Extending Russia - Competing from Advantageous Ground

RAND Corporation

James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, Brent Williams

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This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia:  Competing from Advantageous Ground, sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army. The purpose of the project was to examine a range of possible means to extend Russia. By this, we mean nonviolent measures that could stress Russia’s military or economy or the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps we posit would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps are conceived of as measures that would lead Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence. This report deliberately covers a wide range of military, eco- nomic, and political policy options. Its recommendations are directly relevant to everything from military modernization and force posture to economic sanctions and diplomacy; consequently, it speaks to all the military services, other parts of U.S. government that have a hand in foreign policy, and the broader foreign and defense policy audience.

This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program.

Preface.. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .  iii

Figures and Tables.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Summary.. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  xi

The maxim that “Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears” remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th. In some respects, contemporary Russia is a country in stagnation. Its economy is dependent on natural resource exports, so falling oil and gas prices have caused a significant drop in the living standards of many Russian citizens. Economic sanctions have further contributed to this decline. Russian politics is increasingly authoritarian, with no viable political alternative to the highly personalized rule of Presi- dent Vladimir Putin. 

Militarily and politically, the Russian Federation wields much less global influence than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, a condition Putin is trying to change. In addition to these real vulnerabilities, Russia also suffers from deep-seated anxieties about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change, loss of great-power status, and even military attack.

Yet these problems belie the fact that Russia is an extraordinarily powerful country that, despite its systemic weaknesses, manages to be a peer competitor of the United States in some key domains. While not the superpower that the Soviet Union was, Russia has gained economic strength and international weight under Putin and now boasts much greater military capabilities than any country with similar defense spending—to such a degree that it can exert its influence over immediate neighbors. Moreover, while still conventionally inferior to the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies when they are judged as a whole, Russia can and does threaten the United States and its allies through other means—short of conventional conflict.

Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, this report seeks to define areas where the United States can do so to its advantage.

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Of all the measures we examined, expanding U.S. energy production and imposing trade and financial sanctions on Russia seem most likely to further stress the Russian economy, government budget, and defense spending. Russia needs oil export revenues to maintain its government operations, including military activities abroad and the provision of social services and pensions at home. Limits to oil revenues will lead Russia to make difficult choices beyond those it has had to make already. Global oil prices and production are beyond the full control of a single country, but the United States can adopt policies that expand world supply and thus depress global prices, thereby limiting Russian revenue.

Imposing tougher sanctions is also likely to degrade the Russian economy and could do so to a greater extent and more quickly than maintaining low oil prices, provided the sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral.  The effectiveness of this approach will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process. Furthermore, sanctions come with substantial costs and considerable risks and will only have impact if widely adopted. In contrast, maximizing U.S. oil production entails little cost or risk, might produce second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not need multilateral endorsement.

Increasing Europe’s ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia presents a third, longer-term, and more expensive effort that could economically extend Russia and buffer Europe against Russian energy coercion.

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Geopolitical Measures

Another way to extend Russia is to make its foreign commitments costlier, but this turns out to be quite risky for the United States and its allies and partners. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is not overextended geographically. Other than in Syria, its foreign commitments in Ukraine and the Caucasus are relatively compact, contiguous to Russia, and in locales where at least some of the local population is friendly and geography provides Russia with military advantages. The measures examined under this heading tend to risk counter-escalation by Russia to which the United States might be hard-pressed to respond effectively.

The Ukrainian military already is bleeding Russia in the Donbass region (and vice versa). Providing more U.S. military equipment and advice could lead Russia to increase its direct involvement in the conflict and the price it pays for it. Russia might respond by mounting a new offensive and seizing more Ukrainian territory. While this might increase Russia’s costs, it would also represent a setback for the United States, as well as for Ukraine.

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In the Caucasus, the United States has fewer options to extend Russia. Russia enjoys even greater geographic advantages there, making it considerably more expensive, for instance, for the United States to defend Georgia than for Russia to threaten it. Likewise, the United States is not in a strong position to challenge Russian influence in Central Asia for similar geographic reasons. Efforts might be made to persuade Moldova to align more closely with the West and to expel the small Russian peacekeeping force located in the Russian-speaking enclave within that country.

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Land and Multidomain Measures

Compared with the United States or even the NATO allies in aggregate, Russia spends far less on its land forces—but geography gives it notable advantages. In general, it is much costlier for the United States to position ground forces close to Russia’s borders than it is for Russia to undertake countervailing buildups. Such measures can assure U.S. friends and allies, encouraging their self-defense investments and strengthening their resolve in the face of Russian coercion. While such deployments might be important for deterrence, they might not work as part of a cost-imposing strategy. Continuing to press NATO allies to improve the capabilities of their own forces could lead to a more productive use of Western resources.

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Conclusions

Russia’s greatest vulnerability in any competition with the United States is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly dependent on energy exports. The Russian leadership’s greatest anxiety stems from the stability and durability of the regime.

Russia’s greatest strengths are in the military and information warfare realms. Russia has deployed advanced air defense, artillery, and missile systems that greatly outrange U.S. and NATO air-defense sup- pression and artillery counterbattery capability, potentially requiring U.S. ground forces to fight without air superiority and with inferior fire support. Russia has also matched new technology to old techniques of misinformation, subversion, and destabilization.

