tactics recommended left the workers’ parties free to sup-port bourgeois parliamentary candidates who promised to advocate legislation in favour of labour protection.
Bebel sharply opposed directing the activities of the parties to reforms instead of to the final objective, the course which was implied in such election tactics, and at the same time attacked reformism in the German Party:
“I wish above all to emphasise that in my opinion the chief task of Social Democracy is not to secure laws for labour protec-tion, but to explain to the workers the nature and character of pre-sent day society, in order that that society may disappear as quickly as possible, the more quickly as it bears within itself, by virtue of its own laws of development, the fatal germ of its own de-cay. The workers must learn to understand the nature of that soci-ety so that, when its last hour has struck, they will be able to es-tablish the new society. And I would emphasise this the more as recently the opinion has often been expressed abroad that there exist within the German Party differences of principle in regard to this task or these tactics. That is an error; no such differences ex-ist, and whoever tries to divert the party from the execution of this task, will have to leave the party.”
It is true that he took the edge off his attack by declaring that, although the German Party would put forward no candidate who did not subscribe fully to the entire Social Democratic programme, down to its most extreme conse-quences, it conceded to comrades from other countries freedom of action ac-cording to national circumstances, and would refrain from taking part in the vote on that question.
Even the leader of the Austrian Party, Victor Adler, who later developed into one of the greatest diplomats of opportunism, went further on this point. He said:
“For us, parliamentarianism as a whole, the franchise, the vote, labour protection, are only means to an end, good means for revolutionising minds and thus creating the weapons which will carry out this revolution. We shall never be induced to lose sight of the end because of these means.”
He would have to vote, he said, against the passage which made the support of a candidate dependent upon his advocacy of labour protection; in Austria, where there was no universal franchise, and where there was a temp-tation to “flirt with the bourgeois-radical parties,” the Party rejected it.
“because we are convinced that we shall never get our de-mands fulfilled by the ruling classes of society, nor shall we win the workers if we ourselves disguise or hide our own colours.”
In the resolution as adopted, the paragraph concerning the tactics of compromise with bourgeois parties was omitted.
On the subject of militarism the Congress passed a resolution which was filled with the spirit of revolutionary Marxism and represented the sharpest demarcation from bourgeois pacifism. It described the system of exploitation as the cause of the condition of latent warfare and of the militarism resulting therefrom; all efforts to abolish militarism and to establish peace, which did not refer to the economic causes of war were of no avail, a socialist order of society alone being able to dispense with militarism and secure peace. The workers were called upon to protest energetically and indefatigably against all warlike manifestations, and to hasten the triumph of socialism by perfecting their in-ternational organisation. That was the only means of averting the frightful ca-tastrophe of a world war.
A counter-proposal brought forward by the Dutch went much further. Their resolution ran:
“…that all modern wars, originating exclusively in the capi-talist class and in their interests, are means by which they divert the forces of the revolutionary movement and consolidate the su-premacy of the bourgeoisie by intensifying the most shameless ex-ploitation. The Congress therefore decides... that the socialists of all countries will answer a declaration of war with an appeal to the peoples to cease work.”
In moving this resolution Nieuwenhuis argued: the outlook of the great nations was not sufficiently international; there were chauvinists even among the Social Democrats, as the case of Vollmar in Germany proved. On the out-break of war all socialists must adopt the same attitude. Otherwise, at the word of command, the peoples would just march out to war and destroy each other. Chauvinism led to a differentiation between wars of aggression and wars of defence. In the event of war socialists would be placed in the front lines, so that they might kill each other. Therefore they must refuse to shoot each other. It was true, they would then be imprisoned, but the cell was preferable to death. The civil war against the bourgeoisie was to replace the war of nations. Instead of governments, the representatives of the people and an international court of arbitration should decide disputes between the nations. A people which did not obey its ruling should be boycotted by the others. In existing conditions, the peoples should rise in the event of war.
This speech is a remarkable mixture of correct revolutionary ideas with the most pacifist and syndicalist illusions; on the one hand the civil war against war, on the other a court of arbitration! Liebknecht was of course justi-fied in pointing out, in opposition, that it was impossible to proclaim a “world strike” or revolution beforehand. Given, particularly, the weakness of the politi-cal and trade union organisation of the socialist movement in the most impor-tant capitalist countries at that time, it would have been senseless to have bound the parties to take steps which it was beyond their power to carry out.
Moreover, if one were seriously considering the prospects of a civil war, the revolutionary workers could not be advised to refuse military service and allow themselves to be imprisoned. For it was impossible to begin the civil war with any prospect of success, without weapons, and unless the utmost possible was done to carry the spirit of rebellion into a reactionary army.
But Nieuwenhuis was quite right in referring to the danger of chauvinism within the socialist parties, and in dealing with Vollmar not as an individual case. For, as early as 1885, the Social Democratic fraction in the German Reichstag had, by a majority, voted for the state subsidy for a steamship line to the colonies, basing their support on reasons closely akin in spirit to social-patriotism. Therefore it was by no means unnecessary to discuss the character of the future war and the attitude to be adopted towards it by socialists. It is true that Nieuwenhuis’ polemic against the differentiation between wars of ag-gression and wars of defence lacked a Marxist foundation. He merely pointed out that every diplomatist is an expert at presenting any war as a war of de-fence. But that certainly does not prove that it is impossible to have a war of defence. This question, so decisive for a correct socialist attitude towards war, was not thoroughly cleared up either at this or at any subsequent congress of the Second International.
Liebknecht‘s vigorous reply to Nieuwenhuis ignored all these problems. He protested against the accusation of chauvinism which German Social De-mocracy, after the position it had taken up in 1870, so little deserved. “On the outbreak of war military law prevails. Whoever refuses to obey is immediately court martialled and straightaway shot.” They could not make themselves ri-diculous by revolutionary phrases, he said.
However weak the discussion was, it is noteworthy that no mention was made in any of the speeches or in the resolution that was passed, of “defence of the fatherland,” the creed which later became the gospel of the Second Interna-tional.
The weakness of the International in questions of united action was manifested in the discussion on the May Day celebration. The Paris resolution on this subject — the only decision which laid upon the parties the obligation of joint activity — was at the Second Congress contested by two of the most important delegations. The Germans and the English proposed that the cele-bration should be held on the first Sunday in May. Actually, in 1890, both the Germans and the English had organised large demonstrations, but they had made no attempt to bring about a cessation of work on a large scale, whereas the French and the Austrians had carried on a determined and successful struggle around this question. The resistance offered by these two latter parties prevented the complete omission of a reference to cessation of work.
A compromise resolution was arrived at, which declared that the First of May was to be a day of rest in so far “as this was not rendered impossible by the circumstances prevailing in the different countries.”
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