The most promising measures to stress Russia are those which directly address these vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia’s current advantages. Continuing to expand U.S.  energy production in all forms, including renewables, and encouraging other countries to do the same would maximize pressure on Russia’s export receipts and thus on its national and defense budgets. Among the many measures looked at in this report, this one comes with the least cost or risk.

Sanctions can also limit Russia’s economic potential. To be effective, however, these need to be multilateral, involving (at a minimum) the European Union, which is Russia’s largest customer and greatest source of technology and capital, larger in all these respects than the United States.

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It will be difficult to raise the costs to Moscow of its external military commitments because most of these are in small areas adjacent to Russia and populated with comparatively pro-Russian populations.

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The other area where Russia has maintained parity and even achieved superiority is in air defense and long-range fires. Here, greater U.S. investment in longer-range air defense suppression, more advanced electronic warfare, new and longer-range sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, and more-exotic systems with advanced capabilities would likely lead to an expensive Russian response.

Basing large additional U.S. ground forces in Europe might be necessary for deterrence and would likely impel a Russian force posture response, particularly if these forces were positioned close to Russia. The costs to the United States are likely to be higher than those to Russia, however, while increasing deployments near Russian borders would increase tensions, generate controversy among NATO members, and possibly provoke Russian reactions elsewhere.

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Most of the steps covered in this report are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counter-escalation.

From Geopolitical Measures

This chapter describes six possible U.S. moves in the current geo-political competition: providing lethal arms to Ukraine, resuming support to the Syrian rebels, promoting regime change in Belarus, exploiting Armenian and Azeri tensions, intensifying attention to Central Asia, and isolating Transnistria (a Russian-occupied enclave within Moldova). There are several other possible geopolitical moves discussed in other RAND research but not directly evaluated here—including intensifying NATO’s relationship with Sweden and Finland, pressuring Russia’s claims in the Arctic, and checking Russia’s attempts to expand its influence in Asia.

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Proxy competition of this sort is not new. Indeed, the “great game” characterized interstate relations for several centuries, as aspirant global powers clashed over conflicting spheres of influence. 

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Promote Regime Change in Belarus

Belarus is Russia’s most important ally. It provides a buffer between Russia and major NATO countries and is the initial link in Russia’s ground lines of communication between the mainland and Kaliningrad...

Exploit Tensions in the South Caucasus

The United States could extend Russia in the Caucasus in two ways. First, the United States could push for a closer NATO relationship with Georgia and Azerbaijan, likely leading Russia to strengthen its military presence in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Armenia, and south-ern Russia. Alternatively, the United States could try to induce Armenia to break with Russia. Although a long-standing Russian partner, Armenia has also developed ties with the West:

The United States might also renew efforts to bring Georgia into NATO. 

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Reduce Russian Influence in Central Asia

Russia is part of two economic ventures related to Central Asia:  the EEU and the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia has benefited from both, although in the case of the former, partners might have been harmed economically. There might be steps the United States and allies could take to reduce Russia’s benefits from both of these.

Acknowledgments.. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii

Abbreviations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Overview and the Central Argument of the Report.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

CHAPTER TWO

Russia’s Anxieties and Vulnerabilities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Russia Since 1991.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Contemporary Russian Military.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Contemporary Russian Economy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Contemporary Russian Politics.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Russian Anxieties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

CHAPTER THREE

Economic Measures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Recent Russian Economic Performance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Measure 1: Hinder Petroleum Exports.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Measure 2: Reduce Natural Gas Exports and Hinder Pipeline Expansions.. . . .  59

Measure 3: Impose Sanctions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69

Measure 4: Enhance Russian Brain Drain.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

CHAPTER FOUR

Geopolitical Measures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95

Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Measure 2: Increase Support to the Syrian Rebels.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Measure 3: Promote Regime Change in Belarus.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Measure 4: Exploit Tensions in the South Caucasus.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Measure 5: Reduce Russian Influence in Central Asia.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Measure 6: Challenge Russian Presence in Moldova.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 135

CHAPTER FIVE

Ideological and Informational Measures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Pathways for Influence Operations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Current Status of Russian Regime Legitimacy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Russian Domestic Environment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Policy Measures to Diminish Domestic and Foreign Support for the

Russian Regime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  158

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  170

CHAPTER SIX

Air and Space Measures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Measure 1: Change Air and Space Force Posture and Operations.. . . . . . . . 175

Measure 2: Increase Aerospace Research and Development.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Measure 3: Increase Air and Missile Components of the Nuclear Triad.. . . 189

Recommendations .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

CHAPTER SEVEN

Maritime Measures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  195

Measure 1: Increase U.S. and Allied Naval Force Posture and Presence.. . . 197

Measure 2: Increase Naval Research and Development Efforts.. . . . . . . . . . . 203

Measure 3: Shift Nuclear Posture Toward SSBNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Measure 4: Check the Black Sea Buildup.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 211

CHAPTER EIGHT

Land and Multidomain Measures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Measure 1: Increase U.S. and NATO Land Forces in Europe.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Measure 2: Increase NATO Exercises in Europe.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Measure 3: Withdraw from the INF Treaty.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Measure 4: Invest in New Capabilities to Manipulate Russian Risk

Perceptions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  254

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Implications and Recommendations for the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

References.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279